



# JAPAN CHAIR PLATFORM

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## **CSIS Japan Chair Study Group New Roles and Missions: Transforming the U.S.-Japan Alliance Report of the Cochairs**

*A key principle of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—the notion that the United States is primarily responsible for regional security and that Japan plays a secondary role—appears increasingly anachronistic when Japan is exploring new ways to expand its contributions to international security and the United States views its close ally as a key partner in the war on terror. The joint statement released during the recent Bush-Koizumi summit reaffirms a strategic commitment to define the security relationship in a global context and also welcomes advances in bilateral security coordination that will better position the alliance to meet new threats. Accompanying the great potential to expand Japan's role in the alliance are numerous logistical, institutional and legal questions that could affect the extent to which Japan can implement envisioned roles and missions. Japan's active discussions in the wake of North Korea's July 4 missile tests regarding long-range strike capability on missile launch pads and other issues adds to the urgency of getting U.S.-Japan coordination right.*

*The Japan Chair convened a study group in spring 2006 to analyze the expectations, requirements, and obstacles for future alliance cooperation and produce a set of policy recommendations for public debate. To that end, this report addresses critical themes and offers a glimpse of the challenges ahead. This is not a consensus document. The participants do not necessarily agree with all of the conclusions in this report, and this report does not represent the views of their affiliated institutions.*

### **Security Environment**

The international community is struggling to meet the security concerns of the post-September 11 era. Persistent threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction further destabilize a fluid security environment. This is particularly relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, where security concerns such as territorial disputes, piracy in sea lines of communication, proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, and Islamic fundamentalism paint a troubling picture. Despite the inauguration of the Association of Southeast-Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in 1994, Asia has yet to develop a comprehensive security framework equivalent to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to address security challenges, and while some form of regional architecture will emerge over time, security cooperation in the short run must stem from solid alliance relationships.

Meanwhile, the United States is transforming its global military posture to defeat major threats and considers the U.S.-Japan alliance central to this effort in Asia and beyond. The two governments are currently exploring new ways for Japan to assume greater responsibilities as an alliance partner, a process that will invite heated debate in Tokyo over the degree to which Japan should imbed itself in the U.S. global strategy and over the logistical, institutional, and legal ramifications of expanding Japan's contributions to international security. Japan has managed only ad hoc responses to security challenges since September 11, and this approach is unsustainable. We believe it is in the interests of both countries that Japan should continue to take on greater responsibilities to defend its territory against new threats and maintain the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the foundation for regional peace and stability. A robust alliance also would create a multiplier effect, as the two nations seek additional partners for future operations and contemplate regional security architecture. This is a pivotal moment in U.S.-Japan policy coordination where strategic convergence must be achieved. A key

ingredient to success would be an expansive mandate for the Self-Defense Force (SDF) of Japan to affect greater security cooperation in the future.

## **Evolution of the Alliance to Date**

The alliance has a long history of adapting to changes in the security environment. A bilateral security treaty was concluded in 1951 justifying the continuation of the U.S.-force presence for U.S. general security obligations in the Far East. Japan's demands for more say in the security relationship prompted the two nations to revise the treaty in 1960 to increase Japan's control over U.S. bases in Japan, including limiting their role in defending Japan and in ensuring peace and security in the Far East. Bilateral defense guidelines were agreed on in 1978 that paved the way for Japan to play a greater role in air and sea-lane defense. In response to criticism of Japan's failure to contribute forces to the Gulf War and its "checkbook diplomacy," the government of Japan dispatched its SDF overseas for the first time, in 1991, to conduct minesweeping activities in the wake of the Gulf War. Concerns about instability in the Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula and the need to recast the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in a post-Cold War context, led the two governments to announce a joint declaration on security in 1996 and revise the defense guidelines a year later to facilitate a greater SDF supporting role in regional security. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi spearheaded two pieces of special legislation in the post-September 11 era to enable the SDF to conduct refueling operations in the Indian Ocean during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and reconstruction efforts in Iraq in 2003. At every turn, the role of the SDF has increased to make Japan more of an equal player in the alliance. Strong political leadership in both countries and sustained policy coordination at all levels of government can ease the transition to a new chapter in the development of the alliance.

