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**Asymmetric Threats and Arms Control:
The Impact of a Partial
and Full Peace in the Middle East**

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Table of Contents

A Full or Partial Peace?	1
The True Meaning of a “Warm” or “Perfect” Peace	2
The True Meaning of a “Cold,” “Failed,” or “Real” Peace	3
Western Definitions of Asymmetric Threats	4
Middle Eastern Definitions of Asymmetric Threats.....	5
Dealing With Asymmetric Threats: The Option of “Managed Peace(s)”	6
Dealing with the Issue of Drugs	7
A Developing Threat Whose Proportions are Still Not Clear: A US Estimate of Patterns in Global Drug Seizures by Area.....	8
Dealing with Border Problems from Smuggling, Disputes, and Transnational Threats	9
“Conventional” Counterterrorism.....	10
Patterns in Terrorism by Region.....	11
The New Threat Posed by Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Managing Creeping Proliferation - I	12
The New Threat Posed by Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Managing Creeping Proliferation – II	13
The New Threat Posed by Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Managing Creeping Proliferation – III.....	14
The Nominal Lethality of Different Biological Weapons.....	15
Terrorism and Unconventional War Fighting Options	16
The Problem of Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare	17
Attack Scenarios: “Dr. Ben No” and “Professor Abu Moriarity” At Work in the Middle East - Part I.....	18
Attack Scenarios: “Dr. Ben No” and “Professor Abu Moriarity” At Work in the Middle East - Part II	19
Attack Scenarios: “Dr. Ben No” and “Professor Abu Moriarity” At Work in the Middle East - Part III.....	20
New Forms of Conventional Warfare: e.g. Revolution in Military Affairs and Low Intensity Conflict.....	21
Information Warfare and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure.....	22

Violations of Arms Control and Peace Agreements.....23

A Full or Partial Peace?

- **Israeli-Palestinian**
- **Israeli-Syrian**
- **Lebanon?**
- **Iran-Iraq**
- **Iranian Moderation**
- **Iraqi Regime**
- **Border tensions and conflicts**
- **Ethnic and religious divisions**
- **Extra-regional Threats**

The True Meaning of a “Warm” or “Perfect” Peace

- **Stable political basis for full legal peace inside and outside of entire region**
- **Economic security**
- **Internal stability; No internal conflicts**
- **Border security: stable borders and secure freedom of movement**
- **Full regional cooperation in counterterrorism: “Your threat is my threat.”**
- **Full rule of law: Effective law enforcement with full human rights**
- **Effective arms control for both conventional forces and proliferation.**
- **No border tensions and conflicts**
- **No ethnic and religious divisions**
- **No extra-regional threats**

(THIS IS THE ONLY CASE THAT ELIMINATES THE RISK OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS)

The True Meaning of a “Cold,” “Failed,” or “Real” Peace

- **Peace is perceived as uncertain, unjust, or not meeting critical expectations.**
- **Major economic asymmetries, economic failures, or massive inequities.**
- **Peace fails to address critical issues: Water, refugees, other countries or parties.**
- **Hatreds, tensions, desire for revenge remains.**
- **Peace based on separation, exclusion, or segregation.**
- **Internal political, ethnic, and religious divisions**
- **Border feuds, closed borders, limited movement, infiltration, smuggling, unreconcilable enclaves.**
- **Water, off-shore, coastal, and/or riparian rights not resolved.**
- **Little or no cooperation in counterterrorism: “Your threat is my friend or freedom fighter.**
- **Limited rule of law with limited human rights**
- **New forms of arms races.**
- **Creeping proliferation; uncontrolled and expanding technological base**
- **Ethnic and religious divisions**
- **Extra-regional Threats**

Western Definitions of Asymmetric Threats

- **Drugs.**
- **Organized crime.**
- **Immigration.**
- **New forms of conventional warfare: e.g. low intensity conflict.**
- **Conventional terrorism**
- **Asymmetric use of weapons of mass destruction: State actors, proxies, terrorists, and extremists.**
- **Missile attacks.**
- **Information warfare and attacks on critical infrastructure.**

