

**CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES (CSIS)**

**PRESS BRIEFING:
PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO NATO SUMMIT**

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TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2008

*Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.*

H. ANDREW SCHWARTZ: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to CSIS, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, briefing on the president's upcoming trip to the NATO summit. I'm really glad that you all could be here today. I know it was a big stretch to miss the president giving the Bassmaster Award. Serious stuff. I remember that from when I was over there myself. But I'm really glad to see all of you here today and we've got a terrific panel and I'll get right to it.

I'm going to lead off with Julianne Smith, who is our Europe program director. Following Julianne we'll hear from Dr. Steve Flanagan who is our senior vice president and Henry Kissinger chair in international strategy. In addition, Steve is the director of our international security program. And then we have Mr. Janusz Bugajaski, who is the head of our new European democracies program. I know of no one in town or anywhere who knows more about this stuff than Janusz, and I'm sure you'll find him very informative.

With that, I'll pass it over to Julianne.

JULIANNE SMITH: Thanks, Andrew, and good morning. Thanks for coming over to CSIS this morning. We're all just going to make a few minutes' worth of remarks and then really get to your questions and see what direction you want to take this. I thought I would just offer up the 60,000-foot view of what the atmospheric are like heading into this summit, and then I'll allow Janusz and Steve to get into some of the details, some of the initiatives that you're likely to see, some of the more hot button issues that will be discussed in Bucharest.

So I think leading up to this summit the question for me is, is this really some sort of defining moment for the alliance, as we're hearing NATO headquarters kind of couching it in those terms? Or is this a moment of *déjà vu*? And for me there is an element or an air of *déjà vu* for this summit, for three different reasons.

First and foremost, Afghanistan is going to eclipse the summit agenda, much like it did in 2006 in the Riga summit. You've all heard about the challenges that we're facing on the ground in Afghanistan. Steve will get into some of those. It's a very long list, both on the military side where NATO needs more troops on the ground, but also on the reconstruction side. There are coordination issues with all of the bodies that are operating on the ground, both civilian and military. There are issues with Karzai and his team. Of course the border region with Pakistan.

But the one I really wanted to highlight for you is the fact that we have a bit of a blame game going on between Europe and the United States at this moment. Europeans, as you've heard, have been accused of really losing faith in the mission on the ground in Afghanistan. You've heard some of the leaders in Europe talk about their skepticism that

we can actually win this mission on the ground, that NATO has the capabilities it needs to see this mission through. And I'm sure you're aware of the fact that there is increasing public opposition to this mission on the ground and a lot of European publics have been calling for some sort of exit strategy.

Americans, on the other side of the equation, have been accused of losing focus, not faith but focus. Why? Because Europeans claim that the United States for the last couple of years has been heavily focused on what's going on in Iraq, that for us that has been mission number one, and that we in fact have not put the required political capital, the resources into the mission in Afghanistan. So you've got a little bit of finger-pointing going on. You're going to see some efforts to try and get around some of that finger-pointing in Bucharest, but this is very similar to what we saw in Riga in 2006.

Secondly, I feel this summit has an air of *déjà vu* because at a more broader level, we have a very deep strategic divide inside the alliance on what the alliance's future roles and mission should look like. On one side of the equation you have countries like the United States, convinced that NATO should have more global missions, more global partnerships. It should address new threats, new challenges. And then you've got the other side of the alliance that takes a much more conservative view. France, for example, would subscribe to this. That the alliance should kind of step back, focus on its traditional mission of collective defense and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and not get ahead of itself and be too ambitious with its vision and in crafting kind of where it's going to go in the next 10 to 20 years. This is a debate we've seen inside the alliance for the last couple of years, but it's really coming to a head over Afghanistan because part of the alliance feels that Afghanistan should be a precedent for future missions, and part of the alliance feels like it should be an exception, perhaps never to be repeated again.

The last thing I would mention is capabilities, capabilities, capabilities. This is an issue that has haunted the alliance for many, many years. Almost at every summit that I can remember the alliance has struggled to address the capability shortfalls that exist, things like air-to-air refueling, strategic lift, C4ISR. We still have a number of members inside the alliance that have failed to transform their military to cope with expeditionary operations. So that's why I would say this summit definitely has an air of *déjà vu* to it.

I won't argue that there will be no new initiatives, no breaking news. That's not the case. You'll hear from my colleagues some really interesting things coming out of the summit.

The one last thing I would mention in terms of an interesting development on Afghanistan is there will be a vision statement that will be presented at the summit. This is trying to counter the European complaint that NATO lacks some sort of roadmap on the ground, that it never has determined what its goals are, how we will know if we've won the mission, that there are no goalposts, there are no metrics. And so NATO's going to try to do that. The Pentagon has been very busy in the last couple of months conducting a strategic review that will get at the heart of those questions, and hopefully European governments can take that vision statement, that roadmap, back to their publics

and explain why Afghanistan matters for the people of Afghanistan, why it matters for the safety and security of Europeans and Americans and Canadians, and why it matters for the transatlantic relationship more broadly.

So I'll leave it at that and turn it over to Steve and Janusz to talk about some of the specifics, some of the bits of breaking news that you will see coming out of Bucharest.

STEPHEN FLANAGAN: Great. Thank you. I was going to touch on the main defense and military action at the summit, particularly Afghanistan but also missile defense, some a little bit more detail on the capabilities issue, Kosovo, and also the new initiative on clarifying NATO's role in cyberdefense, which is kind of an issue that's been moving along a little bit below the radar, but we'll get some additional push at Bucharest.

On Afghanistan, as Julie said, that's going to be clearly the dominant issue overarching everything at the summit. The U.S. and other governments have been urging additional troop and equipment commitments from a number of other allies to join the small coalition, the Canadians, the U.S., the Brits, and the Danes, who are in the south and the east, most heavily engaged in the counter-insurgency mission. That has proven to be a disappointing sort of outcome. The U.S. made some additional commitments of particularly sending the 3,200 additional Marines, and 2,200 of those will go to the south as a way to hopefully galvanize allied response, and actually also adding about 1,000 troops that will go to the very critical and neglected mission of training the Afghan police.

Unfortunately that hasn't proven to trigger too much of a response. The one bit of good news that it does appear that the French will announce the commitment of about 1,000 elite paratroopers to operations probably in the east, although it could also be in the south as well, to somewhat answer this challenge particularly coming from the Canadians and others who have been in Kandahar and feeling a bit beleaguered and needing some additional support, as they've had some doubts in their own domestic debate about the way in which risk and burden-sharing is being shared within the alliance. So that would be the hope.

