The US and Iraq now face a transition period that may well be as challenging as defeating the insurgency, Al Qa’ida in Iraq, and the threat from militias like the Mahdi Army.
A combination of Iraq’s internal politics and outside pressure from nations like Iran has created serious tensions between the US and Iraqi government over the status of US forces and the timetable for US withdrawal. Iraqi politics and public opinion see the US as an occupation force. Iraq's Kurds are the only group in Iraq that showed a consistent desire for the US to stay.
As a result, the US-Iraqi status of forces agreement approved by Iraq’s parliament in November, 2008 has focused on the timing and conditions for US withdrawal, Iraqi jurisdiction over US military personnel and contractors, basing rights, and Iraqi approval of US operations. In the process, both the Iraqi and US governments have tended to forget the need to create effective Iraqi security forces.
The Burke Chair has produced a comprehensive report detailing the continued development of the Iraqi Security Forces, their strengths and weaknesses, and the problems and prospects of future force development. The full report can be found at: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081201_isf_report.pdf.
The SOFA agreement could set a timeframe for US withdrawals that will lead to instability in Iraq, and force the US to hand over responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) before they are able to do the job. In fact, Iraqi and US leaders seem to have agreed on timelines for US withdrawal without agreeing on a plan to ensure that Iraqi forces can and will be ready to operate without US support and security guarantees. This may also open up a Pandora’s box of problems in ensuring that US trainers and embeds can be effective in bringing Iraqi security forces to full strength and combat capability, and that enough US combat power remains in the country to protect these training personnel.
No one can be certain whether Iraq can achieve a stable level of political accommodation to deal with its internal problems. Iran seeks to expand its influence, and Turkey will not tolerate a sanctuary for hostile Kurdish movements like the PKK. Arab support for Iraq remains weak, and many Arab states fear both Shi’ite dominance and what this could mean in terms of Iran’s role not only in Iraq but in Syria and Lebanon.
Iraq and the US are reaping some of the consequences of past reports that exaggerated the progress in developing the Iraqi security forces. Many Iraqi and US politicians now seem to take such exaggerated reporting too seriously and are unaware of how much still needs to be done. Both Iraqis and Americans need to understand the level of incremental progress that Iraqi forces have actually made, and how far they still have to go.
Iraq’s internal politics and the Iraqi-US status of forces agreement (SOFA) have led many in Iraq to ignore these realities. It is important to remember that both the Iraqi minister of Defense and General Dubik, the head of the MNF-I advisory effort from July 2007-July 2008, stated in 2007 that the Army was unlikely to be able to take over the counterinsurgency mission before 2012, and there are good reasons why even the basic goals for shaping the police force remain uncertain.
The ISF faces serious problems in curbing the autonomy of Kurdish forces, integrating the Sons of Iraq into the ISF and job programs, reforming the National Police, promoting the rule of law, and battling the influence of various militias and local actors on the force. The ISF still face serious shortcomings in its logistical capabilities, naval and air forces, ISR capabilities, and in developing heavy forces that are even close to strong enough to defend Iraq’s borders in a tough neighborhood. Accomplishing all of this in 2-3 years will be extremely challenging, and the Coalition has yet to release a detailed plan on how it intends to do this.
Dealing with these issues will be a critical and immediate priority for the new US Administration if a 2010 - 2011 deadline for withdrawal is to involve minimal risk. Readying the ISF in time will also mean eliminating most of the 6 month delay in US process of arms sales and deliveries – and the 12 month Iraqi delay in planning and executing them – that now places basic limits on force expansion.
None of these points mean that the US should not agree to Iraqi efforts to set potential goals for withdrawal or that 2011 is necessarily a bad goal. Neither the US nor Iraq have reason to want US forces to stay any longer than necessary, and creating a joint set of pressures for the US to leave as soon as possible is likely to be more constructive than destructive. At the same time, both Iraq and the US now need to develop far clearer plans for such a transition, determine what goals are really feasible, and be prepared for problems and delays.
The debate over the status of force agreement, deadlines for US withdrawal, and how soon Iraq can assert every possible degree of sovereignty has lost touch with the practical realities involved. Neither side is debating whether US forces should be steadily cut and then entirely withdraw. Both sides need to be careful in setting goals for how fast and when. US forces may not be popular, but they do have a stabilizing effect that helps damp down the risk that these power struggles may turn violent. Their stabilizing effect is also likely to increase during the critical transition period involving elections and political accommodation between 2009 and 2011 if it is clear to Iraqis that the US is really going to leave and their own forces and government are really going to be taking over.
This is why Iraqi and US leaders need to make most of the details of their plans unclassified and actively communicate them to the legislatures, political leaders, media, and people of Iraq and the United States. It is particularly important that Iraqis understand how slowly the ISF is developing and that the US has no intention of maintaining even an advisory or support presence except as an honest response to the desires of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people. “Conditions-based” withdrawals cannot simply be based on Iraqi security needs, they also must consider how strongly Iraqis want the US and other Coalition forces to leave and the negative impact of a US presence on Iraqi politics and public opinion.
Americans need to understand just how sensitive Iraqis are to what many see as an occupation, and that many Iraqis still see the US-led invasion as unjustified and feel that the US intends to stay in Iraq and/or seize control of Iraqi oil. Iraqis need to understand that the US is truly committed to helping Iraq achieve full sovereignty and fully end its security dependence on the US, and that the US really is willing to eventually withdraw all of its forces. They need to see that progress is occurring as rapidly as is feasible given the security situation and speed with which the ISF can be made effective, and that the US is not favoring any sect or ethnic group and is steadily letting Iraq take charge of the force development effort. Americans need to see that there is a clear end game that can result in success and in an end to a US combat presence and the spending of US resources.
If all goes well, the US should be steadily able to phase out its combat forces, and then remove its entire military presence if this is what Iraq desires. At the same time, Iraq is still at war, and still faces the threat of serious sectarian and ethnic conflict. The resulting mix of real-world planning and real-world conditions in Iraq may well lead to pauses in US withdrawals. It may well prove harder to go below the level of 4-6 US combat brigades in a strategic overwatch role than either Iraq or the US desires. Iraq may need US air, naval, and IS&R support well beyond 2011, as well as large teams of US advisors.
Iraq will almost certainly need a stabilizing US military presence for at least several years to come, and will need a substantial US military advisory effort for several years longer. Iraq’s forces are not yet ready to provide the security and stability that Iraq needs, and US withdrawals need to be tailored to the progress they actually make and not to politically correct deadlines that are decoupled from conditions on the ground.
It will scarcely hurt Iraqi sovereignty to wait a few more years for total US withdrawal. The difference is likely to be between full withdrawal at some point in 2011 and at some point in 2013. Under some conditions, a slower pace of US withdrawals might lead to more Iraqi political accommodation, allow the pace of development to increase, and give Iraqi forces time to become fully capable of defending the country without US support. This may not prove necessary, and every month should see the Iraqi take more control and the US carefully assess what troop cuts it can make. The history of states facing a predicament similar to Iraq's present position, however, shows that time and patience can be critical assets. It is also all too clear that no side within Iraq can win if the result of rushing forward is sectarian and ethnic violence, divided or incapable Iraqi security forces, and the kind of Iraqi internal politics that exacerbate conflict rather than produce lasting stability.
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