The Afghan War is not an unreported war in the media, but it is a largely unreported war in terms of useful, unclassified reporting by governments and NATO/ISAF. Only the UN has provided consistent analytic reporting on the progress of the war, and its reporting only goes into significant detail in the area of counternarcotics.
The US government has cut back on its reporting over time, and its web pages now do little more that report on current events. Unlike the Iraq War, there is no Department of Defense quarterly report on the progress of the war, and on efforts to create effective Afghan security, governance, and development. There is no equivalent to the State Department weekly status report. Testimony to Congress, while useful, does not provide detailed statements or back up slide with maps, graphs, and other data on the course of the war.
The same is true of virtually all of the other governments providing NATO/ISAF forces, and of NATO/ISAF itself. There are some useful data on the reasons for deploying forces, casualties, and the units actually deployed, but no real analysis of the course of the fighting, threat developments, and relative success.
Most NGO and governmental reporting on aid is equally uninformative. There is largely anecdotal reporting on projects and successes, but little reporting on actual spending, the overall aid effort, and measures of requirements or effectiveness.
The Afghan government provides little or no useful data.
Developing An Unclassified Survey
The end result is not a "forgotten" war as much as one where governments have failed to provide meaningful transparency, and where an effort to provide a meaningful overview using unclassified information becomes a cut and paste exercise in finding materials that provide enough detail to show where the war is going and the challenges involved.
The present draft is a rough cut at developing a comprehensive briefing on the current status of the war. It pulls together a wide range of material from US commands, NATO/ISAF, UNAMA, the US and other NATO/ISAF governments, and private organizations like Senlis. It is at best, however, a start.
There are many critical limits in the material available. For example, Senlis provides most of the available maps that give some idea of the progress in the fighting and the relative balance of Afghan Central government, Pakistani central government, NATO/ISAF, Taliban, and Al Qa'ida presence and influence. Yet this organization sometimes tends to exaggerate the Taliban and Al Qa'ida challenge as part of its effort to increase aid and NATO/ISAF troop strength.
The end result is necessarily long and complex. The full brief runs over 200 pages. Even so, it has to rely heavily on maps, graphs, and tables to provide an overview of the unclassified reporting that is available at the cost of depth in any given area. (Please note that some material was also blurred or poorly defined in the original version, and this could not be corrected.)
This briefing will be steadily expanded and revised over time. It is also my hope that there are useful summary maps, charts, and assessments that we have missed. Accordingly, I would be very grateful for any additional material you can suggest, and for corrections to the data shown. These can be e-mailed to me atacordesman@gmail.com or to amausner@csis.org.
The Real Nature of the War: The Challenge of Armed Nation Building (pp. 2-17)
There has been little attempt to portray an overall strategy for the war in anything approaching meaningful terms, and almost no effort to give a rough idea of suitable timelines. This section of the briefing includes summary data developed by the US command, showing both the overall strategy and an estimate of the conditions-based timeframe necessary to execute it.
These US materials highlight the fact that the Afghan War is not a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency campaign, but a much broader exercise in armed nation building. They do not, however, reflect anything approaching a NATO/ISAF, UN, or Afghan compact view, and no country web page presents an official nation view of either strategy or timelines, much less any details on the forces, actions, resources, and time necessary to implement one.
NATO appeared to move towards the creation of a meaningful overall strategy for security, governance, and development at the spring 2008 Ministerial in Bucharest, but NATO has a long history of vacuous ministerial declarations that are not supported by coordinated plans and resources. Having the right strategic concepts is pointless unless there are supporting plans, programs, and budgets.
As is true throughout this briefing, the problem is further complicated by the need to paper over major differences in national approaches to security and aid, poor internal coordination of security and aid efforts in most countries, a failure to provide the necessary resources to carry out national missions, major delays or failures in funding aid, and the inability of the Afghan government to act as an effective partner.
The Rising Intensity of the Conflict: 2001-2007 (pp. 18-35)
The US government and UN have provided a limited amount of unclassified data on the rising intensity of the conflict, but the amount of data provided has actually declined as the conflict has grown more serious. Most of the maps and charts in this section come from leaked UN material and from Senlis. The summary statistics on recent trends are uncertain, and figures often vary from speech to speech or release to release.
