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Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War

*Rough Working Draft: Circulated for Comment and
Correction*

**Peace with Violence versus Violence
without Peace**

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Introduction

The reader should be aware that this is an initial rough draft. The text is being circulated for comment and will be extensively revised over time. It reflects the working views of the author and does not reflect final conclusions or the views of CSIS.

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XVII. The Continuing Hope for Peace: The Quartet and the “Road Map”

At this writing, there is no way to predict the ultimate course of the Israeli-Palestinian War or its outcome. Given the conflict’s history to date, however, it is all too possible that it will continue as a long-term conflict, and will be a battle of attrition lasting for years—even if there are sporadic ceasefires and periods of “peace.” The struggle will continue to be a combination of asymmetric warfare, political warfare, and economic warfare where attempts at mediation, ceasefires, and negotiations are used more as an extension of war by other means than as a serious effort to halt the fighting.

At the same time, there have been continuing signs of hope. Prime Minister Sharon has advocated Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a prelude to a Palestinian state. Arafat’s death may lead to a more accommodating Palestinian leadership. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority still negotiate at some level. President Bush continues to call for the creation of a Palestinian state. The Arab League is still committed to the peace plan proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and the US, the “Quartet” (US, EU, Russia, and UN), and other nations continue to seek to find ways to put an end to the fighting. It is clear that the search for a long-lasting ceasefire and a new peace process have not been abandoned.

If Peace Does Come: The Cost of Living with “Peace with Violence”

Israeli and Arab Palestinian opinion polls reflect the fact that a large part of the population on both sides would still like peace, although on their own very different terms. They also, however, reflect the fact that years of asymmetric warfare have led many on both sides to increasingly regard the other as an irreconcilable and immoral enemy. As was the case in the Balkans—and many other earlier asymmetric wars—the length and intensity of the war steadily complicate efforts to create a real ceasefire and to resume peacemaking. These new tensions have combined with old ones. Any peace settlement that can be reached in spite of the fighting that began in September 2000, will still leave major problems and the near certain threat of at least low-level continuing violence.

There are many painful trade-offs that each side must make if a real peace is to occur. At this stage, any compromise acceptable to both sides must leave Jerusalem and the West Bank deeply divided. Some of the West Bank must remain under Israeli control and at least the Greater Jerusalem area will remain open for Israeli settlement.

There also are powerful economic and demographic forces at work. No peace seems likely to be able to meet many of the current economic and political expectations of the younger Palestinians for years to come. It was young Palestinians, however, that created the first Intifada, and that turned the events that began in September 2000 into something approaching a popular uprising. The Israelis, in turn, will have to live with the uncertainty that a peace would give the Palestinian Authority steadily growing power without necessarily bringing lasting security and peace, and with the specter of some kind of uprising by Israeli Arabs.

Under these conditions, even the best peace will probably be “peace with violence,” for some years after a formal peace agreement and signing a new peace agreement will only be the first step in a long and troubled process. There are so many tensions and hatreds, divisions within each side, and painful compromises to be made that any achievable peace will be the prelude to years of further agonizing tension over the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian rights to full sovereignty. Israelis and Palestinians could be faced with a new political and military struggle for power even if they hold to such a “peace.”¹

“Peace” may well proceed in a way in which Israel continues to deal with a Palestinian entity that supported the peace process, but where extremist elements within the Palestinian community continue to attack and murder pro-peace Palestinians and Israelis, where Israeli Jewish extremists oppose each movement towards compromise; the creation of a Palestinian state; a halt to and/or roll-back of settlements; and economic integration with the Palestinians and Jordan.

The internal political dynamics of each side will create additional problems. Regardless of whether the Israeli-Palestinian War continues, or a “cold peace” occurs, leadership problems and internal disputes will almost certainly affect both the Palestinian Authority and Israel. “Palestinian reform” is already a major issue, but the success of such reform is uncertain and it is possible that the struggle for the succession to Arafat could create a low-level civil war among Palestinians that could spill over into attacks on Israel, bring an anti-peace Palestinian leader to power, or even make Islamic extremism a dominant force within the Palestinian movement.

It is equally possible that Israeli opposition to the peace process, and anti-government extremism, could grow in response to the implementation of Sharon's Disengagement Plan; the transfer of territory in the West Bank and Gaza; and negotiations over the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and the future of the all Israeli settlements.

