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**DEFENDING AMERICA  
REDEFINING THE CONCEPTUAL BORDERS  
OF HOMELAND DEFENSE**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
PROGRAMS: COUNTERING  
ASYMMETRIC, INDIRECT, COVERT,  
TERRORIST, AND EXTREMIST  
ATTACKS WITH WEAPONS OF MASS  
DESTRUCTION**

**Final Review Draft**

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***The following report is a rough initial draft section of a full report on Homeland Defense being prepared as part of the CSIS Homeland Defense project. It is a rough working draft, and reflects solely the views of the author and not of the CSIS team working on the project. It is being circulated for comment and reaction and will be substantially modified and updated before being included in the final report.***

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The current role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in defending and responding to counterterrorism is something of an anomaly, and highlights the gap between classic national defense roles like missile defense and the current approach to counterterrorism. DoD is responsible for the development of a national missile defense system. At present, however, there is no clearly defined mission for the Department in dealing with response to a catastrophic event like a successful missile penetration and strike on a US target. Similarly the Department plans for asymmetric attacks by states, their proxies, and major terrorist groups using nuclear or highly lethal biological weapons, but has largely sought to avoid being integrated into the defense and response effort for such highly level attacks because of its fear that (a) it would be forced to fund the mission with existing resources, (b) would see its primary missions diluted, and (c) would be dragged into a political morass in dealing with the interagency process and Congress.

As a result, the Department is charged with supporting the FBI or FEMA in a terrorism crisis and has no lead designation. This may be appropriate when states or their proxies are not involved in an attack, and when it is an isolated incident that does not require a state of national emergency. It is a potential recipe for failure, however, at higher levels of attack. It highlights the de facto gap between the current focus civil agencies have on relatively low levels of terrorist attack and the very different threat that could occur from overt or covert state or state sponsored attacks.

It is also unclear that the present arrangements are really adequate even for dealing with terrorist attacks. The National Commission on Terrorism, also known as the Bremer Commission, recommended that the DOD be the lead agency if a catastrophic terrorist event overwhelms the capabilities of other federal agencies. The Commission advised the creation of contingency plans in case a devastating terrorist event forced the DOD to take the lead and advised the Secretary of Defense to create a unified command structure to prepare the DOD for the lead role. The Commission said:<sup>1</sup>

The Department of Defense's ability to command and control vast resources for dangerous, unstructured situations is unmatched by any other department or agency. According to current plans, DoD involvement is limited to supporting the agencies that are currently designated as having the lead in a terrorism crisis,

the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). But, in extraordinary circumstances, when a catastrophe is beyond the capabilities of local, state, and other federal agencies, or is directly related to an armed conflict overseas, the President may want to designate DoD as a lead federal agency. This may become a critical operational consideration in planning for future conflicts. Current plans and exercises do not consider this possibility.

An expanded role for the DoD in a catastrophic terrorist attack will have policy and legal implications. Other federal agencies, the states, and local communities will have major concerns. In preparing for such a contingency, there will also be internal DoD issues on resources and possible conflicts with traditional military contingency plans. These issues should be addressed beforehand.

Effective preparation also requires effective organization. The DoD is not optimally organized to respond to the wide range of missions that would likely arise from the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack. For example, within DoD several offices, departments, Unified Commands, the Army, and the National Guard have overlapping responsibilities to plan and execute operations in case of a catastrophic terrorist attack. These operations will require an unprecedented degree of interagency coordination and communication in order to be successful.

There are neither plans for the DoD to assume a lead agency role nor exercises rehearsing this capability. Hence, these demanding tasks would have to be accomplished on an ad hoc basis by the military.

The Bremer Commission further recommended that increased funding for the National Security Agency to allow the NSA to close technology gaps and to ensure that the NSA has the capability to collect terrorist information.<sup>2</sup> This recommendation not only seems sound, it is crucial if the US is to prepare effectively for the future spectrum of attacks on the US homeland, close the present gap between NMD and counterterrorism, and prepare for complex forms of asymmetric attack that could combine covert attacks with weapons of mass destruction and new forms of attack like cyberwarfare. It is also essential if homeland defense is to be treated as part of war fighting, rather than a largely passive and defense activity. The failure to plan for events like multiple, near simultaneous biological attacks using multiple agents is one case in point. So is the tendency to limit the examination of cyberwarfare and CIP attacks to limited acts of terrorism rather than fully examine vulnerability and response in the case of large-scale state sponsored attacks or actual war.

### **Analyzing the Role of the Department of Defense**

There are other major problems in analyzing the role of the Department of Defense, and the national security community as a whole. At present, most reporting is designed to cover a highly compartmented definition of counterterrorism activity that excludes three basic elements

of the problem. It does not include most counterproliferation activities. It does not include an analysis of asymmetric warfare capabilities. And, it does not include large-scale cyber and information warfare. There also is no way to know what resources the Department is being given that could be used for responding to a large-scale attack or in a national emergency.

In practice, however, the Department must play a critical role in defending the US against foreign attacks, in intelligence, in counterterrorism, and in responding to CBRN attacks. In fact, the Department is anything but consistent in its approach to looking at this aspect of the problem. The Secretary of Defense announced the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in 1993 to combat the CBRN threat. This Initiative called for developing capabilities that will allow the US to defeat an enemy using CBRN weapons, and the Secretary of Defense has described the CBRN threat as the single greatest and most complex challenge currently facing the DOD.

The GAO reported on the progress DOD has made in implementing the Initiative in May 2000:<sup>3</sup>

The U. S. National Military Strategy states that the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons, has made their use by an adversary increasingly likely in both a major theater war and smaller scale contingencies. These weapons are capable of causing mass casualties, and their threat or use can disrupt the planning and conduct of military operations. DOD believes effective deterrence against the use of these weapons depends on a range of nuclear and conventional response capabilities, as well as active and passive defenses and supporting command, control, communications, and intelligence. DOD estimates that for fiscal year 2001 it will invest over \$7.3 billion on the research, development, and acquisition of such conventional response capabilities, with about \$5.3 billion of that investment on missile defense. Although an unclassified estimate is unavailable, additional funding is spent to provide intelligence support for counterproliferation.

To help ensure that DOD's counterproliferation policy objectives are met and that implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated and focused, the Secretary of Defense, in 1996, established the Counterproliferation Council composed of senior DOD civilian and military officials. The Council is to monitor departmental progress on developing the strategy, doctrine, and force planning necessary to effectively execute its counterproliferation objectives. In 1997, DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review report stated that a key challenge the Department must meet to ensure it is prepared for the NBC threat is to institutionalize—integrate or make permanent—counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every facet of military activity.

To review activities and programs related to countering proliferation threats within the Departments of Defense and Energy and the U.S. intelligence community, in 1993 the Congress established the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. The Committee's charter includes addressing shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter the proliferation of NBC weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; identifying and eliminating undesirable redundancies or uncoordinated efforts;

and establishing priorities for programs and funding. Since 1995, the Committee has submitted an annual report to the Congress detailing its findings and recommendations.

DOD is taking steps to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within its activities and functions, such as training and field exercises and the acquisition of weapon systems and equipment. Since the 1993 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was announced, DOD has given greater emphasis to this threat in policy and planning documents, and the Joint Staff has made considerable effort to determine and prioritize the counterproliferation requirements of the unified commands. The services, particularly the Air Force, have increased the importance placed on counterproliferation requirements in their acquisition programs, training, and doctrine. Regional unified commands have incorporated counterproliferation concepts, equipment, and tasks into their planning and military exercises.

...While DOD has taken positive steps, it can do more to integrate and focus its response to the growing threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. DOD does not have an overarching joint counterproliferation doctrine document to provide a centralized picture of how DOD should respond in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment across the spectrum of military operations. Such a document, which was recently approved for development, will help ensure that counterproliferation is being satisfactorily integrated in the entire body of joint doctrine. DOD also has not taken sufficient action to provide reasonable assurance that its weapon systems and equipment can survive and operate in a biological and chemical environment. Additionally, studies by DOD and a congressionally mandated commission indicate that DOD's organization structure may be too diffused to effectively manage and integrate the Department's counterproliferation mission.

DOD has not developed key strategy documents and management plans to aid in directing and managing its counterproliferation initiatives. Internal DOD reviews have identified the need for a comprehensive strategy for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a military strategy for integrating offensive and defensive capabilities. There is also no management plan to guide, oversee, and integrate department-wide initiatives, which would include a reporting and evaluation process with performance measures to allow for a continual assessment of the Department's progress in achieving goals and objectives.