## **Current Bilateral Agreements on the Way Ahead**

### ***"Two Plus Two" Statements***

The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) has issued a series of statements over the past two years expressing support for additional SDF missions. The first document, released in February 2005, listed common regional and global security objectives calling for strengthened bilateral defense cooperation in pursuit of those objectives. This was followed by a report in October 2005 detailing plans for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and offering examples of roles and missions to facilitate coordination and interoperability. The two governments then focused exclusively on the details of realignment and announced an agreement in May 2006 along with another joint statement that reiterated generalities about roles and missions but shed little light on future plans. This leaves several questions unanswered: Which roles and missions is Japan prepared to perform? Does Japan have the capability and the capacity to meet U.S. expectations on future roles and missions? Is the current alliance structure appropriate for such expanded roles? What are the issues and obstacles that must be overcome?

### ***Agreement on Strategic Objectives***

The February 2005 SCC statement included a broad range of common security objectives. Some of them were familiar, such as the security of the Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula that was mentioned in the Sato-Nixon communiqué of 1969 in the context of the reversion of Okinawa. Yet others, such as the resolution of the Northern Territories issue between Japan and Russia and Japan's desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, seemed to reflect Japan's foreign policy objectives but did not present obvious roles and missions for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The SCC took a bold and welcome step in expanding the range of security concerns for the two countries to consider. The challenge now is to prioritize areas for bilateral security cooperation and determine what changes might be necessary to facilitate such cooperation.

## **Study Group Findings on Implementing Roles and Missions**

The October 2005 statement focusing on roles and missions was an important step forward conceptually but also appears somewhat incongruous in places. The section listing examples of bilateral security and defense

cooperation to be improved combines brief references to broad missions such as humanitarian relief operations with logistical tools for alliance coordination. It is noteworthy, however, that the statement also includes seven essential steps to strengthen cooperation: close and continuous policy and operational coordination; advancing bilateral contingency planning; enhancing information sharing and intelligence cooperation; improving interoperability; expanding training opportunities in Japan and the United States; shared use of facilities by U.S. forces and the SDF; and ballistic missile defense. Critical elements of alliance transformation were identified, but a plan to synthesize goals and operations is still to be determined.

Alliance managers are to be congratulated for bringing the process so far. In anticipation of the next stage in bilateral discussions on roles and missions, the study group sought to find consensus among experts on ways to narrow the gap between expansive objectives and their implementation and on identifying challenges that may be confronted. If Japan and the United States seek to realize the strategic objectives identified by the SCC, we believe the two governments should emphasize the following roles and missions, which are listed in order from areas that are the most developed to those with potential:

**1) Missile Defense:** Implementing effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation in operations, acquisition, and policy is a matter of strategic necessity, given North Korea's most recent provocations and concerns about China's growing military arsenal. Further, this conceptually and operationally serves as a prime example of effective alliance cooperation. Japan has conducted joint research with the United States since 1999, and cooperation will continue into the joint development of future missile-defense upgrades. Deployment into Japan of an early warning X-band radar system, as well as the introduction of additional PAC-3 units, will strengthen Japanese missile defense capabilities. Revision of the SDF law in 2005 to authorize SDF interception of incoming missiles is critical to effective joint U.S.-Japan BMD operations.

**Challenges:** BMD is transforming the alliance in many ways. In the past, there was a clear demarcation of roles and missions with respect to the defense of Japan and the defense of U.S. territory. But the introduction of BMD in Japan implies that the SDF could be called on to prevent threats against the United States. Major challenges include the constraints on defense industrial cooperation due to Japan's reluctance to export arms to third countries; the prevailing view that the constitution prohibits Japan from exercising the right to collective self-defense, which would prevent Japan from destroying missiles destined for the United States; establishing common missile defense policy; information sharing between the United States and Japan; command and control for real-time joint operations; and the use of space.

**2) Defending Offshore Islands:** The defense of Japan remains the top priority of the SDF and a core function of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Although a full-scale invasion of Japan has become less likely, a series of events within the last decade, most notably the discovery of Chinese nuclear submarines and North Korean armed vessels in Japanese territorial waters, led the government of Japan to identify the invasion of offshore islands as one of five major challenges in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2004. Lingering territorial disputes with neighboring countries also prompted this increased preparation for low-intensity conflict in the areas surrounding offshore islands. This commitment was underscored by joint exercises conducted in January 2006 by the U.S. Marines and the SDF that focused on the defense of unspecified remote islands.