Israeli politics could bring to power a government that firmly opposes peace, and is unwilling to take the risks necessary to make a peace work. Future elections may couple the deep divisions in Israeli society and politics to the debate over peace and turn every effort to implement and improve a peace into a bitter partisan political debate in Israel that increases the risk of Israeli extremism and/or delays or blocks the implementation of given aspects of a peace agreement. It is one of the tragedies of current events that "peace," or any interim security agreement that brings an end to violence, may be a double-edged sword.

“Peace with Abuses” versus “Peace with Violence”

One thing does seem clear. Even if a peace can be reached, both sides will be forced to conduct aggressive security operations for years to come. These operations not only will be the price for peace; they will also be essential to prevent new crises and confrontations from escalating to large-scale violence or war. At the same time, such operations can have a high price tag in terms of human rights and will present risks of their own.

Both sides will have to learn to live with continuing low level violence, and bursts of terrorism, while doing their best to limit it. At least for several years, they will have to choose between acting decisively and sometimes violently and having terrorists or extremists succeed. Issues such as the right of return, repatriations, water, definitions of sovereignty, security arrangements, the future of Jerusalem, and the fate of the Israeli settlements are simply too controversial to firmly resolve with one set of accords. Any compromise is too likely to provoke extremists on both sides. Even under the best conditions, there is little near-term prospect that either Palestinians or Israelis can avoid living with “peace with violence” and “peace with abuses.”

If “peace” means that extremists and terrorists go on with levels of violence that approach low intensity combat, then it will be difficult to establish the norms of civil society. In such a “peace,” both sides—and world opinion—will have to decide what level of security measures is necessary and justified. The key issue will be how many acts of violence occur, how well

targeted the security response is in countering those who directly commit terrorism, and how justified given security measures appear to be in terms of their near-term effectiveness and longer-term impact on human rights and civil liberties.

There are three possible ways to reduce these dilemmas:

- First, make a much more massive effort to improve the quality of the Palestinian security effort and create effective communication between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, of the kind the CIA, as well as elements of the EU and other advisory groups, have already carried out. In general, every improvement in the quality of each side's security forces and the cooperation between them should reduce the need for tradeoffs between effectiveness and civil liberties.
- Second, recognize that no security effort is likely to succeed that is not based on the mutual perception of the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians, and that any compromise resulting in a ceasefire or peace is better than continued fighting. New words or lines on a map will not be enough. Similarly, even the best compromise will probably fail if both sides do not address the demographic and economic problems of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
- Third, find some way to inject a third party into the security process that both sides feel they can trust, and do so in a way where the third party can avoid being perceived as an enemy by either side, and can avoid being used as yet another tool in the conflict.

The Dilemmas in Any New Palestinian Security Effort

There can be no peace without more effective Palestinian security efforts. Any new peace settlement will confront the Palestinian security forces with the same series of contradictory goals they faced before the fighting began in September 2000. If the Palestinian security forces do not react effectively in dealing with terrorism and violence, there will either be no lasting peace, or no stability in the peace process. Effective security will be essential if they are to preserve the momentum of future Israeli withdrawals, the expansion of Palestinian control and sovereignty, and the stability of the peace process.

Such measures will sometimes have to be strict. The unfortunate reality is that there was the least violence when Israeli pressure and Palestinian politics led the Palestinian Authority security forces to emphasize security over human rights long before the crisis that began in September 2000, although they often did so to maintain the present ruling elite rather than to preserve the peace process.

In this context, the Palestinian Authority security forces will probably use excessive force by the standards of Western police forces. Efforts to halt terrorist and paramilitary action movements like by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad may involve interrogations, detentions, and trials that are too rapid and lack due process by Western standards. The alternatives,

however, could have a much higher net cost to both peace and the human rights of most Palestinians. Israeli leaders have clearly focused on the very issue of terrorism as a means of evaluating the Palestinian Authority's commitment to the peace process.

Yet, the Palestinian security forces will have to maintain popular support from the Palestinians and must still try to meet as many of the demands of human rights activists. These are not new problems. The previous chapters have shown that both the Palestinian and Israeli security forces encountered severe criticism over human rights issues when they acted decisively, but received equally severe political and partisan criticism from the other side, or hard-liners on their own side, when they freed suspected terrorists or pardoned convicted ones. They have also shown that there have been cases when the Israeli and Palestinian security services took excessive and extreme action instead of decisive and effective action. The Palestinian Preventive Security forces in particular seem to have resorted to the arbitrary arrest and torture of fellow Palestinians—in many cases Palestinians whose business interests conflicted with those of Palestinian Authority officials, or who publicly criticized Arafat and the Palestinian Authority.