There is no real transparency or public accountability as to progress in the fighting. No country or international organization provides useful unclassified overview data on developments in the fighting in anything like the depth that the US Department of Defense provides in its quarterly reports on the Iraq War.
The reporting that is available also decouples the fighting in Afghanistan from that in Pakistan. Accordingly, public official reporting on the growing intensity of the war since 2006 ignores one of the most critical aspects of the conflict.
The Rising Intensity of Conflict: 2008 (pp. 36-48)
The lack of any systematic reporting on the intensity of the war is particularly striking for 2008. It is clear from US background briefing that the level of conflict continues to intensify, but the data provided are national and do not show where the fighting is becoming most serious.
The Secretary General of the UN and the US Director of National Intelligence have provided some useful summary judgments. (pp. 39-40)
The UN, NATO/ISAF governments, and the Afghan government do not, however, provide reliable breakouts of Afghan casualties, no reliable central chronology, no detailed description of NATO/ISAF or Afghan Army and police activity and outcomes. No meaningful maps are provided of either the pattern of conflict, or the shifts in Taliban influence. Once again, activity in Afghanistan is decoupled from activity in Pakistan.
The closest thing to useful summary reporting on the location of the fighting, and trends by area and region, is provided by Senlis (pp. 42-48). It is important to note that NATO sources and the Afghan government dispute much of the detail in these maps, but that background briefings tend to support them. One key difference is that background briefings by intelligence experts tend to describe much of the Taliban presence in terms of support areas for the fighting, while Senlis describes them as areas of Taliban influence.
These omissions are not a minor issue. Far too much NATO and member government reporting focuses almost exclusively on the fighting and kinetic developments. The Taliban, however, is not fighting the same war as NATO/ISAF. It is seeking to expand its political and economic influence, not to defeat NATO/ISAF and Afghan forces in open battle.
The Taliban and other Islamist fighters are also fighting a war of political attrition in an effort to outlast NATO/ISAF presence, force out given countries and NGOs, and push the Afghan people into a belief they must deal with the Taliban. Polls by ABC and TFT indicate that the Taliban and other Islamist fighters are having growing success in achieving these objectives.
This does not mean that the Taliban or other factions control most areas. It does often mean that they are present more often that NATO/ISAF or Afghan government forces, can pressure of threaten local leaders, can control part of the drug trade, and recruit and pay young fighters – in a country with 40-60% youth unemployment or underemployment. The Senlis maps on pages 42-48 of the briefing may not be fully accurate, but they illustrate the point quite well.
The Battle of Perceptions: Afghan Attitudes Towards the War, Their Government, and NATO/ISAF (pp. 49-60)
As later portions of the brief show, the failure to counter the growth of the Taliban presence -- and to follow up tactical victories with aid, jobs, governance, and a rule of law – has meant that NATO’s tactical victories have had limited popular impact. It is not possible to fully poll high risk or combat areas on an unclassified basis, but Afghans show an eroding confidence in victory, in the survival of their government, and in its ability to win. (Pp. 51-60)
This does not mean, however, that most Afghanis are pessimistic, quiet the opposite. Even those who feel the war is getting worse often see progress in reconstruction, schools, security, etc. These polls do precede the food and employment crisis that began to take hold in the winter of 2007, and Afghanis in the south are far less optimistic than Afghanis are nationally. (pp. 58,60)
The Shifting Nature of the Threat and Afghan Attitudes Towards the Taliban and Other Threat Elements (pp. 61-70)
There are no reliable estimates of the trends in the strength of full and part time cadres for the four main threat groups: Taliban, Taliban in Pakistan, Haqqani Network (HQN), Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddun (HiG), and Al Qa’ida. All, however, seem to have grown and found at least partial sanctuaries since 2001, and especially since 2003. (p. 62-63)
The intelligence community has not declassified maps of the areas influenced or dominated by such groups since late 2006 (p. 64). US experts have, however, noted that the Taliban has split between a more traditional Afghan Taliban under Omar in the south and a more splintered Taliban with closer links to Al Qa’ida, the HiG, and HQN in the east and Pakistan (p. 65).