Middle Eastern Definitions of Asymmetric Threats

- **Drugs.**
 - **Border problems from smuggling, disputes, and transnational threats.**
 - **Ethnic and religious divisions.**
 - **Paramilitary political parties.**
 - **Border problems from smuggling, disputes, and transnational threats.**
 - *Conventional terrorism*
 - *New forms of conventional warfare: e.g. revolution in military affairs and low intensity conflict.*
 - *Asymmetric use of weapons of mass destruction: State actors, proxies, terrorists, and extremists.*
 - *Missile attacks.*
 - *Information warfare and attacks on critical infrastructure.*
- §□ **Violations of arms control and peace agreements.**

Dealing With Asymmetric Threats: The Option of “Managed Peace(s)”

- **Peace does not end many problems, particularly a partial peace.**
- **Progress towards some solutions does not depend on peace.**
- **Cooperation between governments in a wide range of areas will be critical with or without peace.**
- **The problem is to develop cooperation as opportunities develop, and to manage the peace process to deal with continuing threats.**
- **The military will play a critical role in many areas.**
- **There will be a growing linkage between security, peace enforcement, and arms control.**

Dealing with the Issue of Drugs

- **Demand-driven societal problem.**
- **Intensely corrupting to military and law enforcement.**
- **There are, however, many areas of potential cooperation:**
 - **Border surveillance and control, anti-smuggling.**
 - **Maritime surveillance and control, anti-smuggling.**
 - **Cooperation in intelligence.**
 - **Exchange of data on producers, traffickers, smugglers, and users.**
 - **Eradication programs.**
- **Difficult to separate from problems in counter-terrorism, broader issues in law enforcement.**

A Developing Threat Whose Proportions are Still Not Clear: A US Estimate of Patterns in Global Drug Seizures by Area

HEROIN

Europe	40%
South West Asia	24%
Africa and Oceania	1%
Americas	5%
South Asia (India)	5%
Middle East	3%
East and South-East Asia	22%

COCAINE

Americas	89%
Europe	10%
Rest of World	less than 1%

CANNABIS

Americas	69%
Europe	11%
Africa (inc. Maghreb)	13%
Asia and Pacific	7%

HASHISH

Europe	57%
Americas	5%
Africa	11%
Middle East	25%
Rest of Asia	2%

AMPHETAMINE-TYPE STIMULANTS

Europe	56%
East and South-East Asia	31%
Australia	2%
North America	10%
Rest of World	1%

Dealing with Border Problems from Smuggling, Disputes, and Transnational Threats

- **Tightly linked to many problems in peace enforcement, counterterrorism, and anti-drug operations:**
 - **Force limitation, disengagement agreements?**
 - **International bodies: UNIFIL, etc.?**
- **Requires clear border demarcations and/or zone agreements.**
- **Surveillance, sensors, cooperative forces, and national forces can be tailored for a wide variety of purposes.**
- **Military cooperation in a range of missions can ease tensions in peace enforcement.**
- **Military has a wide range of advantages:**
 - **Airborne recce/UAVs.**
 - **Night vision.**
 - **Sensors, electronic fences. etc.**
 - **Mobility + firepower.**
- **Clear link to major transportation nodes: Crossing points, key roads/.bridges, air and sea ports.**
- **Often a missing dimension in arms control, which stresses security over cooperation.**

“Conventional” Counterterrorism

- **Again, tightly linked to many problems in peace enforcement, counterterrorism, and anti-drug operations:**
 - **Force limitation, disengagement agreements?**
 - **International bodies: UNIFIL, etc.?**
- **Many aspects of military cooperation are similar to counter-drugs, and border security:**
 - **Cooperation in intelligence.**
 - **Exchange of data on producers, traffickers, smugglers, and users.**
 - **Border demarcations and/or zone agreements.**
 - **Surveillance, sensors, cooperative forces, and national forces can be tailored for a wide variety of purposes.**
 - **Military cooperation in a range of missions can ease tensions in peace enforcement.**
 - **Military has a wide range of advantages:**
 - **Airborne recce/UAVs.**
 - **Night vision.**
 - **Sensors, electronic fences. etc.**
 - **Mobility + firepower.**
 - **Clear link to major transportation nodes: Crossing points, key roads/bridges, air and sea ports.**
- **Much depends, however, on having a common definition of “terrorist”: Problems with “freedom fighter,” ethnic and religious issues, politics, human rights.**

Patterns in Terrorism by Region

<u>Total International Terrorist Attacks by Region</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
Africa	-	-	-	-	6	25	10	11	11	21	52
Asia	-	-	-	-	37	24	16	11	21	49	72
Eurasia	-	-	-	-	5	11	5	24	42	14	35
Latin America	-	-	-	-	97	58	92	84	128	110	116
Middle East	-	-	-	-	100	116	45	45	37	31	25
Western Europe	-	-	-	-	185	88	272	121	52	48	85
North America	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	0	13	0	2
Total – Worldwide	375	437	565	363	431	322	440	296	304	273	387

Source: Adapted from US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 1999, and Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, Department of State Publication 10610, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 2000.