The practical result is that there are likely to be continuing moral dilemmas in any Palestinian effort to enforce a peace. There will be painful choices between the need for effective counterterrorism and peace enforcement, and the need to preserve and improve civil liberties. At the same time, no one should ignore the violent nature of some political movements and focus solely on the Palestinian Authority's abuses of human rights, or to demand that the highest international standards be applied in spite of the level of violence and hatred involved and the potential cost to peace. Important as civil liberties are, they are only one of the human rights that nations and the world must try to protect.

Israel will also have to revise its standards for judging the Palestinians. A "zero tolerance" policy is a road to war, not peace. It will take years to rebuild the Palestinian security forces, and even then, security cannot be the only priority. Israel must learn to tolerate some level of violence, just as the Palestinians must learn that security is one option they cannot give up without giving up hope for a lasting peace.

It is clear from the chronology of past ceasefire and peace efforts in this book. There can be no peace without more Israeli tolerance of occasional acts of terrorism and violence. In the past, Israel has demanded that the Palestinian security forces succeed in maintaining an almost

perfect order among a population with significant elements that strongly oppose the peace process and deny the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and PLO. As events have shown since the June 2003 ceasefire, this will be “mission impossible” in the near to mid-term.

The Role of Neutral Observers in a Hot Ceasefire and Cold Peace

If peace is defined as meaning a full peace settlement that both sides accept with a high degree of trust and mutual respect, such a peace will take years to forge and its path will involve many further incidents of violence unless some better solution can be found for providing security. The recommendations stipulated by the Mitchell Committee and the Road Map “Quartet,” may offer a possible precedent for establishing a “third party” to help implement a peace by recommending the creation of a neutral body of international monitors and observers. Such an international presence could potentially assess the causes of violence and the nature of the military response on both sides without being perceived as biased in favor of one side or the other, and turning the assessment of the actions of each side and its use of force into a political extension of asymmetric warfare by other means.

It is important to recognize the validity of Israeli and Palestinian fears that any outside presence or security force will become a “weapon” for the other side in a war of perceptions, be biased in favor of the other side, or become a target for extremists and the other “side” in future violence. There is a serious risk that any international effort to monitor violence and the actions of both sides to counter it can become more of a problem than a solution. This is particularly true if any international effort does more than focus on helping to create a just and secure peace and future for Palestinians and Israelis.

Even so, both sides may still be able to benefit from having some neutral body to turn to, if one can be created that will still be acceptable to both sides during periods of violence as well as during efforts to create a lasting ceasefire or peace. Both sides can benefit from international transparency in executing the terms of a ceasefire or peace agreement, review of the way they conduct their security efforts, and aid in improving the effectiveness of their security efforts while reducing the cost to civil liberties. Objective, balanced, and mutual criticism will still be painful, but it can also be highly constructive. Ideally, Israelis and Palestinians should be able to communicate and work together without any such neutral third party. In practice, they have

failed to do so effectively to date, and an international body or “presence” could be useful *if* one can be created that both sides trust.

In practice, such a body will require both US participation and a role for other states that provides at least an effective observer force. The use of any kind of military cadres to actively enforce a peace or ceasefire is far more controversial. At this point, Israel feels—and not without reason—that many such calls for such forces are simply a call for UN security efforts that will aid the Palestinians. Certainly, this is an area where the UN’s political record may make it difficult for the UN to play such a role. At the same time, Palestinians have equal reason to question whether any such enforcement group that is acceptable to Israel will be truly neutral and even handed in dealing with the Palestinians. Peacekeeping can also become an extension of war by other means.

At a minimum, securing an Israeli-Palestinian peace will be the greatest challenge to finding new approaches to peacekeeping since Bosnia and Kosovo. At the same time, abandoning the use of international commissions and some form of military observer force because the mission is difficult means abandoning tools that might well be the only ways to create a more stable ceasefire and peace process.

The Central Role of Economics

No form of peace settlement that only deals with political and security issues will ever be stable or secure. Israel, the Palestinians, and the world, will have to address the extent to which any peaceful outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle can be made stable without a massive exercise in economic aid, development, nation building, and some deliberate effort to develop Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian economic cooperation—if not partial integration. Like peace, security, and civil liberties, the “right” to economic well-being can never be perfectly implemented. Economics, however, are ultimately as critical to security as any political treaty.

