|
|
 |
|
Home page  About CSIS Programs Is a United Approach Toward Iran Enough?
|
|
|
Is a United Approach Toward Iran Enough?
|
March 9, 2006
Iran’s pursuit of sensitive nuclear technology continues to dominate the news, and the political theater where the issue plays out is likely to shift to the U.N. Security Council in the next few weeks. It is not yet clear what strategy the United States, Europe, and the other countries can use to convince Iran to change its current behavior and comply with its international treaty obligations. The unity of the coalition confronting Iran is critical, and appears intact for now. Unless that unity can be maintained, Iran will likely continue its efforts to pursue uranium enrichment technology and, with it, the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Even with a united front, however, it is far from clear that Iran will alter its nuclear trajectory.
In 2002, Iran was discovered to have hidden a robust uranium enrichment program from the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors for almost two decades. Now the focus of intensive efforts by the IAEA to document the full scope of its program, Tehran has yet to comply with numerous IAEA requests for information and documents, raising further questions about how much of Iran’s nuclear activities now remain outside of the inspection system. An IAEA Board of Governors resolution in September 2005 found Iran in non-compliance with its treaty obligations, and a February 2006 resolution reported these violations to the U.N. Security Council. At the same time, the IAEA Board of Governors gave Iran 30 days to meet IAEA requests for more information and to clear up uncertainties about its nuclear activities. The late February report by IAEA Director General and Nobel Laureate Mohamed ElBaradei made clear that “uncertainties related to the scope of Iran’s nuclear programme have not been clarified after three years of intensive” IAEA work, reaffirming that Iran has not met the requests of the agency or the Board of Governors’ February resolution. With the 30-day deadline now past, the issue seems destined to be referred to New York. With the IAEA being unable on its own to convince Iran to come clean about its nuclear past, the U.N. Security Council must now take up the matter. It is uncertain, however, what the council members are prepared to do to enforce the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA inspection regime remains unclear. The United States and key European partners, including France, appear prepared to consider tough diplomatic and even economic steps to pressure Iran to change course. Russia and China, both veto wielding members of the U.N. Security Council are more cautious in their approach, and Russia in particular is pushing for diplomatic solutions that may yet yield results. What is of concern in Washington and elsewhere is that some of these potential compromises being discussed would allow Iran to continue some limited work on uranium enrichment with centrifuges. Any such settlement would provide only a false sense of security since Iran might easily work to perfect the operation of a small number of centrifuges under inspections and then apply that expertise to facilities not safeguarded that might exist elsewhere, now or in the future. At a minimum, allowing Iran to continue its uranium enrichment work would bring Tehran closer to the nuclear threshold and shorten the time Iran might need to break out of the NPT inspection regime and divert its entire nuclear complex to military ends. In addition, condoning even limited use of the illegally acquired equipment such work would allow Iran to escape responsibility for its 18 years of systematic violations of international laws, further eroding the vitality of the international nonproliferation regime. In the meantime, Iran continues to pursue its uranium enrichment program. Regular IAEA inspection provide a valuable window into the progress Iran is trying to achieve, but it appears that Iran is still several years away from being able to produce any significant amounts of enriched uranium for either reactor or weapons use. A number of major technical hurdles remain for Iran to overcome, including providing centrifuges with adequate amounts of high quality uranium hexafluoride gas and mastering how to safely and reliable install and operate a multi-unit centrifuge cascade. Over time, it is likely Iran will master these steps, but it has yet to demonstrate such capabilities at any known nuclear facility. So on the one hand, the U.N. and its members have time to find a solution that provides confidence Iran’s nuclear program is not able to support the pursuit of a nuclear weapon. However, on the other hand, the geo-strategic situation seems to be on Iran’s side. With oil prices hovering near $60 a barrel and U.S. military commitments in Iraq and elsewhere having greatly limited American military flexibility, it is not yet clear what combination of pressure and incentive might convince Iran’s leaders to abandon their politically popular nuclear efforts. Diplomatic or economic penalties by the U.N. that reinforce the idea that Iran’s sovereignty or rights are being challenged, however, are likely to backfire. The result of such measures would likely be increased support for the unpopular regime in Tehran. The only possible exception might be targeting leaders in Tehran for direct penalties such as travel bans, economic sanctions, including money and property outside of Tehran, and even restrictions on the ability of their family members to travel or attend western schools. These might have some value in making the decisionmakers in Iran feel the affects of their actions, but are not necessarily enough to convince them to change their nuclear behavior. In the end, however, the United States and its allies must also think of what alternatives they are willing to provide to Tehran should it decide to change course. While not a democracy, Iran is still a highly political country and any viable solution to the standoff must include some way for decisionmakers in Iran to justify their decision publicly. To be sure, it would be preferred if the United States could find a solution that would both end Iran’s nuclear ambitions and weaken the regime, but such a compromise is unlikely to emerge unless the international landscape changes significantly. Offering Iran the ability to benefit from other forms of nuclear technology including the possible sale by Russia of additional nuclear power plants might end up being an important part of any political compromise.
Download as a PDF
|
|
|