We'll have a little bit more clarity on what's going to come from the French. There is a meeting that starts tomorrow. Gordon Brown and Sarkozy will discuss some of this. The French do want to link, though, this reaffirmation of their commitment to NATO missions in a highly visible way to further commitments from the British and also the United States on full development of an independent European Union defense structure. Whether or not this will come to fruition in some kind of general endorsement at the Bucharest summit is still not clear, but as a long-term goal, certainly by the 2009 summit the French would like to see this notion that they're moving ahead to reaffirm their commitment to NATO, and perhaps even move back into the integrated military structure, but they want the quid for that is some kind of affirmation by the rest of the members of the alliance, and particularly the U.S. and the Brits, of the full development

of the European defense capability. And we can come back to that because that gets into high theology and I want to focus more on the capabilities in the military area.

As Julie mentioned, the other part of the Afghan agenda will be to try to highlight this notion and to undercut the trend in particularly European elite thinking that somehow this mission is not winnable, that NATO doesn't have a coherent strategy. Secretary Gates, of course, has been very forthright about some of his concerns, about whether or not the NATO allies have a common approach to counter-insurgency, whether there needs to be further refinement and clarification of that operational concept, and different kinds of training to look at lessons the United States has learned and some of the other allies have learned in operations in the east and the south, as well as lessons learned in Iraq.

So there may be some boost to that in the context of the summit communiqué endorsing this idea that NATO does have to further refine its strategy, perhaps rolled up and integrated into this vision statement that, yes, we know there has been important progress. We need this more integrated, what NATO calls its comprehensive approach of civilian and military efforts being brought together more effectively. And particularly the big challenge has been NATO is doing very well, the clear part, getting rid of terrorists and foreign fighters and Taliban out of certain areas. But then the problem becomes the hold and build part of it, and filling that capacity and enhancing the alliance's capability to work also with the Afghan government to then re-insert its sovereignty and control over the areas that are liberated from the insurgents. So that will be, I think, a big part of the Afghan discussion.

On Kosovo, it's not really an issue that needs any further clarification. The mission is clear. More than 80 percent of the troops in Kosovo are European, but just in the time of stress the allies would want to reaffirm their commitment to that mission, that it remains an important job and steadfast resolve, and Janusz will talk more about the politics of that decision. But on the military side, the allies will want to profile and remind everyone that NATO does have a sizeable peacekeeping force in Kosovo and affirm the importance of that mission.

Missile defense is a complicated issue. It's a priority for the Bush administration, not so much a priority for some of the other allies. But that said, there are sort of two dimensions of this. NATO has had a program underway since 1999 in the development of theater missile defense for protection of forces against short and medium-range ballistic missiles. That is moving ahead on schedule. The first contract has been signed and the development of initial capabilities of that system based on Patriot and THAD and some other existing capabilities will take place in 2010. Full operational capability in about 2013.

So the summit will probably endorse the notion that that is continuing, and to also welcome another part of this, which is more related to the U.S. bilateral discussions with the Czechs and the Poles. That is that NATO also launched in the Prague summit in 2002 a feasibility study of the development of a limited missile defense of population centers,

and that feasibility study has been ongoing. It's been sort of brought more to the fore in the context of the discussion that the U.S. has had on a bilateral basis with the Czechs and the Poles about the development of the radar in the Czech republic and the 10 interceptor missiles to be deployed in Poland, also ideally around 2013, or perhaps a bit later, if the threat seems to be further on the horizon.

So there will be probably some effort to endorse – certainly the Bush administration will be seeking in the summit communiqué an endorsement of NATO's continuing activities, both in theater missile defense, and to note the important contribution that the U.S. and Polish and Czech cooperation in population defense could be an important contribution to deepening and strengthening the coverage of missile defense to all the alliance. So the Bush theme will be, we want to make sure that no part of the alliance is vulnerable to a specific kind of threat, particularly intermediate and longer-range missiles. So the importance of continuing the momentum on some kind of missile defense.

A couple of other smaller issues with regard to capabilities, and in particular with regard to helicopters. As many of you know well, NATO has thousands of helicopters but very few of them are capable of operating in the harsh environment and difficult operating conditions of Afghanistan. It remains a problem, both because of limited operational budgets in a lot of these countries, but also certain political will and willingness to put some of these assets out there and at risk.

But the hope is that there will be some kind of an initiative in and endorsed by the summit, the heads of state and government, with regard to perhaps a pooling arrangement. In the past there has been an initiative that was undertaken also at the Prague 2002 summit, which is bearing some fruition, of a pooling of aircraft for lift. That was one of the other things, as Julie mentioned, the NATO expeditionary capabilities. The fact is that even those countries that have some assets that are deployable at a distance, they can't get themselves there. So there's been an effort to develop some C-17 aircraft that NATO would essentially own collectively and share the cost, in a sense a timeshare use of that assets. That same model might be used or developed with regard to helicopters, or perhaps some other kind of initiative to help finance and deploy helicopters that could be maintained and operated in these kind of harsh conditions.

There's also going to be some sort of welcoming and endorsement of further coordination of NATO's special operating force activities. NATO has not really spent a lot of time until Afghanistan thinking about how its special operations forces would work together more effectively, but there's been a planning cell set up at SHAPE, where coordination among – and going back to what Julie was saying is part of this overall effort to integrate the strategy better in Afghanistan, the summit may welcome progress in that area and talk about advancing further integration of special operations forces, training, tactics, and procedures, sort of a little bit down in the military weeds. But recognizing the importance and the value of that contribution in NATO that has not been prominent in the past,

In addition, kind of another tinkering on the capabilities area will be movement to the adjustment of the NATO response force which was established in 2002, a 25,000 full capability force to go anywhere and on short notice. There's a recognition that the maintenance of the current operations in Afghanistan now has made it difficult to sustain that force as well as kind of an additional back-up. So there will be a looking at and an endorsement of a concept that was discussed by the NATO defense ministers earlier in Vilnius in February about a graduated response option in terms of generating that kind of a force. That is to say that not all elements of that 25,000 member force needs to be available.