DOD primarily coordinates its counterproliferation activities with the Department of Energy and the intelligence community through the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee. DOD, Energy, and intelligence agency officials generally expressed satisfaction with the exchange of information that the Committee had provided about ongoing programs among the agencies. However, the Committee has taken little action to identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies among research and development programs, one of the primary reasons the Congress established it. The Committee does not have a process to facilitate such determinations and provide a basis to make decisions on eliminating undesired redundancies.

This report includes recommendations that the Secretary of Defense (1) develop strategies, a management plan, and performance measures to help guide and manage the implementation of DOD's counterproliferation actions; (2) include in the next Quadrennial Defense Review an examination of the Department's organization for counterproliferation; (3) take steps to help ensure that the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat is being given sufficient attention in military doctrine and in the design and development of weapon systems and equipment; and (4) devise and implement a mechanism to help identify and eliminate undesirable redundancies among counterproliferation programs.

A broader recommendation is needed. Homeland defense is not simply NMD, counterterrorism, and information security. It involves a much broader matrix of national

security efforts. Effectively planning and analysis requires a full understanding of the overall nature of DoD and other national security efforts in this area and regardless of past PDDs, and the work of the NSC, the federal government at present lacks even a raw conceptual picture of its current plans, capabilities, and spending.

### **The Size of the Current Department of Defense Effort**

Although the Department of Defense pioneered program budgeting and the development of future year plans, its program is even more opaque and lacking in any public evidence of long term planning than that of any civil agency – although problem far more for security reasons than from a lack of confidence.

The OMB report to Congress on the Federal budget does not provide specific budget figures, or program descriptions, for the Department of Defense. Instead, the DoD is included as part of the OMB totals for “National Security.” One major recommendation for improving future efforts to coordinate Homeland defense is that OMB be tasked with providing future reporting by federal agency, and that any sensitive figures on black programs either be rolled into other DoD programs or put into some general intelligence or “other agency” heading that could include NSA and CIA.

In general, OMB seems to have a tendency to grossly overclassify broad categories of data in the national security area which made little real sense during the Cold War and which make no sense in a context where enough data have to be declassified to allow effective government-wide planning. The present system of OMB reporting almost seems to be designed avoid effective review by the NSC and Congress, much less any outside experts.

Table Seventeen

National Security for Combating Terrorism and WMD Preparedness

<b>National Security</b>	FY1998	FY1999	FY2000	FY2001
<i>Combat Terrorism</i>	4,496.12	4,682.51	5,117.17	5,124.06
Law Enforcement and Investigative Activities	2,042.33	2,067.79	2,213.24	2,213.52
Physical Security of Government Facilities and Employees	2,075.47	2,036.47	2,122.75	2,173.85
Physical Security of National Populace	0.15	0.04	0.15	0.15
Preparing for and Responding to Terrorist Acts	104.20	256.18	358.58	233.84
Research and Development	270.98	322.03	422.45	502.71
<i>WMD Preparedness</i>	180.56	408.15	475.82	467.21
Law Enforcement and Investigative Activities	7.10	20.96	20.41	19.47
Preparing for and Responding to WMD Terrorism	2.71	156.39	161.50	100.74
First Responder Training and Exercises	0.05	49.90	32.10	10.20
Other Planning and Assistance to State/Locals	0.00	15.60	8.50	10.30
Special Response Units	2.66	90.89	120.90	80.24
Research and Development	170.75	230.80	293.90	347.00
Basic Research, incl. Gene Sequencing	44.50	0.00	6.25	37.50
Detection/Diagnostics	0.25	34.10	48.45	62.30
Modeling, Simulation, Systems Analyses	0.00	8.60	10.00	10.00
Other	126.00	140.00	161.50	141.00
Personal/Collective Protection	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.00
Personal/Environmental Decontamination	0.00	6.50	17.10	21.00
Therapeutics/Treatments	0.00	12.00	16.50	22.20
Vaccines	0.00	29.60	34.10	43.00
*OMB Highlighted Programs				
WMD Programs				
Terrorism Consequence Management Response Units	-	-	-	80.00
Coordination of Civil Support	-	-	-	5.00
Research and Development	-	-	-	340.00
Airlift for Counterterrorism Response	-	-	73.00	N/A

The Department of Defense does, however, prepare a separate unclassified report called “combating terrorism activities.” This report makes no effort to distinguish between domestic and foreign activities, but it does make an interesting contrast with the OMB report. The DoD estimate of National Security spending is shown in Table Eighteen below. Chart Eighteen shows the trends in total DoD spending by major program activity, and compares them to the OMB estimate of total national security spending for the same activities. It also compares the OMB estimate of total spending on WMD programs against an estimate of similar spending for

FY2001 based on the DoD data.

The Department of Defense report that explains Table Eighteen seems almost to be designed to be confusing and limit effective review.<sup>4</sup> It provides no future year or program planning data, and covers only three fiscal years. There are no trend analyses, and the resource analysis are heavily concentrated on service and agency data in ways where it becomes almost impossible to distinguish overall activities by function. In fairness, this is almost certainly a response to the Congress's insistence on reviewing a somewhat archaic "line item" annualized budget, rather than programs. The Department also does provide enough functional data to get a rough idea of where the money goes.

Table Eighteen


Summary of the Budget Data in the Department of Defense Report on Combating Terrorism

<u>Activities</u>	<u>FY1999</u>	<u>FY2000</u>	<u>FY2001</u>
<u>AntiTerrorism</u>			
Physical Security Equipment	192.4	185.9	205.2
Physical Security Site Improvements	56.4	89.2	57.3
Physical Security Management and Planning	58.3	55.6	58.1
Security Forces and Technicians	1,594.2	1,678.4	1,755.1
Law Enforcement	861.9	884.3	906.8
Security and Investigative Means	428.6	427.3	473.0
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation	48.2	59.6	65.6
SUBTOTAL	3,240.1	3,380.2	3,521.0
<u>Counterterrorism</u>			
Special Operations Command	446.5	620.8	554.9
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation	1.9	3.4	3.0
SUBTOTAL	448.3	634.2	557.9
<u>Terrorism Consequence Management</u>			
Domestic Preparedness Programs	48.9	32.1	10.2
Consequence Management Response	106.4	202.2	90.6
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation	89.0	134.7	164.7
SUBTOTAL	244.3	369.0	265.4
<u>Intelligence</u>			
Counterintelligence	107.1	106.8	106.0
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation	4.1	6.4	5.7
SUBTOTAL	111.2	113.2	111.7
<u>TOTAL</u>	4,044.0	4,486.6	4,455.9
<i>OMB National Security Total</i>	<i>(4,682.5)</i>	<i>(5,117.2)</i>	<i>(5,124.1)</i>
<i>Difference</i>	<i>638.5</i>	<i>630.6</i>	<i>668.2</i>

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from Department of Defense, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Combating Terrorism Activities, FY2001, Washington, DC, January 14, 2000.

Chart Eighteen

Department of Defense Spending on Combating Terrorism and Counter CBRN Defense  
(Current \$US Millions)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from Executive Office of the President, Office Management and Budget, "Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism," May 2000.

The Department of Defense data track with the OMB report in terms of total spending. This does not mean, however, that the differences between the two totals are measures of the money going to the intelligence community – although the DoD report makes no mention of any intelligence money going to CIA, NSA, or DIA. There is no way to correlate the line item data in the OMB and DoD reports and there seem to be a number of differences in the way each agency does the counting.

Several trends are apparent in the Department of Defense data, however, that are not as apparent in the OMB data:

- The vast bulk of spending goes to force and facility protection activities under the heading of “antiterrorism.” This has also been the area of the most rapid growth in recent years – rising from \$3.2 billion in FY1999 to \$3.5 billion in FY2001. In broad terms, protecting US military forces and facilities overseas accounts for roughly 79% of all Department of Defense spending on counterterrorism. There is no way to know, however, what percentage affects DoD activities in foreign countries and DoD activities in the US.
- Another major element is more a matter of accounting than reality. The entire Special Operations Command is stated to be a dedicated counterterrorism activity because the DoD resources dedicated and available to a given activity and personnel who dedicate 51% or more of their time to such efforts. As a result, counterterrorism spending is largely an artificial accounting construct. In FY2001, this included \$557.9 million, or about 12% of total DoD spending.
- Terrorism consequence management is not a growth area and shrank from \$369 million in FY2000 to \$265 million in FY2001, as part of the DoD effort to reduce its responsibilities in this area. It was 5.9 percent of the total DoD effort in FY2001.
  - Between FY1999 and FY2001, the DoD effort in Domestic Preparedness Programs shrank from \$ 48.9 million to \$ 10.2 million, or by nearly 80% percent. It was far less than one percent of the total DoD effort in FY2001.
  - The consequence management response effort lost more than 50% of its funding between FY2000 and FY2001. It was 2.0 percent of the total DoD effort in FY2001.
  - In contrast, RDT&E efforts in Terrorism consequence management nearly doubled between FY1999 and FY2001, and rose from \$ 89.0 million to \$ 164.7 million. It was 3.7 percent of the total DoD effort in FY2001.
- Intelligence spending was nearly static between FY1999 and FY2001, at around \$112 million, or 2.5 percent of the total effort. It is obvious that no new programs are underway and no new capabilities are being funded or developed. The funds shown in this heading do not, however, include any activity by

NSA or DIA, and virtually all go to the military services. Only about 4% are devoted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

- The DoD excludes all counterproliferation activity from its analysis of spending to combat terrorism. It also excludes most capabilities relating to asymmetric warfare.
- The DoD figures are meaningless in terms of measuring overall response capability and costs because these are contingency dependent. For example, any major emergency deployment of the Guard, reserves, or active forces in reaction to a nuclear or large scale biological attack could easily spend multiples of the total funding now shown for counterterrorism.