The New Threat Posed by Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Managing Creeping Proliferation - I

- **Close links to arms control, evolving towards a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone**
 - **Links to international enforcement rules and regimes for NPT, CTBT, CWC, and BWC?**
 - **Links to controls on conventional threats.**
- **Delivery systems:**
 - **No rules that say must use a military delivery system: Covert attacks, proxies, terrorists, civilian transportation systems.**
 - **Cannot distinguish clearly between WMD and conventional delivery systems.**
 - **Are some areas for technical cooperation:**
 - **Open telemetry.**
 - **Open sites and production facilities.**
 - **Tagging of missiles and warheads.**
 - **Exercise and training transparency.**
 - **Missile freezes, rollbacks, and range (payload) limits or missiles or tests.**

The New Threat Posed by Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Managing Creeping Proliferation – II


- **Chemical threats:**
 - **Add to counterterrorism cooperation: Special sensors, inspections, intelligence exchanges.**
 - **Enhanced CWC cooperation.**
 - **Import transparency.**
 - **Munitions stockpile inspection.**
 - **Facility inspection.**
 - **Transparency in training and use of protection and contamination equipment.**
 - **Cooperation in response: Medical, transportation, rescue equipment, decontamination.**
- **Biological threats:**
 - **Similar in many ways to chemical threats.**
 - **Enhanced BWC cooperation**
 - **Transparency in research and development.**
 - **Cooperation in detection, forensics, characterization.**
 - **Warning, quarantines, medical services.**
 - **Emergency response.**

The New Threat Posed by Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Managing Creeping Proliferation – III

- **Nuclear threats:**
 - **Scale of nuclear and highly lethal biological approaches existential threats.**
 - **Enhanced NPT Cooperation.**
 - **Similar in many ways to chemical and biological threats.**
 - **Possible NBC or CBRN measures:**
 - **Force declarations.**
 - **Alert status.**
 - **Secure second-strike capability – interim or permanent.**

The Nominal Lethality of Different Biological Weapons

(Numbers of dead from delivery of 1,000 Kilograms)



<u>Agent</u>	<u>Downwind Reach</u> (kilometers)	<u>Casualties</u>	
		<u>Dead</u>	<u>Incapacitated</u>
Rift Valley Fever	1	400	35,000
Tick-Borne Encephalitis	1	9,500	35,000
Typhus	5	19,000	85,000
Brucellosis	10	500	100,000
Q Fever	20+	150	125,000
Tularemia	20+	30,000	125,000
Anthrax	20++	95,000	125,000

Terrorism and Unconventional War Fighting Options

- **Unconventional and terrorist delivery means offer significant incentives.**
- **Powers like Iran and Syria have used terrorists and extremists as proxies in attacking neighbors.**
- **Biological warfare -- the easiest way to achieve extremely high lethalties -- is best conducted in this manner.**
- **Past terrorist attacks have shown it can take months to years to firmly characterize the enemy and where terrorism have full state support.**
- **“Plausible deniability” may exist indefinitely and a state subject to an existential attack has no meaningful way to retaliate.**

