


NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES IN SOUTH ASIA

WORKING GROUP REPORT



MAY 2004

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About the Working Group

This report is the product of a study carried out by a group of senior, non-governmental Indians, Pakistanis, and Americans between December 2003 and May 2004. The project was organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based bipartisan policy research institute, and supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a charitable foundation devoted to reducing global threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. A list of the working group participants is at Annexure 1.

Contents

Executive Summary	iv
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in South Asia	
Existing Confidence-Building Measures	1
Hopes for a New Beginning	2
A New Communications Mechanism	2
Functions of NRRCs	3
Possible Future Functions of NRRCs	6
Domestic Communications Links and Roles for NRRCs	6
Communications Options for NRRCs	7
Operational Aspects of NRRCs	7
Legal Instruments	9
Risks and Benefits	9
Annexure 1: Working Group Participants	11
Annexure 2: Relevant CBMs and Communications Measures	12
Annexure 3: Lahore Declaration, Joint Statement, and Memorandum of Understanding	13
Annexure 4: Joint Statement, Islamabad	17
Annexure 5: Joint Statement by Foreign Secretaries	18
Annexure 6: U.S.-Soviet Agreement and Protocols	19

Executive Summary

In May 1998, when India and Pakistan declared their nuclear weapons capabilities and demonstrated them to the world, they assumed a heavy responsibility—to do everything in their power to ensure that their nuclear arsenals would be devoted to promoting the stability of their region and the safety of their peoples. Experience since then has made clear that the possession of nuclear weapons does not automatically bring security and that active efforts by the two governments will be required to strengthen deterrence and reduce the risks of war. There is now the prospect, after meetings at the summit level early this year, that the two sides will engage each other in a serious and determined effort to overcome the obstacles that divide them.

A group of senior Indians, Pakistanis, and Americans has come together to explore whether a new bilateral communications mechanism can reduce the risks of armed conflict and escalation to the nuclear level.¹ This Working Group met three times between December 2003 and May 2004² and reached agreement on key findings and recommendations:

- A new communications mechanism—Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs) in India and Pakistan—should be established to complement existing bilateral channels. Its primary goal would be to reduce the risks of unintended nuclear confrontation between the two countries.
- The main functions of the NRRCs would be to provide each party a dedicated, secure means of: (1) notifying the other side about activities or events on its territory that might be misperceived or misinterpreted and lead to conflict, (2) exchanging information that the two countries are obliged to exchange under existing security agreements, and (3) seeking and receiving clarifications about ambiguous events on the territory of the other side. Other functions could include the conduct of joint exercises of certain NRRC notification procedures, technical back-up during crises, and support for consultations on the implementation of existing confidence-building measures (CBMs).
- Adequate infrastructure already exists in South Asia to support a wide range of secure communications options, including data, voice, video, or a combination of them. The approximate cost for a dedicated cable permitting teletype and voice communication would be U.S.\$10,000-\$50,000 annually. For a dedicated satellite channel permitting teletype, voice, and video, the annual cost would be roughly U.S.\$560,000.

1. See Annexure 1 for a list of participants.

2. December 8–10, 2003, in Woodstock, United Kingdom; March 11–13 and May 13–15, 2004, in Cobham, United Kingdom.

- The Centres would operate on a continuous, around-the-clock basis. Written messages using pre-agreed formats would be the norm, although voice and video capability would also be desirable to have. It would be the prerogative of each government to decide where institutionally it would house its NRRC and to determine how its NRRC would relate to other government organizations. The Indian and Pakistani solutions to these questions need not be symmetrical.

The Working Group recognizes that NRRCs are not a substitute for continued efforts by India and Pakistan, as envisaged in the composite dialogue, to resolve the underlying problems that face them. At the same time, the group feels that, in light of the great importance of reducing the risks of inadvertent nuclear conflict, the creation of NRRCs should not be delayed pending progress in addressing those problems.