One key insight is that DoD's total consequence management effort is now only \$265 million and is less than 6% of its total effort. Intelligence, which is not really defined, is static and funded at only \$112 million. Reports that imply that there is a massive Homeland Defense effort in DoD relating to CBRN attacks are flatly wrong, while the data that the DoD provides make it impossible to understand what is really happening, and to link counterproliferation and asymmetric warfare capability to Homeland defense

At the same time, there are critical limits to the DoD report. It is currently impossible to produce a valid analysis of the subset of DoD activities affecting the defense against the use chemical, biological, and radiological weapons by states, proxies, terrorists, or extremists, or to tie these aspects of Homeland defense to other aspects of Homeland defense. The figures in excess of \$10 billion sometimes associated with such efforts are clearly statistical rubbish, and so are any efforts to associate total DoD spending to combat terrorism with CBRN defense of the American homeland. Only a minor amount of "combating terrorism" money goes to such efforts, and even some of that money actually supports many other functions.

### **Key Department of Defense Activities**

According to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, the Secretary of Defense leads the Emergency Response Assistance Program to train first responders. To carry out the program, the Secretary of Defense must consult with the Director of FEMA, the Secretary of Energy, and the heads of any other federal, State and local agencies with expertise and responsibilities in the area of emergency response. The Office of the Secretary of Defense directs the following efforts:

- *Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC)*: Has overall policy and resource oversight for

domestic preparedness. Maintains the Counterterror Technical Support Program (CTTS) which is a fast-track R&D program for multi-agency and international aspects of terrorism.

- *Defense Threat Reduction Agency*: Manages and coordinates the extensive technical expertise on chemical and biological defense within the Defense Department. Also involved in counterproliferation, Cooperative Threat Reduction activities, and special weapons technology.
- *Director of Military Support (DOMS)*: Located under the Secretary of the Army, within the office of the Assistant Secretary for Installations, Logistics, and Environment, this office serves as the central point for the coordination of military support to civilian authorities.
- *Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office*. The Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office has been established under the command of the Director of Military Support in order to integrate Reserve and Guard components into the national domestic preparedness strategy. This office will coordinate identification, training, equipping, and exercise of Reservists and Guard components.

While they are not always part of the CBRN budget, the US military services also play a broad role in deterring, defending, and responding to CBRN incidents:

- *US Army 52<sup>nd</sup> Ordnance Group (EOD)*: “Provides military explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/bomb squad units to defeat or mitigate the hazards from conventional, nuclear, or chemical military munitions and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) throughout CONUS as requested by local, state, federal law enforcement or military authorities.”<sup>5</sup>
- *US Army Response Task Forces (RTF)*: RTF aids the lead agency in consequence management operations by creating a command and control that coordinates all other DoD elements.
- *US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), Medical Chemical Biological Advisory Team (MCBAT)*: Is the lead source for medical information for chemical agents.
- *US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMARIID)*: USAMARIID is the lead medical research laboratory for the US Biological Defense Research Program. Its role is to protect against bioterrorism and biowarfare with the ideal prevention of immunization. It conducts research to develop technologies, procedures, and training programs for medical defense against biological warfare threats and naturally occurring infectious diseases. It is a tech based research facility that creates countermeasures for biological agents. USAMARIID’s facilities include the capability to contain and care for at biosafety level 3 and 4. It also has an Aeromedical Isolation Team that can respond anywhere in the world and transport back to the center. USAMARIID also provides counterterrorism support with threat evaluation, rapid bio agent identification, and as a general reference to biological agents. USAMARIID is the lead medical research laboratory for the U.S. Biological Defense Research Program and the only biological containment laboratory in the DOD capable of studying infectious diseases.
- *US Army Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic Analytical Center Modular On-site Laboratory*: Provides facilities with capabilities to analyze chemical agents.
- *US Army Radiological Control (RADCON)*: Supports RTF to provide radiological monitoring.

- *US Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT)*: Supports RTF and local responders during radiological health situations.
- *Air Force Radiological Assessment Team (AFRAT)*: AFRAT is a response team for nuclear and radiological incidents. Its indirectly funded with O&M funds from the Institute for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health Risk Analysis (IERA), Radiation Protection Division. These funds go towards the equipment and training AFRAT needs to respond to radiological incidents.
- *Special Operations Command*: Special Mission Units are manned, equipped, and trained to deal with transnational threats, including WMD. Includes members from Army Delta Force, Navy SEAL Team 6, Air Force Special Tactics Squadron 1. Also can include the Army's 75th Ranger Regiment and the 160th Special Operations Regiment. The Special Mission Units are under the command of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- *Central Command*: Central Command's area of responsibility extends to the Middle East and much of Africa. Within this area, this command must assure the security of Americans and their property abroad from acts of terrorism. Central Command acts as the military's forward deployed eyes, ears, and arms to counter acts of terrorism within its area of responsibility.
- *Technical Escort Unit (TEU)*: Army unit that handles, dismantles, and disposes of chemical and biological weapons and munitions. Based at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
- *Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)*: Formerly Chemical and Biological Defense Command. SBCCOM has responsibility for training development and city training visits. The organization has established a chemical-biological hotline for expert assistance in an emergency, as well as a non-emergency helpline.
- *Navy Medical Research Institute*: Conducts research, development, tests, and evaluations for the Navy and Marine Corps, on infectious diseases, casualty care, and provides biomedical research capabilities to support field laboratories and hospitals.
- *Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit*: This is a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Environmental Defense Response Team. Teams are created on an *ad hoc* basis suited to the situation. They provided assistance to Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Teams and local responders.
- *Air Force*: For FY1999 the House appropriated \$120,500,000 for: the provision of crisis response aviation support for critical national security, law enforcement and emergency response agencies This money is provided with the understanding that the President of the United States shall submit to the Congress by March 15, 1999, an interagency agreement for the utilization of Department of Defense assets to support the crisis response requirements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
- *Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)*: A Marine Corps unit that is developing the capacity to identify chemical and biological agents, "assess downwind hazards, conduct advanced lifesaving support, and decontaminate patients." Provide communications and enhance transportation capability. In FY97, \$10,000,000 dollars was allocated by DOD for equipment to support CBIRF. The DOD reports that the procurement for FY2001 is \$1.9 million.
- *National Guard*: The Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office has been established under the command of the Director of Military Support in order to integrate Reserve and Guard components into the national domestic preparedness strategy. This office will coordinate

training, equipping, and exercising of Reservists and Guard components.

- *WMD Civil Support Teams.* There are member teams in 26 states by 2001. The teams act in support of first responders at the request of the State or federal government. They are on alert to respond to a suspected or actual WMD attack, assess the situation, provide advice to the local incident commander, and facilitate the arrival of requested DOD equipment, services, and people in the after-effects of an event.
- *Military Reserves:* Reservists, like the Guard, will be utilized to train first responders in their community and be mobilized in the event of an attack. The DOD plans to establish 170 reconnaissance and decontamination teams, drawn mostly from existing chemical companies, to train and be equipped to support the rapid response teams. The Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office has been established under the command of the Director of Military Support in order to integrate Reserve and Guard components into the national domestic preparedness strategy. This office will coordinate training, equipping, and exercising of Reservists and Guard components.