The Problem of Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare

- Existing and projected detection and control technologies, arms control proposals, and concepts for missile defense assume that the primary threats are organized states and that relatively large efforts must be used.
- Conventional structures of deterrence assume identifiable and limited sets of opponents and similar values in dealing with issues like mutual destruction. Terrorist movements may be willing to take catastrophic risks, as may leaders who identify themselves with state and/or see martyrdom as a valid alternative to victory.
- War may not be between states or fought for limited strategic objectives. It may be a war of proxies or terrorists. It may be fought to destroy peoples or with minimal regard for collateral damage and risks.
- The target of unconventional uses of weapons of mass destruction may not be military in the normal sense of the term. It may be a peace process, US commitment to the defense of a given region, a peace keeping force, an election or ruling elite, or growing cooperation between formerly hostile groups.
- Terrorist organizations have already attempted to use crude chemical weapons. The development and use of chemical and biological weapons is well within the capability of many extremist and terrorist movements, and states can transfer weapons or aid such movements indirectly or with plausible deniability.
- Covert or unconventional delivery means may be preferable to both states and non-state organizations. Cargo ships, passenger aircraft, commercial vehicles, dhows, or commercial cargo shipments can all be used, and routed through multiple destinations. A well established series of covert transport and smuggling networks exist throughout the region. Biological weapons can be manufactured in situ.
- The Marine Corps Barracks incident has already shown the potential value of “mass terrorism,” as had the media impact of the Oklahoma City bombing and disruptive effect of far more limited events like the suicide bombings by Hamas and the assassination of Yitzak Rabin.
- Biological weapons and chemical present special problems because they can be used in so many ways. Chemical poisons were once used to contaminate the Israeli fruit group. Infectious biological agents could be used to mirror image local diseases or with long gestation times. Persistent nerve agents could be used in subways, large buildings, shopping malls/bazaars, etc. to create both immediate casualties and long term risks. Mixes of biological and chemical agents could be used to defeat detection, protection gear or vaccines.
- Arms control efforts assume large state efforts with detectable manufacturing and weaponization programs in peacetime. The development of a capability to suddenly manufacture several hundred biological and chemical weapons with little or no warning is well within the state of the art using nothing but commercial supplies and equipment, and much of the R&D effort could be conducted as civil or defensive research.
- Unconventional and terrorist uses of weapons can involve the use of extremely high risk biological weapons transmitted by human carriers, commercial cargoes, etc.
- The incentives for the unconventional use of weapons of mass destruction increase in proportion to the lack of parity in conventional weapons, the feelings of hopelessness by alienated or extremist groups, or the prospect of catastrophic defeat.
- Most countries lack gas masks, anti-toxins, etc. to protect both citizens and workers in vital facilities like ports.
- Similarly, the incentive for the unconventional use of weapons of mass destruction will increase in direct proportion to the perceived effectiveness of theater missile and other regular military defense systems.
- Destabilizing State operations will be a constant temptation for state intelligence groups, militant wings of extremist groups, revolutionary forces. etc.

Attack Scenarios: “Dr. Ben No” and “Professor Abu Moriarity” At Work in the Middle East - Part I

- A radiological power is introduced into the air conditioning systems of Cairo’s high-rise tourist hotels. Symptoms are only detected over days or weeks or public warning is given several weeks later. The authorities detect the presence of such a power, but cannot estimate its long-term lethality and have no precedents for decontamination. Tourism collapses, and the hotels eventually have to be torn down and rebuilt.
- Parts for a crude gun-type nuclear device are smuggled into Israel or bought in the market place. The device is built in a medium sized commercial truck. A physics student reading the US Department of Defense weapons effect manual maps Tel Aviv to maximize fall out effects in an area filled with buildings with heavy metals and waits for a wind maximizing the fall out impact. The bomb explodes with a yield of only 8 kilotons, but with an extremely high level of radiation. Immediate casualties are limited but the long-term death rate mounts steadily with time. Peace becomes impossible and security measures become Draconian. Immigration halts and emigration reaches crisis proportions. Israel as such ceases to exist.
- Several workers move drums labeled as cleaning agents into a large shopping mall, large public facility, subway, train station, or airport. They dress as cleaners and are wearing what appear to be commercial dust filters or have taken the antidote for the agent they will use. They mix the feedstocks for a persistent chemical agent at the site during a peak traffic period. Large scale casualties result, and Draconian security measures become necessary on a national level. A series of small attacks using similar “binary” agents virtually paralyze the economy, and detection is impossible except to identify all canisters of liquid.
- Immunized terrorists visit a US carrier or major Marine assault ship during the first hours of visitor’s day during a port call in the Middle East. They are carrying anthrax powder in bags designed to make them appear slightly overweight. They slowly scatter the powder as they walk through the ship visit. The immediate result is 50% casualties among the ship’s crew, its Marine complement, and the visitors that follow. The US finds it has no experience with decontaminating a large ship where anthrax has entered the air system and is scattered throughout closed areas. After long debates over methods and safety levels, the ship is abandoned.
- A terrorist seeking to “cleanse” a nation of its secular regime and corruption introduces a modified type culture of Ebola or a similar virus into an urban area -- trusting God to “sort out” the resulting casualties. He scatters infectious cultures in urban areas for which there is no effective treatment. By the time the attack is detected, it has reached epidemic proportions. Medical authorities rush into the infected area without proper protection, causing the collapse of medical facilities and emergency response capabilities. Other nations and regions have no alternative other than to isolate the nation or center under attack, letting the disease take its course.
- A terrorist group modifies the valves on a Japanese remote-controlled crop spraying helicopter that has been imported legally for agricultural purposes. It uses this system at night or near dawn to spray a chemical or biological agent at altitudes below radar coverage in a line-source configuration. Alternatively, it uses a large home-built RPV with simple GPS guidance. The device eventually crashes undetected into the sea or in the desert. Delivery of a chemical agent achieves far higher casualties than any conventional military warhead. A biological agent is equally effective and the first symptoms appear days after the actual attack -- by which time treatment is difficult or impossible.