The Working Group realizes that only the Indian and Pakistani governments can decide whether, and on what basis, to establish new risk reduction measures. Nonetheless, it hopes that its unofficial work can be of some assistance to the two governments should they decide to take up the question of new information exchange mechanisms themselves at the upcoming meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials on nuclear CBMs and related issues. With that in mind, the Working Group is submitting its report for consideration by the two governments.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in South Asia

SOUTH ASIA IS OFTEN PORTRAYED—especially by observers outside the region—as a nuclear powder keg. Those who subscribe to this view tend to believe that, during the military crises of Kargil and 2002, there were serious risks of armed conflict escalating to the nuclear level. Many Indian and Pakistani officials and non-governmental experts, however, take issue with this assessment. While not dismissing the dangers, they maintain that their respective governments have adopted a mature and responsible approach toward the possession of nuclear weapons and that the nuclear risks in recent confrontations were minimal. But while views differ, both within and outside the region, on the likelihood of nuclear conflict occurring in South Asia, there is strong agreement in our Working Group that:

- Whatever the likelihood of such conflict, both governments have acknowledged their duty, as responsible custodians of nuclear weapons capabilities, to take whatever steps they can to reduce nuclear risks.
- There is an inherent risk, especially during periods of acute tensions and crisis, that armed conflict and escalation to the nuclear level could be triggered by accident or miscalculation.
- Whatever their differences, India and Pakistan have a strong, common interest in avoiding inadvertent military conflict, escalation, and the use of nuclear weapons.

Existing Confidence-Building Measures

To reduce the risks of armed conflict between them, India and Pakistan have previously turned to military confidence-building measures.³ Enhanced communications links are one form of CBM that has been pursued bilaterally in an effort to minimize misperceptions and misunderstandings. The most consistently used of the links established has been the hotline between Directors General Military Operations (DGMOs), which has been used since 1971. Other agreed links—including hotlines between foreign secretaries and prime ministers and communications links between opposing commanders along the Line of Control—have been employed unevenly.

3. See Annexure 2 for a list of relevant Indian-Pakistani military CBMs and communications measures.

At Lahore in February 1999, India and Pakistan agreed to an ambitious plan for augmenting risk reduction and confidence-building arrangements between the two countries, including in the area of communications links.⁴ Due to subsequent bilateral tensions, this plan has not been fully pursued.

Hopes for a New Beginning

On the margins of the SAARC summit in January 2004, India and Pakistan launched a new effort to promote normalization between the two countries and “the common objective of peace, security, and economic development.”⁵ The Foreign Secretaries agreed on February 18 to a schedule for a “composite dialogue” between India and Pakistan whose goal would be “a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.” In accordance with that schedule, expert level talks on nuclear CBMs would be held in late May 2004 and the Foreign Secretaries would meet subsequently for talks on peace and security, including CBMs and Jammu and Kashmir.⁶

This initiative, together with the cease fire along the Line of Control and the international border that has been in place since November 2003, has created the most promising climate in years for pursuing measures to stabilize deterrence, build mutual confidence, and reduce the risks of war.

A New Communications Mechanism

With a view to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) committed India and Pakistan to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident that could inadvertently lead to the outbreak of nuclear war. It also required the two sides to identify/establish an appropriate communications mechanism to diminish the possibility of such incidents being misinterpreted.

Over the past six months, the Working Group has studied the issues involved in establishing a new bilateral communications mechanism and concluded that such a mechanism could make an important contribution to the stability of the Subcontinent and the security of both countries. The group believes that such a mechanism could play a unique risk-reduction role that would complement, not replace, the missions performed by existing bilateral mechanisms, especially the DGMO hotline.

In studying the idea of enhanced communications to reduce the risks of nuclear war, the Working Group examined the precedent of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the United States and Russia during the Cold War. The U.S.-

4. The Lahore Declaration, Joint Statement, and Memorandum of Understanding are attached at Annexure 3.

5. The joint statement from Islamabad is in Annexure 4.

6. The statement issued by the foreign secretaries is in Annexure 5.

Soviet/Russian experience provided useful background, and the group believed that the precedent could be applicable to at least some of the core functions of an enhanced communications mechanism in South Asia. The group concluded, however, that the circumstances in South Asia today are very different from the circumstances surrounding the current U.S.–Russian relationship and the relationship that existed when the U.S.–Soviet Centers were brought into being. To tailor a new communications mechanism to the needs of South Asia, the mechanism could appropriately take on a wider range of functions than the U.S. and Russian Centers.

The overriding goal of a new communications mechanism would be to assist in reducing the likelihood of the accidental, unintended, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. In particular, it would provide a dedicated, reliable channel for India and Pakistan to transmit information to each other about events that might otherwise be misperceived or misinterpreted and lead to armed conflict or escalation of armed conflict to the nuclear level.

