American Strategic, Tactical, and Other Mistakes in Iraq: A Litany of Errors

April 19, 2006

Wartime is scarcely the easiest time for demanding self criticism, but the recent exchanges between the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense over the mistakes the US did or did not make in Iraq have highlighted the fact that the US must both admit its mistakes and learn from them to win in Iraq and successfully engage in the "long war."

The full chronology of what happened in US planning and operations before, during, and immediately after the fight to drive Saddam Hussein from power is still far from clear. It is now much easier to accuse given US leaders than it is to understand what really happened or assign responsibility with credibility.

The following summary analysis does not focus on blame, although it indicates that any such "blame game" should focus on the overall problems in the US national security apparatus and not any individual. It rather attempts to highlight a litany of errors that the US needs to deal with if it is to succeed in the future.