And then lastly on the cyber, this is an initiative that particularly has come in the wake of the attacks against Estonia last year. There is a movement towards creating a NATO center of excellence in Tallinn in Estonia. The defense ministers agreed in Vilnius that NATO should have a substantial policy and capability in cyber-defense, and they're sort of working out the modalities of how that will be operated and financed, and this will be given a boost by the NATO summit. So those are the main defense and military issues for the summit.

JANUSZ BUGAJASKI: Okay, last but hopefully not least. I'm going to say a few words about two other issues, two additional issues that will definitely feature on the summit agenda, even if they're not priority issues in the sense of the future of NATO operations. Both have, I think, significance for European security. First of all, enlargement in the Western Balkans, and secondly, the question of giving MAPs or Membership Action Plans to Ukraine and Georgia. I'll mention Kosovo also in this context, although maybe I'll leave that to questions and answers. A lot to say about Kosovo, but it's not just a NATO issue. It's an east-west issue, and sometimes also a west-west issue.

So let me start with enlargement. Three countries – the Adriatic, U.S.-Adriatic charter countries, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia – are all slated to receive invitations for membership at the summit. All three have generally fulfilled the criteria, the conditions for NATO entry, or at least to the extent that the previous invitees have in terms of democratic reforms, civil-military reform, economic progress, good relations with neighbors, ethnic coexistence, and so forth. All three countries also made contributions to NATO missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, which you cannot say for all NATO countries. And as well to U.S. operations in Iraq, which you also cannot say for all NATO countries.

NATO accession for the three, I believe, and they believe, will enhance security in the region, particularly at a time when there is a certain degree of uncertainty stemming from the recognition, the independence declaration and mixed recognition of Kosovo, and uncertainty amongst some neighbors in terms of potential volatility in the region.

The one question that still needs resolution in the invitation process is the Greek-Macedonian dispute, and I don't want to go as far back as Alexander the Great, but

believe me, they do. It's a question of not only the country's name but the use of that name, and this is where the dispute really continues to this day. As we speak there are negotiations going on, there's a new set of negotiations tomorrow, I believe, in New York. The long and the short of it is that Athens looks as though it's going to block Sopkje's or Macedonia's entry into NATO. In other words to block ratification. The parliament in Greece will not ratify Macedonia as a member of NATO, and it takes all NATO members to ratify for a new country to be accepted.

A compromise solution. We have one week left. They've had 17 years. I doubt very much it will be done in a week unless there's enormous pressure from outside. But I think both countries in a way have staked too much on this. The Greek government, I think is fearful that there will be a vote of no confidence in parliament if it does accept and the government will fall. Macedonian government, which is very weak, the coalition recently lost one of their main partners, which is one of the Albania parties, so there's a fear in Macedonia that that government could collapse if they make too big a compromise.

The one possible solution is that there could be an invitation, but it may be conditional. In other words, it will be conditional on an agreement on the name and the use of the name before the anniversary summit in Berlin next year. Which means that in a way Macedonia will be placed on hold, but hopefully the three countries – and I think this is the case – the three countries will not be tied together. In other words, even if Macedonia doesn't get a full invitation, an endorsed invitation from all NATO members, that this won't affect Albania and Croatia, that they will go ahead and get invitations and ratification. So you can ask me more about this. That's the enlargement issue.

The second issue is the MAP question. Again, I would say even more controversial because of one other factor, which is Russia. Just the background. Both Ukraine and Georgia have asked for MAPs, which are Membership Action Plans. These are not to be conflated with membership, which is what Moscow is doing at the moment to try and block the process. MAP is a program for achieving NATO standards over several years. Albania, for example, has had MAPs since 1999. That's almost eight years. Membership still hasn't been guaranteed during that process.

However, MAPs do enhance connections, both military and political, with the alliance. They do contribute to military reform, modernization and so forth, as has been the case in the western Balkans. And the biggest obstacle to MAP accession, as I mentioned, is Russia, which doesn't fear NATO enlargement as a security threat, and doesn't fear MAP expansion also as a security threat, but it fears it for one main reason, both processes. In other words, the reason being that it undercuts Moscow's strategy to bring its former satellites back within the Russian sphere of dominance. Hence, the Putin-Medvedyev regime I think wants to restore Russia as a superpower, or as a hegemon, regional hegemon, and one component of that strategy is to try and undermine U.S. and NATO influence, which includes expansion, which includes MAP, which includes several other programs as well as U.S. presence, as we see with the missile defense question.

I'm still not 100 percent sure that Putin will be there, but the reason Putin will be coming to the summit, one of the reasons, not only bowing out – which he probably isn't – but to exert some pressure particularly on the allies in Europe that MAP is not a good idea. And unfortunately the alliance is divided over the MAP question. Moscow has in recent weeks sought to drive wedges between NATO members by claiming that MAP for Ukraine and Georgia will damage Europe's relations with Russia, diplomatically, politically, and economically in terms of business. I think this is a form of strategic blackmail that disregards the security aspirations and national interests of both Kiev and Tbilisi.

And unfortunately, I would say some West European governments seem to be succumbing to Kremlin pressure, particularly in Berlin, indicating I would say yet again that the West lacks a coherent and an effective policy towards Russia. The United States' opposition on the MAP question I think is veering towards getting them MAPs. As you know, President Bush will be visiting Kiev on the eve of the summit and the question is, is he there to reassure them that they will get a MAP, or is he there to reassure them that they won't but we're still with you. In other words, that sooner or later they will. And you'd have to ask the president about that.

Last but not least, very quickly, Kosovo. There is division within the alliance on recognition. There have been several waves of recognition. I think the number is now up to 33. I think one of the major signs that there's no reversal, which Serbia has pushed for, is that three neighbors of Kosovo recently recognized. That's Hungary, Croatia, and Bulgaria. And I think that indicates that the process is going to move forward. In other words, that there's no going back now.

The big division, of course, is with Russia. Russia I think is using both Kosovo as a potential frozen conflict. They love frozen conflicts, if you look at Georgia or Moldova. Keeps them in the business. And also I think Kosovo is simply one of the issues that Russia uses like a game of chess on European chessboard. It's one of the pieces that it uses against Western influence, a sort of rollback policy, containment policy, I would say, by Russia vis-à-vis the West. Missile defense is one. There's also the conventional forces in Europe treaty, OSCE, ballistic missile treaties. I mean, any number of issues, as well as bilateral disputes with individual European countries figure on the agenda.

