In this paper, Cory Welt assesses the causes of Georgia’s November 2003 Rose Revolution. He argues that it is best understood as a conjunction of two factors – one state-based and one society-based. The state-based factor was the regime’s extreme vulnerability to electoral loss or pressure, which explains much of the success of popular mobilization in Georgia. A more confident government, in particular one capable of brandishing a more credible threat of force, would have been able to deter or withstand the not very large protests.
At the same time, without substantial popular mobilization even a teetering regime might buttress itself anew. As Georgia’s own slow-moving mobilization suggests, it is a mistake to assume that regime vulnerability automatically engenders popular mobilization. A collective action problem must still be overcome - if not regarding the fear of punishment, then regarding the perceived benefits of participation.
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