Can Trump Persuade Putin to Make Peace in Ukraine?

Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP/Getty Images
As a presidential candidate, Donald J. Trump promised to end Europe’s largest war since 1945 in one day. This was always ambitious. Since taking office, President Trump and his advisers have already admitted a deal could be months away.
Last week, Trump kickstarted the process of getting to the negotiating table with a threat of more tariffs and sanctions if Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, did not stop his “ridiculous war.” As he warned: “We can do it the easy way, or the hard way . . . It’s time to ‘MAKE A DEAL’.” Trump missed out on the “deal of the century” for Middle East peace in his first term. Helping secure peace in Ukraine would strengthen his case for the Nobel Peace Prize that he so covets.
But ending the war in Ukraine is not like closing a business deal. Negotiating with Putin will require a large dose of coercive diplomacy. The book Trump’s team should be reading to help them prepare for negotiations is not his Art of the Deal, but Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War by the political scientist Alexander L. George. Applied to Ukraine, George’s work sheds light on why the conflict is so difficult to settle through diplomacy. It also reveals how these prospects might be improved. This perspective can help Trump’s team make the best of a bad situation—and perhaps the deal of the century.
An Alternative To War?
In his book, George defines coercive diplomacy as “the threat of force . . . as a means of restoring peace.” It is “a defensive strategy undertaken in response to an opponent’s encroachment or aggressive action.” George saw the strategy as an alternative to using military force to compel an adversary to submit, as described by his contemporaries such as Thomas Schelling. In contrast, coercive diplomacy “seeks to persuade an opponent to cease his aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping.” George also saw more potential than Schelling for the use of “carrots” as well as “sticks” to get results, using “persuasion and accommodation as well as coercive threats.”
George described three distinct strategies for coercive diplomacy: “try-and-see,” “turning of the screw,” and “ultimatum.” The first strategy requires issuing the adversary a clear demand to see if they will comply. The United States, Europe, and Ukraine have tried this with Russia for many years—for example, demanding its forces end their occupation of Crimea since 2014—and have seen no results.
The second strategy involves gradually increasing coercive pressure over time. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the West has turned the screws on Putin by ratcheting up military and economic pressure over the course of the war. These efforts have inflicted severe pain on Russia but have not yet brought Putin to the table.
This leaves the third strategy identified by George: the ultimatum. Ultimatums are the starkest form of coercive diplomacy: do this now (or by a specific date) else face the consequences. They are the most appropriate strategy for a severe, zero-sum conflict like the one in Ukraine. But since 2022, Western leaders have been unable to issue any credible ultimatums on Russia. Mantras like “as long as it takes” demonstrate commitment but remain vague—as long as what takes?
Rather than coercive diplomacy, the United States and its allies have tried to end the war by economic and military attrition, hoping to leave Russia’s economy unable to support the war and its forces defeated on the battlefield. In George’s terms, the strategy has been to bludgeon, not persuade. Or in other words: all coercion and no diplomacy.
Worst Case Scenario
The circumstances surrounding the war in Ukraine have not been propitious for ending it through coercive diplomacy. According to George, this is not surprising. The war in Ukraine is his worst-case scenario for attempting coercive diplomacy: a fait accompli invasion and a zero-sum conflict. The historical factors that favor successful coercive diplomacy are mostly absent in Ukraine: Russia has advantages in motivation, sense of urgency, manpower, and risk tolerance making it less susceptible to coercive pressure.
The biggest challenge to coercive diplomacy in Ukraine is mutual mistrust. Putin will find it difficult to believe the United States will follow through on any promises to ease sanctions or keep out of Ukraine when the fighting ends. More importantly, Ukraine will not believe any promises by Russia not to resume hostilities down the road—as it did following the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and 2014 Minsk agreement, a period which culminated in the 2022 full-scale invasion. Hence why Ukraine is so keen to insure against Russian renegement with the strongest possible security guarantees. Ukraine may also be skeptical of any new Western assurances after the bitter experiences of Budapest and Bucharest, neither of which led to the kind of action Kyiv expected. This is why Zelensky is keen to complement security guarantees with military support to help Ukraine achieve “peace through strength.”