Attack Scenarios: “Dr. Ben No” and “Professor Abu Moriarity” At Work in the Middle East - Part II

- A truck filled with what appears to be light gravel is driven through the streets of Tel Aviv or Cairo during rush hour or another maximum traffic period. A visible powder does come out through the tarpaulin covering the truck, but the spread of the powder is so light that no attention is paid to it. The driver and his assistant are immunized against the modified form of Anthrax carried in the truck that is being released from behind the gravel or sand in the truck. The truck slowly quarters key areas of the city. Unsuspected passersby and commuters not only are infected, but carry dry spores home and into other areas. By the time the first major symptoms of the attack occur some 3-5 days later, anthrax pneumonia is epidemic and some septicemic anthrax has appeared. Some 40-65% of the exposed population dies and medical facilities collapse causing serious, lingering secondary effects.
- A terrorist group scatters high concentrations of a radiological, chemical, or biological agent in various areas in a city, and trace elements into the processing intakes to the local water supply. When the symptoms appear, terrorist group makes its attack known, but claims that it has contaminated the local water supply. The authorities are forced to confirm that water is contaminated and mass panic ensues.
- Immunized terrorists carry small amounts of anthrax or a similar biological agent onto a passenger aircraft like a B-747, quietly scatter the powder, and deplane at the regular scheduled stop. No airport detection system or search detects the agent. Some 70-80% of those on the aircraft die as a result of symptoms that only appear days later.
- Several identical nuclear devices are smuggled out of the FSU through Afghanistan or Central Asia. They do not pass directly through governments. One of the devices is disassembled to determine the precise technology and coding system used in the weapon's PAL. This allows users to activate the remaining weapons. The weapon is then disassembled to minimize detection with the fissile core shipped covered in lead. The weapon is successfully smuggled into the periphery of an urban area outside any formal security perimeter. A 100 kiloton ground burst destroys a critical area and blankets the region in fall out.
- The same device is shipped to Israel or a Gulf area in a modified standard shipping container equipped with detection and triggering devices that set it off as a result of local security checks or with a GPS system that sets it off automatically when it reaches the proper coordinates in the port of destination. The direct explosive effect is significant, but “rain out” contaminates a massive local area.
- Iraq equips a freighter or dhow to spread Anthrax along a coastal area in the Gulf. It uses a proxy terrorist group, and launches an attack on Kuwait City and Saudi oil facilities and ports. It is several days before the attack is detected, and the attacking group is never fully identified. The form of Anthrax involved is dry and time encapsulated to lead to both massive prompt casualties and force time consuming decontamination. Iraq not only is revenged, but benefits from the resulting massive surge in oil prices.
- A terrorist group scatters small amounts of a biological or radiological agent in a Jewish area during critical stages of the final settlement talks. Near panic ensues, and a massive anti-Palestinian reaction follows. Israeli security then learns that the terrorist group has scattered small amounts of the same agent in cells in every sensitive Palestinian town and area, and the terrorist group announces that it has also stored some in politically sensitive mosques and shrines. Israeli security is forced to shut down all Palestinian movement and carry out intrusive searches in every politically sensitive area. Palestinian riots and then exchanges of gun fire follow. The peace talks break down permanently.
- The Iranian Revolutionary Guards equips dhows to spread Anthrax. The dhows enter the ports of Dubai and Abu Dhabi as commercial vessels -- possibly with local or other Southern Gulf registrations and flags. It is several days before the attack is detected, and the resulting casualties include much of the population of Abu Dhabi and government of the UAE. The UAE breaks up as a result, no effective retaliation is possible, and Iran achieves near hegemony over Gulf oil policy.

