Introduction
On April 12, Gabon will go to the polls to select its next president. The election will mark the first time in more than five decades that the ballot does not include a candidate named Bongo, marking a new era for the small West African country.
The last fifty years of rule in Gabon were defined first by Omar Bongo, who served as president from 1973 until his death in 2009, and then by his son Ali Bongo, who served from his father’s death until he was ousted in a coup in August 2023. Ali’s ouster set off a transitional period that is set to end this weekend.
During this period, the country has been led by a military junta known as the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions, with Brigadier General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema at its helm and serving as the transitional president. Nguema has used this transitional period to consolidate power, with the upcoming election seen by many as a coronation rather than an election.
By consolidating power around a junta leader, Gabon does not stand alone amongst countries in West Africa’s “coup belt.” Niger recently concluded a long-awaited national dialogue after its own coup ousted democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. This dialogue recommended the transitional period continue for an additional five years and, at its conclusion, allow coup leaders to stand for elections. This includes the leader of the ruling junta, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, who was promptly sworn in as transitional president after the dialogue’s conclusion.
Mamadi Doumboya, the leader of the military junta in Guinea, seems similarly inclined toward contesting delayed-but-eventual elections for president. The transitional charter specifies that no members of the junta may stand in elections, however, a constitutional referendum set for September 2025 may reverse this. The model—a dialogue, then a constitutional referendum allowing junta leaders to run, followed by an election in which outcomes are all but certain—conspicuously follows the transitional model conducted in Chad which solidified now-President Mahamat Deby’s rule in 2024.
Mali and Burkina Faso, both also under the rule of military juntas after coups, have been less inclined to plan elections, making their futures an unknown.
The African Union
The last several years could lead one to believe that the road from coup leader to transitional leader to elected president is both commonplace and accepted. In actuality, it is in direct violation of the African Union’s (AU) regulations.
The AU African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance states that, “The perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State.”
Prior to the current slate of coups, there had been precious little opportunity to create precedent around this rule, as coups were not a major part of the African governmental change landscape after its adoption in 2007. Unfortunately, the one major opportunity for such a determination was skirted.
In 2017, then-President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was removed from power in a complex series of events that would ultimately result in his resignation during an impeachment hearing. In the days prior to the hearing, the Zimbabwean military appeared on television to announce military operations to remove “criminals” around the aging president, and the president himself was held under house arrest. President Mugabe was then removed from leadership of the ruling party and replaced by his former vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was sworn in as president five days later.
The African Union, while initially stating that the events “seem[ed] like a coup” would eventually welcome Mugabe’s “decision . . . to step down from his position as head of state” which “paves the way for a transition process, owned and led by the sovereign people of Zimbabwe.” This determination avoided difficult conversations surrounding the participation of coup leaders in future governance when Mnangagwa ran in, and ultimately won, Zimbabwe’s 2023 presidential election.
In addition to the historical issue avoidance, the African Union has been largely silent as the current slate of coup leaders positioning themselves to run in future elections.
After President Idriss Deby Itno of Chad died in April 2021, the military quickly suspended the constitution, dissolved the government and parliament, and announced by decree the formation of a Transitional Military Council (TMC). At the head of the TMC was Mahamat Idriss Deby, the son of the former president. This was in sharp contrast to the constitutional method for transition of power in the event of a leader’s death, which requires elections be held within 45 to 90 days.
In response to this extra-constitutional appointment, the African Union, in a communique, “recall[ed] the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, as well as the Lomé Declaration; and express[ed] grave concern with respect to the establishment of the Military Transitional Council.” They did not, however, designate the removal as a coup.
Despite avoiding this designation, multiple further AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) communiquescalled on the TMC to adhere to its designated 18-month transitional timeline and not run in elections. These pleas were ignored by the TMC, which extended the transition timeline and allowed its chairman to stand for election as president. While initially there had been a vocal response from the African Union, with an extraordinary session called just days after the death of the elder Deby and a resulting communique on the shape of the transition, followed by several similar statements, the PSC did not feature Chad on its agenda for the year prior to the May 2024 election.
Human Rights
Both historical precedent and current practice make it clear that there will be no strong regional or otherwise multilateral effort to ensure that coup leaders do not become elected presidents. This is despite AU legal requirements that junta leaders play no role in future governance.