No peace can succeed without massive aid to the Palestinians, realistic plans for economic development, and some kind of economic links between Palestine, Israel, and Jordan. Peace is a desirable end in itself, but it does not, in and of itself, bring economic growth and development. Neither will any foreseeable solution to the final settlement issues. Furthermore, any peace or ceasefire based on “fences” or “separation” risks permanently crippling Palestinian economic development and severely hurting the economic development of Jordan.

If Peace Should Fail: “Violence Without Peace”

Difficult as peace may be, the cost of violence without peace will be far higher than the costs of peace with violence. There is, however, no certainty that peace can be achieved. Israel's former defense minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer recognized this as early as July 2001. He stated in a speech on Israeli army radio that: “We are heading towards a long conflict with the Palestinians, to my sorrow, until the Palestinian side recognizes that actually there is no sense in going on with this conflict as it is.”² The only optimism in Ben-Eliezer's speech was that he stated there was little chance that the Israeli-Palestinian War would become a regional conflict: “No. No, no, no. I think that is far from us...I don't think Egypt is interested in that today, I don't think Jordan is interested in that today...I don't think Syria is guiding itself towards war.”³

By the day that Eliezer spoke, approximately 473 Palestinians, 121 Israelis and 13 Israeli Arabs had already been killed since violence erupted in September 2000. Eliezer was also scarcely alone in predicting a prolonged war. A number of senior Israeli and Palestinian officials expressed much the same the view of the future. Even a statement by Arafat rejecting violence and supporting the ceasefire at this time contained a warning of the deep divisions between the two peoples. Arafat gave an interview in which he told the German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, that he condemned all forms of violence and terrorism “whoever is responsible. We must give radical and violent groups on both sides no chance.”⁴ Yet, Arafat went on to attack Israel for its actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: “Above all, I reject violence against my own people. Occupation is violence. Illegal settlements are violence. Blockades are violence...so I can't just say to my people they should endure daily distress and carry the heavy burden of an unjustified and unnecessary occupation...Sharon is allowed both— violence and occupation.”⁵

Since that time, Israel has openly rejected Arafat as a peace partner and destroyed much of the capability of the Palestinian security forces. At this writing Arafat's death may or may not produce a better negotiating “partner,” and Israel's willingness to grant the concessions necessary for a true peace are just as questionable. Yet another opportunity may be sacrificed, and the Israeli-Palestinian War may simply grind on, creating more mutual hostility and intolerance— and it could eventually give the Palestinians far more radical leadership. The war has already given Palestinian Islamic extremists, such as the military wing of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the equivalent of sanctuaries and better access to weapons and explosives as well as

strengthened both Islamic and other extremist elements within the Palestinian Authority. It has also led Palestinian extremist groups outside the West Bank and Gaza to arm and train new cadres.

The war has polarized many Israelis against peace and any form of partnership with the Palestinians. Israel too may move toward extremism. At a minimum, the expansion of the settlements, new barriers, and forced separation already help sustain the fighting. The Israeli separation plan has been leading Israel to expand its presence in the West Bank and to enforce a wide range of security measures in order to defend all of the settlements. As a result, the IDF is being forced to find an even more difficult balance between a long-term effort to defeat the violent elements of the Palestinian population and trying to pacify the rest.⁶

Possible Israeli Tactics in a Prolonged Conflict

There is no consensus among Israelis as to the exact tactics that Israel should employ in a prolonged “no peace” scenario. However, Israel’s future approaches to dealing with such a scenario could be very similar to the tactics it is already using:

- *Fully isolating the Gaza Strip*—Israel would seal the borders with Gaza, and use the crisis as a rationale to remove any remaining Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. These settlements currently cost more to protect in military and economic terms than they contribute to the Israeli economy.
- *Completely walling or sealing off the Palestinian areas*—Israel would seal off Palestinian areas to ensure they could not cross into Jewish areas and Israel proper, effectively creating a series of walls or security fences to prevent or restrict Israeli-Palestinian contact. The concept of an elevated secure superhighway between Gaza and the West Bank is a variation on this theme.
- *Ending any remaining dependence on Palestinian labor*—Israel would use labor permits largely as a political weapon, having imported Asian and East European labor as a substitute for Palestinian labor.
- *Removing or marginalizing small Israeli settlements in the middle of Palestinian populations that do not serve security purposes*—Such as the Israeli settlements in Gaza, IDF experts feel many of these settlements are an expensive ideological liability.
- *Securing lines of communication*—Israel would fully secure its strategic lines of communication and major routes into the area, and use travel permits as a lever to push the Palestinian Authority to crack down on violence and extremism.
- *Using economic infrastructure as a lever*—Similarly, Israel would use international phone links, power generation, international postal services, external water flow, and similar levers to pressure the Palestinians into ending attacks on Israel.
- *Securing the perimeter of Palestinian cities and towns*—The IDF would stay out of populated areas wherever possible, but would seal off the perimeter of towns where violence took place and punish towns known to be centers of violence or extremism.

