

Computer Technology and National Security

“Advantages will go to states that have a strong commercial technology sector and develop effective ways to link these capabilities to their national defense industrial base.”

—Central Intelligence Agency, “Global Trends 2015”

The more flexible and precise military force that the U.S. could develop using information technology would have an advantage in the new international security environment.

The centerpiece of the revolution in military affairs is the shift from weapon-centric warfare to network-centric warfare. Many efforts are under way to incorporate information technologies into military operations. Future military operations will involve extensive networks of sensors, databases, command, control, and analytical capabilities that provide information directly to the warfighter and to smart weaponry on an immediate, real-time basis. Computing and network innovations will allow for seamless, real-time connections between troops, sensors, command, platform, and weapon. Data from sensor platforms such as remote sensing satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles, automatically processed and referenced against existing databases located hundreds or thousands of miles away, could be communicated directly to soldiers, platforms, and intelligent weapons. The physical dispersal of forces need not degrade command and control, and maneuver and targeting capabilities can be enhanced and accelerated.

The more flexible and precise military force that the United States could develop using information technology would have an advantage in the new international security environment. Maintaining U.S. superiority requires taking a number of steps: forming partnerships with the information technology industry and academic community; creating a process to increase the flow of innovation and to change doctrine and practices accordingly; and building a strong foundation of education and research to ensure that U.S. technology is as advanced in 10 years as it is today.

Partnership with the private sector is a “new” tool for governance that the United States has already begun to use in areas like encryption policy and critical infrastructure protection to address national security problems where the private sector has an equal role to play. Vehicles for partnership include new, focused advisory groups, task forces, and exchange programs for DOD personnel at information technology companies, internships, and the establishment of joint research programs. The broad objective should be to create connections between the government and the private sector that match warfighters’ needs and private sector innovations. Ideally, DOD warfighters and private sector technical personnel

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(including chief technical officers) could work together to improve U.S. capabilities.

Creation of a joint evaluation center, staffed with both government and industry detailees to look at technologies and applications either in development or planned for development, would help the United States better understand, and adjust to, the new global technological environment. As a related measure, the United States might want to expand existing programs at the National Defense University (NDU) and other military education facilities. Existing efforts at NDU and the War Colleges could be reinforced by additional programs and faculty staffed by technologists from the information technologies industries. The United States may also want to integrate private sector information technology expertise directly into facilities like the Army's National Training Center for the development of new doctrine and tactics. Private sector experience may not translate directly to the military and government, but the experience of applying new information technologies to global companies and the effects this had on organizations could be valuable for guiding changes in the national security community.

New technologies are not a panacea—they must be accompanied by doctrinal and organizational changes to reap their full benefit. The French had better, and more, tanks in 1940 than did the Germans, but the Germans used their tanks in new ways. The United States, given the strength of its industry, will have greater opportunities than its potential opponents to gain the advantage if it can find ways to use these technologies to transform processes rather than merely injecting them into existing processes. The most immediate example of this would be logistics and acquisitions reform at the Department of Defense. The private sector has made advances in improving supply chain management and acquisitions that the national security community could mirror. Using B2B (business-to-business) models would streamline acquisitions activities.

The creation of a business-to-business portal by General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and DaimlerChrysler is a useful model for DOD. This experience of large competitive bureaucracies working together could map well to DOD and the armed services. The three companies formed a business-to-business integrated supplier exchange through a single global portal. It is an online global network that provides for catalog purchasing, bidding and price quotes, online sourcing, and auctions. In addition, it provides supply chain management functions such as capacity planning, demand forecasting, production planning, transaction automation, financial services, payment, and logistics. The companies were able to set up this supply chain network quickly and without putting sensitive information at an unacceptable risk.

Improved logistics and acquisitions processes will help address the problem of DOD's information technology often lagging behind the private sector in

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Adopting business-to-business practices could allow the DoD to have a faster “refresh rate” for IT, thus allowing them to keep pace with the private sector.

Current acquisition regulations may be the biggest obstacle to greater use of information technologies.

information technology. Using old technology can be expensive, as models go out of production and spare parts and maintenance costs increase. Adopting B2B (business to business) practices can allow DOD and the armed services to have a faster “refresh rate” for information technology. Solving this problem will require changes in funding and acquisitions practices, but it will also require using technologies incorporating open systems and standards and “plug-n-play” technologies by DOD, to allow easier upgrading of systems.

Partnerships with the private sector that can increase the flow of innovation to the national security community will require changes in acquisition practices and a devolving of acquisition authority to the “customer” rather than some intermediary, or complex, hierarchical review process. Existing acquisition practices are a disincentive for innovative information industry companies. Although Defense contractors have mastered the complex defense acquisition system, information companies whose primary market is global and civil may find the opportunity cost of working with DOD on specific applications too high. The leading innovators are not defense contractors and are unwilling to absorb the costs of learning how to sell to DOD; they can make as much money or more selling to the commercial market. Acquisition regulations may be the biggest obstacle to greater use of information technologies. Congress and the administration need to change the acquisitions process to allow the United States to gain the full benefit of its lead in commercial technologies.

Some problems of interest to the national security community (global operations and logistics, acquisitions, purchasing, data mining) have already gone through several iterations in the private sector. The United States can capitalize on these experiences. DOD and the private sector could explore these commercial innovations now for projects of national security benefit. As first step in translating these concepts in practical tools, DOD or DARPA might wish to begin four or five fast-track programs with leading information technology companies to develop new applications. Possible fast-track program areas include:

—**Wireless broadband applications.** The military is likely to be one of the most avid consumers of wireless broadband applications. These applications can help solve the “last mile” problem by greatly extending data and communications networks. One commercial model, for example, uses a low earth-orbit satellite network to provide data transfer rates of up to 200 kilobits per second to aircraft. The Global Broadband System (GBS) and its predecessor the Joint Broadband System offer existing platforms for the integration of new technologies. Other commercial products in development (such as those using Bluetooth or other short-range, secure wireless standards) could also be applied to military applications.

