The 20th Anniversary of the North Korean Human Rights Act

On October 18, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law the North Korean Human Rights Act. The president’s statement, issued on his signing of the law, said the legislation “provides us with useful new tools to address the deplorable human rights situation in North Korea by focusing our efforts to help both those who flee the regime and those who are trapped inside the country.” The statement emphasized that the legislation was bipartisan and reflected “our unified concern for and commitment to the welfare of the North Korean people.” The legislation that became law specified that promoting human rights for North Korea should be “a key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea, and other concerned parties.”

The legislation also included provisions and expressions of support for promoting freedom of information and specifically mentioned a commitment to radio broadcasting. The legislation also specified that “The President shall appoint a special envoy for human rights in North Korea within the Department of State,” and the envoy was to report annually to the Congress on efforts to promote human rights in North Korea.

The legislation also expressed strong support for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which shortly before had voted to appoint a “Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The appointment of the UN special rapporteur was the beginning of regular reports on human rights conditions in North Korea to the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly.

The legislation was a textbook example of the value of bipartisan cooperation on human rights issues. The legislation was introduced by Congressman James Leach (R-IA), and the principal minority party cosponsor of the bill was Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA). Lantos was a Holocaust survivor who immigrated to the United States from his native Hungary at the time the Soviet Union engineered the Communist takeover of Hungary in 1947, shortly after the end of World War II. Lantos was elected to Congress from California in 1980, and in 2004 he was the ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (The “ranking member” is the leader of the minority party members and is usually the longest-serving member on a congressional committee.) Lantos later served as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in 2007–2008.

The George W. Bush Administration (2005–2009)

On August 19, 2005, following the adoption of the North Korean human rights legislation in 2004, President George W. Bush appointed Jay Lefkowitz as special envoy on human rights in North Korea. Previously, Lefkowitz served as deputy assistant to the president for domestic policy and general counsel in the Office of Management and Budget. He was also director of cabinet affairs and deputy executive secretary to the U.S. Domestic Policy Council during the presidency of George H.W. Bush.

When Lefkowitz was appointed special envoy, he had already left Washington and was practicing law in New York. He continued his law practice there, but also served part-time as special envoy until the end of the George W. Bush administration in January 2009. That somewhat tenuous link between the special envoy and the Department of State was problematic. On October 9, 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon, and U.S. policy quickly focused on limiting North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Serious diplomatic efforts were made through six-party talks to deal with the danger of North Korea’s nuclear pursuit. Department of State officials focused on the nuclear issue, but at the same time, Lefkowitz was pressing and speaking critically of North Korea’s human rights practices.

On one occasion after 2006, Lefkowitz said that North Korea would not limit its nuclear capabilities, the six-party talks were unlikely to succeed, and not criticizing North Korea’s human rights abuses would do nothing to change that. In response to a journalist’s question, then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice rebuked Lefkowitz: “He’s the human rights envoy,” Rice stated. “That’s what he knows. That’s what he does. He doesn’t work on the six-party talks. He doesn’t know what’s going on in the six-party talks and he certainly has no say in the six-party talks.” Lefkowitz’s offending speech was promptly removed from the Department of State’s website. (See the New York Times.) Lefkowitz had strong links to the George W. Bush White House from his time there in the first Bush term, but he also held senior positions during the presidency of George H.W. Bush. Despite the controversy over his comments on the nuclear issue, he remained as the special envoy until the end of the George W. Bush presidency.

The Obama Administration (2009–2017)

Congressional procedures and U.S. law provide that most legislation has a time limit. Generally, legislation remains in force for only four or five years. This is to prevent provisions that are no longer relevant from being “on the books” past their need. For legislation such as the North Korean Human Rights Act, the provisions of the legislation can be extended, but this requires the adoption of legislation specifically extending the provisions. The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 expired after four years, but in October 2008 the legislation was extended for another four years. Modest revisions were made to the new law. Probably the most significant change was the provision elevating the position of special envoy for North Korean human rights issues to full ambassadorial rank, which would involve Senate approval, as required for senior presidential appointments.

During my seven-year tenure as the special envoy for North Korean human rights issues under the Obama administration (November 2009–January 2017), I documented the issues and experiences from that period in detail in Patterns of Impunity (2021).

One of the most interesting issues was my involvement in the U.S. provision of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. Food shortages have been and remain a serious problem. North Korean officials at the United Nations in New York approached me soon after I became special envoy asking if the United States would provide food aid. I was able to negotiate a workable agreement to provide aid under conditions that the United States could monitor distribution. The death of Kim Jong-il in 2011 and Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of power prevented the implementation of the food aid agreement negotiated. We were also able to support nongovernment organizations in their efforts to help the North Korean people.

The United States played a very active role at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, the UN General Assembly, and the UN Security Council in New York. The United States was actively engaged in UN efforts seeking improvement in human rights. We actively pressed for the establishment of the UN Commission of Inquiry into human rights abuses in North Korea, and the United States supported the Commission of Inquiry’s efforts. The United States was involved in improving the flow of information to North Korea, particularly in improving access to radio and other media.