And again, just to underscore again, I don't think there is a unified, coherent, effective Western policy towards Russia, Putin's Russia, now Medvedev's Russia. I think I'll stop there. Thanks.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Great. And with that we'll take your questions. If you could identify yourself and speak into the microphone, that would be very helpful. Terry?

Q: What kind of a stake does President Bush have in this summit? Is this important to him politically, from legacy? What does it matter to him?

MS. SMITH: Well, I would say that leading up to this summit there was a little bit of friction between the Bush administration and the other members of the alliance. There was some question as to whether or not NATO needed to have a summit in 2008 in the first place because it will be having its 60th anniversary summit next year. So a lot of members of the alliance said, why don't we catch our breath, focus on Afghanistan, skip the summit in '08 and move to '09. And I think the Bush administration made the point that there were many things that needed to be addressed, particularly Afghanistan, but also enlargement. I think it's no secret that President Bush is a huge supporter of enlargement. Many people in and out of the government in Washington are. That Bush is looking to build a legacy. I don't think there's any question about that. This does fit into kind of his broader agenda of bringing these countries into Western institutions, so we did move forward with the summit.

I don't think there's any friction now about that. That has died down. I think instead of watching Bush at the summit, I don't expect any major fireworks between the Bush administration and other members of the alliance, really. There will be some push again to send more troops, but I think the more interesting two relationships to watch is the fact that Putin's there, as Janusz mentioned. It's fascinating to see what comes of that, what kind of rhetoric is going to be coming from Putin on a whole host of issues.

And also the Sarkozy-Merkle relationship, which has not been going terribly well in recent months. There's a lot of friction between these two leaders. Normally it's the Franco-German engine that drives not only the European Union but a whole host of other issues inside Europe, and it's going to be interesting to see how those two react to each other and deal with each other, particularly as they've canceled their last couple of meetings to meet. So I think for me, I'll be watching those two, both Putin and the Sarkozy-Merkle relationship, just to see if anything is said or something comes out of it, rather than Bush's personal relationship with others.

I think a lot of these European countries have found a way to get past the dark shadows of 2003 and '04, when we had divides over Iraq and all the rest, and many of them are looking forward now to the next president in Washington and are already thinking about what the 2009 summit will bring.

Q: Francine Kieker (ph) from the Christian Science Monitor. I'm curious as to whether you think there's been enough discussion in the United States about enlargement. I mean, are we really prepared to defend Georgia if something happens over there, or Ukraine? What's your sense about – what has sold enlargement in the United States?

MR. BUGAJASKI: Well, let me start by you've conflated enlargement with MAP. MAP is not part of the enlargement process as such. I mean, you can have MAPs. As I said, in Albania you've had MAPs for almost 10 years.

Q: (Off mike.)

MR. BUGAJASKI: Yes, it doesn't necessarily – it doesn't guarantee membership. In fact, the situation in Ukraine is very complex because most of the public does not support membership, so there won't be any security guarantees unless there's membership. This is simply a process to enable the military and the civil authorities to try and catch up with the reform process and with the standards that are pursued by NATO. So that's not part of the enlargement process. The enlargement process involves the three west Balkan countries, who have already had commitments for several years in terms of a presence on the ground, in terms of the fair participation in our missions, their interoperability with our troops.

Bringing these three countries in I don't think, let's say, necessitates some major debate in the United States. I mean, there have been hearings up on the Hill. I think most senators are very much for enlargement. There's huge public support in those countries. It's not going to – let's put it this way. None of these three countries run under any major threat from outside. Which isn't the case, I would say, for Ukraine and Georgia. Georgia, as you know, has two so-called frozen conflicts which could explode into violence. Ukraine is still in a precarious position, and just in the past 24 hours the Russians have raised the issue of potential division of Ukraine, potential claims to Crimea. Hence, membership is a long, long way off, I think for both countries.

Q: Andrew Gree (ph) from Reuters. If I could just follow up on that, specifically on Macedonia and the question as to whether – the point has been made before that countries have to be security enhanced or security contributors to join NATO. Macedonia is a country that only a few years ago couldn't really handle an insurgency inside its own borders. As you said, its government is still quite unstable.

Quite apart from the name issue, are you confident Macedonia is ready from a security standpoint to join?

MR. BUGAJASKI: A couple of things. When I say the government is unstable, this current government is unstable. The system isn't unstable. In other words, other than the violence in 2001, which was I think quite well handled, and the Ohrid agreements were signed and the Albanian community has been incorporated in state institutions, I wouldn't say it's a happy multiethnic society but it functions. It does have democratic institutions, it does have economic development. Generally it has good relations with most of its neighbors. And the Greek dispute really isn't over territory. It's a question of identity, heritage, name, symbolism, political symbolism. We may laugh, but I think it's important in U.S. politics as well. If you look at the Confederate flag, it does create certain passions in this country. The name Macedonia creates certain passions between Greece and Macedonia.

Macedonia, however, has contributed to the Afghani mission. In fact, more so than I think about seven or eight NATO countries with militaries have contributed. In terms of its military capabilities, I think it's made a strenuous effort to participate in alliance activities. It's also helped the United States. It's given absolute overflight rights, basing facilities, fully cooperative with the U.S. army, the U.S. military. So in terms of their security contribution, I think it's been very positive. In terms of the political situation, I think it's manageable. In terms of their relations with neighbors, I think once that Greek dispute is solve – and Greece itself wants Macedonia in the alliance. Greece has not opposed Macedonian membership. It simply wants that name issue resolved, and then I think it will for sure ratify Macedonian membership. So it's in the interest of all the neighbors to have Macedonia in rather than out.

Q: Tatiana Kopericz (ph), Voice of America. If I can be allowed two questions. If we are not taking, for example Russia, into account, do these both countries, Georgia and Ukraine, meet the standards for joining MAP? Can they, for example, compare Ukraine today and Albania in 1999? That's the first question.

And the second question, what kind of compromise do you envision on MAP issue? Like several days ago the talk began about talking about some action plan about bringing the Ukraine and Georgia in MAP in Berlin. What do you know about that? Thank you.

MR. BUGAJSKI: Right. Certainly I would say Ukraine, from even several years ago, is at the same level at Albania in terms of civil military reform. Ukraine has also participated in NATO missions as well as American missions around the world. It has troops in Kosovo, it had in Bosnia, in Croatia. It's participated quite insistently, I think, with NATO and other, let's say, allied missions.

