Photo: BAY ISMOYO/POOL/AFP/Getty Images
Matthew P. Goodman: Good morning from Washington. My name is Matthew Goodman. I direct the Economics Program here at CSIS. Delighted to have you with us for this joint program between the CSIS Economics Program and OMFIF, the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. And we’re going to get a debrief today on the G-20 summit in Bali from the sherpa’s mouth, as it were.
As you all know, the – a couple weeks ago the 2022 G-20 summit was held in Bali, Indonesia. Leaders from countries representing over 80 percent of the world economy met, got together as they have done since 2008, to talk about global economic challenges and other challenges, from slowing growth in inflation to food and energy crises to longer-term challenges such as climate change, geopolitical tensions, and so forth.
Frankly, the Indonesian hosts got more than they bargained for when they signed up as hosts. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, that really sort of overshadowed the events in the Indonesian year and kind of lowered expectations for this forum below where they already were, which was pretty low. But to their great credit, the Indonesians pulled together a creditable series of events ending with the summit and got, in fact, the leaders of all the G-20 countries represented to sign a joint declaration. And you know, that includes some common ground and renewed commitments to addressing some of the global challenges I mentioned. Also some useful bilateral meetings on the margins of the G-20 summit, notably the one between U.S. President Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
So there was a lot that was interesting and constructive, I think, that happened in Bali, and validated the role of the G-20, which doesn’t get a lot of love these days but I still think is an essential forum that we would – if it didn’t exist, we’d need to create it because it does help to set a global agenda for these difficult challenges. At its best, it addresses crises and real problems in the global commons and it builds habits of cooperation among leaders who don’t have many opportunities to meet. So I think the G-20 is still an important forum.
And so to help assess all of this we’re delighted to be welcomed by Mike Pyle, who is U.S. deputy national security adviser and both the G-7 and G-20 sherpa. Mike’s been in this role since earlier this year and I’m sure is questioning his judgment in taking on such a challenging assignment. I’m sure his family is.
But let me – let me hand over to the two moderators of the conversation today with Mike: my colleagues Stephanie Segal, senior fellow in the CSIS Economics Program; and Mark Sobel, who is U.S. chairman of OMFIF and nonresident senior adviser to our program. So over to you, Mark.
Mark Sobel: Thank you. I hope Mike is still with us.
Mr. Goodman: Yeah. It looks like we may have lost him. If we can just hold on for one second, we will try and get him back. Maybe Mark, while – since we’re on – there we go. I think they’re coming back on. Just hold on one second to our audience. There we go. There’s Mike.
Mr. Sobel: There’s Mike.
Mr. Goodman: All right, Mike, we can – we can see you again on a different machine, I think. Can you hear us, Mike? Thumbs up if so. OK. Hold on one second. Thanks, everyone.
(Break.)
Mr. Sobel: All right. Well, we apologize for that minor glitch. It’s a delight to see Mike. Let’s just dig in quickly. As Matt was already suggesting, there was much focus in Bali on the Xi-Biden bilateral meeting. The fact that Putin didn’t attend, and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov left early in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And of course, there was the summit meeting itself. And to the surprise of many, there was a communique.
So what is the Biden administration summary overview of the Xi-Biden bilateral meeting and the G-20 meeting itself? What was achieved? Was the meeting a success in the president’s eyes? And why?
Deputy Michael Pyle: Thanks, Mark. So maybe a few observations on each of those questions. I mean, first, with respect to the G-20 itself, I think the president and the entire team was pleased with the outcomes that we saw. You know, the president entered the G-20 summit with two real goals squarely in mind.
First, wanting to bring the G-20 together to rally the world and strongly condemn not just Russia’s war against Ukraine, but the economic pressures and spillovers that have resulted for the rest of the world as a result of that war. And then, secondly, to articulate an affirmative vision for what it would mean for the G-20 to coalesce behind an action plan to address those pressures from food and energy insecurity to the pressures of debt sustainability in much of the lower-income and middle-income world, to taking steps to improve the resilience of the global economy and the safety nets available in the global economy. These were all things the president wanted to speak to, and I think was pleased with the steps forward that were able to be taken along each of those dimensions.
Perhaps, just to talk about each a little bit more in turn, you know, one, I mean, as you sort of pointed out, I think there was some positive surprise
with respect to delivering a communique at all. Certainly, ministerials in the leadup to the G-20 over the course of the entire Indonesian year had failed to produce a consensus document, principally, of course, because of the challenges around agreeing to language around Russia’s invasion.
