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**DEFENDING AMERICA
REDEFINING THE CONCEPTUAL BORDERS
OF HOMELAND DEFENSE**

**Taking Advantage of Delay:
A Success-Driven Approach to NMD**

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Missile Defense: The Current Problems

- **Rushing forward with half-defined interim single-site system with SIBRS without any clear picture of ultimate system requirements and costs.**
- **Deployment schedule makes effective test and evaluation impossible. Costing and effectiveness models are badly politicized.**
- **Freezing on current system in purely homeland context means ignoring boost-phase and theater-homeland options.**
- **Lack of open Net Technical Assessment and realistic evaluation of cost to defeat proposed programs and solutions.**
- **Failure to explicitly consider offensive and retaliatory options.**
- **Highly politicized support and opposition, but the friends of NMD are often its worst enemies.**
- **Over-puffed near-term threat from Iran, Iraq, North Korean threat which is compartmented away from longer-term regional and Russian and Chinese threat.**
- **Failure to integrate theater and homeland offensive/defense issues.**
- **Failure to honestly examine the “balloon effect”: forcing attackers to use other methods, strike at US allies. External vulnerabilities: Oil and Asian trade.**

- **NMD planning and execution is too decoupled from arms control efforts.**

Missile Defense: The Problems are the Solution

- **Recast the current program as an operational “test bed” one-site deployment on a success-driven schedule. Ignore national coverage, and seek to create an effective site concept.**
- **Re-examine theater and homeland offensive/defense issues: Consider post Cold-War strategic and theater offensive/retaliatory options, including nuclear.**
- **Re-evaluate the threat and include Russia and China, arms control risks: Examine the threat in terms of both deployment and non-deployment, and impact of deployment on pushing threats to use other forms of attack.**
- **Honestly examine the “balloon effect”: forcing attackers to use other methods, strike at US allies. External vulnerabilities: Oil and Asian trade. Look beyond NMD to NMD/TMD.**
- **Conduct a Zero-based reexamination of all missile defense options, including boost-phase, space-based (Brilliant Pebbles) and theater-homeland options. Require an annual classified and unclassified report including a summary of the full system architecture and costs.**
- **Require Net Technical Assessment and realistic evaluation of cost to defeat proposed programs and solutions as part of this zero-based options.**
- **Adequately fund the development and deployment program on a less driven by actual success or kill it. Don’t “nickel and dime” it, or try to force the pace, in ways that ensure failure.**
- **The Punchline: Evolve the right solution to real problems.**

Recast the Current Program to a “Test Bed” Deployment on a Success-Driven Schedule. Ignore Immediate National Coverage, and Create an Effective Development Concept – Part One

- **Don’t give up the bird in hand. There probably is no real-world substitute that be fully operational and deployed in less than a decade.**
- **Recast the present program for full-scale RDT&E through 2010-2015, with a test-bed deployment of a limited system at Grand Forks.**
- **Restructure the entire test program to provide an honest level of testing, funding of multiple parallel tests, and full-scale testing of systems integration.**
- **Deploy the first site as a “test bed” sized similarly to the existing initial deployment concept, but which begins with limited operational capability and which is used to evolve full operational status.**
- **Build the system around SBIRS if possible, limit or avoid the need for foreign X-Band radar sites.**
- **Consider making the test-bed deployment (more) compliant with the ABM Treaty.**
- **Forget “national coverage” on a cookie cutter basis.**
- **Coverage of Hawaii and Alaska is not a valid sizing consideration for a single-site test bed system. Deploy a limited system at Grand Forks.**

Recast the Current Program to a “Test Bed” Deployment on a Success-Driven Schedule. Ignore Immediate National Coverage, and Create an Effective Development Concept – Part Two

- **Create a scalable way of adding and expanding sites, and adding advanced technical and counter-countermeasure capabilities that is inked to honest and full-scale testing of the required C⁴I/BM/SR system and other aspects of systems integration.**
- **Make it clear that the system can be scaled up to deter and/or defend against threats, strikes, and accidental/rogue launches by with China, Russia, or sophisticated third-country missile forces and penetrators.**
- **Explicitly develop synergistic packages for adding TMD and boost-phase systems that can reinforce the land-based, US-sited NMD system.**
- **Define the level of defense against “accidental” and “rogue” launches the system needs and ensure the system evolves the required level of technical sophistication.**
- **Define the end state of the full operational system. Move towards a clearly defined goal.**

Re-Examine Theater and Homeland Offensive/Defense Issues: Consider Post Cold-War Strategic and Theater Offensive/Retaliatory Options, including Nuclear Strikes