- *Mobilizing “border” defenses of Israel proper, the greater Jerusalem area, and Israeli settlements on the West Bank*—Israel would create strong security defenses that tightly control entry and movement into Israeli areas. It would seal off Palestinian areas believed to be centers of violence and effectively halt all economic activity until such violence ceased. Such efforts would be highly selective and would seek to rely largely on non-violent means.
- *Creating new kinds of security forces*—The IDF and security forces would avoid mass call-ups or the use of troops without special training. It would emphasize the identification and tracking of actual threats, and the use of the GSS and Border Police, and officers and forces with counter-insurgency training. It would utilize the improved equipment it obtained during the Intifada.
- *Expanding the use of non-intrusive surveillance methods*—Israel would use its UAVs and SIGINT capabilities to provide surveillance of Palestinian activity without sending IDF forces into Palestinian areas except to deal with known targets or in hot pursuit. Although Israel’s network of informers and covert operatives in Palestinian areas has been sharply reduced, use would still be made of such techniques where possible.
- *Emphasizing a willingness to continue the peace process and good relations with Arab states, rather than the Palestinians*—Israel would seek to politically and diplomatically isolate the violent and extremist elements within the Palestinian community.
- *Rewarding Palestinians who support the peace process and/or are non-violent*—Restrictions would be minimized in any area or case where the Palestinian Authority or some town or company did not present security problems. Labor permits and investment would be encouraged in such areas.

Israel can also apply more powerful forms of economic warfare. It retains control over Palestinian movement, utilities, transport, and water. It is able to set the terms by which Palestinians can work in Israel, if at all, and demonstrated that it could use low cost Asian and East European labor as a substitute for Palestinian labor long before the war began. Israel issued labor permits to over 55,000 non-Palestinian foreign workers in 1994,⁷ and nearly 70,000 in 1995, versus less than 5,000 a year during 1992 and 1993.⁸ In 1998, the Israeli government issued 80,000 permits to non-Jewish foreign workers, a cut back of 23% since 1996. At that time in 1998, only 38,000 Palestinian workers were legally allowed to work in Israel.⁹

The Palestinians have fewer options than Israel, and risk being forcibly isolated in Gaza and enclaves on the West Bank while slowly being pushed out of the Greater Jerusalem area. Any Palestinian political advantage in terms of media and world opinion is likely to be more than offset by the war’s economic costs, cost in blood, growing loss of territory, and inability to form a real state. They can, however, always find new ways to attack Israel and Israelis, and to try to broaden the conflict. They can establish stronger links to the more radical nations and movements in the region. Certainly, the possibility of Palestinian ties to Islamic extremism already is all too clear.

Prolonged Conflict and “Separation”

Israel is certainly the stronger combatant, but it cannot win by combining harsh tactics with an aggressive “separation” program. If Israel pursues a policy of separation between Israelis and Palestinians, limited reoccupation of key areas, improved security measures, selective deportations, and economic and political pressures on the Palestinians, this may result in lower casualties, and political, military, and economic costs, than the present nature of the Israeli-Palestinian War.

In time, however, such an approach will either drive even more Palestinians into radical violent movements or effectively turn Gaza and the West Bank into large, hostile concentration camps with no real economic future. Even if such forced separation works for a while, the end result is likely to be a situation where the Palestinian response would explode to a point so serious that such a “reoccupation” would eventually be more costly than containment, and lead to the equivalent of “ethnic cleansing.”

This might drive Israel to even go further and carry out large-scale, forced deportations of Palestinians from the greater Jerusalem, East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nablus areas. It remains unclear, however, whether the IDF has ever translated conceptual studies of such options into even preliminary contingency plans,¹⁰ and the end result would be to create even more Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic anger and undercut Israel’s position in the rest of the world.