The Trump Factor
Ukraine’s Western allies have been unable to issue any credible ultimatums due to a combination of Russia’s surprising economic resilience, a war both sides think they can win—so each prefers fighting to conceding—and a cautious, incremental approach to arming Ukraine.
But this situation is in flux as Trump arrives in the White House. Russia’s wartime economy is on a precipice, while on the battlefield slow gains have come at a massive cost in lives and equipment. Meanwhile, Ukraine has managed to take and hold Russian territory in the Kursk region while conducting a growing campaign of missile and drone strikes deep inside Russia. The most significant change may be the one driven by Trump himself: a reverse in sentiment over U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. Despite sometimes talking about “peace through strength,” Trump campaigned on reducing levels of support to the point where Ukraine may not be able to continue fighting for long even if it wanted to.
Moreover, Trump is not known for caution. Quite the opposite: he cultivates an image of being unpredictable and “crazy” to gain leverage. His instincts for playing hardball were on display last week when his demand for Putin to stop the war was sandwiched between two other dramatic coercive moves: withholding widely expected tariffs on China to provide leverage in upcoming talks with Beijing, and threatening Colombia with massive tariffs if Bogota did not accept deported migrants. As Zelensky has stated: “I believe (Trump) is strong and unpredictable. I would very much like President Trump’s unpredictability to be directed primarily toward the Russian Federation.”
The Art of Coercive Diplomacy
Despite his detractors, Trump’s unpredictability and dealmaking instincts may help Ukraine strike a ceasefire and peace deal on its own terms. His temperament and character, combined with shifting political, military, and economic conditions around the war, could make an ultimatum strategy viable again.
But even if the majority of Ukrainians and Russians now want a peace deal, it will not happen automatically. Getting Putin, who thinks he is winning in Ukraine, to the negotiating table will be tough even for the man who wrote a book on making deals. Let alone striking a peace deal that does not amount to capitulation. Taking advantage of this moment of opportunity will require not the art of the deal, but the art of coercive diplomacy.
George’s work on the theory and practice of coercive diplomacy points to four principles that can help Trump’s team take advantage of this moment, stop the war, and get a lasting peace deal: get specific, mix carrots with sticks, take small steps, and lower the temperature.
Get Specific
The first principle is to get specific. According to George, effective coercive diplomacy demands details: about threats, conditions, and deadlines. President Trump’s opening gambit did none of this. As he threatened:
If we don't make a ‘deal,’ and soon, I have no other choice but to put high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions on anything being sold by Russia to the United States, and various other participating countries.
This left the condition (“make a ‘deal’”) and deadline (“soon”) far from clear. The threat (“Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions”) is also vague and expansive. Each requires clarity and specificity. Threats also have to be credible. The threat of further sanctions may not hold water given the U.S. sanctions locker is all but empty, while convincing “other participating countries” who trade with Russia—such as India or China—to cut back will be a tough sell.
Combine Sticks and Carrots
The second principle is to complement threats (sticks) with inducements (carrots). George found coercive diplomacy worked best when it used “persuasion and accommodation as well as coercive threats.”
Trump’s threat was not accompanied by any inducements. According to George, these are not always appropriate: concessions can be hard to swallow in severe crises or zero-sum contests, seen as a reward for bad behavior, or discounted by leaders who want to look tough. Russia has carried out such grievous acts in Ukraine any carrots may be hard to swallow. But even “seemingly trivial” concessions can have a major impact.
Inducements can vary in practice. As George describes: “The carrot in such a strategy can be any of a variety of things the target of coercion values.” These may include measures of a “face-saving character” or those granted behind the scenes, such as President Kennedy’s secret removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Viable inducements could range from minor concessions to major sanctions relief. Even ordinary Russians are keenly aware of such measures: “I listen to my kids, and they’re celebrating Trump’s victory and hoping he’ll end sanctions.”