- **We are and should remain a nuclear superpower. Arms control either reinforces US security or it is simply well-meaning weakness.**
- **The offensive, retaliatory deterrent option will be the critical option for Homeland defense for at least the next decade. We need to modernize our nuclear and offensive doctrine to make it clear we will massively retaliate in response to any missile or CBRN strike on the US.**
- **A similar policy may be needed to provide extended deterrence to our allies. This includes the Southern Gulf, or Arab-Israeli allies, Japan, and South Korea – not just NATO. Taiwan will be a critical policy issue.**
- **NMD and TMD must be integrated into a common architecture. We need to develop clearly defined options and architectures and to determine what is truly cost-effective.**

Re-evaluate the Threat and Include Russia and China, Arms Control Risks: Examine the Threat in Terms of Both Deployment and Non-deployment, and Impact of Deployment on Pushing Threats to Use Other Forms of Attack

- **It makes no sense to design and deploy a system built around the limited, worst-case for nations like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.**
- **We need an honest assessment of what NMD can and should do in the event of a Russian “accidental launch” – which may well mean a rouge launch of a significant number of missiles or warheads. The trade-offs with Russian acceptance of NMD need to be explicitly reexamined.**
- **China may or may not be a threat, but NMD and TMD are so provocative in terms of Taiwan and Chinese perceptions of China’s overall security in Asia that these issues must be seen as part of the “threat” used in evaluating NMD.**
- **The net threat from third country threats may not justify NMD in the face of a Russian and/or Chinese missile build-up, or Chinese shift to a CBRN option.**

Honestly Examine the “Balloon Effect”: Forcing Attackers to Use Other Methods, Strike at US Allies. Consider External Vulnerabilities: Oil and Asian trade. Look beyond NMD to NMD/TMD

- **There is a fundamental intellectual dishonesty and grand-strategic failure in compartmenting NMD away from other forms of homeland defense and national defense needs.**
- **Today’s main threats to the US are theater-driven and spill over to the US from theater threats to our allies and forces over seas. NMD and TMD must be part of an integrated effort.**
- **Missiles are the high-cost, high-risk way to attack. NMD without CBRN and cyberdefense simply invites other forms of attack.**
- **The threat from “rogue states of concern” (“states of confusion?”) is only part of the story. China may well be a more real threat. The question is whether diplomacy/containment or NMD/TMD is the better option. NMD must be sized accordingly.**
- **NMD can never be a cost-effective form of homeland defense without adequate CBRN and cyberdefense.**
 - **Defense against short-range missiles, air-breathers, and covert/proxy attacks must be equal to the level of NMD defense.**
 - **One key issue to be addressed is what happens if the system fails or leaks. This presents the same response problems as major CBRN incidents, and the key limiting factor is public health and medical capabilities.**

Conduct a Zero-based Reexamination of All Missile Defense Options, including Boost-Phase, Space-Based (Brilliant Pebbles), Airborne Laser (ABL), and Theater-Homeland Options. Require an Annual Classified and Unclassified Report Including a Summary of the Full System Architecture and Costs

- **We must honestly reexamine the “birds in the bush.”**
- **We need to know the truth about alternative options and systems, and whether they can replace or supplement the current system.**
- **Political/policy assertions about the merits of competing systems are no substitute for realistic and detailed planning.**
- **The reexamination must be as detailed and as public as possible. A national debate is the price of obtaining any kind of consensus.**
- **Theater and boost phase options cannot deal with all Chinese, Russian, Iranian, or Iraqi strikes. They may, however, be cost-effective in supplementing a US-based system We need to look at the full range of global missile threats, not simply the ones that suit a given defensive option.**
- **Theater-based and sea-based options requiring working dialogue with our allies. We may face some very hard choices, and have to accept partial coverage. The trade-offs between theater-based and sea-based options may have to be tailored to allied attitudes.**
- **We need to examine scalable, ABM Treaty compliant options as well. Sea-based, airborne, and wide area land-based TMD defenses are critical.**

Conduct a “Zero-Based” Look at Missile Defense and Arms Control. Examine Missile Defense as a Partner to Arms Control