You know, I think here we were very constructively pleased to see now just Indonesia, but much of the emerging world, from Brazil and India and others, really work hard under the leadership of the Indonesian G-20 to deliver strong language that, again, condemned Russia’s war, articulated what those spillovers looked like to the rest of the world around food, energy, much else besides. That was the result of incredibly intensive diplomacy by the president, by the entire U.S. team, but also really spoke to, I think, the leadership of the Indonesians and a number of the other large emerging economies that, you know, took the view that, you know, the G-20 is an important institution to preserve, it’s an important institution to underscore the ongoing vitality of. And what it was going to take to do that in Bali was finding a path through on this core issue that confronts not just the global system, but the global economy. And I think that everyone was pleased with just how strong that language ended up bring and the fact that, you know, frankly, Russia signed off on an approach that isolated them in the eyes of the global community. So I think that was something that we were working hard for, worked hard towards alongside a lot of our partners globally, in particular among some of the key emerging markets including the hosts, and were pleased to see be unlocked as an outcome for the G-20 summit as a whole.
And I think the one additional point I would make there is having done that I think clears some space for the Indian G-20 as they kick off their year of the presidency to have higher ambition on a lot of policy outcomes, having found a template for what it means to resolve the core issue of condemning Russia’s war.
Secondly, with respect to policy, you know, I think, as I said, the president had a – had a vision coming in for what it would mean to have an affirmative set of steps to address those pressures in the global economy largely stemming from Russia’s war. You know, around food and energy security, I think there, you know, the G-20 was key to kind of helping to take some of the final steps to unlocking the renewal of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, obviously a very key piece of the food-security landscape, and providing greater certainty there. The president also, you know, continued to articulate the steps that he’s taken around energy security globally, including providing greater energy security in Europe through U.S. LNG exports and the facilitation of those. But I think also importantly, the work that the president and the whole team have done around putting in place a price cap
on Russian oil and in particular the ways in which that’s designed to both facilitate and preserve global energy supply, especially for developing economies, but also to do so in ways that limits the price and, thus, reduces pressures on the global economy, but also limits the amount of revenue that Russia has at its disposal to wage war.
You know, beyond that, I think we were – we’ve been very focused on issues of debt relief and debt restructuring among lower- and middle-income countries. You know, here I would say we’ve increasingly wanted to raise the spotlight on this issue. You’ve seen Secretary Yellen speak to the importance of this issue, other senior Treasury officials, seen Ambassador Power speak to this issue herself. And you’ve seen in forums like the G-20 finance ministers meeting in October ministers come together in a way that sort of allowed 19 of the 20 members of the G-20 to really speak to the importance and the centrality of this issue, making clear that one country – China – really stands in the way of getting to a constructive outcome here. I think we basically were able to reiterate that same kind of core conclusion at the leaders level that there is, even among the G-20 except for one, around how squarely important this issue is, particularly against the backdrop of a challenging global economic landscape. And I think one of the things that we’re seeking to do as we roll the clock forward into 2023 is continue to lift the spotlight on this issue, continue to lift pressure on this issue, and recognize that it’s going to be through sustained focus/sustained pressure that, ultimately, we’re going to be able to find a pathway ahead that sees, we hope and expect, steps forward in terms of providing relief and steps forward from China to do exactly that. I think to that same end, I think we’ve been very heartened in some of our early engagements with India and others as we go into the Indian presidency year that this is going to be an ongoing area of sustained focus from the Indian presidency as we go into 2023.
You know, lastly, with respect to what the president I think was focused on at the G-20 in terms of an affirmative agenda, you know, you really saw, I think, validation of what Secretary Yellen, what the president have spoken to in terms of the need for and a model for a multilateral development bank reform, in particular starting with the World Bank. Things like reorienting those institutions towards a focus on global public goods, like climate, like migration, like public health, even while maintaining that core focus on development.
In so doing, working to get more out of the existing resources of the World Bank and other MDBs, including through innovative financial tools. You know, this is a vision that we think is core to what it means to take steps forward for the World Bank and for a focus on some of these global challenges. But it was also an approach that was validated by the G-20 as a whole, and I think really opens up a pathway across 2023 to deliver on that in a very assertive and expedited way.