It is recognized, in this connection, that a communications mechanism—and confidence-building measures in general—cannot prevent all military conflicts or avert nuclear war altogether. Where CBMs can be most useful is in avoiding unintended conflict or escalation.

The new bilateral communications mechanism would consist of a direct communications link between “centres” in India and Pakistan. For the purpose of this report, they will be called “nuclear risk reduction centres” (NRRCs).

Functions of NRRCs

A critical issue in establishing NRRCs would be deciding on their functions. The possible functions NRRCs might perform range from the rather modest to the very ambitious. The Working Group recommends adopting an initial set of functions, testing them out in practice, and leaving open the possibility of adding to them in the future.

The primary function of the NRRCs should be to provide each party a reliable, secure mechanism for transmitting three types of messages: (1) special messages, providing information to the other side immediately about activities or events on its territory or carried out by its personnel that might be misperceived or misinterpreted and lead to a heightening of tensions or armed conflict; (2) agreement-mandated messages, exchanging information that the two countries are obliged to exchange under existing confidence-building or other security agreements, and (3) clarification messages, seeking and receiving clarifications about ambiguous events on the territory of the other side.

Special Messages

The first category of transmissions was anticipated in the Lahore MOU, in which the two sides undertook “to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of . . . an outbreak of nuclear war.” Among the kinds of events or activities that might be notified are terrorist incidents, accidental nuclear detonations or large-scale con-

ventional explosions, accidental releases of radioactivity or toxic chemicals, airplane hijackings, missile flight tests or military exercises that do not fall within parameters requiring notification under existing agreements (e.g., smaller-scale ground force exercises, cruise missile tests), and unintended deviations in activities or events that had been previously notified (e.g., a military exercise that mistakenly deviated from its planned routing). Some of these activities (e.g., scheduled exercises) would be pre-notified, while others (e.g., accidents) would have to be notified after the fact.

The decision on whether to notify a particular event or activity—that is, the judgment of whether it has the potential to be misinterpreted and lead to increased tensions—would be left to each party, although the two sides might try in advance to specify, if only for illustrative purposes, the kinds of developments that might be expected to warrant notification.

The decision to send a special message would be taken by an appropriate authority in each country. For major or sensitive events, such as a terrorist incident or nuclear reactor accident, established senior-level decisionmaking, crisis-management, or coordination bodies would be involved. These groups would deliberate on whether to inform the other side and, if so, whether the NRRC or some other communications channel (e.g., DGMO hotline) would be most appropriate. If the NRRC were selected, it would be instructed by higher authorities to convey the message. In cases where other channels were chosen to convey the primary message, NRRCs might be instructed to follow up with a more detailed, technical communication. In relatively non-sensitive cases, NRRC officials might have pre-delegated authority to decide whether a particular event warranted a message.

Agreement-mandated Messages

For the second category of transmissions—information the two countries are obliged to exchange under existing agreements—the two sides would explicitly identify those agreements whose information-exchange provisions would be carried out by the NRRCs. The agreements they would identify would deal not only with nuclear issues per se, but also with other security-related agreements whose goals would include strengthening stability, reducing tensions, and minimizing the risks of armed conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level (e.g., the 1991 agreement on the prior notification of large-scale military exercises). By mutual consent, any future agreements (e.g., on the advanced notification of ballistic missile flight tests) could be added to the list of agreements whose data exchange provisions would be implemented via the NRRCs.

The parties could also decide whether they wished to use the NRRCs to exchange bilaterally some or all of the information that they are already obliged to provide to third parties or international organizations under specific multilateral agreements. For example, the NRRC could be used to exchange bilaterally the notifications both countries provide to the International Atomic Energy Agency in case of radiation release events.

Clarification Messages

Another function of NRRCs should be to enable a party to initiate inquiries about events of potential concern on the territory of, or carried out by, the other party. For example, even if one side was not notified of an event on the territory of the other but received information about it through other channels (e.g., its own intelligence means, media accounts, third parties), it would have the option of using the NRRC to seek clarifications and reassurances about the nature of the event. Clarification might also be sought about information provided under existing agreements.

Again, the decision to use the NRRC for the purpose of raising queries might well be taken by senior-level decisionmaking bodies operating outside the NRRC itself. As in the case of notifications of events on one's own territory, requests for clarifications regarding events on the other side's territory could be made through a variety of channels. National authorities would need to determine, based on the circumstances surrounding individual events, which channel was most appropriate.