The US Director of National Intelligence and has also warned that threat activity continues to grow and outpace the development of Afghan forces, and US experts indicate that the Taliban has clear regional goals for expanding its influence and presence throughout Afghanistan in 2008. (pp 66-70).
As for public attitudes, Afghans do not support terrorism, and are largely negative towards the Taliban – although more supportive of Al Qa’ida. They are, however, sufficiently concerned over the course of the war to advocate negotiations between the government and Taliban and a limited majority favor a coalition government. Afghans are also more supportive of the Taliban in the Pashtun south. (pp. 79-80)
One War in Two Countries: Afghanistan versus “Pashtunistan” (pp. 71-100)
There is no official reporting that addresses the fact that fact that the Afghan War is essentially a struggle by violent Pashtun Islamist in both countries. It is clear that the war would have a radically different character if Pashtun and Baluchi areas in Pakistan did not act as de facto sanctuaries and support areas for the Taliban, HiG, and HQN. (p. 82-89) US experts estimate that the areas under such influence in Pakistan grew significantly in 2006 and 2007.
Pakistan also provides an important sanctuary for Al Qa’ida, which has steadily closer links to the Taliban in eastern Afghanistan and to the Hi, and HQN. (pp. 90-91). As a result, all of these movements are having a destabilizing impact on Pakistan and create steadily greater instability in both the largely Pashtun Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in the East and the Baluchi areas in the south. (92-96)
Pakistani public opinion does not favor the government carrying out a major campaign to deal with these threats or any form of US or NATO intervention. It is also deeply divided on the impact of Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, and local Jihadis and relatively hostile to the Bush Administration. (pp. 97-100)
NATO/ISAF: Can the Alliance Work? (pp. 101-133)
Afghan public opinion remains supportive of the US and major NATO/ISAF countries operating in Afghanistan, although it shows a high level of hostility to Pakistan. Some 70% of Afghans believed that foreign forces should stay in country for at least two years, and 43% felt they should stay as long as necessary.
Popular Afghan support is, however, steadily declining. Positive ratings of US forces dropped by nearly 40% between 2005 and 2007 (from 68% to 42%). The number of Afghans who felt attacks on foreign forces were justified rose from 17% to 30%, while the number who felt they were not justified dropped from 74% to 60%.
Somewhat ironically, Afghan public opinion is more favorable to the security efforts of the Karzai government, Afghan Army, and Afghan Police than NATO/ISAF forces -- although this is more a matter of nationalism than the actual effectiveness of the Afghan government or forces. There is little support for local militias; and they, the Taliban, and drug traffickers are normally seen as serious threats.
There is significant popular resentment of the civilian casualties caused by US/NATO/ISAF, and of the way they carry out searches and their discipline. There also, however, is gratitude for the security US/NATO/ISAF forces provide and for their role in aid and humanitarian assistance. (pp. 105-111)
US/NATO/ISAF force levels are rising, but have not kept pace with the growth in the threat, and force levels remain a major problem in spite of recent reinforcements by the US Marines. Force levels have been very low relative to the population, even by peacekeeping standards.
US/NATO/ISAF forces also remain sharply divided in active, standby, and caveat forces, while many national elements are so small that they are symbolic at best and consume more support resources than their military value is worth. NATO/ISAF forces also remain largely geographically divided, so that a limited number of countries bear the burden of the fighting in the east and south.
The problems caused by divisions within NATO and inadequate forces (the NATO commander has said that 2-3 more brigades are needed) are compounded by serious limits in the equipment, mobility, and support capabilities of most non-US forces. NASTO/ISAF forces have been slow to react to the rising intensity of conflict in Afghanistan and the lessons of Iraq, and have become over-dependent on US air support and reinforcements. (pp. 113-124).
The lack of adequate ground forces has help contribute to a major increase in the role of airpower in the conflict, and the number of combat sorties has risen sharply in recent years. Data are only available on fixed wing combat sorties, but they increased from 86 in 2004 to 3,572 in 2007.
The number of sorties dropping major munitions has also increased, particularly during the peak campaign season in the late spring and summer of 2007. Cargo drops have also been a key factor in compensating for the limited mobility of NATO/ISAF land forces, rising 75% in 2006 and 90% in 2007.