So that’s really, you know, the landscape that we saw, both going into and coming out of the G-20. And really, you know, I think underscores that the president had a gameplan for going into Bali. And both of the key prongs of that, both in terms of condemning Russia’s war, isolating Russia, but also articulating what an action plan to address those stresses looks like, especially for the emerging world. Both of those pieces, I think, were spoken to quite effectively through the Indonesian summit.
With respect to the Xi bilat, and I recognize I’ve been kind of talking on here a little bit, I think that that was an important opportunity to do a couple of things. And again, I think generally that that was a very constructive engagement between President Biden and President Xi. You know, one, just the president continued to speak very forthrightly and very firmly about U.S. interests globally and vis-à-vis – and vis-à-vis China. In particular, articulated, I think, an ongoing set of – set of core beliefs about how the economic relationship needs to work between the U.S. and China, and how China should behave on the global stage.
To go back to that issue of debt, and you probably saw in the readout from the meeting, this was an issue that the president raised with President Xi, highlighting the fact that it is important to achieve debt relief for lower-income countries, for some middle-income countries. And China needs to be a constructive partner to get there. So this has now kind of reached the presidential level. I think you saw that in the readout. But beyond that, continuing to articulate, you know, the president’s, you know, core concerns with China’s economic model, and the need to see progress on that.
But beyond articulating, I think, in an ongoing way a forceful set of views about our own values as it relates to our relationship with China, you know, I think there were objectives around finding a path forward constructively that were also achieved. You know, I think one of the goals for the bilateral meeting was to put a floor under the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. But I think across a couple of dimensions we saw that play out. I think one, opening up a renewed effort on some shared challenges.
In particular, reopening engagements on the climate issues that, honestly, confront all of us globally, and for which the U.S. and China are key players. But also at the level of opening up further engagement, including person-to-person in-person engagements. I think that, too, saw a path forward as we saw it announced that Secretary Blinken will be visiting China in the new year. So I think all in all it was a constructive engagement between the two
presidents, both a matter of continuing to forcefully articulate our own values, our own interests vis-à-vis the PRC in its role in the world, but also opening up some constructive paths on shared challenges and what it looks like for there to be more robust engagement, person-to-person, as we roll the clock forward into 2023.
Stephanie Segal: Thanks. Thanks, Mike. And thanks a lot for joining us. We know everything you have on your plate, so we appreciate you spending this time with us. There was a lot in what you just said. I know we’re going to have kind of follow-up questions too, but I want to pick up on the climate theme. In part, because of the G-20 leaders actually fell right in the middle of COP. President Biden actually made a stop in Sharm El Sheikh enroute to Bali. And it was striking the language between the leaders statements on climate and then what ultimately came out of COP. It seemed from the outside like there was a lot of cross-reference between the two. So I’m wondering if you could just address how the two convenings – COP and G-20 – how they were related, how the discussions that were taking place in Sharm El Sheikh linked to the discussions in Bali. And if you could say a little about the big takeaway from Bali, which was the loss and damage fund, that wasn’t a G-20 deliverable so much but I imagine that the G-20 countries and the U.S. in particular had views of that. So anything you can say on those broad themes would be interesting.
Dep. Pyle: Sure. That’s a fantastic question.
You know, I think with respect to the G-20, you know, we saw, I think, three key outcomes on climate, all of which were, you know, reinforcing and overlapping with what we saw play out in Sharm El Sheikh.
First, you know, it just showed that even given everything else happening around the globe – Russia’s war, an ongoing set of challenges and headwinds with respect to the global economy writ large – that climate and the clean energy transition remain a core priority for the leaders of the world’s biggest economies.
Secondly, you know, I think what you heard from G-20 leaders was that the current moment globally – the fact of Russia’s invasion, the fact of Russia weaponizing energy as a tool in their war – only underscores the need – (audio break) – the clean energy transition from here. And that’s a way in which the core needs of the climate – combating the climate crisis are reinforced by the geopolitical landscape and geopolitical realities that we all face.
And then, third, you know, I think that you saw G-20 countries as some of the world’s biggest economies, some of the world’s largest emitters, recognize that they have a leadership role in tackling the climate crisis in pursuit of a 1.5-degree-centigrade world. This included reaffirming the Glasgow climate pact and explicitly its call to countries to revisit and strengthen their NDCs to align with the Paris agreement by the end of the year, which some but not yet all of the G-20 countries have done. So I think that was important to see that articulated.
