Building a Golden Dome: Lessons from the 1950s

In response to his January executive order, President Trump will soon consider options developed by the Pentagon for a technologically advanced “next generation” missile defense system, known as Golden Dome. The goal of this initiative is to protect the homeland against threats and potential attacks from an expanding array of strategic weapons, including ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles.

Considerable public discussion has been paid to the capabilities this initiative might deliver. Less has been paid to the organizational structure, acquisition authorities, and leadership. All of these elements will be necessary to deliver the executive order’s goals.

The Golden Dome signals a welcome interest in more comprehensive air and missile defenses for the homeland. It aims to move beyond the missile defense policy framework established decades ago in a far more benign strategic threat environment. That policy narrowly confined the homeland defense posture to a small number of ground-based interceptors and radars to defend against a handful of ballistic missiles from regional powers. Given the ascendance of Russia and China as significant great power competitors, the role of missile defense should be realigned to provide a measure of protection from any adversary who might seek to threaten or strike the United States.

Programmatically, the Golden Dome will pursue two reinforcing paths. The first seeks to reduce the vulnerability of the homeland to current air and missile threats as quickly as possible by fielding additional ground and sea-based interceptor systems that are already under development or in production. The second puts in place the foundation and capabilities for a more significant shift that leverages advanced technology to build space-based interceptors and space-based missile tracking sensors, all in conjunction with terrestrial systems. This layered defense would include space, land, and sea-based sensors and interceptors, integrated into a unified command-and-control network to destroy attacking missiles in all phases of flight.

This is a complex undertaking, to be sure. One senior U.S. Space Force official called it a “no joke of a physics problem.” Moving to the next generation of missile defense is made all the more challenging by the fact that there has been a chronic lack of investment, programmatic direction, and prioritization for advanced missile defense technology development efforts. This is especially true for technologies associated with space-based interceptors. Over the last three decades, funding for research and development in this area has been virtually nonexistent. Moreover, throughout this timeframe, neither civilian Pentagon agencies nor the military services have evinced any notable support or advocacy for more advanced and comprehensive homeland air and missile defenses.

The president’s executive order is a positive first step that marks a sharp break from past constraints that have stunted missile defense technology and capability development. But for the Golden Dome effort to succeed in actually delivering a strategic defense, it will require overcoming long-standing bureaucratic inertia and opposition, programmatic incoherence, and a consistent lack of sustained investment.

A vital part of the administration’s forthcoming decision on the Golden Dome should be to empower a single Pentagon organization and its leadership with the broad authority and resources to direct all agencies, services, and industry components engaged in delivering the Golden Dome system. The leadership responsible for executing this large defense enterprise must have direct reporting authority to senior Department of Defense (DOD) decisionmaking officials, most likely the deputy secretary of defense, to ensure it remains a national priority.

This is a model that administrations have followed in the past when bringing into existence high-priority military programs that faced bureaucratic, resource, and technical hurdles. It is how the United States established its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the 1950s. To rapidly create this entirely novel weapon system, the United States had to address two initial obstacles. The first, bureaucratic in nature, stemmed from the resistance of Air Force leadership, who questioned its feasibility and viewed ICBMs as a threat to the budget and mission of the existing strategic bomber force. The second challenge was technical in nature. After all, no one had ever built an ICBM before. No organizational or technological foundation existed in the United States for such a complex strategic system.

To move this enterprise forward rapidly as a national priority, President Eisenhower and his advisors stood up a new organization, staffing it with the best talent from across the DOD, scientific community, and industry, with the singular mandate to develop an ICBM as quickly as possible. This led to the establishment of the Western Development Division (WDD) at the end of 1954, which was placed under the leadership of Brigadier General Bernard Schriever. All planning, programming, and budgeting management, along with system production and testing, were centralized in WDD.

Notably, General Shriever received a strong, indisputable commitment from the Eisenhower White House for direct reporting access to the Pentagon’s senior leadership on all decisions related to the overall direction of the program. This included prioritization within the DOD resource allocation process for sufficient multi-year funding and control over the operating management for program execution. The results were remarkable. Within four years, the U.S. launched its first ICBM, the Atlas. Over the next three years, it would develop and field a second-generation ICBM, the Titan, and a third-generation system, Minuteman.

For the United States today, there is a path to harness emerging and new technologies to achieve rapid and innovative capability development to make the Golden Dome a reality. This can only occur, however, if the administration sets up the enterprise for success. The experience creating an ICBM system of astounding complexity and capability offers a propitious model for fielding next-generation defenses to reduce the United States’ exposure to strategic blackmail and the risk of devastating missile attacks on the homeland.

Dr. Peppi DeBiaso is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and former director of the Office of Missile Defense Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense from 2000 to 2021.