Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile programs, and their interactions with its growing capabilities for asymmetric warfare, are becoming steadily more critical security issues for the US, Iran’s neighbors, and the international community. The foreign and domestic policy implications for the US will be a major issue the next administration must address during its first months in office.
Iran’s actions, and the Iraq War, have already made major changes in the military balance in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may still be several years to half a decade away from becoming a meaningful nuclear power, but even a potential Iranian nuclear weapon has already led Iran’s neighbors, the US, and Israel to focus on the nuclear threat it can pose and its long-range missile programs.
The CSIS has addressed these policy issues in a number of studies and publications. These include Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Rodhan, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Real and Potential Threat, CSIS, 2006; and Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, CSIS, w2007.
The Burke Chair has now prepared a new set of briefs that summarize Iran’s actions, current and potential capabilities, and the possible outcome of a nuclear exchange. This briefing draws on official statements, US intelligence judgments, work by the IAEA, and material provided by a number of other research centers, including the Nuclear Threat Initiative, ISIS, the Federation of American Scientists, Global Security, and the Brooking Institution.
The briefing is entitled The US, Israel, the Arab States and a Nuclear Iran. The entire brief is available on the web at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081006_iran_nuclear.pdf. It can also be accessed by key topic at the web addresses shown below.
Iran’s nuclear program is continuing to improve and is becoming steadily more threatening. Because of Iran’s deceptive behavior, policy makers must plan to deal with a possible Iranian force with unknown characteristics, delivery systems, basing, and timelines. Key topics include.
Nuclear Uncertainty
Technology Base
Confusion Over the US NIE
DNI’s March 2008 Summary
Iran Nuclear Facility Locations
Imagery of Nuclear Facilities (imagery of suggesting Iranian deception with use of underground facilities)
Data on Iranian progress and amount of fissile material to build a nuclear weapon
Information pertaining to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons plans from AQ Khan network
May 26, 2008 IAEA Report Summary
September 15, 2008 IAEA Report Summary
Statements By Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Response to September 15, 2008 IAEA Report
Part II: Iranian Missile Programs and Missile Defense Options:
Iran’s development of missiles and other potential delivery systems is ongoing and producing steadily more capable systems. Recent missile developments have shown Iran’s may be actively working to equip missiles with nuclear warheads and to improve the range-payload capabilities of its missile program. These developments given new impetus to the development of missile and air defenses by Iran’s neighbors, Europe, and the US,.
Iranian Delivery Systems: Ballistic Missiles and Other Threats
Range of Delivery Options
Locations of Missile Sites
Table of the stages of Iranian missile production
Timeline of current Iranian missile developments
Shahab 3 & EMP Debate
Growth in Iranian Missile Range
Ballistic Missile Defense: US Progress and Future Options
Strengths and Limits of BMD/TMD
Options for Missile Defense
Build-up of US Missile Defense: July-December 2008
Nuclear weapons are not Iran’s only option. Iran has biological and chemical options. These weapons are often overlooked in the controversy over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. However, these weapons pose a serious threat regardless of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Graph: CBRN Prompt (48-hour) Killing Effect in an Urban Environment
Q50 for Some Types of BW - Open-Air Deployment
New Types of Biological Weapons
Non-State Actor CBR(N?)
State Actor Covert Bioterrorism, Suitcase Nuclear
WME: “Weapons of Mass Effectiveness”
Part IV: Military Options for Dealing with Iranian Threat:
Although there are many possible military scenarios for dealing with Iran, there are major uncertainties regarding Iranian defensive doctrine, location of HVT’s, non-state actors, covert operations, and alliances. The international community can wait for diplomacy for the time being, but it cannot ignored the need to develop effective military option, including defense and deterrence.
Dealing with Nuclear Uncertainty
Possible “Wars”
Strike on Iran?
Israeli Prevention, Preemption of Iran
US Prevention, Preemption of Iran
The Restrike Issue
Iranian Post-Strike/ Parallel Iranian Options
Key Mid-Term Force Posture Decisions
Arms Race; “War of Intimidation”
Part V: Iranian Capabilities to Respond to Preventive Attack:
Iran’s response to a preventative attack could involve asymmetric tactics throughout the region with the IRGC as well as the use of non-state actors. Iran could respond by attacking oil sources and transit routes, such as pipelines, the Strait of Hormuz, etc. The history of oil shocks coupled with the effectiveness of asymmetric strategy and tactics make these types of attacks very likely in the event of a preventive strike on Iran. Making this type of attack more likely is the fact that the balance of forces in the region is unfavorably to a conventional military counter attack by Iran.
Near-Term Iranian Response: Air and Missile Defense Capabilities
Iran’s Current Air/Missile Defenses
TOR-M Short Range Air Defense
S-300 (SA-10), S-400 (SA-12)
Near-Term Iranian Response: Conventional Capabilities and Options
Land Force Threats
Comparative Military Manpower (Gulf States)
Comparative Total Armor Strength (Gulf States)
Comparative Total Gulf Tank Strength (Gulf States)
The data for the future nuclear balance in the region involves massive uncertainties regarding force strength, doctrine, and employability. The only certainty is that it is one thing to rattle sabers, and another to go to nuclear war. The consequences of such an exchange would be catastrophic. In the end, the only way to win is not to play.
Key Actors in 2010-2020
Iran’s Hypothetical Forces
Israel’s Hypothetical Forces
US Hypothetical Forces
Syrian Hypothetical Forces
Gulf Hypothetical Forces
Non-State Hypothetical Forces
An 2015-2020 Israeli-Iranian Nuclear Exchange
Introductory Cautions
Targeting and Existential Strikes
Counterforce, Countervalue, Counterpopulation
Near Use to Warning Shot: Crisis “Management”
Iranian-Israeli Exchange
Israeli vs. Iranian Direct Lethality
Fall Out
Israel’s Key Cities
Israel: High Value Target Areas
Iran High Value Population Centers
Tehran
Arab and Gulf Cases
Other Exchange and Deterrence Issues are Critical
Syrian “Wild Card”-Israeli Exchange
Syria: High Value Population Centers
Egypt: High Value Population Centers
Iran Nuclear, US Conventional
WME: “Weapons of Mass Effectiveness”
The Gulf Target Base
Iran Nuclear, US Nuclear
GCC Options
The “War Game” Paradox: The Only Way to Win is Not to Play
Part VII: The Problem of International Response and Arab Attitudes
The US does not yet have popular international support for any action against Iran, but it faces a special problem with Arab attitudes. A number of polls by the Pew Trust, Gallup, ABC, BBC, ARD, and other sources have shown the level of anger and distrust the US must deal with. Recent work by Brookings provides an overview of the views of Arab nations regarding US involvement in Middle East Region in various capacities and the Iranian Nuclear Program)
This report will be regularly updated and corrections and additions would be most welcome. Please address corrections and additions to amausner@csis.org.
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