In terms of MAPs, of course, I think they are prepared because they've had these action plans already with NATO, which haven't involved the word membership, which has been a stumbling block. Membership Action Plans I think are just one step a little bit further than the kind of agreements they've had with NATO in the past. They've had joint training, they've had joint exercises. There's good sharing of all sorts of intelligence, military officers come and train in the United States and study in the United States. Not only the United States. We have very good relationships with the Ukrainian military.

And often one finds in these countries where maybe the political system hasn't been yet completely stabilized. Military to military cooperation has developed extremely well over the past decades. So I would say yes, very clearly I think Ukraine is definitely prepared for a MAP, as well if not better than Albania was in '99, which remember was only two years after the country nearly collapsed.

Secondly, in terms of MAP compromise, I would be very careful about this because if you start trying to put forward some new arrangement, I think it's going to confuse matters even more. It's either a MAP or not a MAP. If you come up with some

new word, it's not going to fool anybody. It's really going to signal to Russia that we're not absolutely serious about involving these countries in cooperating with Western institutions, that they don't have a European future. I think it will send a negative signal to both Kiev and Tbilisi. And particularly in the case of Georgia I think it will make them feel a lot more vulnerable to Russian pressure, which they're under sustained Russian pressure and have been for several years.

MR. FLANAGAN: I would just add that definitely Ukraine's progress in the military forum is highly regarded by the U.S. and most of the other NATO militaries. They have been a major contributor in many of the things that Janusz said. But also in terms of lift, Ukraine has been in many ways NATO's additional lift capacity, particularly for missions in Afghanistan. I mean, it's cost to the other allies, but they have provided important support functions. So in terms of their overall contribution to Euro-Atlantic security, I think there's no question that Ukraine would fall in that category, being a net contributor.

The real question, though, goes to the question of the depth of support and the potential polarization within Ukraine over the long-term implications of membership.

Q: David Sands (ph), Washington Times. Are there any particular issues where the president's lame duck status is going to affect things? You say that they're already looking at the next summit. Is a President Obama going to be in the same position that's strong on, say, missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, or Afghanistan issues?

MR. FLANAGAN: Well, I think one of the concerns certainly – Julie didn't mention it, but it's one of the legacy issues is, is the missile defense question for the Bush administration the hope that they had both, first of all, gotten rid of the treaty at the early stage of the administration, now the treaty limiting development of a wide area of ballistic missile defense. And then to now move forward and have this momentum both within NATO for theater tactical missile defense, but also to begin to plant the seeds for the development of this limited wide area of defense.

So I think the hope is that they can get an endorsement in the summit declaration, make it harder to walk back and move away from some of the commitments, even though I think many people were looking even when Prime Minister Tusk from Poland was just here with the president, what kind of commitments were being made to enhance Polish air defense as the way to keep their commitment there.

The Czechs seem pretty firm on this, but again, the question will be how much of a priority will missile defense be for the next administration. That's one that a number of the European participants, particularly the Poles and the Czechs, are looking at very closely and wondering how deeply should they become committed. But the hope is to – I think the administration is hoping, by maintaining enough momentum, by putting in place some of these support programs, that they'll cement that as something that will be at least hard to walk away from completely. It may be slowed down, it may be stretched out,

even as we mentioned the administration has even told the Russians it's willing to stretch out the actual activation of those sites in Poland and the Czech Republic in response to a changing assessment of the threat from Iran or other countries.

MS. SMITH: I would just add as an aside, there do appear to be rising expectations on the other side of the Atlantic about the next U.S. president and the overall state of the transatlantic relationship. If certain candidates were to win, there seems to be a great deal of enthusiasm, particularly for Obama but also Hillary on the other side of the Atlantic, that there's going to be some revitalization of the transatlantic partnership and we start with a clean slate and a new chapter and all the rest. But truth be told, regardless of who wins, whether it's McCain, Hillary or Obama, I think all of them feel absolutely the same when it comes to Afghanistan and asking Europeans to do more.

So regardless of what happens in November, there will be a knock on the door on the other side of the Atlantic, I think in early 2009, regardless of what additional commitments we get next week in Bucharest, to ask Europe to send not only more troops on the ground but also more reconstruction and development assistance as well. So there may be – you know, I think there's a potential for a slight rude awakening depending on the outcome of the election. But I do think that you could find very little difference among the candidates right now when it comes specifically to the question of NATO's mission in Afghanistan.

Q: Thanks. Howard LaFranchi, Christian Science Monitor. Someone – I'm not sure who, but someone said that NATO's mission in Kosovo was clear, and I'm wondering if that includes preventing any partition of a Serbian – the northern part. And more broadly on this question of the lack of a common policy or strategy towards Russia, is that just something that you're feeling and talking about or how is that sort of – how do you see that playing out? I mean, is that something that can just be swept under the rug, or is it just going to keep coming up in all of these different areas? Is that something that is going to be approached by the alliance?

MR. BUGAJSKI: Sure. I think Steve mentioned that NATO's mission in Kosovo will continue. It will continue, even though the mandate is supposed to change from UNMIK, from the United Nations' mission to EULEX, which is the European Union mission. But there is some confusion because the Serbs in the north of Kosovo will not accept EULEX but they will accept UNMIK. If they accept UNMIK, they also accept NATO. So NATO forces I think are more active now in northern Kosovo, but on the other hand, they don't want to provoke things too much. They don't want to overreact to some of the provocations that some of the extremists in the north are staging with support from some radical elements in the Serbian government in Belgrade.

But I think there has to be a strong NATO presence. We saw the riots last week. I think NATO actually were quite restrained in terms of how they handled it. Some would argue they weren't sufficiently prepared for riot control. But this is something that they're going to have – they're going to have to, let's say, increase their presence, show

they mean business, basically, but without provoking some all-out confrontation with the Serbs in the north.

I don't think there is any possibilities – this isn't Milosevic's days. There is no possibility I think – I don't think that the Serbs in any capacity, whether military or paramilitary are going to cross the border and provoke a confrontation with NATO forces. I mean, nobody is that foolish. It's more of a political diplomatic struggle than anything else.

On the Russia question – just one more thing, yes. NATO is committed to keeping Kosovo together. There has been a plan in the last few days – it's been revealed from Belgrade – to potentially partition Kosovo, and that is unacceptable not only to the government in Prishtina, but to the Western alliance, including both NATO and European Union.