- **We must continue to try to persuade Russia. Like it or not, however, the delay in deployment means we must have a true national debate over the merits or non-merits of abrogating the ABM Treaty if Russia will not accept this.**
- **Chinese nuclear and missile modernization is the hidden gap in both NMD and arms control planning. We must address this.**
- **We need to reexamine the NNPT and CTBT to see how effective enforcement could help limit the threat from third countries and ease the burden on NMD.**
- **Effective NMD will push hostile states towards biological and chemical warfare. The BWC and CWC take on new meaning.**
- **Supplier regimes and programs like the MTCR should be reexamined. The level of confrontation with Russia and China over their transfers of technology and weapons should be raised, and their level of transfer should be explicitly linked to the level of US NMD deployment and sophistication.**
- **The US needs a clear arms control policy. It should develop and articulate clear “either or” criteria that tell potentially hostile states there are limits to their actions if the US is not to proceed with NMD. It should make it explicitly clear that it will not be bound by existing arms control agreements if the threat matures to given levels.**

Require Net Technical Assessment and Realistic Evaluation of Cost to Defeat Proposed Programs and Solutions as Part of the Zero-based Examination of Options

- **All sides in the present technical debates lack credibility.**
- **The US must publicly resolve the debate over decoys and land-based interceptors versus boost phase options.**
- **“Space-based” has equaled “intellectually dishonest analytic bullshit” for nearly 20 years. The US planning and analytic community may be too corrupt to honestly assess such options.**
- **BMDO and contractor test and evaluation, costing, and effectiveness models need outside validation.**
- **The cost to defeat given NMD/TMD options needs to be explicitly examined.**
- **The probable evolution of offensive and defensive technology needs to be projected over at least a 25 year period, and NMD options must be justified in terms of life-cycle growth capability and validity.**

Adequately Fund the Development and Deployment Program on a Level Driven by Actual Success or Kill It. Don't "Nickel and Dime" It, or Try to Force the Pace, In Ways that Ensure Failure

- **If this journey is worth taking at all, it is worth hundred of billions of dollars over the life-cycle of the program(s).**
- **An American political consensus must be based on honest cost analysis and honest understanding of the risks and uncertainties.**
- **A high insurance-level funding of full-scale test and evaluation through test-bed system deployment is far superior to try to fix a failed or partial success and deal with the political aftermath.**
- **Budgeting for full-scale deployment, not an initial or interim system, will help ensure success of the entire planning, programming and budgeting process.**
- **The program budget and outyear costs must be regularly and publicly reassessed.**
- **Adequate funding is not a rigid national commitment. Trade-offs with arms control, offensive forces, TMD, CBRN/CIP, and other national priorities must be regularly reassessed.**

The Punchline: Evolve the Right Solution to Real Problems

- **Forcing the pace must be proportionate to the real-world development of the threat. As long as the threat is at the current level, there is time to develop and deploy with a high level of strategic, political, and technical competence.**
 - **The option for crash deployment should be fully planned and prepared as a contingency plan.**
- **Full-scale development of the present ground-based system should go forward on this basis with clear plans to deploy a test bed site at Grand Forks.**
- **The most successful options for boost-phase and space-based systems should be fully funded for development – to supplement or replace the current land-based system depending on progress.**
- **Creating an effective SBIRs and C⁴I/BM/SR can proceed, with adequate flexibility to expand the system or shift the nature of the hunter-killer.**
- **Adequate arms control is a possible answer, but only if it provides real security. NMD must be brought to a rapid deployment option regardless of the apparent success in arms control.**
- **Offensive/deterrent/retaliatory capabilities must also evolve, probably to include extended deterrence over key theater and allies.**
- **NMD must be integrated into broader architecture for CBRN/CIP defense and theater defense. The role of TMD in supplementing or acting as an NMD must be fully examined.**

Homeland Defense: The Broader Issue of Timelines and Responsibility

- **NMD is only part of effective homeland defense. Must tie together modernization of offensive/deterrent/retaliatory capabilities, theater defense, and defense against missiles, CBRN, and cyber attacks.**
- **Need effective, rolling 5-year planning, programming, and budgeting efforts, and 20-year development and deployment programs based on realistic threats, not short-term half-measures in response to artificial crises.**
- **Some kind of central planning and programming is critical, but the issue is not strategy, masterminding today's defense/response, or allocating one rear of budget funds. Must develop and manage a coherent program in detail.**
- **Who and where the Czar is, is important. What the Czar does is far more important.**
- **Must be central managers for intelligence, defense, and *response with individual programming and review authority and adequate resources*. Putting some one in charge at the top is of limited practical value unless this is done.**
- **Need to understand that no affordable system is likely to be capable of dealing with worst cases, and no one will pay for worst cases until the threat is far more tangible.**
- **Congressional review cannot be improved until the Executive Branch presents a program worth reviewing.**