US and Iranian relations are clearly deteriorating, driven by Iran's support of Iraqi insurgents hostile to the US, by the risk of clashes in the Gulf, by contingency Iranian missile developments, and by the claim that Iran now has some 6,000 centrifuges far more advanced than the IAEA or the US NIE on Iran reported. The end result is both a revived concern that the US may use force against Iran, and a new set of stories about US preparations and war plans.
If is important to note, however, that it takes weeks to update US contingency capabilities in the Gulf, and months of contingency planning to determine what military options to use, how to move and support US forces, create effective targeting, and have a credible military option that can be used to deter and intimidate as well as to make an actual use of force. It is difficult for those who have not been directly involved to understand how complex US contingency plans can be and how often they require updating.
The Real Nature of Contingency or "War Plans"
Any form of modern contingency or "war plan" involves steadily more complex joint operations for the actual execution and then contingency plans to deal with the fact that the enemy may escalate or act in unpredictable ways -- even for limited strikes. At a minimum, updating such plans to create a real-world ability to execute them involves restructuring the intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) plan to deal with an evolving target base, restructuring the strike plan, developing a near-real time surveillance and collection plan, and restructuring the damage assessment plan. At the same time, communications need to be structure to combine tactical, regional and national assets for a given contingency, and now with digital communications such as visual intelligence and data displays -- not just voice or written. All of this has to be done in ways where the US (and any allies) can have a much more informed and rapid decision and execution cycle than an enemy. This one part of a "war" plan can easily involve updating or developing some 10,000 or more actions for the IS&R loop alone, and many have to be done centrally and at the joint level. If months or years of initial work have not taken place, the end result is also far less effective.
Being actually able to fight is far more demanding. It means assembling, supporting, deploying, executing, and reinforcing actual combat and support units. Today, this means develop or adjusting contingency plans to make the best use of the latest mix of joint assets. In the case of the Gulf, this means land based fixed and rotary wing air, possible land force and SOF use, carrier air, surface warfare, and cruise missile operations -- plus deciding on whether to deploy or alter for land and sea-based anti-missile and surface-to-air operations. These forces must also be ready to deal with both predictable forms of escalation and uncertainty, they must be sustainable, and they must be ready to deal with partial failures and the problem that the first casualty of war is often the war plan.
The dynamics involved are illustrated by the problem of targeting air and missile strikes. Since targeting is not simply a matter of finding the target, but assessing its probable status after an initial attack, deciding on the proper munitions, assessing damage, deciding whether restrikes are necessary -- while reacting to the enemy -- contingency or war plans become even more complex. Further, every action has to be assessed in terms of its probable political and diplomatic impact.
This is why "preserving the military option" means constant contingency planning, and development of a very wide range of war plans. At the same time, the very existence of this process often leads to war scares whenever the media get a partial picture of a plan -- often coming from someone in the military with an axe to grind, a limited understanding of what is going on, and sometimes a tendency to confuse preparations and alerts with the intent to actually execute the plan.
Furthermore, US exercises, "leaks," and the sending of mixed signals is a routine way of putting pressure on a potential enemy, and using intimidation as a substitute for force and an incentive for the enemy to accept diplomatic options. The contingency plan becomes a political weapon, and the same Administration that appears to bemoan misinterpretation by the media, or "leaks," may be using them deliberately. While not suggesting that the Administration might have to invent journalists like Hersh if they did not invent themselves, there have been cases where a complex drum beat of war scares and denials has had useful diplomatic impact as well as negative effects.
Iranian Nuclear Weapons
The US faces a very complex set of problems in dealing with Iranian intervention in Iraq which do not lend themselves to the same military option. There are at least three different sets of interactive contingencies the US must be ready to deal with.
One is the nuclear contingency -- which would require a very high level of deep US strikes and restrikes to have lasting effects. Much would depend on whether the US chose to stick strictly to nuclear targets, also choose to deal with missile production and Iranian command and control capabilities, and the degree to which it sought active suppression of Iranian air defenses. It would also depend on whether the US sought to open up a lasting corridor through which it could carry out restrikes to hit surviving or new targets and how long it sought to keep that corridor open. A limited "warning" strike is a possible option, but might do more to provoke than prevent. It is more than possible that such an option would require a 1,000 or so air sorties -- including support and UAVs -- and more than 1,000 actual strikes with precision weapons and cruise missiles.
Many targets could be hit from ships or carriers, but some targets would depend heavily on land-based bombers with earth penetrators. The political blowback would be high, and the US would find it very difficult to pull back from anything other than "success." The US does not have the land forces to invade Iran -- even if it could risk another exercise in armed nation building -- and this means containment of Iranian options for actions in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and dealing with various non-state actors and terrorists.