In terms of Russia policy, well, it's not just my feeling; if you look at the situation on the ground, there is no uniform EU policy. You could say there is no uniform EU policy towards anywhere, but particularly when it comes to Russia, it really matters for some of the EU members, particularly those that neighbor Russia because they feel particularly under pressure from Russia, whether it's energy, whether it's – they are threats against missile defense. I think Poland gets a warning once every couple of weeks that it will be destroyed if it hosts missile defense.

So, you know, it doesn't build sort of confidence, does it, vis-à-vis your neighbors if you're constantly getting threats and warnings from Russia. And I think Medvedev isn't going to be very much different than Putin; in fact, I think they probably work in tandem.

Yeah, I think the confrontations will continue. I don't see any easy resolution. There is no common EU policy on energy; there is no common EU policy on what the plans for membership for the Black Sea countries, including Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. They have something called ENP, European Neighborhood Policy, which does not – which is not a path to membership, and these countries do feel excluded. Numerous issues – I think OSC is another – democracy promotion. Russia has tried to block OSC's – an effective force in promoting democracies in former Soviet territories, Caucuses, Central Asia, and so forth.

I think there will be points of confrontation. Of course there will also be points of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia and between EU and Russia. The question is how emboldened will Russia become in pushing those areas where it thinks it can gain advantage and push back Western influence from its borderlands.

MR. FLANAGAN: Yeah, NATO's military missions are to allow continued freedom of movement to protect minority populations and to also protect religious sites, mostly Serbian monasteries that are in parts of – various parts of Kosovo. So as Janusz said, the key challenge will be to not overact, to help the Kosovar authorities also not

overreact to likely provocations as we saw in the north and along some of the border checkpoints. NATO did respond I think fairly effectively to helping to restore the controls on those crossing points. We do have to still worry about volunteers coming in and stirring up trouble, but I think as long as NATO continues to work with the Kosovar – to prevent any kind of overreaction that could lead to a cause in Serbia itself that might cause even further unrest, I think that will be the key to maintaining stability there.

MR. BUGAJSKI: If I could just add to that question on Ukraine – in fact, a Ukrainian soldier was killed during the riots last week, indicating what an important role Ukraine actually plays in helping NATO to stabilize regions within Europe, which I think really underscores that Ukraine's progress towards MAP is a good thing.

Q: (Off mike.)

MR. FLANAGAN: I'm not sure that was an initiative that the U.S. first broached in October, actually, when Secretaries Gates and Rice went forward to both offer a broader strategic dialogue with the Russians but also restoring a dialogue that existed in previous administrations but also to adapt some of these confidence-building measures, if you will, both in terms of the timing of the activation of the sites and the idea of Russian inspectors.

There did seem to be some question as to whether or not they had been adequate prior to consultation. I find it hard to believe that the administration would have offered that without some kind of previewing it, but I really don't know the answer. I don't know if any my colleagues do know.

MR. BUGAJSKI: If I could, I think there has been the distinction between military inspectors and civilian inspectors. I mean, both Czech Republic and Poland had Russian military inspectors for almost 50 years, so they are very hesitant to allow any kind of military presence, Russian military presence. However, they are not averse completely to having periodic – not permanent, but periodic civilian inspectors coming in together with American team, if indeed the Russians want to view that as a form of reassurance that missile defense isn't aimed against them. And I think both Warsaw and Prague are more than likely to agree to that. It's going to be a process of negotiation exactly who they are and how long they stay, what they do, where they go, what they find out, but I think that is part of negotiations.

Q: (Off mike.)

MR. FLANAGAN: My impression is there is going to be an additional commitment on the French – on the part of the French. I'm not exactly sure – I mean, the discussion has been mostly about certainly elite paratroop units, and I don't – they have had special forces there before, but I'm not sure if it's the same – I haven't looked at their actual unit designators, or – who's coming in behind them. But my impression is that it's upwards of a thousand, maybe a little less – could be a little more.

And then on caveats, I think that is probably going to be an enduring – it isn't the kind of thing that will be dealt with at the level of heads of state in government. The defense minister has certainly wrestled with it in Vilnius. This discussion about the need to revisit the way in which risks and burdens are shared and how we engage in counterinsurgency operations as an alliance. I mean, I think all of that is out there in the background, but I can't see there being any specific decision made to, say, alter the – you know, certainly – I mean, among the major concerns would be the Germans. Some of the others, if they were to really take some of the restrictions off the way their troops are used – I don't see that happening at this summit.

MS. SMITH: Yeah, I would just add that this was definitely an issue that haunted the 2006 Riga summit as well. And they tried to show some progress on it by having a lot of the member states agree to moving their troops in cases of emergency. The problem is the term “emergency” was never really defined. We never got a feel for what conditions would need to be met in order to free up those troops and allow them to move on very short notice to the south if necessary.

So there may be some sort of slight workaround again in Bucharest, but my guess is that this will be definitely a goal for 2009, particularly as there is still some indication that either the French or the Germans will host the 2009 summit. Either one would be looking to make some sort of major announcement if they were the host. So if Germany happened to be involved, it may be looking for a way to free itself up. But, I mean, there is a lot of rumblings going on in Berlin, but I don't see any major traction, particularly on the parliamentary side, that really controls this type of decision, despite what their defense advisors may suggest.

Q: Wendell Goler with Fox. A couple of questions: What should we look for to determine which faction wins, if you want to use that term, on expanding NATO's role or going – rolling back as the French may want to do. That is one question.

And a second: Ukraine is already under pressure from Russia, which, as I understand it, wants control of the pipelines that carry natural gas to Europe, and several incidents suggest that they are trying to get back – Moscow is trying to get control of those pipelines. Wouldn't a MAP for Ukraine subject that country to more intimidation by Moscow?

MS. SMITH: I think what has happened in terms of the debate about where NATO is going in the next 10, 20 years, what its future roles and missions should look like is we've seen incremental change over the last couple of years that would seem to indicate to me that we are ultimately moving towards the more bold, ambitious vision. The fact that NATO is now talking about the things that Steve mentioned, particularly special forces, it's getting into cyber-terrorism – there are discussions about NATO's role vis-à-vis energy security – seems to me, preview a future NATO that is willing to address non-traditional security challenges.