Maybe taking a step back, you know, I would say for my part, you know, there was, obviously, work that we accomplished collectively at the G-20 on climate, which as I said I think was reinforcing with what played out in Sharm El Sheikh. But I’d also say I think a lot of the work on climate was done on the sidelines of the G-20 and, in particular, you know, just an ongoing discussion bilaterally about the steps the United States has taken through the Inflation Reduction Act to deliver on our own climate ambition. This has, of course, been something that the world has sought from the United States from some time, to see kind of historic ambitious action from the U.S. to deliver on its climate goals. We saw Congress, alongside the president, take that action over the summer. And I think, you know, what we did a lot of at the sidelines in Bali was articulate in that vision around the IRA what it’s going to mean in terms of implementing it for our shared climate objectives, what it’s going to mean in terms of transitioning to a world of clean and renewable energy abundance over the medium term, and really facilitating that transition. And so I think that focus on kind of really delivering the message of the steps we’re taking here at home and the way in which we think that can be a model for steps that other countries and regions can take was an important part of the work that played out at Bali as well.
Mr. Sobel: Well, thank you for that.
So, Mike you know my background in G-20. My bread and butter was kind of the macro and finance parts, so I’ll ask you a question about that. We’ve got a world economy with high inflation. Interest rates are high. There are risks to financial stability. So, you know, and the G-20 had its genesis in the global financial crisis. So what did G-20 leaders discuss with respect to the world economy? And, more importantly, what did they achieve in improving global economic prospects?
And then I did want to ask you about debt. And you alluded to it, low-income countries and some emerging markets, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, are facing severe debt distress. And they desperately need debt relief. China, as you said, it’s a large official creditor. Efforts to secure for relief from China, including through the G-20 framework, common framework, have not gone well at all.
There was this interesting footnote in the communique that one member said IFIs need to be part of the solution. You alluded to that earlier. So, again, you said this was discussed, but what progress was made?
Dep. Pyle: Thanks, Mark. You know, like I said, I think there was a very acute awareness of the macroeconomic environment that the G-20 leaders meeting was being held in the midst of. You know, I think if you look at the – (audio break) – to the G-20 leaders declaration, you really saw two things spoken to.
One was Russia’s war in Ukraine. And the – (audio break) – together, the G-20 – (audio break) – to condemn that war.
But secondly, you saw – you saw recognition of the pressures in the global economy, first stemming from Russia’s war and the pressures on energy, food, and looking ahead the broader headwinds out there from a high-inflation environment to slowing growth to challenges we saw across the course of the fall around financial disruption and instability. So all of that was, you know, the backdrop that was spoken to by leaders at that kind of – at the head of the document, reflecting, I think, the priority on it.
You know, I think there you saw, you know, really leaders reflect what finance ministers and central bank governors had said about the need to coordinate responses, about the need to have a toolkit – (audio break) – to deal with any moments of financial instability, to reaffirm a range of the commitments that the G-20 had made previously about challenges in the global economy. But I think you’re right that, as I alluded to earlier, you know, we wanted to kind of focus in on, you know, what can we do actionably to address some of the challenges – (audio break) – energy, food and debt were – (audio break) – priorities – (audio break).
And I think one energy, obviously, we’re now in the final stages of hopefully – (audio break) – looking at global market potential, with particular benefits for emerging economies. Obviously, food and – (audio break) – and the really important steps forward in terms of possibility around global food markets. And with that, you know, I think that, you know, this has been a very vexing issue, precisely because, you know, the G-20 came – (audio break) – years ago around – (audio break) – to provide a pathway for providing debt relief to debt-distressed lower-income economies. And we continue to see that – you know, that sort of bottled up and frustrated in terms of actually delivering for some important lower-income economies that are in debt distress, as you say – you know, Zambia, Chad, others.
And then also the limitation of the common framework in terms of not extending to middle-income economies like Sri Lanka, which is currently in the midst of substantial debt distress as well. You know, there’s also a recognition that ultimately China, as a very large official final creditor, has got to be a part of that solution. And while they were, you know, a part of signing up for the common framework, they haven’t really been a part of following through and delivering on that. And I think what we have taken as an important first step – (audio break) – this year.