**Challenges:** The government of Japan is determined to protect its perceived territory and has expanded joint training exercises among various agencies, such as the SDF, the Coast Guard, and prefectural police forces. The U.S. role in such contingencies is not entirely clear, however. If a large-scale attack on a Japanese remote island were to occur, U.S. policymakers would definitely consider supporting Japan under Article 5 of the Security Treaty and would presumably operate under the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. But in delicate cases such as an invasion of territory claimed by other countries, the United States would face a difficult political choice between assisting Japan and not interfering in territorial disputes. The group concluded that the alliance is well suited to handle these contingencies but that continued coordination and planning should be encouraged.

**3) Maritime Security:** The SDF already conducts patrol and surveillance operations in areas surrounding Japan and should build on this experience to play a larger role in the security of the commons, such as sea lanes and

strategic choke points. It could also capitalize on minesweeping and antisubmarine warfare capabilities developed during the Cold War to protect sea lines of communication. Although one-third of world trade and one-half of the world's oil shipments, including 80 percent of Japan's oil imports, pass through the Strait of Malacca, most Asian countries do not have adequate antipiracy laws and lack the capacity to patrol the seas. The Phillip Channel, the narrowest section of the straits, shrinks to 1.2 nautical miles and a depth of only 25 meters. If terrorists were to devastate the world economy, it would be hard to find a better target. Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia reached an agreement on coordinated patrols, and Japan recently provided Indonesia with patrol ships to improve the situation. There is great potential for U.S.-Japan cooperation in this field, both bilaterally and with regional partners such as Australia and India.

**Challenges:** Japan lacks both a comprehensive maritime strategy and the centralized coordination mechanism necessary to play a central role. This is too complex a challenge for the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to tackle alone, and the government could therefore emphasize greater coordination with civilian agencies such as the Coast Guard, customs, and port authorities. Similar coordination between the United States and Japan would also be critical in terms of applying concepts of maritime domain awareness. Recent improvements in cooperation between the Coast Guard and the MSDF reveal great potential for enhanced interoperability among Japanese agencies. The civilian agencies might also be recognized as new players in alliance management and might be integrated into bilateral coordination mechanisms. Bilateral cooperation could extend throughout the region to defend vital maritime traffic routes. This requires power-projection capability against deep water and oceanic threats, and Japan would need to improve sea-basing operations accordingly.

**4) Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief/Peacekeeping Operations:** The SDF has developed expertise in humanitarian, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations as a result of several United Nations missions in the 1990s and more recent experiences in Iraq, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Given the SDF's solid record of achievement in this field and the fact that noncombat missions are more politically acceptable, it is only natural to designate humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and reconstruction operations as primary international missions and to increase the capacity to lead such efforts in the future. The 2004 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) emphasized these missions under the rubric of "international peace cooperation activities," and the government of Japan recently submitted legislation to the Diet that would revise the SDF law to make humanitarian and peacekeeping activities a primary mission of the SDF. This is a positive step in Japan's efforts to make greater contributions to international security and one that the United States will continue to welcome. Recent experience also demonstrates that humanitarian operations and economic assistance are inextricably linked. The 2004 NDPG states that "in order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the government of Japan will actively carry out diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of ODA." This approach was supported by coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Japan should continue to provide economic resources for nation building.

**Challenges:** Japan would have to address four major challenges to assume an even greater role in humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction operations. First, the lack of a permanent law for international security operations severely hampers Japan's ability to respond to international crises. Second, existing law created to facilitate participation in UN peacekeeping missions in the past (namely, the International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992) does not present a clear and effective command structure within the government to manage various aspects of such missions, including the authorization of the use of force. For example, the SDF and other civilian personnel have participated in UN peacekeeping missions together as part of an International Peace Cooperation Corps under the direction of the Cabinet Office, but the government did not have the expertise to manage both civilian and military personnel, thus complicating the chain of command and hampering cooperation between the SDF and civilian agencies. The absence of a unified command structure for personnel deployments overseas complicates coordination both within the government and with coalition partners. Special legislation passed since 2001, however, clearly authorizes the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) to dispatch personnel under its direct command, and the creation of a Joint Staff Office in the JDA this past March was a remarkable step toward a more integrated unity of command within JDA and hence toward more efficient operations in the field. A third challenge is the fact that the International Disaster Relief Team Law