—**Pervasive computing/embedded intelligence.** Cheap, powerful CPUs and

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Possible fast-track program areas:

1. Wireless broadband

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pecially designed operating systems and applications can be incorporated into ships, aircraft, vehicles, and facilities, creating dense networks of “intelligent” devices. These devices could automate functions and provide a more detailed and complete situational awareness. Managing the floods of data generated by these dense networks of intelligent devices will itself have to be automated, using software agents, data mining, and other applications. Pervasive computing and network technologies would enhance redundancy and improve communications across commands, and artificial intelligence functions could improve computerized pattern recognition to allow automated rules of engagement, rapid assignment of weapons to hundreds of targets, and some automated maneuver and logistics functions.

—**Software agents, or “bots.”** Bots are software tools for retrieving and managing information from remote sites on the network. Defense has a number of projects already under way to exploit software agents. These tools can perform statistical analysis, resource discovery, network maintenance, and updating and can provide “mirroring” of information. More sophisticated bots can be self-configuring and can make decisions on how to refine searches based on their own search experience.¹

—**Data mining.** Database applications that automatically search for new patterns or new relationships in a large amount of data offer possibilities for improved intelligence functions, maintenance, personnel, and other activities. Combined with software agents, data mining would enhance and accelerate the tasking, processing, evaluation, and dissemination (TPEDS) process used in the intelligence community.

—**Collaborative virtual workspace.** Group-to-group communications networks can bring people together in real time, regardless of their physical location, for large-scale distributed meetings, collaborative work sessions, and training, using large-format displays and “intelligent” meeting rooms.

Addressing issues in education and long-term research development are also crucial for national security.

Education, Research and Development

Enhancing national security with new information technology also requires addressing fundamental problems in education and long-term research and development. The United States faces a shortage of skilled workers in the information technology sector. This shortage has worsened in recent years, particularly in the government, where organization and pay scales put it at a disadvantage in competing for skilled information technology personnel. The general shortage means that information technology workers are expensive, making it difficult to staff positions at government salaries—particularly at entry levels. The private sector can overcome this shortfall by recruiting skilled labor from foreign countries, but this does not work for national security applications. The United

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States needs to find the incentives and develop the programs that will produce an adequate supply of information technologists. One solution is to adopt a scholarship model where the United States would pay for higher education in exchange for a commitment to service for a number of years, as is already done with other short-supply skills such as medical care.

Maintaining U.S. superiority also requires addressing the long-term problem of funding research and development. The United States needs to ensure that the pipeline of innovation does not run dry, as that would eliminate an important element of U.S. superiority. This expansion should apply to research both in specific information technologies and in the basic research that underpins developments in information technologies. Basic research funded by DARPA and others in the 1970s and 1980s underlies much of the progress made in information technology in the past two decades. This kind of long-term investment must be repeated to maintain U.S. superiority.

Cyberspace capabilities must match the deterrent and defensive capabilities of U.S. strategic and conventional forces.

Attention to the fundamentals (education and research and development) is essential for the United States to protect its national security in the face of challenges from potential opponents. Other nations are deeply interested in the use of information technologies to gain “asymmetric” advantage over the United States. Export controls do nothing to help manage this risk, as they cannot catch the technologies involved. An increased pace for innovation by the United States, however, will make it harder for potential opponents to benefit from asymmetric approaches. Although the United States is perhaps the nation most vulnerable to cyberattack, it is also the best positioned (given the size of its industry and its defense establishment) to exploit new technologies to its advantage, including in information warfare.

Potential opponents will also face a more difficult task if the United States pays sufficient attention to information security. To some extent, this is a question of making strong, well-designed interoperable encryption an integral part of national security applications. Progress is also necessary in critical infrastructure protection and information assurance efforts. Some efforts are already under way at Defense, such as DOD’s Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for its own network. The United States has made progress in protecting its critical infrastructures, but the task is not complete. Information technologies can strengthen U.S. military forces’ ability to operate in physical dimensions, but the United States also needs to ensure that U.S. cyberspace capabilities match the deterrent and defensive capabilities of U.S. strategic and conventional forces.

As part of this, the United States also needs to expand its ability to assess what other nations’ forces can do with commercial technology and widely available military technology. It could perhaps use joint military/private sector evaluation

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centers and industry partnerships to counter attempts to gain asymmetric advantage by developing DOD programs and initiatives.

Developing and strengthening partnership with the information technology sector requires finding new vehicles that differ from the traditional relationship with a “contractor” and to make the changes in organizational structures and procedures that would allow and accelerate these partnerships. These partnerships are central, as the bulk of innovation and development of applications and networking technologies is taking place in the private sector. There is a precedent for this—the resolution of the debate over encryption is one such model. It will not be possible to turn information technology companies into defense contractors (and it is not in the national interest to do so), but there are ways to build cooperative relationships that provide benefits to both.

Notes

¹ There is abundant literature in military periodicals on this point. A recent recommendation would be, for example, the 2000 Report of the Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (“The Information Edge: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial Information in an Evolving National Environment,” December 2000) which says: “NIMA should aggressively explore ways to realize the large potential for improving effectiveness through ‘force multiplier’ opportunity in automated extraction tools or both geospatial and image analysis.”