### **Antiterrorism and Force Protection**

Although anti-terrorism and force protection efforts receive the vast bulk of DoD funding to combat terrorism, they generally have little to do with CBRN attacks. They are designed basically to deal with high explosives and direct assaults, with limited capability to deal with a direct intrusion of a chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

In fact, one of the more interesting aspects of a detailed review of the service programs in this area is that there is considerable expense on intrusion detection and explosive detection, and blast mitigation, but little on either CBRN detection or cyberattack detection. It is also unclear that the massive number of vulnerability assessments reflected in the FY1999-FY2001 budgets examined these aspects of the problem or any aspect of the possible impact on defense health facilities. It is unclear that current service regulations and technical manuals require such analysis although protection against CBRN attacks is in the charter of each service force protection effort. (The only service to specifically mention this in its budget justification is the Navy.) Somewhat ironically, DoD law enforcement activities pay far more attention to CBRN attacks than any of the programs related to force and facility protection improvement and design.<sup>6</sup>

Even the DTRA portion of the ongoing force protection effort does not explicitly touch on any CBRN-related effort in the DoD budget justification document.<sup>7</sup> The Joint Staff did,

however, developing a WMD Planning Template Annex in FY1999, and directed a program to educate CINCs and the services in FY2000 and FY2001.<sup>8</sup>

They do, however, have at least some relation to the problem. In brief, DOD has taken action to improve its antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) program since the 1995 Riyadh car bomb and 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. The Secretary of Defense chose the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the principal AT/FP adviser in September 1996, and the Chairman announced DOD's goal of becoming the worldwide AT/FP leader. A July 2000 GAO report describes the DOD AT/FP program:<sup>9</sup>

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) policy. While this office focuses on policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combating Terrorism directorate within the Joint Staff focus on implementing DOD's AT/FP program. The Joint Staff's responsibilities include reviewing the services' AT/FP budgets, developing standards, managing the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment program, and representing the geographic combatant commanders on AT/FP matters.

DOD policy makes commanders responsible for protecting their forces from terrorist attacks. For forces overseas, the responsibility rests with the geographic combatant commander and the installation commander, with the support of the service headquarters. The geographic combatant commanders are responsible for developing antiterrorism policies that apply at the installations in their areas of responsibility and that take precedence over service or other DOD component AT/FP policies. They are also responsible for determining the threat levels for each country in their area of responsibility, identifying the money and manpower needed to achieve sufficient AT/FP, and working with the services to provide the resources necessary. Finally, because all risks cannot be eliminated, the geographic combatant commanders are responsible for determining the types of risks their forces will face as they undertake their missions.

Installation commanders are responsible for protecting the people, assets, and facilities under their command from terrorist attacks. The installation commander, working with the installation AT/FP manager, is responsible for ensuring that AT/FP standards established by DOD, the geographic combatant commanders, the services, and the service headquarters are implemented. Additionally, because DOD recognizes that not all vulnerabilities can be addressed, installation commanders practice risk management—to decide what risks can be accepted and what risks are too great to be accepted. When the risk is unacceptable, the commander is responsible for taking action to mitigate the risk.

Although geographic combatant commanders have overall responsibility to protect forces assigned to them, individual services are responsible for funding an installation's AT/FP needs and for providing the required number of trained personnel. The majority of funds used for AT/FP activities (excluding the cost of military personnel) are located in the services' Operation and Maintenance appropriations. Operation and Maintenance appropriations are generally used to fund readiness activities, equipment maintenance, recruiting, pay for civilian employees (including contract security guards), and the everyday costs of running an installation. A number of subactivities within this appropriation fund specific expenses. Examples of the subactivities include real property maintenance, depot maintenance, and base operating support. The base operating support subactivity pays for expenses such as utilities, communications,

security, building repair, and maintenance. Traditionally, the services have included funds for AT/FP in the base operating support subactivity, and AT/FP activities must compete against other activities for the same limited funding.

Shortly after the Khobar Towers bombing, the Secretary of Defense established the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund.<sup>4</sup> The Fund, which is managed by the Joint Staff, was not intended to relieve the services of their responsibility to fund AT/FP projects; rather, it was intended to provide funding for emergency or other unforeseen high-priority, combating terrorism needs. In fiscal year 2000, the Fund totaled \$15 million—\$10 million of Operation and Maintenance funds and \$5 million of procurement funds. This level of funding is scheduled to continue through fiscal year 2002. In fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the Fund will be reduced to a total of \$10 million a year according to DOD.

The GAO did criticize the DOD for underfunding AT/FP programs, for inadequately training AT/FP managers, and for incompletely assessing vulnerabilities. The GAO said:<sup>10</sup>

Overall, military forces stationed overseas are better protected today than they were 3 years ago. The Joint Staff has developed DOD-wide construction standards to ensure that antiterrorism/force protection measures are included in new construction. In addition, DOD has signed agreements with the Department of State and U.S. ambassadors or chiefs of mission to protect DOD personnel not under the jurisdiction of commanders. Geographic combatant commands have created permanent antiterrorism/force protection offices, hired permanent antiterrorism/force protection staff, and developed systems to monitor progress to correct vulnerabilities. Installation commanders are more aware of their responsibility to protect their forces from terrorist attack and, despite funding constraints, have addressed many security vulnerabilities. However, significant security and procedural antiterrorism/force protection problems continue at many installations. For example, some installations have not developed plans to deal with terrorist attacks, others have no effective means of stopping unauthorized vehicles from entering the installation, and some lack secure access to important intelligence information.

Commanders are better able to determine their vulnerability to terrorist attacks than when we last reported. Vulnerability assessments are now being conducted more routinely and are based on a defined set of criteria. However, vulnerability assessment reports do not provide specific actions to rectify problems mentioned in the reports. Additionally, there is no comprehensive method in place to share solutions to common problems among different installations.

Limited antiterrorism funding and trained staff have affected the ability of commanders to correct known vulnerabilities. Funding for antiterrorism protection has been, and will likely continue to be, significantly less than what installation and geographic combatant commanders have determined they require, despite the fact that senior DOD leaders have designated antiterrorism/force protection as a high priority item. For example, some overseas service commands have repeatedly received less than 50 percent of the money the commands believe they require to correct or mitigate vulnerabilities. According to antiterrorism/force protection managers, this level of funding has limited their ability to address vulnerabilities. Congress requires DOD to provide information on proposed antiterrorism/force protection funding and projects as part of its consolidated combating terrorism budget submission; however, it does not require DOD to provide information on the number of projects that remain to be funded. Without information on the types of projects that need funding, Congress does not have an accurate picture of the extent of the risk that U.S. forces face from terrorism. In addition, installations we visited did not have adequately trained personnel dedicated to managing and implementing antiterrorism solutions.

The GAO never explicitly addressed CBRN vulnerabilities. It did report, however, that all services will face a shortage of AT/FP funding in FY 2001. It estimated that the services' required \$274.5 million and estimates that the proposed budget is only \$141.3 million, or 51% of the need. The Joint Staff also estimated that AT/FP programs need an extra \$700 million over current FY 2002-2005 spending plans. The GAO made the following recommendations to improve AT/FP:<sup>11</sup>

To improve the effectiveness and increase the impact of the vulnerability assessments and the vulnerability assessment reports, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve the vulnerability assessment reports provided to installations. Although the Joint Staff is planning to take some action to improve the value of these reports, we believe the vulnerability assessment reports should recommend specific actions to overcome identified vulnerabilities. In addition, the Joint Staff should develop an antiterrorism/force protection best practices or lessons learned program that would share recommendations for both physical and process-oriented improvements. The program would assist installations in finding answers to common problems—particularly those installations that do not receive Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment reports or others who have found vulnerabilities through their own vulnerability assessments.

To provide Congress with the most complete information on the risks that U.S. forces overseas are facing from terrorism, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to include in their next consolidated combating terrorism budget submission information on the number and types of antiterrorism/force protection projects that have not been addressed by the budget request and the estimated cost to complete these projects. Information on the backlog of projects should be presented by geographic combatant command.

To ensure that antiterrorism/force protection managers have the knowledge and skills needed to develop and implement effective antiterrorism/force protection programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to expeditiously implement the Joint Staff's draft antiterrorism/force protection manager training standard and formulate a timetable for the services to develop and implement a new course that meets the revised standards. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict should review the course content to ensure that the course has consistency of emphasis across the services.

As is the case with the OMB data, there is no way to tie the GAO estimates to the DoD reporting on such activity. The DOD reports that the AT/FP budget for FY2001 is \$3.5 billion. There is a large discrepancy between the GAO estimate with the DOD estimate.

## **Counterterrorism**

As is noted earlier, the DoD budget category for counterterrorism is essentially the budget for the US Special Forces Command and includes the US Army Special Forces

Command, Naval Special Warfare Command and SEALs, US Air Force Special Operations Command, and Joint Special Operations command. This effort does have a heavy RDT&E element (\$87 million in FY2000), but most of the spending is on operating and procurement spending. The budget increased from \$446 million in FY1999 to \$621 million in FY2000, but dropped to \$555 million in FY2001. Virtually all of the shift was procurement related.<sup>12</sup>

Much of this program is black, but there are no indications of CBRN dedicated programs in the DoD reporting, and little to indicate that spending really goes to combat terrorism as distinguished from all types of special forces missions. It is not clear that this budget category makes any functional sense.