The US would probably need to make extensive use of bases in Qatar and Kuwait, need contingency or working bases in Oman, and want to active Diego Garcia on at least a contingency basis. It would also want to be able to secure the entire Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and related waters in the Indian Ocean. Justifying the strike would take a massive diplomatic and information warfare campaign -- made even more difficult by the mishandling of intelligence during the run up to the Iraq War, the NIE on Iran, and the Syrian reactor.
Iranian Support of the Extremist Insurgent Elements in Iraq
Dealing with Iranian support of the extremist insurgent elements like those in the Sadr militia is a very different kind of struggle. On the one hand, containing or halting Iranian support of such militias by a combination of threats to attack Iran, US and Iraqi force’s actions against the Al Quds forces in Iraq, and similar actions against the Iraqi Shi'ite militias and insurgents, involves a relatively low risk mix of actions. Fighting inside Iraq is already going on, and the US has already scored significant hits against such Iranian and Iranian-supported elements in Sadr City and Basra.
On the other hand, US containment and intimidation of such Iranian activity in Iraq requires that US threats be credible, military actions against Iranian targets are seen to be potentially successful, and the US to demonstrate that it can "out-escalate" Iran and that such an Iranian response would present major problems for Iran. In short, making a limited amount of force work requires very convincing threats against existing Iranian capability and convincing threats to do far more. Even then, the end result may well fail. Iran has shown that it is not reckless, but it also has shown a willingness to call US bluffs and ignore such threats.
If the US does feel it has to actually use force against the Al Quds and other elements of Iran's support of the Iraqi militias that are in Iran, it faces a number of problems. Al Quds facilities are relatively low value targets, they are easy to disperse, and even the best attacks can be countered relatively quickly by recreating new cadres and force elements. This has been all too clear from past US attempts -- many of which have been very successful in striking somewhat similar al-Qa'ida and Taliban facilities. Iran could claim large-scale civilian casualties, innocence, and then recover relatively quickly.
This could mean at least demonstrating US capability to carry out far more punitive strikes. Iran is vulnerable in other areas. The US has no interest in the survival of its gas facilities, power grid, or refineries. It may have underground nuclear facilities, but its reactor facility is vulnerable and so are it military production facilities. Asymmetric warfare is not simply the province of the weak, it is also the province of the strong.
If such options can be limited to Iran, they are also forms of limited warfare that Iraq, our Gulf allies, and the world may not like, but are likely to tolerate. A hundred or so cruise missile and precision air strikes might be enough. The strike force could be sea-based, eliminating any embarrassment to Southern Gulf states in "hosting" such an option.
Iranian Escalation in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf, Lebanon, and with Non-State Actors
The problem for the US is that Iran has many options outside its own territory. Iran has already fought one low level naval struggle with US and British forces in the Gulf -- the "tanker war" of 1987-1988. It could seek to mobilize world and Islamic opinion, and demonize the US in Iran, by confronting US naval forces even if this meant major losses. A good part of its aging navy is expendable. Direct attacks by the small craft and missile patrol boats in the naval branch of its Revolutionary Guards might end in "martyrdom," as might an anti-ship missile strike from land-based facilities on its islands or territory near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran might, however, calculate that it could win by losing, and it could either launch enough simultaneous small attacks to force the US to escalate in ways that much of the world would see as provocative, or conduct a slow and unpredictable war of attrition in the Gulf with a series of phased, small raids. It might well calculate that the US would not risk striking at Iranian oil exports, or food imports, given the politics and economics involved.
Iran also has options that could be executed at low, covert levels over time. Iran can appear to back off in Iraq, and create a new and more covert support presence, or wait to see if it can exploit the new political climate arising out of the struggle with Sadr, the October local and provincial elections, or the US elections in November. The US will leave Iraq with time, and perhaps soon if either Democratic candidate wins. Iran will still be on Iraq's border and have ties to Syria.
Iran can step up support of both Afghan and Pakistani elements. Iranian pressure in the West would make things worse, as would active support for the Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan and aid to the Omar-dominated Taliban in Southern Afghanistan and the Baluchi area in Pakistan. It could step up arms to Hezbollah, provide more overt support to Hamas, or transfer more missiles to Syria.
Iran does not have to confront US and British naval forces in the Gulf. It can use the naval branch of the Revolutionary Guards to actively or passively threaten tanker traffic, release free floating mines in the currents in the Southern Gulf, use submarines to plant mines, or use local Shi'ite movements in the Southern Gulf states as a proxy or cover for sabotage.
Once again, the US has counters to all of these options, and can use asymmetric escalation to do more damage to Iran than Iran can do to the US or its allies. There are, however, obvious political costs and risks, the end result could mean making Iran into a far more serious enemy, and the US must have contingency plans to deal with all of these possibilities.
The Law of Unintended Consequences
There is no punchline to this range of contingencies. All uses of military force involve risks, but so does inaction. The law of unintended consequences applies to both. What is important, however, is to understand both why the US needs to preserve the military option against Iran, and the risks in actually executing it.
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