Take Small Steps
The third principle is to adopt a small-step approach toward peace. According to George, the crucial factor in setting diplomatic goals is “that the strength of the opponent’s motivation not to comply is highly dependent on what is demanded of him.” In other words, the higher the goal, the lower the chances of meeting it. A piecemeal approach to getting talks off the ground could pay dividends for Ukraine.
Ukraine’s basic goals of restoring its territorial integrity and joining NATO are the right ones but they remain ambitious at this stage. These goals should be retained but talks could start with lesser goals to get the ball rolling and establish momentum. These could include local ceasefires, humanitarian corridors, demilitarized zones, further prisoner exchanges, the release of children in captivity, agreements to protect food exports, and securing nuclear sites in Ukraine. Progress on these smaller goals could pave the way for larger talks on tougher issues.
A small-step approach also applies to the interlinked issues of arming Ukraine and providing postwar security guarantees. For Kyiv, the ideal solution to both is for the United States to maintain current levels of support and underwrite a security guarantee—either bilaterally or through NATO. But President Trump will probably do neither. Likewise, the “bridge” towards the ultimate guarantee of NATO membership might be “irreversible” but it is not on the cards anytime soon. Zelensky has already conceded only parts of Ukraine might be taken “under the NATO umbrella,” but even this might be a bridge too far.
All this means Ukraine’s bid for “peace through strength” to deter future Russian aggression may depend on Europe stepping into the breach—a project Washington has a clear interest in actively supporting. Another key step would be the emergence of a European “coalition of the resolute” to provide the reassurance and military assistance Ukraine needs to deter Russia in the future. Further steps might involve a European peacekeeping force (although this comes with its own challenges) and long-term commitments like the UK’s 100-year partnership with Ukraine.
Lower The Temperature
The fourth principle is to lower the temperature of the broader U.S.-Russia and Russia-West rivalry. George stresses the concern that either negotiating party “will be tempted to renew pressure and push for even greater concessions after the initial agreement for terminating the crisis is concluded.” In other words, Putin will be concerned any hint of compromise offered will be exploited to further weaken Russia. Equally, Washington, Kyiv, and Europe will be worried Putin will simply regroup and try again later. Easing the intensity of the wider conflict could make it easier to persuade Moscow to engage in talks and agree to a settlement, while minimizing the chances of a broader miscalculation (Putin has made nuclear threats against the West and waged hybrid war on European soil).
It also seems clear Putin wants to use his war as a platform to settle his wider, longstanding issues with the regional order writ large. These are complex issues which include arms control, strategic stability, and Europe’s security architecture. Putin’s demands are equally problematic, such as a smaller NATO, a sphere of influence, and denuding European missile defense and nuclear deterrent. While opening talks over these issues before the Ukraine war is settled might be seen as a grave concession by many, it could also work in Ukraine’s favor if it makes the coercive diplomacy of Ukraine and its allies more effective.
Either way, reestablishing a U.S.-Russia and Russia-West dialogue could help moderate the current zero-sum dynamic around Ukraine. This approach led to the emergence of dialogue even at the height of Cold War tensions.
Time To “MAKE A DEAL”?
Despite Trump’s enthusiasm to “get this war . . . over with” and “MAKE A DEAL,” the fact remains the vast majority of wars involving states do not end this way. Most last a few months; when they last longer than a year such wars typically take a decade to resolve. The fact Russia’s war in Ukraine passed this grim milestone nearly a year ago could mean the time is right for negotiations. But it also reveals how intractable the conflict is. Both sides see the conflict as existential and have committed to a grinding stalemate which has already produced a million casualties.
As with so many other issues, President Trump’s arrival has the potential to disrupt this situation: for good or bad. He has arrived at a time when the political, economic, and military situation is in flux—and has driven some of this change. He also appears more willing—even desperate—to make a deal. If Trump plays his cards right, the deal of the century might be within reach. If desperation leads him to sell out Ukraine and strike any deal for the sake of it, he may end up suffering a catastrophic defeat with lasting consequences for him, Ukraine, and the world.
Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.