But the moment when we know what's really going on with the alliance will be when the alliance decides to task itself with rewriting its strategic concept. The last strategic concept, you'll remember, was drafted in 1999. Of course, this is before 2000 – September 11th, this is before the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, this is before enlargement really was up and running.

And so there are many forces inside the alliance, particularly led by Washington, arguing that NATO needs to task itself with rewriting its strategic concept. And that would force the alliance to have a strategic debate about where it's headed and write down on paper what its future roles and missions would look like, what capabilities would be required to undertake those missions, and what types of changes would need to be made structurally inside the alliance headquarters to get that momentum moving.

But right now what happens is a big, bold, ambitious proposal is put on the table, often by Washington, then it's walked back ever so slightly, and then it creeps back onto the NATO agenda. I mean, we were talking about some of these same issues at the last summit or two, but now they are slowly making their way in a less-ambitious form. So, for example, with cyber terrorism, I think there was a search for some big, bold statement on this outlying what NATO's role should be. Now we're having the center set up, and we're just easing our way into some of these new missions. But I think the moment will come at the 60th anniversary when NATO will be required to put a marker down about what it believes its future really should look like.

MR. FLANAGAN: Yeah, just to fill in a little bit on that, this is maybe one story we might suggest that you look for. There is a little bit of a difference I think between the administration and some of the other NATO allies and particularly the Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer has been calling for a new strategic concept for some time. It becomes complicated because of some of the questions of timing. You have an – you have the next summit coming in the early stages of the next – new U.S. administration, not enough time to really prepare effectively for a full engagement with its allies as a new administration.

So there is the whole question of can this really be done in that period of political transition in the United States with the United States being such an important actor in the decisions that are taken. But there is also a question about whether or not the alliance wants to tie itself up in knots in the negotiation of a very detailed and comprehensive kind of assessment, the last one done in 1999. And having lived through it, I can tell you – while it was harvested at the Washington summit, it took a lot of political energy of heads of state and government haggling over words.

On the other hands, those words do matter, and particularly if you're going to say that we're going to reach an agreement as to what the roles and missions are of the alliance in this post-9/11 era. And that is one thing that the – well, the 1999 concept talks about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It talks about the importance of new missions in peace operations. It didn't really anticipate some of the kinds of things, long-distance missions in counter-insurgency. It didn't really get into some of the questions of

the role of terrorism, other humanitarian relief, global partners. Some of these other issues are still unresolved.

And so there are some in the administration who would, rather than see a long and difficult negotiation – or detailed strategic concept – maybe a shorter vision kind of document that could be harvested – either set in motion now in Bucharest and then harvested perhaps at the 2009 summit. But even that may be difficult, again, because of the American political calendar, but I think that that is really out there.

And just one quick word on the French, Wendell, I don't really think the French are about diminishing NATO. I think they want recognition of – recognition of equal status or at least a broader recognition that the European Union has a role to play in overall management of Euro-Atlantic security, and a recognition by the United States and other key allies that this role will continue to grow and it can support and bolster the overall effort working more in partnership with NATO and less subordinate – I mean, overcoming some of the French concerns that somehow everything being led through NATO means European subordination to American leadership.

MR. BUGAJSKI: Yeah, the question of Ukraine, Russia, and MAP, I think Russian intimidation or pressure or potential corruption of the Ukrainian elites, which is another form of pressure which they put on the country I think will continue regardless of MAP. But the Ukrainian government, which is fully (?) united on this, both president and prime minister and speaker of the house – which is, for the first time actually in history that seem to be united on something – are very much for a MAP because it gives them a sort of sense of reassurance that they are moving closer to the West.

And for them, ultimately, I do believe Western standards, Western democracies, Western security will be the best form of protection against a potential – potentially hostile Russia. I don't think in that sense the MAP membership or non-membership is going to change Russian policy. In fact, you could argue the opposite. If Ukraine does not get a MAP, then the Russians will feel more emboldened that their pressure and their campaigning vis-à-vis the West has had dividends because Ukraine was excluded. So you could argue it the other way as well.

The energy question – I'm not going to go into this – is very complex. Russia, I think one of the things – a couple of things they want to do – as Europe wants to diversify its sources, Russia wants to diversify its provisioning; in other words, it doesn't want to be dependent on any one country for supplies it gives to another country. Hence, they are trying to bypass Ukraine, they are trying to bypass the Baltic states, they are trying to bypass Poland, which is also gives them an extra leverage of pressure against those countries because then they can cut those countries off without cutting off the West Europeans, which was part of the problem when they cut off Ukraine a couple of years ago that also affected both supplies and their image in Western Europe. So Russia is trying to diversify its roots, just as Europe hopefully is trying to diversify its sources.

Q: Andrew Ward, Financial Times. Whenever Bush goes to Europe, he seems to want to always get as close to the Russian border as possible to make a speech or send a signal, and he's doing it again this time with Ukraine. How antagonistic was it towards Moscow to make that stop in Kiev and what should we look for on that leg of the trip? Is it purely symbolic or will there be serious negotiation about MAP while he's there?

MR. BUGJSKI: Well, I don't know about antagonistic. Maybe he should go to Moscow as well before a summit. Putin is coming to NATO to the summit so why shouldn't Bush go to a country that is independent, has its own national interests? These countries should not be seen simply through the prism of Russia. I mean, they have their own security priorities; they have their own national interests; they have their own aspirations and so forth.

Of course, the Russians may want to use this as a symbol that somehow the Americans are trying to pull Ukraine out of the Russian orbit, but that is not the question; the question is what does Ukraine want. And the Ukrainians haven't fully 100 percent decided. They have decided on a MAP. They certainly haven't decided on membership.

In terms of – what was the other question you asked about –

Q: Well, I think it was alluded to before that – it was suggested that maybe a deal will be done or an agreement will be made between the U.S. and other NATO countries about whether or not there will be a MAP beforehand. Is it going to be a done deal before he gets to Kiev?

MR. BUGAJSKI: Right. This is what I questioned before, whether he is actually going – and I don't know the answer – whether he's going to Kiev to tell them that they are not getting a MAP but they can get something just short of a MAP with a promise of a MAP may be the Berlin summit, or whether he's going to reassure them that they will be getting a MAP. I tend to feel it's the former. I think there is sufficient German and French and other opposition to prevent, let's say, that the kind of decision that was made to give MAPs to the West Balkan countries several years ago. My instincts tell me that there will be something short of a MAP or something qualified.