One thing is certain. Each new level of escalation on the part of either Israel or the Palestinians makes it progressively more difficult for both sides to reach either a “cold” or “warm” peace. It leads to more Palestinian radicalism and terrorism while it pushes Israel towards more active consideration of the separation option.

Escalating to Nowhere: The Uncertain Role of Other States in a Prolonged Conflict

Each new level of escalation will also be a test of the global political costs Israel is willing to pay for such actions. The Israeli-Palestinian War has already done great damage to Israel’s relations with Europe and Asia. It has reinforced Islamic extremism and polarized the Arab and Islamic worlds against both Israel and the United States.

If the war drags on, it may also widen. Arab states are fully aware of Israel’s conventional military superiority and possession of nuclear weapons. Even so, there already are

growing risks on Israel's Northern Front, and Syria, Iran, and Iraq already play an indirect role in the conflict. There is at least some risk that a prolonged Israeli-Palestinian War may force the collapse of Israel's peace with Egypt and Jordan, and create a lasting block on further progress in the peace negotiations with Syria.

Jordan, the only other Arab state with full diplomatic relations with Israel, will face growing threats to its internal stability. While some Israelis are foolish enough to argue that the solution to the Palestinian problem is to make Jordan a Palestinian state—this ignores the fact that Israel would then face a lasting enemy with a common border. A lasting and open-ended war will almost certainly trigger new action by Shi'ite extremists in Iran and Lebanon like the Hizbollah, and by Sunni extremists outside the Palestinian movement. It will continue to undermine the US position in the entire Middle East, encourage violent Islamic extremism, and push other moderate Arab regimes to actively support Palestinian use of force.

More broadly, the war will aid the efforts of Islamic extremists throughout the world to charge that the US and the West are anti-Arab and anti-Islamic. It will continue to help block regional efforts at political, economic, and social reform. Even if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict never broadens to include other Arab states, and does not destabilize Jordan, it has already broadened to reinforce the threat posed by movements like Al Qaeda and violent Islamic radicalism. It is an ulcer that eats at the stability of the entire Middle East.

There is one certainty. Escalating to nowhere can only consist of tragedy with a seemingly unlimited number of acts. The message to Israel and the Palestinians should be clear. It should be equally clear to the world that it is in the strategic interest of all major powers, the international community, and the UN to give both sides a very possible form of aid and encouragement in moving towards peace. This conflict is not simply a local or regional struggle. There is a steadily growing risk that this tragedy will escalate other conflicts and tragedies in the region, encourage extremism and terrorism, divide the West from the Arab and Islamic worlds, and create anger and hatred between the followers of three of the world's greatest religions. Seen from that perspective, the history and pattern of the Israeli-Palestinian war makes a broader search, and the direct and continuing involvement of other nations a strategic necessity.

¹ For example, see the maps in The Economist, February 19, 2000, p. 47, and the hostile Palestinian reaction in “Israel’s Matrix of Control, For the Record, The Center for Policy Analysis of Palestine, No. 26, January 21, 2000 and No. 30, February 14, 2000.

² Reuters, July 5, 2001, 0415.

³ Reuters, July 5, 2001, 0415.

⁴ Herb Keinon, Janine Zacharia, and Lamie Lahoud, “UN, US: Stop Targeted Killings,” Jerusalem Post, July 6, 2001.

⁵ “Arafat Pledges Ceasefire,” Namibian, July 6, 2001 and Herb Keinon, Janine Zacharia, and Lamie Lahoud, “UN, US: Stop Targeted Killings,” Jerusalem Post, July 6, 2001.

⁶ Ha’aretz, August 23, 1995 and September 13, 1995; Yediot Ahronont, August 25, 1995.

⁸ Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Supporting Peace, Washington, Washington Institute, pp. 1994, p. 83; Economist, September 12, 1998, p. 48; “Arafat’s Palestine – Closure, Corruption, and Poverty,” Swiss Review of World Affairs, September 1, 1997; Business Week, November 9, 1998, p. 504; Israel Business Today, July 31, 1997, p. 6.

⁹ Economist, September 12, 1998, p. 48; “Arafat’s Palestine – Closure, Corruption, and Poverty,” Swiss Review of World Affairs, September 1, 1997; Business Week, November 9, 1998, p. 504; Israel Business Today, July 31, 1997, p. 6.

¹⁰ These points are drawn from conversations with Israeli civilian experts, and not with active Israeli officers or officials.