Attack Scenarios: “Dr. Ben No” and “Professor Abu Moriarity” At Work in the Middle East - Part III

- A terrorist group attempting to drive Western influence out of Saudi Arabia smuggles a large nuclear device into Al Hufuf on the edge of the Ghawar oil field. It develops a crude fall out model using local weather data that it confirms by sending out scouts with cellular phones. It waits for the ideal wind, detonates the devices, shuts down the world’s largest exporting oil field, and causes the near collapse of Saudi Arabia.
- Alternatively, the same group takes advantage of the security measures the US has adopted in Saudi Arabia, and the comparative isolation of US military personnel. It waits for the proper wind pattern and allows the wind to carry a biological agent over a Saudi airfield with a large US presence from an area outside the security perimeter. The US takes massive casualties and has no ability to predict the next attack. It largely withdraws from Saudi Arabia.
- A freighter carrying fertilizer enters a Middle Eastern port and docks. In fact, the freighter has mixed the fertilizer with a catalyst to create a massive explosion and also carries a large amount of a chemical, radiological, and/or biological agent. The resulting explosion destroys both the immediate target area and scatters the chemical or biological weapon over the area.
- Extreme believers in Eretz Israel move a “cocktail” of radiological and persistent biological/chemical agents to the Temple Mount to contaminate the Mosques. They use carefully designed devices that only scatter very heavy matter over a limited area, although they use explosives to ensure a high degree of contamination within the mosques. All prayer in the mosque area must be halted indefinitely and there are significant casualties among the Islamic faithful in Jerusalem. The Jewish group issues a statement demanding that the temple area be clear of all non-Jewish religious activity triggering mass violence.
- A large terrorist device goes off in a populated, critical economic, or military assembly area -- scattering mustard or nerve gas. Emergency teams rush into deal with the chemical threat and the residents are evacuated. Only later does it become clear that the device also included a biological agent and that the response to this “cocktail” killed most emergency response personnel and the evacuation rushed the biological agent to a much wider area.

New Forms of Conventional Warfare: e.g. Revolution in Military Affairs and Low Intensity Conflict

- **Peace agreements have so far not constrained military spending, force expansion, or modernization per se.**
 - **Force restructuring to make a peace stable can involve extensive force changes and force modernization; raise cost of military.**
 - **Agreements based on tradition limits on weapons, units, manpower may no longer offer much security. The “RMA” and shifts to professional manpower and high technology make limits on numbers suspect.**
- **There are, however, a wide range of areas where it may be possible to evolve towards controls and force management:**
 - **Transparency in arms buys, force plans, and modernization.**
 - **Freezes in select areas of weapons and munitions.**
 - **Transparency in exercises and deployments.**
 - **Transparency in munitions.**
 - **Talks on perceptions of destabilizing measures.**
 - **Similar in many ways to chemical and biological threats.**
 - **Transparency in modernization of electronic order of battle.**
- **Cooperate in down-sizing to fixed limits on major weapons and munitions..**

Information Warfare and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

- **“War” is inevitable: Crime, hackers, and commerce.**
- **Growing vulnerability is equally inevitable as Middle East fully joins the information age.**
- **Some forms of information warfare are, however, military:**
 - **Cyber attack on the specific data base of an owner/operator**
 - **Cyber attack for the purpose of gaining access to a network**
 - **Cyber attack for the purpose of espionage**
 - **Cyber attack for the purpose of shutting down service**
 - **Cyber attack for the purpose of introducing harmful instructions.**
 - **Cyber attack to destroy military capability or block military operations.**
- **Cooperation in intelligence, and law enforcement can be critical; May redefine counterterrorism in the Middle East.**
- **Cooperation in purely military aspects of information warfare is possible but difficult: Transparency of any kind tends to reveal the “crown jewels.”**

Violations of Arms Control and Peace Agreements

- **Securing effective arms control requires measures similar in many ways to cooperation in dealing with asymmetric threats.**
- **Peace agreements do not, however, normally address asymmetric threats or the broader problems in “managing a peace.”**
- **Peace agreements can also drive parties towards asymmetric threats if they do not support the peace or feel compelled to continue competing.**
- **Evolving a true regional security concept will ultimately force countries to address asymmetric threats.**
- **At the same time, synergistic cooperation is possible in many areas on a case by case basis. It may not have to wait for a full peace.**