You know, it’s not just Secretary Yellen and Ambassador Power speaking to it. It’s now the president, both multilaterally and bilaterally. It’s other leaders. It’s hearing from India that they’re going to raise a spotlight on this issue considerably across the course of their own G-20 presidency. And so, you know, I think the expectation is that as we raise visibility, as we raise pressure, as we raise that bilaterally through the G-20 I think importantly, as you said, through our channels of communication at the IFIs – including, you know, as Treasury has pointed out, some steps that IFIs could take to firm up their own approach to the PRC on debt restructuring issues – that this is going to be a really focused area of attention and action across the course of 2023, in the hopes of getting to a much more constructive place across the G-20 as a whole in time for India’s G-20 presidency to conclude next year.
Ms. Segal: Thanks, Mike. I’ll kind of pick up on the IFIs theme, and specifically on MDB reform. So I noted in the leaders declaration there was language about asking the MDBs to bring forward actions to mobilize and provide additional financing within their mandates. I’m reading that as a reference to the Capital Adequacy Framework, which would basically have the MDBs use their balance sheets maybe more aggressively or take on some additional risk in order to mobilize some more finance.
I guess one question would be, is that inference correct? Is that what that reference is to? And how does that sit alongside other proposals for additional capital to the MDBs, including capital increases to the MDBs? How did that conversation play out in the G-20?
Dep. Pyle: Yeah, thank you, Stephanie. So I think reform of the multilateral development banks, and of the World Bank in particular, is also going to be a key focus of 2023. As I said earlier, you’ve heard Secretary Yellen and others really articulate that vision. I think you’re right to point to the Capital Adequacy Framework as a highly aligned statement as well. You know, I think to our way of thinking, you know, there are several things that have to be a part of that reform effort.
You know, one, while maintaining a focus on the core development objectives of the World Bank and others, also increasing the focus on
important global public goods and transnational challenges – like climate, like public health, like migration. And importantly, that means being – broadening the aperture with respect to the types of countries that the World Bank and others are engaged with, to include middle-income countries that might not be traditionally a part of the World Bank’s remit, but that are vital to achieving objectives around some of those shared global challenges.
And then as you said, also getting more out of the existing resource footprint for – of the World Bank and the other MDBs, including precisely – you know, using more innovative financing tools, things like loan guarantees and the like more extensively, to get more out of the existing capital footprint of the World Bank and others. You know, in terms of, you know, additional resources, additional capital, you know, I think our approach is, you know, there’s important reform to be done now that I just described, including getting more out of the existing balance sheet, including delivering on some of these global shared challenges, while maintaining a focus on development.
And the focus for right now needs to be on doing exactly that. That’s going to be a huge lift in its own right. That’s going to be important, vital work in its own right. And let’s really demonstrate across the course of 2023 that that’s something that we can really take on together and deliver on together, and then that opens up a conversation to what future steps might look like from there.
Ms. Segal: Mike, could I just ask a quick – a quick follow-up on that point? And you mentioned kind of the importance of some of the nontraditional borrowers or broadening to include some of the key middle-income countries. Were they supportive – are they supportive, based on what you heard in Bali, on the multilateral development banks doing both development and global public goods?
Dep. Pyle: Yeah. I think – exactly right. I mean, I think that’s why you saw that spoken to in the leaders declaration, including in the chapeau itself, which was certainly where sherpas spent most of their time focusing. And I think – you know, I think part of the reason why we’ve seen, I think, such energy from the Indians and a
handful of the other large emerging economies is precisely this recognition that we need to be able to do both – that there needs to be an ongoing focus on core development needs while at the same time addressing global challenges is going to encompass a broader set of countries, you know, potentially inclusive of exactly those countries, in order to really meet the moment on climate and much else besides.
Ms. Segal: Sorry. I think I’ve lost my order of the questions. But I did have one other question, if I can maybe be brief with it. So one of the other kind of key emerging markets, also the host country for the G-20, is Indonesia. There were a few big announcements that came I guess on the sidelines, but really pretty central to the G-20 convenings themselves that involved Indonesia. There was the agreement in the context of the JETP, the Just Energy Transition Partnership, and related to that the Partnership for Global Infrastructure (and) Investment. Can you talk a little bit about what those bilateral agreements actually included and how that linked to the broader G-20 agenda and some of Indonesia’s priorities specifically on the energy transition?