### **Terrorism Consequence Management**

Virtually all dedicated DoD activity related to CBRN threats is funded as part of the Terrorism consequence management program. As has been touched upon earlier, this is not a growth area. Total funding shrank from \$369 million in FY2000 to \$265 million in FY2001, largely because of a DoD effort to reduce its responsibilities in this area. The spending in this category is divided into three major program activities:

- Domestic Preparedness Programs which shrank from \$ 48.9 million to \$ 10.2 million between FY1999 and FY2001, the DoD effort in, or by nearly 80% percent. These programs train emergency responders, support Rapid Response Teams, and a Chemical-Biological Emergency Response Team (CBERT). It funds an interagency FBI, FEMA, DOE, EPA, USPHS, and DoD coordination group.
- Consequence management response programs which rose from \$106 million in FY1999 to \$202 million in FY2000, and then dropped to \$91 million in FY2001. These efforts lost more than 50% of their funding between FY2000 and FY2001.
- RDT&E efforts in terrorism consequence management, which nearly doubled between FY1999 and FY2001, and rose from \$ 89.0 million to \$ 164.7 million.

### **Domestic Preparedness Program**

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, designated the DOD as the lead agency for domestic preparedness for responding to and managing the consequences of a WMD attack. This is why the DOD

established the Domestic Preparedness Program to train local and state first responders for a CBRN attack. The program is supposed to cover the 120 largest cities in the US based on 1990 Census data, and each city can request \$300,000 of equipment that is loaned from the DOD for 5 years. Training will be completed in the 120 largest cities by mid-2001.

The Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command is the organization within the DOD that administers the Domestic Preparedness Program.<sup>13</sup> The OMB reports that the total funding for the program during fiscal years 1997-99 was \$66.9 million. Funding for fiscal year 2000 was \$12.6 million, and the funding request for FY2001 is \$31 million.<sup>14</sup> The DoD report states that funding for the same heading was \$48.9 million in FY1999, \$32.1 million in FY2000, and \$10.2 million in FY2001.<sup>15</sup> The difference between the OMB and DoD costing seems to be largely the result of the fact that the OMB report did not take account of plans to transfer much of the DoD activity to the Department of Justice.

In FY2000, the Administration proposed to transfer the Domestic Preparedness Program to DOJ on October 1, 2000, and DOJ will complete DOD's commitments to the 120 cities.<sup>16</sup> The current DoD budget plan will complete this transfer management of the Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice in FY2001. The DOD will retain management of some programs that utilize DOD resources. The DOD will still fund the Chem-Bio Database development component of the Rapid Response Information System and also the equipment-testing program.

This transfer makes only tenuous sense. DoD may not like the responsibility, but transfer to a civil agency only seems suitable if the program focuses on incidents of the kind that can be dealt with by normal civil defense and response agencies, and DoD and civil agencies are not called upon to deal with a major nuclear or biological incident or a series of asymmetric attacks by a foreign power, proxy, or highly sophisticated terrorist agency. Even then, it is not clear what DOJ would be chosen instead of FEMA.

A March 2000, GAO report summarized progress in the Domestic Preparedness Program

as follows:<sup>17</sup>

Defense developed the Domestic Preparedness Program to build on the existing knowledge and capabilities of those who would first deal with a WMD incident locally: fire, law enforcement, hazardous materials, and medical personnel. Defense planned to provide personnel in the 120 largest U.S. cities (based on city population) with training and expert advice regarding emergency responses to the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction or related materials. Defense targeted cities for the training because it wanted to deal with a single government entity that could choose the most appropriate personnel to be trained and to receive training equipment. Defense trains city personnel, who then provide similar instruction to their emergency responder communities.

The training is generally a week long and comprises six separate courses--emergency responder awareness, emergency responder operations, technician-hazardous materials, technician-emergency medical services, technician-hospital provider, and incident command. The awareness and operations courses, each 4-hour segments, generally train responders in how to recognize a WMD incident and how to protect themselves and their communities during such incidents. The technician courses vary in length from 8 to 16 hours and are primarily for individuals in those specialties. The incident command course, 8 hours in length, focuses on the management of an incident and includes an exercise during which participants role-play their responses.

As of September 30, 1999, Defense had completed training in 67 cities and trained approximately 19,000 individuals. This includes only those individuals directly trained by Defense instructors...

The GAO also provided the following table on the output of these training efforts:

Table Nineteen:

First Responders Trained Through Domestic Preparedness Program (from program's inception in fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 1999)

Responder community	Number trained
Firefighter	5,100
Law enforcement	4,300
Emergency medical services	a1,600
Hospital provider	2,800
Military	850
Other <sup>b</sup>	4,350
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,000</b>

There have been problems in the program. The lack of interagency coordination in the Domestic Preparedness Program has been an example that critics like the GAO have cited in arguing for better federal integration of terrorism programs. DOJ administers the Metropolitan Firefighters program and FEMA administers WMD courses at its National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute in Maryland. The problem is the potential for and actual

overlap in first responders' training among the DOD, DOJ, and FEMA programs. Furthermore, another complaint is that it is inefficient for responders in each city to attend three programs from three departments when an integrated program would save time and resources.

The GAO made the following comments,<sup>18</sup>

Federal training programs on weapons of mass destruction are not well coordinated, resulting in inefficiencies in the federal effort and concerns in the first responder communities. The Departments of Defense and Justice and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are providing similar awareness courses as part of their train-the-trainer programs. Defense and Justice plan to deliver their programs to individuals in the same 120 cities, and Justice also plans to train individuals in 135 additional jurisdictions. Through September 1999, Defense had trained individuals in 67 cities, and through mid-November 1999 Justice had trained individuals in 95 cities and metropolitan areas. Training from both agencies' programs was provided to individuals in 16 common cities. State and local officials and representatives of various responder organizations expressed concerns about duplication and overlap among the two federal training programs, courses offered by the Consortium, and other courses such as hazardous materials and other specialized training that first responders are required to complete. Some officials said that the number of federal organizations involved in weapons of mass destruction training creates confusion about which federal organization is in charge of that training. Officials were concerned that the Defense and Justice programs offered to cities and counties had bypassed the states' emergency management and training structures. As a result, some responders, such as state police, had been missed. And some officials were concerned that the Defense and Justice programs will not train responders in smaller communities. They pointed out the potential to reach responders in smaller communities through the use of state and local training organizations and the use of training tools such as video transmission of instructional materials to existing facilities at firehouses and National Guard armories. The responders' concerns are consistent with the conclusions reached by a forum of over 200 state and local responders in August 1998 and a June 1999 Justice report. Common themes included the need for a single focal point for information about federal programs, a centrally coordinated and standardized national training program to ensure an effective and integrated response and to minimize redundancy in training programs, and the need to incorporate training related to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction into existing training delivery mechanisms for the emergency responder communities.

Efforts are under way to improve the federal government's role in weapons of mass destruction training, but more actions are needed to eliminate duplicative training and improve the efficiency of the Defense and Justice programs. Although Defense plans to transfer its Domestic Preparedness Program to Justice on October 1, 2000, and Justice was to provide Congress with a comprehensive plan for the transfer no later than December 15, 1999, that plan had not been issued as of March 1, 2000. According to Justice officials, Justice will complete Domestic Preparedness training in the 120 cities to honor Defense's commitments to those cities. It also still plans to deliver its Metropolitan Firefighters program to individuals in 255 cities and counties. Thus, in the near term, some cities will receive similar awareness courses under both programs. Justice officials said that in the longer term, they will assess the need to continue the Domestic Preparedness Program beyond the 120 cities based on a number of factors, including comprehensive needs assessments to be completed by the states and inputs from the first responder communities. In response to requests from the first responder community, Justice has established the interagency National Domestic Preparedness Office. The Office, recently funded under the Consolidated Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2000, is just getting organized. According to its draft action plan, it will provide an interagency forum for coordinating federal weapons of mass destruction assistance to state and local emergency responders. The Office has identified an ambitious list of tasks directed at many of the training concerns expressed by first

responders.

To improve the efficiency of federal programs, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General eliminate duplicative training in the same metropolitan areas. We are also recommending that if the Department of Justice provides Domestic Preparedness Program training in more than the currently planned 120 cities, it integrate the program with the Metropolitan Firefighters Program to capitalize on the strengths of each program and eliminate duplication and overlap.

