The results of the U.S. presidential election are more likely to affect the United States’ immediate neighbors than countries in other regions.
Canada is concerned a Trump presidency would connect specific pieces of the North American agenda to extraneous issues—for example, by linking trade issues like the renewal of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) to defense topics such as modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and increasing defense spending to 2 percent of GDP. Growing protectionism and new tariffs would also pose a significant problem for Canada, which sends 75 percent of its exports to the United States. Canada is also concerned about the commitment of a Trump administration to allies, the global system, and global hot spots, especially Ukraine. On the flip side, a Trump administration would likely welcome a more vigorous energy security relationship with Canada that involves Canada’s large reserves of oil and gas and greater integration of critical mineral supply chains.
A Harris presidency would likely still pressure the defense spending threshold and press Canada to take a more assertive line in defending the North American Arctic. But while USMCA renewal could have some sticking points, such as Canada’s digital services tax, dairy quotas, or softwood lumber, it would likely be less confrontational under Harris than under Trump. Greater respect for allies and the global system would be met with Canadian support.
Canada will hold its national election no later than October 2025—and likely sooner. A return to power for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, though unlikely, could worsen relations with a Trump administration, whereas Trump would find an ideological ally in Pierre Poilievre as prime minister.
For Mexico, a Trump administration would likely place significant pressure on the country to continue limiting migration flows and cracking down on organized crime, especially the trafficking of fentanyl. The administration’s likely tool of leverage would be the threat of increased tariffs, the possibility of nonrenewal of the USMCA, and perhaps, in an extreme case, kinetic action to target organized crime in Mexico. Nearshoring of Chinese state-owned enterprises to Mexico to circumvent tariffs and access the North American market would also likely be a point of serious friction between Mexico and a Trump administration. Mass deportation of undocumented migrants in the United States, as promised in the Republican Party platform, would have an immediate impact on Mexico and could turn one or several generations of Mexicans—the majority of whom hold a favorable view of the United States—strongly against the United States with repercussions in all spheres of the bilateral relationship.
Whereas a Harris administration would also emphasize migration, crime, nearshoring, and resolving trade disputes, Mexico would likely expect the administration to address these topics through binational institutions, as has generally been the case with the Biden administration. Nevertheless, Harris would still drive a hard bargain when it comes to USMCA renewal. Constitutional reforms during the final month of the administration under Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)—in particular the judicial reform that will usher in the popular election of judges—could alter the bilateral relationship significantly, likely leading Canada and a Trump or Harris administration to place joint pressure on Mexico to improve its business climate and guarantee investments.
The next U.S. administration also faces the challenge of growing authoritarianism in Central and South America. Few countries in the region are more important to its trajectory—or more challenging—than Venezuela under the Nicolás Maduro regime. Since 2015, nearly 8 million Venezuelans have left the country, mostly settling in Latin America, Spain, or the United States. Venezuela has lost more than 70 percent of its GDP under Maduro’s economic mismanagement and kleptocratic government—the largest peacetime economic decline in world history, according to the International Monetary Fund. Polls before the 2024 election showed a vast number of Venezuelans were ready to exit the country if Maduro clung to power, and credible pollsters reported that around 40 percent of Venezuelan respondents stated they were thinking about leaving the country by the end of the year—with a sizable portion saying they would leave even before the inauguration in early January 2025.
Both a Trump administration and a Harris administration could struggle to deal with the outflow of Venezuelan refugees and another full-blown migration crisis in Latin America. While a Trump administration might return to “maximum pressure” as its Venezuela policy, it could also seek to strike a deal with the Maduro regime for some kind of modus vivendi. A Harris administration would likely continue Biden’s policies of negotiations and sanctions relief with Venezuela—policies that have so far failed to induce Maduro to change his behavior. Regardless of the approach, the next administration has its hands full dealing with a regime that (1) fabricates election results; (2) seeks to massively repress its way out of the current crisis; (3) counts the support of an axis of authoritarians and U.S. strategic rivals such as China, Russia, and Iran; and (4) will force the migration of millions more Venezuelans over the next four years.
Brazil is another country closely watching the results of the U.S. election. The election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2022 will deprive a Trump administration of the ideological ally it had in former president Jair Bolsonaro. While a Harris administration might find points of commonality with Lula, the president’s occasional antagonism toward the United States and increasing alignment with U.S. adversaries like Russia and China will present challenges to both potential administrations. Lula’s positions on the Israel-Hamas conflict and especially Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine have irked the United States. At one point, the Biden administration accused Lula of “parroting” Russian talking points. With strong rumors that Brazil—Latin America’s largest economy—is set to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative at the upcoming G20, which Rio de Janeiro will host in November, both a Trump and a Harris administration will struggle to find areas of commonality with a Brazil keen on asserting its independence from Washington, even as that manifests in more open alignment with U.S. adversaries. Lastly, Brazil’s largely closed economy and lack of a trade deal with the United States leave it on the outside of many of the blocs and informal groupings Washington is galvanizing on issues such as critical minerals and supply chain realignment.
The United States under either a Trump or a Harris administration cannot afford to ignore Latin America and the Caribbean. Likewise, the United States’ shared neighborhood is observing the dynamics of the presidential race closely. The next administration will need to deal with democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation in several countries, China and Russia’s burgeoning role in the region, and, of course, the flow of people fleeing many of those countries, all while pursuing the region’s opportunities and pushing strategic economic initiatives related to nearshoring and supply chain security.
Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and senior fellow of the Americas Program at CSIS.