The Working Group anticipates that the NRRCs could also take on certain additional functions:

A ROLE DURING CRISES. In addition, the Working Group anticipates that NRRCs could play a role even in acute crisis situations, but that role is likely to be quite circumscribed. Crisis management and conflict resolution are inherently political functions that will usually require the direct interaction of the most senior civilian or military policymakers of the two sides, using their own channels of communication. However, even in such situations, NRRCs might play a supportive role. They could provide a prompt, reliable, additional channel with assured connectivity, and might be especially useful for exchanging essentially technical information. Readiness to utilize the NRRCs in such circumstances would, of course, depend on their perceived reliability in less stressful situations.

SUPPORT FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING CBMs. A widely acknowledged deficiency of existing India-Pakistan security-related CBMs is that they do not provide for a mechanism in which the two sides can raise questions and concerns about the implementation of the agreements. Recognizing this shortcoming, the Lahore MOU states that, "the two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures and, where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs."

Bilateral consultations on implementation of existing CBMs could be held regularly to discuss concerns about compliance or implementation and to work out means of ensuring that those CBMs operate smoothly in the future. The appropriate ministry in each government would be in charge of such consultations, which should be scheduled on a regular basis. The NRRCs could provide support for these consultations. Given the familiarity of NRRC personnel with existing CBM agreements (in light of their day-to-day role in exchanging information on them), they would presumably be represented in the consultations. Moreover, the NRRCs could perform the archival function of maintaining detailed records regarding the imple-

mentation of CBMs, including all notifications and queries made under existing agreements and all exchanges regarding compliance with those agreements.

JOINT EXERCISES. An important function of NRRCs should be to practice the function of exchanging special messages. From time to time, the two NRRCs would work together to devise and execute joint exercises involving simulated events on the territory of one side or the other (e.g., a missile flight test that veered off course). The exercises would help the parties develop, refine, and practice procedures that they would implement in real-world situations. The exercises would also have the benefit of building constructive working relationships between personnel at the two centres.

Possible Future Functions of NRRCs

The Working Group recommends that the initial functions of the NRRCs be limited to those discussed above: transmission of special, agreement-mandated, and clarification messages, joint exercises of special message procedures, technical back-up during crisis situations, and support for periodic consultations on implementation of existing CBMs. After gaining experience with NRRCs and evaluating their effectiveness, governments may wish to consider additional functions. At some later stage, the two countries might agree on monitoring arrangements for bilateral security agreements. If they do, the NRRCs might play a supporting role. Another function that might be considered in the future would be for the NRRC to provide communications support following a disaster with potential major trans-border consequences. In this case, its role would be to ensure, through its reliable and redundant communications network, that the authorities responsible for consequence management in both countries were able to communicate directly.

Domestic Communications Links and Roles for NRRCs

The primary functions of the NRRCs are external—linking the Indian and Pakistani centres and facilitating data exchanges and consultations between the two countries. However, carrying out those functions will require both NRRCs to develop effective links to organizations within their own countries.

- Especially for sensitive incidents, it is assumed that the NRRCs would not decide on their own to notify the other side, but would await instructions from a higher national authority. If the two sides are to “notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained incident” (Lahore MOU), rapid, effective links would therefore have to exist between such authorities in India and Pakistan and their respective NRRCs.
- In terms of personnel, it would be desirable to ensure adequate contacts between the NRRCs and the national bodies responsible for instructing the NRRCs on whether to provide notifications of particular events.

- Each NRRC would have responsibility for distributing NRRC messages from its counterpart NRRC to appropriate organizations within its own government. Each government would decide who would receive the information and in what form (e.g., raw messages, summaries, etc.).

On the matter of domestic communications and institutional links, the Indian and Pakistani governments will come to their own conclusions based on their national governmental structures and requirements. The domestic roles and structures they assign to their NRRCs need not be symmetrical.

Communications Options for NRRCs

The specific equipment and technologies used for communication between the Indian and Pakistani NRRCs will depend heavily on the functions and other requirements that the two governments decide on. Once they have made basic decisions about the role of NRRCs, there will be a wide range of communications options to choose from.

In terms of the form of communication, the parties could have data, voice, video transmissions, or a combination of them. The communications network could be point-to-point or multiple points to multiple points. An adequate communications infrastructure already exists in South Asia. Available modes of transmission include coaxial cable, optical fiber, microwave, radio, and satellite. Redundant, dedicated channels would be readily achievable. Assuming a need for secure communications, a variety of privacy mechanisms, utilizing authentication and encryption techniques, could be used by the parties.