does not authorize the use of weapons, and the SDF cannot be dispatched absent law and order in the affected areas. In emergency situations, it is unrealistic to expect local governments to create such conditions for the participation of the SDF. Finally, in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and East Timor, where the combination of SDF operations and official development assistance (ODA) prove critical, cooperation between agencies responsible for economic aid and the JDA could be improved to strengthen the impact of these missions.

**5) Counterproliferation:** The United States launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 in response to the mounting threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Japan has demonstrated its commitment to counterproliferation by joining PSI as an original core member and has participated in more than 15 various exercises and meetings, having also hosted 1 international exercise in 2004. Japan traditionally considered counterproliferation efforts a matter for domestic law enforcement, but as the shipment of WMD has been identified as a useful tool for rogue regimes or terrorists to acquire such weapons and related technologies, maritime interdiction by naval forces has become the centerpiece of alliance contributions in this area. The United States and Japan could lead regional partners in norm-setting to ensure effective cooperation in the future.

**Challenges:** As noted above with respect to maritime security, cooperation between MSDF, the U.S. Navy, and civilian agencies of both countries could be improved. As revealed during counterterrorism operations in the Indian Ocean during Operation Enduring Freedom, the SDF is not authorized to engage in maritime interdiction on the high seas in peacetime, and the SDF law would have to be revised to substantially expand its role to support civilian agencies such as the Coast Guard. Multilateral initiatives to clarify legal jurisdictions for maritime interdiction would also need to be pursued.

**6) Counterterrorism:** Since the attacks of September 11, the United States has vigorously pursued the global war on terror and established counterterrorism activities as a major theme of international security cooperation. Prime Minister Koizumi pledged his clear support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts at a very early stage and rapidly ushered several pieces of legislation through the Diet to that end. The passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and revisions to the SDF law enabled SDF roles in logistical support for coalition forces in the Indian Ocean and clarified the SDF role in protecting U.S. forces and critical infrastructure in Japan. This was a marked departure from previous notions of security policy, in that Japan's roles were no longer limited to "situations surrounding Japan," and terrorism was no longer viewed exclusively as a domestic law enforcement matter. The special measures legislation is temporary, however, and has been renewed several times. Japan should find a way to reassure the United States and other partners that its military is fully committed to counterterrorism efforts over the long term.

**Challenges:** At a minimum, logistical support for counterterrorism activities such as the refueling operations conducted in the Indian Ocean during Operation Enduring Freedom should be firmly established as an SDF mission. In terms of working to rebuild failed states, Japan's reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan arguably constitute a form of counterterrorism, though this approach does not always conform to U.S. interpretations. Japan also has a great role to play in capacity building for fledgling governments and in training local security forces. Once again, interdiction capabilities would also prove useful. As in the case of counterproliferation, civilian law enforcement agencies such as the police play a central role in counterterrorism, and coordination between these agencies and the SDF should be improved.

## Other Concerns

The group identified several other noteworthy concerns. Some are general to the policymaking process in Japan, while others apply directly to alliance management.

**Budgetary Constraints:** A lingering budget deficit and political sensitivities against growth in defense spending limit SDF capacity significantly. BMD spending must be fit together with funding of other major programs, personnel and operation expenses, and host-nation support. Further, the recent agreement on realignment commits the government of Japan to cover 59 percent of the cost of relocating U.S. troops from

Okinawa to Guam, approximately \$6 billion. Capacity building could prove difficult without greater flexibility for discretionary spending.