Q: So the implication is that Bush arrives in Kiev to give them a decision rather than there being some sort of deal that the U.S. and the Ukraine can do to take to the summit.

MR. BUGAJSKI: I think there is both a decision, but it's also – you know, politics is also symbolism; it's a symbolism that your path is eventually with the West, but there is still a lot of questions that we need to resolve in the meantime.

MR. FLANAGAN: I would just – (off mike) – to say that Putin's more confrontational policy – this isn't a dividend of Putin's more confrontational policy. That's one of the things that the administration is going to be very worried of, of looking at somehow that Putin's bluster has led to NATO's hesitancy. So I think there will be an

effort to try to reassure the Ukrainians and also to show the Russians that Washington at least does not – is not wavering on the long-term notion that Ukraine has the right to choose – join or not join alliances guaranteed by various European charters.

Q: (Off mike.)

MR. BUGAJSKI: One question here: I think there is general unity on enlargement. I don't think America has had to push its allies in Europe to convince them that Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia do belong in NATO. The one outstanding issue, as I said, as you've mentioned, is the Macedonian question with Greece. I personally think that this should have been resolved, well, 17 – well, at least seven years ago – (chuckles) – at least at the beginning of this decade. And here I don't think we put sufficient emphasis on a resolution. I don't think we understood how important it was to Athens. I don't think we understood, in a way, how important it was to resolve it in order to move Macedonia into NATO because we thought eventually, well, the Greeks would recognize the fact that 120 countries have recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name.

And I think the Greeks have left it – the fault is on many sides – I think the Macedonians in a way for not trying to – not seeing clearly enough that they need to compromise for the Greeks for raising this very late instead of pushing this several years ago, and for our mediating role, which I think has been fairly lukewarm for the past decade.

In terms of MAPs I think there is much more division here, and I don't think – I don't think Washington has exerted a strong role. But on the other hand, we didn't know that the Ukraine is also at fault. Ukraine was very late in issuing a letter – I think it was in February that they finally issued a letter asking for a MAP. Now, that doesn't give you a lot of time for discussion, deliberation and a coherent allied policy.

So the fault lies on various sides. We can't push Ukraine to do something that they haven't decided to do.

Q: Just one more. I wonder if you could talk briefly about the idea of France and returning fully to the NATO military command structure. How much difference would that really make in practical terms? I mean, France is obviously heavily involved in NATO missions. The current K4 commander is a French general. Can you put that in some sort of context for us?

MR. FLANAGAN: That is a very good point. It's true. Well, I mean, about a third of the French forces that are deployed outside the country are with NATO missions. And as you mentioned, a command in Kosovo mission right now – about 1500 – I didn't mention that earlier – 1500 forces already in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission, and another 2200 troops in K4, in Kosovo as part of that commitment, as well as the command.

I mean, the main difference will be that France has opted out of the integrated military planning. Its military has always, throughout all of the last few administrations in Paris, has been very anxious really since the Gulf War when they saw the way in which their failure to participate in the integrated military planning structure, and to get some of the other benefits of the information sharing and technology sharing within the alliance was potentially really leaving the French way behind in the revolution in military affairs as it was being called then. And really all through that period, the French have been looking, the French military have been looking for a way for an opening to get back to have a closer relationship.

At the operational level, the U.S. and the French, and the other NATO militaries work very well together. There is really very little problem. France adapts itself to most of the NATO standards and procedures for operations. It's not really an issue. But on the issue of integrated planning, it does leave the French a little bit outside of the tent in the sense of their overall understanding of the way in which NATO thinks about and develops operations is a little bit sort of looking, you know, over from the observer gallery.

So they get a lot of information, they have a pretty big military – I mean, they have about 300 – almost 300 military officers assigned to NATO headquarters, and many at the military command as well, but it's, again, they're not inside the room when these decisions are being made; they are not as familiar with the NATO planning processes.

So I think it would strengthen the overall and political – it will strengthen the overall effectiveness of NATO's integrated military planning, but it would also send an important signal, political signal in the sense that NATO is once again engaged in a full integration of its members, and all of the activities, and help provide additional support for the idea that the risks and the responsibilities ought to be shared in a more equal way. So I think it will still help enhance capabilities over the long term.

MS. SMITH: Just to add onto that, I think there is an interesting NATO dimension, but there is a very interesting dimension when you look strictly at Paris, and that is that just the communications angle, because the French public I think is not always – has not been well aware of how much France has been contributing to the mission on the ground in Afghanistan. It's been a very quiet, kind of behind-the-scenes contribution. You know, if you ask your average citizen in France, are you aware of the fact that your country has 1200 troops on the ground in Afghanistan, I think you'd get looks of curiosity.

And so if France makes this big, bold announcement, both in Bucharest about increasing its troop commitments and then the full integrations probably in 2009 at the 60th anniversary summit, and it hosts the summit, which is still being debated, that could be an interesting twist for the French public to kind of come to terms because there isn't as much enthusiasm for the alliance inside France – much more stronger support of the European Union and its efforts to build a separate capacity. So that could be interesting to see how the French press reacts to that as well.

MR. FLANAGAN: Well, I alluded a little bit to that in the sense that the expectation is the additional French forces are – most of the speculation has been that they might – they will likely go to the east where there has been – the mission has been moving ahead a little bit and to relieve – I mean, the U.S. will definitely be shipping some of those Marines to the south and I'm not exactly sure whether they will come in directly in support of the Canadian forces in Kandahar, but I do think that they will – you will see some – you definitely will see an additional spike of upwards of 2200-or-so forces, U.S., into the southern region as a result of the addition of the Marines there.

But the specific question – I think the Canadians were as much looking from other – other European allies to step up to the plate and to support. And the Danes have been a little more quiet about it, but they are also – they are equally concerned about the sense that there is an uneven sharing of risks and responsibilities in the southern region where the insurgency – and some of you may have seen some of the briefings our colleagues Tony Cordesman has given on this – where the insurgency is likely to see an important spike in the spring.

Q: (Off mike.)

MR. FLANAGAN: In the Canadian sector – I don't – I don't know the answer to that question. I'm sorry. There will be some shift to the south. Whether they will be immediately in the Canadian positions that are occupied in Kandahar, I'm not sure.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you all very much for coming. We will have a transcript out later today. You can find that at www.csis.org. And I'll also be e-mailing it out to you. Thanks so much.

(END)