The most important factor in costing the system would be the degree of technological sophistication required. For example, teletype versus voice circuit versus video would require increasing levels of bandwidth and correspondingly greater expense. The approximate cost to each government for a dedicated cable permitting teletype and voice communication is U.S.\$10,000–\$50,000 annually. For a dedicated satellite channel permitting teletype, voice, and video functions, the approximate cost would be U.S.\$560,000 annually. Both systems can be made adequately secure. One approach would be to start with lower-bandwidth systems, which would involve modest expenditures, and later consider upgrading to more costly and capable fiber-optic or satellite-based systems.

The two governments will also want to review their internal communications networks to ensure that they are robust enough to support the NRRCs' intended functions.

Operational Aspects of NRRCs

Key operational questions would also be tied closely to basic decisions on functions.

- Assuming that the NRRCs must be available for immediate communications to prevent incidents or accidents from being misinterpreted, there would be a requirement for continuous, round-the-clock operations.

- The parties should have the capability to communicate through text, voice, or video links. It is generally assumed that written messages would be most appropriate for confidence-building measures because they minimize opportunities for subjectivity and misperception. For most types of messages conveyed via the NRRCs, written formats would indeed provide the least ambiguous means of conveying information. However, there may well be situations in which speed and interactivity become important considerations, and so the networks should also have voice and video capabilities.
- Wherever possible, written communications should use pre-agreed formats. Such pre-agreed formats could expedite handling and minimize ambiguity. The use of such formats is most feasible for transmitting data required by existing agreements because the data will usually fall into predictable, standard categories. Pre-agreed formatting will be more difficult in the case of special notifications of unique events (e.g., accidents) or requests for clarifications. However, even in such cases, it should be possible to facilitate expeditious and appropriate handling by developing different formats or designations for specific kinds of events (e.g., routine versus emergency messages, nuclear-related events versus non-nuclear, notifications versus clarification requests, etc.).
- Staffing of the NRRCs would obviously depend significantly on the functions they are given. At a minimum, the NRRCs would require a senior director who would manage the staff and provide liaison with other governmental organizations, communications specialists, administrative support, and some officers with expertise (e.g., diplomatic, military) on the subject matter of the security agreements whose data exchange provisions are being implemented by the NRRCs. Intelligence officers and experts in the disciplines that could be the focus of special messages (e.g., nuclear, chemical, missile, etc.) might also be attached to the NRRCs. Each government would need to decide how much capability it wanted to reside permanently in the NRRC staff and how much in outside organizations that would work closely with the NRRC.
- The directors and key staff of the two NRRCs would meet regularly to review questions related to the operation of the centres (e.g., formatting of messages, equipment problems, etc.) and to make any corrections that are necessary.
- An important issue to be resolved is the locations of the two NRRCs, in both geographic and institutional terms. Presumably the NRRCs would be in Islamabad and New Delhi. Questions such as where institutionally in each government the NRRCs would be housed—and to which organization or organizations in their respective governments they would report—would clearly be the prerogative of each government. The governments would have a range of options. In the case of the U.S. and Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the former is located in the U.S. Department of State and the latter in the Russian Ministry of Defense. The solutions in India and Pakistan need not be symmetrical.

Legal Instruments

NRRCs in India and Pakistan would need to be formally established through a legally binding agreement between the two governments. The agreement would set forth the basic functions of the centres and the responsibilities of the parties. While providing for key procedural and technical aspects of the arrangement, the agreement would allow for updates and flexibility in implementation (e.g., addition of new bilateral agreements whose data exchange provisions would be implemented by the NRRCs, upgrading of technical parameters, etc.) Although not necessarily a model for India and Pakistan, the 1987 U.S.-Soviet agreement establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers outlines the basic obligations in a relatively short agreement and includes two protocols designed to be updated periodically—one specifying the separate agreements whose data exchange provisions would be implemented by the centers and the other describing the technical specifications of the system.⁷

Risks and Benefits

Consideration of NRRCs in South Asia would probably give rise to speculation about potential pitfalls—among them, that NRRCs could be misused for disinformation purposes; that they could lead to redundancy of signals and confusion; that they could be used for intelligence gathering; and that they could be oversold domestically and lead to disillusionment.