**Legal Constraints:** SDF roles and missions are limited by various legal constraints that have been legislated by the Diet or the Cabinet Legislative Bureau. Most of these constraints are drawn from the spirit of Article 9 of the constitution and strong pacifist sentiment among political leaders and the public after World War II. These include impractical restrictions on the use of military force abroad; five required conditions for participation in UN peacekeeping operations and international humanitarian operations; and the ban on the right of collective self-defense. In the last 60 years, the security environment around Japan has changed considerably. In response to such changes, Japan has made great progress in expanding the parameters of security cooperation since the 1991 Gulf War, particularly after September 11. Yet the constitutional framework for such cooperation—Article 9 of the constitution, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and executive agreements such as the Status of Forces Agreement and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation—has not changed to reflect new challenges and expectations. Further, recent SDF deployments were based on short-term special measures laws that had to be extended by the Diet. Lawmakers could hold up legislation for political purposes having nothing to do with geostrategic considerations, causing a lengthy debate that would do little to improve Japan’s capacity to contribute to international security operations in the short run. Even if the legal framework were to change, the United States should not assume that Japanese attitudes toward security policy will be altered dramatically given a deeply rooted pacifist tradition. The group agreed that short-term special measures laws are not optimal but failed to reach consensus on the need for constitutional revision.

**Bureaucratic Inertia:** Limited interagency coordination in Japan and the United States prevents any dynamic movement toward common objectives. In the past decade, the government structure in Japan has changed to shift the center of gravity from various divided agencies to the Office of the Prime Minister. The expansion of the Cabinet Secretariat is noteworthy, and this trend should be conducive to improved alliance management, as should U.S. efforts to make progress in this area.

**Intelligence Capabilities:** Over the last decade, the United States and Japan have had intense discussions on the need to improve intelligence cooperation. Although Japan recognizes the need to improve intelligence gathering capabilities and methods of protecting intelligence information, the study group noted the persistent reluctance of government agencies to make progress in these areas. These weaknesses have been noted in similar reports in the past and were most recently recognized in a report released by the Liberal Democratic Party in June 2006. To be sure, there have been several improvements in the field of defense intelligence in the last decade such as the creation of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) in 1997; the revision of the SDF law in 2002 to stiffen penalties for leaking classified information; and the MOU signed in April 2006 by the JDA and the Pentagon, regarding the protection of computer network and information security. The SCC has promised to take additional measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities. Intelligence sharing with other nations will also prove important as new roles and missions are developed. The absence of a central intelligence organization in Japan and of standardized security procedures are major obstacles.

**Perception Gap:** Although the two governments share an understanding of Japan’s need to assume greater roles and missions, some argue that the Japanese public’s view of security still amounts to nothing more than domestic law enforcement. Government reports such as the National Defense Program Guidelines or the Defense White Paper, while important, hardly resonate with the people of Japan. Promoting an expanded role for the SDF will prove difficult if the population does not appreciate the benefits of regional and global security cooperation for their own security. At the same time, the United States should not assume that Japan’s interpretation of its role as a “normal nation” will necessarily coincide with U.S. expectations. In other words, the two governments must have a clear understanding of the roles Japan is most comfortable with.

## Policy Recommendations

### *Institutional Transformation*

- Expanding the parameters of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation automatically introduces new players into the process. The United States and Japan should firmly establish a bilateral coordination mechanism to integrate the increasing numbers of agencies involved in alliance cooperation. The “Two plus Two” (SCC) is insufficient to advance global security cooperation and should include representatives of civilian agencies such as the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Finance. A Japan-U.S. Treaty Organization (JUSTO) should be established with an expanded SCC as a ministerial level decisionmaking body with the support of a secretariat to coordinate the day-to-day management of the alliance.
- An Office of Global Security Affairs (a Japanese NSC) should be established under the Cabinet Secretariat to craft the national security strategy and facilitate interagency cooperation.