US/NATO/ISAF air forces are often blamed for creating unnecessary civilian casualties, but often because of Taliban claims, and false denials of ties to insurgents by local inhabitants. (pp. 126-133)
Rushing Afghan Force Development? (pp. 134-161)
UN, GAO, and other data show that the Afghan National Army (ANA) is making progress, but much slower progress than its advisors and the Afghan government report. Its development has been slow because it has been badly underfunded, and lacked suitable trainers, equipment, facilities, partner units, and embeds.
The Afghan National Police (ANP) are at best a work in progress. The initial effort was poorly structure and failed. It is still unclear that there is a workable plan to create an effective force.
In spite of the poor progress of the ANA and ANP, most Afghans express confidence in both forces. This confidence, however, has severe limits when Afghans are asked about the ANA’s effectiveness and dependence on foreign advisors. The same is even more true of the ANP.
Funding data show a very slow rise in US funding for both the Afghan forces and Pakistan, with serious funding only be requested in 2003 and major funding beginning in 2006.
Afghan force goals have also increased and are now are pushing the pace to a point where force quantity seems to be emphasized over force quality. This situation will be made much worse if calls for major further increases in ANA force strength are not tied to clear goals for effectiveness.
In general, the US and NATO/ISAF have not yet created plans and capabilities that react to the past lessons of army and police training and development.
Resourcing the Conflict: Too Little, Too Later, Too Confused, and Too Uncertain (pp. 162-167)
Outside aid and support to the Afghan government, forces, and nation-building was slow to grow, and has consistently lagged behind the requirement. These problems are compounded by failures to make good on funding pledges, long delays in actually funding and executing given activities, over-reliance on foreign aid and contract personnel, spending substantial percentages (40-60% of the total) of aid funds outside the country, and Afghan incompetence and corruption.
War on Drugs versus Drugs at War (pp. 168-188)
The counternarcotics program in Afghanistan has so far be worse than a failure. Opium cultivation has continued to grow, but has shifted into Taliban dominated areas and served a major source of funds to the Taliban. Eradication has done little more than anger those affected.
Changes in rainfall and rising wheat prices may help in 2008, but the current program does little more than give aid and comfort to the enemy.
Effective Governance versus Government in Kabulstan (pp. 189-205)
The Afghan government has so far failed to develop an effective presence at the provincial or local level, and to provide clear links to operations outside Kabul. Afghans still strongly support the central government but its failure to provide effective services, a rule of law, and security is slowly but steadily eroding such support. Ratings of Karzai, the parliament, and provincial government are all declining.
Corruption is a critical issue, as is incompetence. There is little trust in the courts and justice system. Leaked UN maps of the quality of governance reveal critical problems in each major region of the country.
This lack of effective governance at every level presents critical problems in defeating the Taliban and other Islamist groups.
The Role of Development (pp. 206-227)
Afghans are grateful for the aid they have received, but a lack of security, resources, qualified foreign aid and Afghan government personnel, and security have sharply limited the impact of foreign aid – at least 40% of which is not spent in country. Many countries do not keep their pledges, and US funding is inadequate and caught up in struggles between the Bush Administration and the Congress for FY2008 and FY2009.
Data on the growth of the economy and per capita income are misleading. Distribution of income seems to have gotten worse, not better and the poor have gotten poorer. Unemployment and underemployment are endemic. These problems are particularly serious in the high risk/high combat areas in the south, and shortfalls in electricity and roads are particularly critical problems.
US aid has been slow to flow, erratic, and increasingly focused on the Afghan security forces. The per capita aid flow is a small fraction of the aid that has gone to a far more wealthy Iraq.
The distribution of aid is a critical problem as is the target. Some estimates indicate that agriculture – the source of 70% of employment – has gotten only $400 million out of some $15 billion in aid. There is a very poor correlation between aid flows and the security situation in various parts of the country.
"Long War” Versus Armed Nation Building (pp. 228-237)
While the UN deserves some praise for its reporting, NATO/ISAF, the US government, and allied governments have not provided any meaningful transparency or insights into the overall course of the war. They also have failed to provide meaningful plans, programs, and budgets; adequate military forces; and adequate aid funds and personnel.
Neither Western governments, nor the Afghan government, have demonstrated any integrity in provide objective or in depth public reporting on the war.
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