The President of the United States and the two presidential candidates agree that the United States ought to close Guantánamo. But how can we expand a position that has been little more than a bumper sticker—“Close Guantánamo!”—and turn it into a blueprint for real policy change? This draft report outlines our answer to this question.
It will likely fall to the next administration to carry out this policy. The challenges are considerable. There is no “silver bullet.” In fact, there are only imperfect options. That said, we have concluded that the costs of keeping Guantánamo open far outweigh the costs of closing it.
The process of closing Guantánamo should be achieved through a policy we call R2T2:
Review
Release/Transfer
Try
During his first week in office, the next President of the United States should announce the date for closure of Guantánamo as a detention facility in conjunction with announcing the establishment of a new policy. Implementation of this new policy would be charged to a blue-ribbon panel of eminent Americans named at the same time the President announces the date for closure, and tasked to review the files on all remaining Guantánamo detainees. The duties of the panel would include categorizing all detainees to be transferred to the custody of another government or released, or, alternatively, to be held for prosecution in the U.S. criminal justice system. Once that sorting of the detainees is done, then they would be either moved to the destination of release or transfer, or to the United States for prosecution. The final element of the new policy would be to prosecute them through the U.S. criminal justice system. The record of the criminal justice system concerning the prosecution of international terrorism cases far outshines that of the Guantánamo military commissions: since 2001, 145 convictions vs. 1.4 Overall, this straightforward policy—R2T2 —can help restore our reputation as a country that is built on and embraces the rule of law.
Restoring the U.S. reputation will have national security benefits. The working group concluded that the United States has been damaged by Guantánamo beyond any immediate security benefits. Our enemies have achieved a propaganda windfall that enables recruitment to violence, while our friends have found it more difficult to cooperate with us.
The draft report represents our firm belief that this conundrum is a nonpartisan issue requiring nonpartisan solutions. We hope that our effort stimulates public discussion as well as refinements to our proposed solution.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington DC, 20006 | Tel: 202-887-0200 | Fax: 202-775-3199