### *Legal Framework*

- The best way for the government to advance SDF roles and missions would be to reinterpret the perceived ban on Japan’s right of collective self-defense and support more practical restrictions on the use of force. To avoid gaps in expectations and alliance coordination, Japan would have to identify the situations in which it would exercise the right of collective self-defense.
- The Diet should pass a permanent SDF dispatch law and a basic national security law sanctioning the roles and missions outlined above, including a mandate that the government issue a national security strategy every five years to articulate security objectives for the public. Legislation advocating significant departures from current roles and missions may become entangled in the debate over constitutional revision. A less controversial approach might promote a permanent law under current legal restrictions to expedite SDF deployments in the short run but allow for subsequent revisions based on the outcome of the constitutional debate.
- The government should pass one comprehensive law for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations, including the right to carry weapons for disaster-relief missions. The current ban is impractical, given that peacekeeping or disaster-relief operations often take place in unstable environments. The use of force authorized under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter should be fully exercised by Japan, but the principle of minimum (or proportionate) use of force should be maintained. Detailed rules of engagement should be established allowing SDF personnel to use force to defend themselves, entrusted personnel, and vital infrastructure crucial to their missions. Such rules of engagement should be specific to operational requirements and the regional environment.
- The five principles of peacekeeping operations participation, as stipulated in the International Peace Cooperation Law, and the restriction of the SDF to “non-combat zones” in special legislation, would have to be reviewed to expand the range of SDF activities.
- Reviews of the Status of Forces Agreement, the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, or the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty might be initiated to update the overall framework for alliance cooperation, but the group did not reach consensus on this point.

### *Improving Government Capacity and Capabilities*

- The government should continue to pursue, and increasingly classify, public diplomacy, official development assistance, and the operations of SDF and civilian agencies such as the Coast Guard and police as forms of maritime security, humanitarian assistance, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism.

- The United States and Japan should continue to engage in joint training exercises to improve interoperability. Japan could share its experience in encouraging cooperation with local partners in the context of humanitarian missions. In addition, enhanced cooperation with other regional partners such as Australia and India should be considered.
- The government of Japan should designate national security agencies within existing agencies and train staff as national security officers. A national security education program might be necessary to generate understanding among different agencies that must cooperate to achieve common security objectives.

### ***Improving SDF Capacity and Capabilities***

- The Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces should acquire additional assets such as long-distance refueling aircraft and transport vessels to support humanitarian relief operations, peacekeeping missions, and maritime interdiction activities.
- The Air Self-Defense Force should continue to improve advanced long-distance fighter capabilities to counter emerging threats from nearby countries.
- The Maritime Self-Defense Force should update antisubmarine warfare and power-projection capabilities to defend against new threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. The acquisition of additional refueling tankers, long-distance aircraft, hospital ships, and aircraft carriers may advance the capacity for complex and long-distance missions.
- The Ground Self-Defense Force has excelled at fostering cultural awareness and there is potential for alliance cooperation in this area. The SDF should improve language training to create more opportunities for service overseas.

### ***Intelligence Gathering***

- Intelligence gathering and information sharing should be centralized in Japan under a National Intelligence Agency (NIA) in order to support the prime minister's leadership in security affairs and to provide necessary intelligence to ministries and agencies that conduct security operations. The NIA could be the leader of the Japanese intelligence community and make necessary arrangements to protect shared classified information. Ideally, the cabinet should have a comprehensive intelligence-security law to protect all secrets held by the Japanese government and to standardize the treatment of secret intelligence. The law should also establish parliament oversight of government intelligence activities. Further improvements could be made by signing a general security of military information agreement (GSOMIA) with foreign partners, including the United States.

### ***Long-Term Force Structure***

- The United States and Japan should consider innovative approaches to force structure and should not get caught up in the technical aspects of alliance management. The importance of the U.S. force presence in Japan and the strategic necessity of realignment are not widely understood in Japan, and the governments must improve outreach efforts. The SCC agreement of May 2006 was a small but important step in a long-term process of reducing the burden of the U.S. force presence in Japan, especially in Okinawa. The total return of U.S. bases was posited in group discussions, but no consensus was reached on long-term force posture.

## **Conclusion**

The U.S.-Japan alliance has evolved successfully over the last 50 years and this process should continue. The two governments have declared new strategic objectives to further defend against the threats of the post-September 11 era and have identified areas for improved coordination and interoperability between forces. Enhancing SDF capabilities as well as national security institutions, accordingly, would strengthen Japan's ability to defend its own territory, reinforce alliance leadership in regional security, and pave the way for greater

contributions to global security. How the government of Japan overcomes institutional and legal challenges while shaping the public debate over Japan's future security role will ultimately determine the degree to which Japan can assume greater roles and missions as a reliable U.S. ally in the future.

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\*The participants do not necessarily agree with all of the conclusions in this report, and this report does not represent the views of their affiliated institutions.

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