Such potential risks need to be examined carefully and not simply brushed aside. At the same time, consideration should be given to how risks can be minimized. For example, concerns about disinformation can be alleviated to some extent by seeking to cross-check data received via the NRRCs with other sources of information, especially on highly sensitive matters. Concerns about information overload and confusion can be mitigated by guarding against an uncontrolled proliferation of communications channels and ensuring adequate data analysis and integration capability in each government. Opportunities for exploiting NRRCs for intelligence gathering would obviously depend on the functions of the centres and how those functions are carried out but, in any event, can be limited by sound counterintelligence practices. On the risks of overselling and eventual disillusionment, governments should explain the value of NRRCs in moderate, realistic terms and avoid the temptation to claim they can do things they clearly cannot do—such as prevent military conflict altogether.

While evaluating the risks and considering how they might be minimized, governments should also weigh those risks against the potential benefits that might be achieved by establishing NRRCs. In particular:

- together with other channels of communication that they would complement, NRRCs could decrease the likelihood of misperceptions and miscalculations

7. The 1987 U.S.-Soviet agreement is attached at Annexure 6.

that could increase tensions, produce armed conflict, or even result in the escalation of hostilities to the nuclear level;

- the existence of this reliable mechanism would provide a “safety net” in case of difficulties with other bilateral communications channels;
- by increasing transparency and facilitating constructive working relationships between the two centres and two governments, NRRCs could over time diminish levels of mistrust and build a more promising foundation for tackling other difficult issues;
- NRRCs could create an institutionalized buffer that could moderate the negative impact of difficult times on the bilateral relationship;
- NRRCs could help foster greater coordination and information sharing even within governments; and
- NRRCs could have the positive political and psychological effect of reassuring the people of India and Pakistan that their governments are working responsibly to reduce nuclear risks.

On balance, the Working Group concludes that the risks are manageable and far outweighed by the potential benefits. It recommends that the Indian and Pakistani governments move expeditiously to examine the question of NRRCs and, in due course, to negotiate an agreement to establish them.

Annexure 1

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Annexure 2

Relevant CBMs and Communications Measures

Bilateral Military CBMs

- Karachi Agreement (1949)
- Tashkent Declaration (1966)
- Simla Accord (1972)
- Hotline between Directors-General of Military Operations (1971)
- Agreement on the Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities (December 1988)
- Code of conduct to protect diplomatic personnel (November 1990)
- Communications links between sector commanders along the Line of Control (1991)
- Agreement on Prior Notification of Military Exercises (April 1991)
- Agreement on the Prevention of the Violation of Airspace (April 1991)
- Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (August 1992)
- Hotline between Prime Ministers (1997)
- Lahore Declaration, Memorandum of Understanding, Joint Statement (February 1999)
- Islamabad Declaration (January 2004)

Illustrative Multilateral Agreements

- Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986)
- Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (1993)

Annexure 3

Lahore Declaration, Joint Statement, and Memorandum of Understanding

The Lahore Declaration

The Prime Ministers of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of progress and prosperity for their peoples;

Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;

Recognising that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries;

Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Committed to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence-building measures for improving the security environment;

Recalling their agreement of 23rd September, 1998, that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Have agreed that their respective Governments:

shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.

shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs.

shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.

shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elab-

orating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.

reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic growth, social progress, and cultural development.

reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.

shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Signed at Lahore on the 21st day of February 1999.

Atal Behari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of the Republic of India

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Lahore Joint Statement

In response to an invitation by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Pakistan from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan received the Indian Prime Minister at the Wagah border on 20th February 1999. A banquet in honour of the Indian Prime Minister and his delegation was hosted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at Lahore Fort, on the same evening. Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Minar-e-Pakistan, Mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, Gurudawara Dera Sahib and Samadhi of Maharaja Ranjeet Singh. On 21st February, a civic reception was held in honour of the visiting Prime Minister at the Governor's House.

The two leaders held discussions on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. They decided that:

- (a) The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues.
- (b) The two sides shall undertake consultations on WTO related issues with a view to coordinating their respective positions.
- (c) The two sides shall determine areas of cooperation in Information Technology, in particular for tackling the problems of Y2K.
- (d) The two sides will hold consultations with a view to further liberalising the visa and travel regime.
- (e) The two sides shall appoint a two member committee at ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relating to Civilian detainees and missing POWs.