More generally, serious questions arise as to whether the present training and equipment activity in this area of activity are really suited to deal with large nuclear and biological attacks or incidents, and realistically examine DoD-civil federal, state, local, and private sector needs and capabilities for more than low to mid-level terrorism. There seems to be a great deal more emphasis on counting training activity in most reporting on this aspect of the DoD program than to assess whether the training is realistic and adequate.

### **Consequence Management Response Program**

The Consequence Management Response Program is the largest operational component of the overall Terrorism Consequence Management Program, with a total budget of \$90.6 million in FY2001. This efforts attempts to integrate the reserves into the response effort, and functions include detection, decontamination, supporting the civil authorities, ordnance disposal, chemical and biological field sampling and characterization. It includes activities like the Civil Support (formerly Rapid Assessment Initial Detection or RAID) teams. It also includes the efforts of the US Army response task forces, and support from specialized US military institutes and facilities like the US Army Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMIIRD), US Army Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic Analytic Center Modular On-Site Laboratory, US Army Radiological Control (RADCON) Team and US Navy Radiological Control (RADCON) Team, and US Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT).

Many of the cutting edge US capabilities for chemical and biological defense outside the CDC and the DARPA research program are concentrated into this area. Unfortunately, the DoD budget reporting does not provide an adequate description of their activity and how much can be ascribed to Homeland defense. There is also a strong tendency to use imply large capabilities and

fund relatively small ones.

#### **Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support**

The Secretary of Defense appointed the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD-CS) to serve as the primary coordinator of DOD's WMD consequence management programs. The ATSD-CS coordinates by chairing the DOD's WMD Preparedness Group, which ensures the DOD's consequence management capabilities and resources are efficiently used.

The WMD Preparedness Group is comprised of the Assistant Secretaries for Health Affairs; Reserve Affairs; Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict; Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; and Legislative Affairs; the General Counsel; the Deputy Under Secretaries for Comptroller and for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and senior representatives from the Joint Staff, the Department of the Army, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The ATSD-CS also represents the DOD in the interagency task force chaired by the President's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism.<sup>19</sup>

#### **Chemical and Biological Defense Program**

After the Persian Gulf War, protection against chemical and biological weapons became a high priority. Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, which directed the Secretary of Defense to improve the DOD's chemical and biological defense programs. DOD integrated all programs into what is now the Chemical and Biological Defense Program managed by DTRA with oversight from the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense.

The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense is responsible for planning, programming, budgeting, coordination of medical and non-medical defenses, and overseeing management. The Deputy Assistance Secretary is also the Executive Secretary of the Steering Committee which is comprised of Directors of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense

Research and Engineering, representatives of the joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, the Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, and top officials responsible for chemical and biological defense.<sup>20</sup>

This led to a steady increase in many expenditures unrelated to Homeland defense. For example, funding for chemical agents and munitions destruction, defense category of Defense-wide Procurement Appropriations Account increased \$24 million from \$979 million for the 2000 FYDP to \$1,004 million for the 2001 FYDP.<sup>21</sup>

The Chemical and Biological Defense Program is divided into three non-medical defensive capabilities: contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination. Contamination avoidance is detecting and avoiding contaminated areas, and decontamination is the restoration of fighting ability after a CB attack. The research agencies of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program include the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. GAO testimony provides a brief description of these research agencies:<sup>22</sup>

- The Soldier and Biological Chemical Command is organized around two integrated business areas, one of which is research, development, and acquisition. Nearly half of its research, development, and acquisition funding supports the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The Command is engaged in the full range of research and development encompassing both biological and chemical systems. Its business areas include chemical detection, biological detection, decontamination, protection, and supporting science and technology.
- The Joint Program Office for Biological Defense manages the biological warfare agent detection program. The office monitors emerging technologies for advanced development, demonstration, and upgrades of fielded biological detection systems.
- The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Biological Warfare Defense Program is an applied research program established under the authority of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201, as amended) to fund revolutionary new approaches to biological warfare defense. The Biological Warfare Defense Program pursues high-risk, high-potential technologies from the demonstration of technical feasibility through the development of prototype systems. The goal of the program is to "develop and demonstrate technologies to thwart the use of biological warfare agents (including bacterial, viral, and bioengineered organisms and toxins) by both military and terrorist opponents. DARPA's primary strategy for accomplishing this goal is to create technologies applicable to broad classes of pathogens and toxins."<sup>23</sup> DARPA focuses on detection, defense, and response of biological weapons. The DOD reports that funding for DARPA has increased every year from \$84 million in FY 1999 to \$162 million for FY 2001. The largest area of funding has been Sensors, which deal with the development of

technology able to discern the type of bio agents used.

The Department of Defense (DOD) Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) continues to implement congressional direction to improve jointness and reflects an integrated DOD developed program. The FY 1999-2000 program funds the highest priority counterproliferation initiatives. During the past year, the Department reviewed its capabilities to protect against the asymmetric threats from chemical and biological weapons. As a result of the review, funding was identified to enhance and accelerate high-payoff technologies and advanced CB defense systems.

The FY 2000-2001 budget submission includes \$380 million in increased research and development funding for biological warfare defense and vaccines over the FY 2000-05 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), as well as additional FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental funding to procure CB defense equipment for the Guard and Reserves to support the Consequence Management mission.

Moreover, the Department continues to procure new CB defense equipment, due in large measure to the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommendation to increase planned spending on counterproliferation by \$1 billion over the FY 1999-2003 program period, of which \$732 million was allocated for chemical and biological defense efforts. The DOD CBDP invests in technologies to provide improved capabilities that have minimal adverse impact on warfighting potential.

For FY 2000, the program's appropriation was \$791 million, \$410 million for R&D and \$381 million for procurement.<sup>24</sup> Virtually all of this funding, however, goes to improve warfighting capability for conflicts overseas. The part of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program that relates to Terrorism Consequence Management has been sharply cut. The DoD budget document indicates that funding dropped from \$14.9 million in FY1999 to \$9.2 million in FY2000 to \$1.2 million in FY2001.<sup>25</sup>

This has been a troubled program in a number of ways. The GAO has repeatedly

criticized the CBDP for not following the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act. The Results Act directs agencies to focus on program outcomes and performance rather than on program resources and activities. GAO criticized the CBDP in August 1999 and again in May 2000.<sup>26</sup>

Congressional reports and administrative guidance indicate that DOD programs such as the Chemical and Biological Defense Program should follow the Results Act's outcome-oriented principles, including the establishment of general goals; quantifiable, measurable, outcome oriented performance goals; and related measures. Moreover, research organizations such as the Research Roundtable, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine have concluded that both applied and basic research programs supported by the federal government could be evaluated meaningfully in accordance with the Results Act framework.

DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program in general, and its R&D activities in particular, have not incorporated key Results Act principles. Program goals are vague and unmeasurable and the performance measures emphasize activities rather than impacts. In the absence of explicit and measurable goals, it is difficult to assess the impact of the Program on warfighters' ability to survive, fight, and win in a chemical and biological environment.

Chemical and Biological Defense Program research and development organizations have incorporated Results Act principles inconsistently. Only one of three DOD organizations that engage in R&D activities in support of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program has adopted the Results Act planning and evaluation tools. The remaining two cited either the utilization of equivalent planning tools or the unique challenges of evaluating research and development activities as reasons for not adopting the Results Act processes.

Our August 1999 report recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct that actions be taken to develop a performance plan for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program based on the outcome-oriented management principles embodied in the Results Act. DOD concurred with the recommendation and agreed to develop a full detailed and coordinated plan for inclusion in its next DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress. Nevertheless, the next Report to Congress in March 2000 did not contain a plan containing the elements outlined in our recommendation. In the March 2000 Report to Congress, DOD established a new set of program goals and stated specific technology and systems goals will be included in a performance plan to be completed during calendar year 2000 and included in the next annual report to Congress.

The GAO also recommended in March 2000 that CBDP be coordinated with the other non-medical chemical and biological research programs:<sup>27</sup>

Each of the federally funded programs conducting non-medical research and development on threats from chemical and biological agents has its own mission objective. However, we found many similarities among these programs in terms of the research and development activities they engage in, the threats they intend to address, the types of capabilities they seek to develop, the technologies they pursue in developing those capabilities, and the organizations they use to conduct the work. For example, these programs conduct a similar range of research and development activities, such as evaluating the feasibility or showing the practical utility of a technology. With regard to threat, two of the programs (those in the Department of Defense and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) focus on threats to the military, and the other

two (those in the Department of Energy and the Technical Support Working Group) focus on threats to civilians. However, the military and civilian user communities are concerned about many of the same chemical and biological substances (such as nerve agents) and possible perpetrators (such as foreign terrorists). In addition, we found that these programs are seeking to develop many of the same capabilities, such as detection and identification of biological agents. Furthermore, the types of technologies (such as mass spectroscopy) they pursue to achieve those capabilities may overlap. Finally, these programs may contract with the same groups of laboratories to perform research and development work.