Dealing with problems facing U.S. citizens traveling to North Korea was a particularly frustrating challenge. We were able to successfully negotiate the release of a number of U.S. citizens, and I was able to bring a U.S. citizen out of North Korea when I visited Pyongyang. But we faced particularly difficult issues involving the death of U.S. student Otto Warmbier. The United States improved aid for North Korean refugees seeking admission to the United States, although the number seeking to settle in the United States has been very modest. We were also supportive of South Korean efforts to accept refugees for resettlement.

During my tenure as special envoy, the North Korean Human Rights Act was extended in 2012 for a five-year period. Congress noted that resettlement of North Koreans in the United States had risen, but the legislation called for a more robust program for admission of North Koreans to the United States. That reauthorization extended through mid-2017. I left the post as special envoy in January 2017, just days before the inauguration of Donald Trump.

Six-Year Vacancy Ends

The North Korean human rights legislation expired in mid-2017 and it was not extended until 2018, a full year after it had expired. Unusually, the legislation was not renewed for a full year because support for the legislation in Congress has always been very strong. One of the very few recorded votes on the North Korean human rights legislation taken in the House in September 2017 and the vote to extend was 415 to 0. When the same legislation was considered in the Senate the following year, it was approved by unanimous consent—not a single senator objected to the legislation.

Rex Tillerson, former Exxon Mobil chairman and CEO and Donald Trump’s first secretary of state, proposed to eliminate the position of special envoy for North Korean human rights issues, as well as a number of other senior Department of State positions. Tillerson was fired by President Trump after serving in the position for only 14 months. His successor, Mike Pompeo, made no effort to eliminate the special envoy position, but he also made no effort to appoint someone to the position. Although Congress voted to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act and Trump signed the legislation in 2018, the president did not nominate a North Korean human rights envoy for the entire four years that he was in office (2017–2021).

The election of President Joe Biden, who took office in January 2021, did not immediately change the situation of the human rights envoy for North Korea. The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2018 called for the appointment of a special envoy. For two full years, Biden did not nominate a special envoy for North Korean human rights issues. Finally, in January 2023 he nominated Department of State official Julie Turner as special envoy. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings and conducted the committee vote on the nomination. Senate dysfunction slowed down the confirmation until July, and the Department of State dawdled for another two months before Julie Turner finally assumed office on October 13, 2023.

The advent of the Biden administration has led to significant improvements in emphasis on human rights with North Korea. The United States has reengaged with the UN human rights mechanisms, in contrast with the Trump administration which withdrew the United States from participation in the UN Human Rights Council, the principal UN body dealing with North Korea’s human rights violations. Under Biden, a U.S. ambassador to the council has been named, and the United States is actively engaged with the United Nations on human rights issues.

In June of this year, the 15 members of the UN Security Council held a session to discuss North Korea’s human rights violations and the impact of these violations on international peace and security. South Korea’s UN ambassador was the rotating president of the council at the time of that discussion. The meeting was held despite the strong opposition of Russia and China, but the necessary majority of council members voted to hold the discussion and it went ahead. The United States played a key role in setting up the session, which was critical of North Korea.

Congress Fails to Reauthorize North Korean Human Rights Act: An Envoy Without Legislation

The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2018 expired in 2022. Efforts were made in both the House and the Senate during the 117th Congress (2021–2022) to reauthorize the legislation. A version of the legislation was adopted in 2022 by the Senate at the very end of the session, but the legislation was not brought to a vote in the House.

In the 118th Congress (2023–2024) legislation was introduced in both House and Senate to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act. In the Senate, a North Korean human rights bill, S. 584, was introduced by Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Tim Kaine (D-VA) with the support of two other bipartisan senators. In the House of Representatives, H.R. 3012, was introduced by Congresswoman Young Kim (R-CA) and Congressman Ami Bera (D-CA) with the support of 34 other bipartisan cosponsors.

Unfortunately, Congress has reached the point today that even noncontroversial and widely supported legislation cannot be adopted. Congress is currently out of session and will only return briefly after the election to adopt the most urgent funding bills and other pressing measures. As of the preelection adjournment on October 4, 2024, Congress has adopted only 106 public laws, a pale shadow of the usual congressional accomplishments. One journalist described the situation in these terms: “Congress left D.C. with little done, they’ll be back November 12 to give it another try.”

The North Korean Human Rights Act still has broad bipartisan support in Congress. The Biden administration has appointed a special envoy for North Korean human rights issues and she is functioning effectively. Unfortunately, the dysfunction of the current U.S. political scene means that even legislation on which there is broad bipartisan support cannot be enacted by Congress. The inability of Congress even to reauthorize such a broadly supported piece of legislation should be a wake-up call.

Ambassador Robert R. King is a senior adviser in the Office of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Previously, Ambassador King served as special envoy for North Korean human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State from November 2009 to January 2017.