They expressed satisfaction on the commencement of a Bus Service between Lahore and New Delhi, the release of fishermen and civilian detainees and the renewal of contacts in the field of sports.

Pursuant to the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries.

The two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.

Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee extended an invitation to Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, to visit India on mutually convenient dates.

Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, thanked Prime Minister, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to him and members of his delegation and for the excellent arrangements made for his visit.

Lahore, 21 February, 1999

Lahore Memorandum of Understanding

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan:

Reaffirming the continued commitment of their respective governments to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter;

Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit;

Guided by the agreement between their Prime Ministers of 23rd September 1998 that an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose;

Pursuant to the directive given by their respective Prime Ministers in Lahore, to adopt measures for promoting a stable environment of peace, and security between the two countries;

Have on this day, agreed to the following:

1. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident

that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

4. The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.
5. The two sides shall conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.
6. The two sides shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.
7. The two sides shall undertake a review of the existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Directors- General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these links, and to provide for fail-safe and secure communications.
8. The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.

Where required, the technical details of the above measures will be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, before mid 1999, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements.

Done at Lahore, 21st February 1999.

Annexure 4

Joint Statement, Islamabad

January 6, 2004

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India met during the SAARC summit in Islamabad.

The Indian Prime Minister, while expressing satisfaction over the successful conclusion of the SAARC summit, appreciated the excellent arrangements made by the host country.

Both leaders welcomed the recent steps towards normalisation of relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that the positive trends set by the CBMs (confidence-building measures) would be consolidated.

Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented.

President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner.

President Musharraf emphasised that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results.

To carry the process of normalisation forward, the president of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the composite dialogue in February 2004.

The two leaders are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.

The two leaders agreed that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for our peoples and for future generations.

Annexure 5

Joint Statement by Foreign Secretaries

February 18, 2004

The Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India met in Islamabad on February 18, 2004.

They reviewed and endorsed the agreement worked out at the Director General/ Joint Secretary level meetings on February 16 - 17 on the modalities and time-frame for discussions on all subjects on the agenda of the composite dialogue.

Both sides agreed that they would approach the composite dialogue with the sincere desire to discuss and arrive at a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir to the satisfaction of both sides. They reiterated their commitment to promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for their peoples and for future generations.

They agreed to the following schedule of meetings:

- (i) Foreign Secretaries would meet in May/June 2004 for talks on peace and security including CBMs; and Jammu and Kashmir.
- (ii) Talks on Siachen; Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project; Sir Creek; Terrorism and Drug-trafficking; Economic and Commercial Cooperation; and Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields would be held at the already agreed levels, in July 2004.

The following technical level meetings would be held earlier:

- (a) Meeting between the Director General, Pakistan Rangers, and the Inspector General, Border Security Force, in March/April 2004.
- (b) Expert level talks on nuclear CBMs in the latter half of May 2004.
- (c) Committee on Drug-trafficking and Smuggling in June 2004.

They reviewed the existing links between the Directors General, Military Operations of Pakistan and India, and agreed to consider further strengthening these contacts.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan and External Affairs Minister of India would meet in August 2004 to review overall progress. This would be preceded by a one-day meeting of the Foreign Secretaries.

Annexure 6

U.S.-Soviet Agreement and Protocols

Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Signed at Washington September 15, 1987

Entered into force September 15, 1987

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971, and the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Each Party shall establish, in its capital, a national Nuclear Risk Reduction Center that shall operate on behalf of and under the control of its respective Government.

Article 2

The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to transmit notifications identified in Protocol I which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement.

In the future, the list of notifications transmitted through the Centers may be altered by agreement between the Parties, as relevant new agreements are reached.

Article 3

The Parties shall establish a special facsimile communications link between their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in accordance with Protocol II which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement.

Article 4

The Parties shall staff their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers as they deem appropriate, so as to ensure their normal functioning.

Article 5

The Parties shall hold regular meetings between representatives of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers at least once each year to consider matters related to the functioning of such Centers.

Article 6

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

Article 7

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

DONE at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

George P. Shultz

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Eduard A. Shevardnadze

Protocol I to the Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the Parties have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties shall transmit the following types of notifications through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers:

- (a) notifications of ballistic missile launches under Article 4 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971;
- (b) notifications of ballistic missile launches under paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972.

Article 2

The scope and format of the information to be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers shall be agreed upon.