Although the four programs we examined currently use both formal and informal mechanisms for coordination, we found several problems that may hamper their coordination efforts. First, participation in formal and informal coordination mechanisms is inconsistent. For instance, several of these mechanisms do not include representatives of the civilian user community. Second, program officials cited a lack of comprehensive information on which chemical and biological threats to the civilian population are the most important and on what capabilities for addressing these threats are most needed. Third, several programs do not formally incorporate existing information on chemical and biological threats or needed capabilities in deciding what research and development projects to fund. Having and using detailed information on civilian chemical and biological threats and the capabilities needed to respond to those threats would enable coordination mechanisms to better assess whether inefficient duplication or critical research gaps exist, and if so, what changes should be made in federal research and development programs.

#### **WMD Civil Support Teams**

One of the original purposes of the CBDP is to provide WMD civil support teams with equipment adequate in a response to a chemical/biological incident under the National Guard (NG) and Reserve Component (RC) Equipment program. The WMD Civil Support Teams represent the first military responders and have a goal of reaching a WMD scene within four hours. Ten teams have already been established and are stationed in the ten FEMA regions around the country.<sup>28</sup> WMD Civil Support Teams were formerly known as National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Teams. The teams help local and state responders assess the situation, provide technical and medical advice, define requirements, and expedite state and federal support. A team is comprised of seven cells: command and control, reconnaissance, medical support, security, logistics, air liaison, and communications.<sup>29</sup> Each team has 22 members, and the governors of the states they are deployed have command and control of the team.<sup>30</sup>

The program was supposed to provide 15 WMD Civil Support Teams with equipment, with 10 equipped in FY 1999 and 5 in FY 2000. The DOD has since called for the establishment of 17 new WMD Civil Support Teams in addition to the sustainment of the 10 already established in FY2000. Funding for the Consequence Management Program has dropped from

FY 2000 of \$107.2 million to \$76.4 million in FY 2001, however, and most is spent on sustainment of the teams instead of initial fielding of new teams. There are no plans to field new WMD CS Teams in FY 2001 and by the end of 2000, there will only be 27 WMD CS Teams of the originally planned 44 WMD CS Teams. According to DoD, it plans to retain one WMD rapid response team in addition to 17 Civil Support Teams.

#### **Chemical Biological Response Force (CBIRF)**

The CBIRF is a 373 man Marine Unit established to provide a chemical-biological incident capability. Funds were provided to stand it up in FY1999 and FY2000, and its equipment has been steadily improved. Most funding, however, has gone for chemical warfare related equipment, and the CBIRF only begins to acquire extensive amounts of biological warfare equipment in FY2001. Even then, most of its capability depends on the success of RDT&E activities described in the FY2001 program, but which have no clear deployment date.<sup>31</sup> The CBIRF has limited technical expertise and manning and the DoD budget report indicates is sized as a one medium incident chemical attack response force with limited biological incident capability.

#### **US Air Force Radiological Survey Team (AFRAT) and Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)**

The US Air Force Radiological Survey Team (AFRAT) is a small 43-man team funded with discretionary funding. It is one of the few teams with dedicated capabilities that could respond to a serious radiological incident.<sup>32</sup>

The USAF provides the aircraft for the interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST). FEST assists with the management of terrorist attacks in foreign countries. The DOD needs funding to replace the 38-year-old aircraft. \$73 million was appropriated in the FY Supplemental.<sup>33</sup> The DOD reports that there is no planned funding for FEST in FY2001. The replacement aircraft will be used.

#### **Counterterror Technical Support Program**

The OASD (SO/LIC) is responsible for the oversight of the Counterterror Technical

Support Program (CTTS), which will be renamed the Combating Terrorism Technology Support Program in 2001. The CTTS helps fund the R&D for The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) under the Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism (IWG/CT). The CTTS develops technology to detect chemical and nuclear threats. The OASD (SO/LIC) also coordinates WMD Terrorist Consequence Management. “Activities funded consist of interagency user requirements related to the personal protection, detection, identification, containment, mitigation and disposal of terrorist-employed chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials.”<sup>34</sup> The goal is to develop protective equipment and early warning devices for WMD incidents. The funding for the CTTS has decreased slightly for FY 2001 because of the completion of various projects.

#### **Joint Task Force for Civil Support**

The DOD established the Joint Task Force for Civil Support to coordinate the department’s WMD consequence management support to local and state officials. The task force is based in Norfolk, VA, and is led by a National Guard brigadier general. The task force has no standing forces but can mobilize quickly at FEMA’s request of assistance. The task force also has operational command and control of WMD Civil Support Teams if the teams are federalized.<sup>35</sup> \$5 million has been requested for FY 2001 for the Joint Task Force.

#### **Defense Logistics Agency**

One of the DLA’s responsibilities is the procurement of protective equipment and training for DLA agents to plan and react during a chemical/biological incident. Of the \$2,246,000 appropriated to the DLA in 2001, however, only \$66,000 will go towards chemical/biological incident protection for the procurement of protective suits and masks and crisis management training.

#### **Defense Threat Reduction Agency**

DTRA is a Combat Support Agency directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, made up of military and DoD civilians to provide vulnerability assessment to better protect

military and civilian personnel. DTRA also manages the Chemical/Biological Defense Program. The DOD has appropriated \$11,442,000 for DTRA in FY 2001.

The Chemical/Biological Defense program includes the development of materials for training, exercises, force protection installation planning, first response, vulnerability assessment, and detection gear. The program has, however, had only limited funding for Antiterrorism and Force Protection: \$2,841 million in FY1999 declining to \$458 million in FY2001. This aspect of DTRA activity is heavily oriented toward chemical as distinguished from biological warfare. In contrast, defense-wide RDT&E in more conventional counterterrorism activity increased from \$25.0 million in FY1999 to \$35.1 million in FY2001.<sup>36</sup> An additional \$30 million in RDT&E was programmed in FY2001 for SOLIC RDT&E, all of which is described as related to attacks using conventional explosives. This illustrates the heavy emphasis DoD places on conventional, versus CBRN counterterrorism.

The DTRA Consequence Management Response Program has been larger, because DTRA has provided chemical and biological defense equipment for several of the field teams discussed earlier. These have include the WMD Civil Support Teams, but the number of teams funded has dropped from 10 in FY1999 to five in FY2001, and funding for these teams has dropped from \$14.6 million to \$1.2 million.<sup>37</sup> The FY2001 submission does not call for funding any teams beyond the 15 already equipped. It is also important to note that the equipment provided is not particularly advanced, and has comparatively limited capability for biological warfare.

DTRA supports several other team efforts:

- *Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments Teams (JSIVA)*: The operational teams that assess “facility vulnerability to terrorist operations and the means of reduction mass casualties. These assessments include: (1) Terrorist Options; (2) Physical Security; (3) Structural Engineering and Response; (4) Infrastructure Engineering; and (5) Operations.”<sup>38</sup> The budget of the DTRA for FY2001 is \$7.6 million, which will be spent on the salaries and expenses of the JSIVA teams.
- *Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT)*: The CMAT is the team that satisfies the DTRA’s responsibility for aiding other DoD organizations with WMD and radiological incidents. It “provides technical, consequence management planning, weapons effects modeling, general counsel, public affairs, and health physics expertise to augment CIMC staffs.”<sup>39</sup> The funding for the CMAT for FY

2001 is \$300,000.

A detailed review of the Department of Defense budget document reveals a number of other DTRA activities. One thing is all too clear, however, and affects much of the intellectual underpinning of the DoD planning effort. A total of \$11.4 million does not come close to the amount needed to carry out adequate assessment of the effects of CBRN weapons in a wide range of different attacks, to support net technical assessment efforts, to improve other aspects of planning or response, or to assist broadly in training. At present, DTRA simply is not funded to take on a mission of the scale required.

### **Research and Development**

DARPA is the core of the independent research and development funding identified in the DoD budget analysis for Terrorism Consequence Management. The RDT&E activity in this category is funded at \$89.0 million in FY1999, \$134.7 in FY2000, and \$164.7 million in FY2001. The DARPA portion is funded at \$84.0 million in FY1999, \$131.7 in FY2000, and \$162.1 million in FY2001. It is a relatively robust effort, and reflects a realistic emphasis on RDT&E in an area where the existing threat is limited, but major advances in technology are needed to defend against future threats like genetically engineered biological weapons.

The DARPA Biological Warfare Defense program covers a wide range of efforts to create new characterization systems and defenses against bacterial, viral, and bioengineered organisms and toxins and address both full-scale and terrorist attacks. It involves major advances in detection and characterization technology to reduce the false alarm rate, increase speed, and deal with complex attacks. The program also involves consequence management and external protection technology, asymmetrical protocols for biological warfare defense, and genetic sequencing research.