Dep. Pyle: Sure. So, you know, as we’ve talked about, climate and the energy transition were very front of mind for the G-20 as a whole. But I think President Biden has in particular emphasized the role that investments, most particularly infrastructure investments, can play in terms of closing investment and infrastructure gaps in the emerging world and in particular ways in which closing those gaps can advance our objectives around the clean energy transition, around combating climate change. You see that embodied in the president’s PGII initiative, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, around which there was a significant side event encompassing a range of both G-7 and non-G-7 economies there in Bali. But you also saw in that in terms of, as you say, some of the direct bilateral engagement with Indonesia and President Widodo, you know, there, in a way that I think really touches on both PGII as well as the bilateral relationship, you know, obviously, a very big announcement around the JETP, you know, unlocking substantial financing in the years ahead to really build a model for Indonesia that sees them transitioning away from in particular coal-fired energy generation and into renewables through a combination of both public- and official-sector financing, but also substantial commitments around private capital and mobilizing private capital.
I think that, you know, that approach – which, again, the G-20 was the perfect venue for that, both because, you know, the president’s PGII initiative is really meant to be, you know, a global initiative, but also Indonesia both as the host country and as a vital – a vital and growing part of the global economy, you know, that was just – it was key, I think, to demonstrate that we were able to take steps ahead on the energy transition, on mobilizing finance for the energy transition for such a sort of large and central player in the G-20, but also in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Mr. Sobel: Thanks for that.
Well, let me ask you a philosophical question. So in the ’80s and ’90s, the G-7 was the key steering group for the global economy. We can say that began to evolve over the 2000s, as the emerging markets gained greater weight in the system. And the Pittsburgh summit made the G-20 the premier forum for international economic cooperation.
But in recent years, due to a series of evolutions, it seems that the U.S. has been emphasizing the G-7 more heavily, given the group’s cohesion, shared democratic values, and the need for progress on such issues as cryptocurrency, cyber, sanctions, as well as issues concerning China and Russia. Yet, as we’ve discussed, the G-20 is needed to tackle global commons such as climate, but that seems difficult absent U.S.-China cooperation.
So how do you assess the G-7 versus the G-20 these days? And what can be done to make the G-20 more effective and better fulfilling its promise?
Dep. Pyle: So I think that the G-7/G-20 kind of question is a little bit of a both/and, not an either/or. You know, Jake Sullivan has spoken to the idea that, you know, in the current moment, you know, the G-7 really is a kind of steering committee for the free world. And I think that, you know, we’ve seen that in action in terms of the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. You’ve seen that in response to the energy pressures that have resulted from that, including through things like the Russia oil price cap that was announced at the G-7 summit this summer. So there really is, I think, a sort of core capacity to coalesce with other likeminded economies to accomplish real steps forward for a united front against violations of core international law like Russia’s invasion, but also the economic spillovers that attend it.
That’s, though, to take nothing away from the centrality of the G-20 and the importance of the G-20 as a – as a distinct organizing mechanism in the global economy. And I think that Bali brought home that there really is no substitute for having each of those economies around a table. And whether it is, you know, addressing the impacts of Russia’s war and speaking to a shared action plan for addressing them, whether it is kind of reaching coalescence on important steps that need to be taken to enhance the global architecture like around things like the multilateral development banks, or whether it's even just using the – facilitating the mechanism of the G-20 to highlight the way in which one country is an outlier on an important issue like that that faces everyone, that the G-20 can be a really powerful mechanism for doing exactly that.
I think part of the reason why we worked so hard, and worked so hard alongside the Indonesians and the other major emerging markets, to deliver the results at Bali that we did is precisely that we wanted to underscore for our part – the president wanted to underscore for our part that the G-20
needs to remain at the center of the global economic conversation and even in this most challenging of years was capable of doing so, of delivering an outcome. And proving out the ability to do that even in this kind of most difficult of circumstances was going to be vital to preserving that vitality, preserving that efficacy, and paving the way forward for what hopefully is a very impactful set of G-20s to come, beginning with the Indian G-20 presidency in 2023.
And there I would just say, you know, again, I think having achieved an outcome around the condemnation of Russia’s war in Bali, I think that that opens, you know, significant runway for India to take the baton and really act with high ambition across a range of global economic priorities. And we look forward to working closely with the Indian presidency to deliver on some of those, including the ones I’ve highlighted elsewhere on the call.
Ms. Segal: Thanks, Mike.
I think that’s a great note to end this conversation on. I think you helped us understand kind of how consequential the meeting in Bali actually was. And you certainly previewed what could be a very consequential G-20 year under India’s presidency. So let me both thank you and invite you back – (laughs) – to help us understand what’s happening in the G-20 and G7 venues in the year ahead. Thanks so much and would love to see you back soon.
Dep. Pyle: Thanks, Stephanie. Thank you, Mark.
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