Article 3

Each Party also may, at its own discretion as a display of good will and with a view to building confidence, transmit through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers communications other than those provided for under Article 1 of this Protocol.

Article 4

Unless the Parties agree otherwise, all communications transmitted through and communications procedures of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers' communication link will be confidential.

Article 5

This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, remains in force.

DONE at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

George P. Shultz

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET AMERICA SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Eduard A. Shevardnadze

Protocol II to the Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the Parties have agreed as follows:

Article 1

To establish and maintain for the purpose of providing direct facsimile communications between their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established in accordance with Article 1 of this Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the national Centers, an INTELSAT satellite circuit and a STATIONAR satellite circuit, each with a secure orderwire communications capability for operational monitoring. In this regard:

- (a) There shall be terminals equipped for communication between the national Centers;
- (b) Each Party shall provide communications circuits capable of simultaneously transmitting and receiving 4800 bits per second;
- (c) Communication shall begin with test operation of the INTELSAT satellite circuit, as soon as purchase, delivery and installation of the necessary equipment by the Parties are completed. Thereafter, taking into account the results of test operations, the Parties shall agree on the transition to a fully operational status;
- (d) To the extent practicable, test operation of the STATIONAR satellite circuit shall begin simultaneously with test operation of the INTELSAT satellite circuit. Taking into account the results of test operations, the Parties shall agree on the transition to a fully operational status.

Article 2

To employ agreed-upon information security devices to assure secure transmission of facsimile messages. In this regard:

- (a) The information security devices shall consist of microprocessors that will combine the digital message output with buffered random data read from standard 5 1/4 inch floppy disks;

- (b) Each Party shall provide, through its Embassy, necessary keying material to the other.

Article 3

To establish and maintain at each operating end of the two circuits, facsimile terminals of the same make and model. In this regard:

- (a) Each Party shall be responsible for the purchase, installation, operation and maintenance of its own terminals, the related information security devices, and local transmission circuits appropriate to the implementation of this Protocol;
- (b) A Group III facsimile unit which meets CCITT Recommendations T.4 and T.30 and operates at 4800 bits per second shall be used;
- (c) Direct facsimile messages from the USSR national Center to the U.S. national Center shall be transmitted and received in the Russian language, and from the U.S. national Center to the USSR national Center in the English language;
- (d) Transmission and operating procedures shall be in conformity with procedures employed on the Direct Communications Link and adapted as necessary for the purpose of communications between the national Centers.

Article 4

To establish and maintain a secure orderwire communications capability necessary to coordinate facsimile operation. In this regard:

- (a) The orderwire terminals used with the information security devices described in paragraph (a) of Article 2 shall incorporate standard USSR Cyrillic and United States Latin keyboards and cathode ray tube displays to permit the exchange of messages between operators. The specific layout of the Cyrillic keyboard shall be as specified by the Soviet side;
- (b) To coordinate the work of operators, the orderwire shall be configured so as to permit, prior to the transmission and reception of messages, the exchange of all information pertinent to the coordination of such messages;
- (c) Orderwire messages concerning transmissions shall be encoded using the same information security devices specified in paragraph (a) of Article 2;
- (d) The orderwire shall use the same modem and communications link as used for facsimile message transmission;
- (e) A printer shall be included to provide a record copy of all information exchanged on the orderwire.

Article 5

To use the same type of equipment and the same maintenance procedures as currently in use for the Direct Communications Link for the establishment of direct facsimile communications between the national Centers. The equipment, security

devices, and spare parts necessary for telecommunications links and the orderwire shall be provided by the United States side to the Soviet side in return for payment of costs thereof by the Soviet side.

Article 6

To ensure the exchange of information necessary for the operation and maintenance of the telecommunication system and equipment configuration.

Article 7

To take all possible measures to assure the continuous, secure and reliable operation of the equipment and communications link, including the orderwire, for which each Party is responsible in accordance with this Protocol.

Article 8

To determine, by mutual agreement between technical experts of the Parties, the distribution and calculation of expenses for putting into operation the communication link, its maintenance and further development.

Article 9

To convene meetings of technical experts of the Parties in order to consider initially questions pertaining to the practical implementation of the activities provided for in this Protocol and, thereafter, by mutual agreement and as necessary for the purpose of improving telecommunications and information technology in order to achieve the mutually agreed functions of the national Centers.

Article 10

This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, remains in force.

DONE at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

George P. Shultz

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Eduard A. Shevardnadze