It is important to note that this RDT&E program does not have strong service counterparts, and seems to be the only major US government effort seek major new solutions to the threat posed by biological attacks. The military service and CDC efforts have an RDT&E component, but funding is comparatively limited and is concentrated on improving detection and

response through the growth of existing technologies.

At the same time, the DARPA program is not described in ways that show any great consistency of effort from year-to-year, or which give any evidence of a coherent future year program. Such planning may exist, but it is not described in unclassified DOD or DARPA literature. No timelines or cost estimates seem to exist for deployment of most of the technologies involved, which generally are designed to fill critical ongoing gaps in the present US government effort to deal with the threat posed by biological weapons.

### **Intelligence**

Virtually all funding in the intelligence category reported by the Department of Defense goes to counterintelligence activity, with very limited funding for research and development. The counterintelligence effort is funded at \$107 million in FY1999 and FY2000, and \$106 million in FY2001. The RDT&E effort is funded at \$4.1 million, \$6.4 million, and \$5.7 million respectively. Total intelligence funding is \$111.2 million in FY1999, \$113.2 million in FY2000, and \$111.7 million in FY2001.

In practice, the budget description of this activity indicates that virtually all of the intelligence activity involved is designed to support the force protection mission at the tactical level. None goes to developing new intelligence methods or broader intelligence efforts to deal with emerging threats or asymmetric warfare. Any funding of improved CIA, NSA, and DIA efforts is funded under other aspects of the national security budget. The independent RDT&E effort does, however, fund a limited program to support the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism for pre-incident intelligence gathering and operations.

### **The Possible FY2001 DoD Budget for CBRN/WMD Homeland Defense**

Another way to look at Department of Defense activities is to search out only those activities to combat terrorism which can be clearly and openly identified as directed toward CBRN attacks and WMD, and which might have direct relevance to Homeland defense.. Any

such estimate using the DoD report on Combating Terrorism must be tenuous at best. Table Twenty does, however, provide a very rough indication of just how small the dedicated effort may really be. While the total for combating terrorism is well in excess of \$4 billion; the figure for core DoD activities that broadly affect the defense and response against CBRN attacks on the American homeland is less than \$300 million. This does, however, account for a major part of the \$467 million that OMB estimates is spent by all National Security agencies on such programs.

Table TwentyCore Department of Defense Efforts in Combating Terrorism that Broadly Affect CBRN-Related Homeland Defense Against State, Proxy, Terrorist, and Extremist Attacks on Targets Other than DoD Facilities and Forces

<u>WMD Preparedness</u>	
Preparing for and Responding to WMD Terrorism	
DLA	.066
DTRA	<u>11.422</u>
Subtotal	11.488
First Responder Training	10.2
Air Force First Responder	<u>2.700</u>
Subtotal	12.9
Other Planning and Assistance to State/Locals	
Navy – Support to Civil Authorities/TCM	5.574
Special Response Units	
Consequence Management Program	76.4
CBIRF	<u>4.369</u>
Subtotal	80.769
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>110.731</i>
<u>R&amp;D</u>	
Basic Research, incl. Gene Sequencing	
DARPA – Genetic Sequencing of Biological Warfare Agents	12.5
Detection/Diagnostics	
CTTS	
DARPA – Advanced Diagnostics	19.350
DARPA – Sensors	<u>24.056</u>
Subtotal	46.454
Modeling, Simulation, System Analysis	
DARPA – Consequence Management	10.0
Personal/Collective Protection	
DARPA – Bio/Chem Defensive Systems	10.0
Personal/Environmental Decontamination	
DARPA – External Protection	21.0
Therapeutics/Treatments	
DARPA – Multipurpose	22.2
Vaccines	
DARPA – Anti-Virals/Immunizations	21.3
DARPA – Anti-Bacterials/Anti-Toxins	<u>21.658</u>
Subtotal	42.958
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>165.112</i>
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>275.843</u>

\*R&D calculated is the total of R&D from Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, Terrorism Consequence Management, and Intelligence categories from p. 78.

Department of Defense, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Combating Terrorism Activities, FY2001, Washington, DC, January 14, 2000

## Conclusions

There is little publicly apparent coordination or policy within the Department of Defense that deal with Homeland Defense against CBRN attacks and WMD Preparedness in ways that go beyond a relatively small core of activities to combat terrorism. This is best exemplified by (a) the failure to tie together all of the key activities relating to homeland defense, (b) a narrow and often dysfunctional definition of counterterrorism, (c) the discrepancies in the DOD and OMB estimates of funding to combat terrorism, and (d) the lack of any apparent dedicated future year planning and programming effort. There is a clear lack of focus, sense of mission, and overall organization of the DOD's efforts against WMD defense in the DOD's Combating Terrorism budget as described in its *public* reporting.

These problems point to obvious solutions. Counterterrorism is only a subset of a much broader problem that affects by Homeland Defense and a world in which the risk of asymmetric conflicts and attacks force us to rethink our entire approach to national security. There is a clear need for a dedicated and more open PPB and FYP effort that covers all of the aspects of the problem and which allows the Executive Branch, Congress, and outside analysts to understand which programs and money is going, our current and planning capabilities, and the balance between different kinds of defensive activity.

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<sup>1</sup> First Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, I. Assessing the Threat, December 15, 1999, [www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/](http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel/)

<sup>2</sup> National Commission on Terrorism, "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism," June, 2000

<sup>3</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused," GAO/NSIAD-00-97, May 26, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00097.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Combating Terrorism Activities, FY2001, Washington, DC, January 14, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, p. 352.

<sup>6</sup> See Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, pp. 296-297.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Combating Terrorism Activities, FY2001, Washington, DC, January 14, 2000, p. 193.

<sup>8</sup> Department of Defense, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Combating Terrorism Activities, FY2001, Washington, DC, January 14, 2000, p. 213.

<sup>9</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas," GAO/NSIAD-00-181, July 19, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00181.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas," GAO/NSIAD-00-181, July 19, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00181.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas," GAO/NSIAD-00-181, July 19, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00181.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, pp. 343-350.

<sup>13</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training," GAO/NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00064.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Including Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection," May 18, 2000

<sup>15</sup> Department of Defense, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Combating Terrorism Activities, FY2001, Washington, DC, January 14, 2000.

<sup>16</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training," GAO/NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00064.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training," GAO/NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00064.pdf>

<sup>18</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training," GAO/NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00064.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> William S. Cohen, Department of Defense, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress," 2000, <http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2000/chap7.html>

<sup>20</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework," GAO/T-NSIAD-00-180, May 24, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00180t.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Future Years Defense Program: Comparison of Planned Funding Levels for the 2000 and 2001 Programs," GAO/NSIAD-00-179, June 14, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00179.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> United States General Accounting Office, "Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework," GAO/T-NSIAD-00-180, May 24, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00180t.pdf>

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<sup>23</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, p. 384.

<sup>24</sup> United States General Accounting Office, “Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework,” GAO/T-NSIAD-00-180, May 24, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00180t.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> Department of Defense, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Combating Terrorism Activities, FY2001, Washington, DC, January 14, 2000, p. 361.

<sup>26</sup> United States General Accounting Office, “Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework,” GAO/T-NSIAD-00-180, May 24, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00180t.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> United States General Accounting Office, “Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Non-medical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs,” GAO/T-NSIAD-00-130, March 22, 2000, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00130t.pdf>

<sup>28</sup> William S. Cohen, Department of Defense, “Annual Report to the President and the Congress,” 2000, <http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2000/chap7.html>

<sup>29</sup> Department of Defense Tiger Team, “Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction,” January, 1998, [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/chapter\\_5.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/chapter_5.html)

<sup>30</sup> Cragin, Charles, “Defense Leaders Commentary: The Facts on WMD Civil Support Teams,” March 31, 2000, [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2000/n03312000\\_20003311.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2000/n03312000_20003311.html)

<sup>31</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, p. 369.

<sup>32</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, p. 375.

<sup>33</sup> Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, “Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, Including Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection,” May 18, 2000

<sup>34</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, p. 394.

<sup>35</sup> Cragin, Charles, “Defense Leaders Commentary: The Facts on WMD Civil Support Teams,” March 31, 2000, [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2000/n03312000\\_20003311.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2000/n03312000_20003311.html)

<sup>36</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, pp. 325 and 338.

<sup>37</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, pp. 378-382.

<sup>38</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, p. 326.

<sup>39</sup> Department of Defense, Combating Terrorism Activities, Office of Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, Programs, Resources and Assessments Directorate, p. 382.