Given this reality, it is worth examining how these leaders approach human rights. After all, they initially came to power through an extralegal process, and will likely maintain power in a violation of international law. This signifies a power politics approach that does not bode well for the rule of law, due process, or political rights.
Across a wide array of human rights and democracy indicators, countries under military juntas perform worse. Burkina Faso, for example, experienced the greatest drop globally in its Freedom in the World score after it experienced two coups in 2022, going from a 53 to a 30 (Freedom House uses a 0-100 methodology where 0 is fully not free and 100 is fully free). This precipitous drop was based on a near total removal of political rights from Burkinabes, with Freedom House noting in one instance “the score declined . . . due to the military’s total dominance of the political system following two coups.” Guinea, Mali, and Niger have all followed similar trajectories, moving from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” in the wake of coups and the military’s domination of politics.
Theoretically, this trend could be reversed when the leaders of military juntas shed their uniforms in favor of civilian attire to become elected presidents. But the reality has been harmful for political pluralism, democracy, and human rights.
While Chad’s 2024 election should have signified the end of the military regime and the country’s transition, the election of Mahamat Idriss Deby has instead meant more of the same—beginning with the election itself, in which the junta did not allow EU-funded observers, and the outcome was challenged as having “gross irregularities and fraud” by the opposition. According to an International Federation for Human Rights report including analysis from both before and after the election, “The military regime has stepped up judicial harassment of human rights [nongovernmental organization] leaders, escalated threats against human rights defenders, and subjected these organisations to undisguised surveillance. Chadian human rights defenders are suffering the consequences of a culture of impunity and the widespread absence of the rule of law across the country” (emphasis added).
The election of a coup leader does not necessarily create a culture of impunity. Impunity of elites is often a cited reason for coups themselves, with demands for accountability of the corruption and malfeasance of previous regimes seen as central grievances. However, just as coups foster further breakdown of the rule of law and move states further from elite accountability, the entrenchment of the same leadership through elections of questionable validity continues this trend rather than alleviating it.
A historical survey of coups demonstrates similar trends across time periods and contexts. There is significant deterioration in the “quality of policymaking and governance” that is fundamental to the restoration of states experiencing coups. Among the areas most impacted are the rule of law, control of corruption, and “voice and accountability.” Breakdowns in these areas are both inherently problematic for democratic governance and are strongly correlated to impingement of human rights, in particular those most important to exposing corruption and holding elites accountable, such as freedom of information, freedom of the media, and free assembly and association.
Notably, voice and accountability, the rule of law, and both legislative and government effectiveness begin to tick back up in the years after coups officially end, slowly moving near pre-coup conditions. While the survey authors are cautious to ascribe causation, they note that this is “possibly coinciding with the return to democratic elections” (emphasis added).
Conclusion
While just a few years ago they seemed like a thing of the past, coups have returned as an unfortunately common method for regime change, particularly in West Africa. And though initially many coup leaders promised discrete transition periods moving toward democratic elections, these timelines have lapsed, sometimes owing to technical difficulties, but more often due to a lack of political will or interest in leaving power. In this vein, in direct violation of treaty obligations through the African Union, it appears that several coup leaders will be seeking the presidency through elections, beginning with Gabon’s Nguema in just a few days.
This is ultimately problematic for the protection of human rights. While the short term may see an increase in crackdowns in response to protests of the election or leadership continuity, years out, coup countries are likely to see a further breakdown of the rule of law, the entrenchment of a culture of impunity, and even greater corruption. This contrasts with the gains seen when there is a return to democratic governance rather than a cementing of the status quo. By cementing junta leadership, countries also miss a significant opportunity for improvement in policy effectiveness that comes with a commitment to democracy.
Recommendations
Responses to coups, electoral malfeasance and human rights violations are most impactful when lead regionally. For that reason, the best way to combat entrenchment of coup leaders as presidents starts with the AU and regional organizations.
The African Union Should Enforce its Treaty Obligations
The starting point for any solution to the problem of coup leaders taking the reins of post-transition states is for the African Union to enforce its treaty obligations. There are two elements to this.
First, when a coup takes place, the African Union should acknowledge it, rather than using overly technical legalism or platitudes. As former head of the AU Alpha Conde acknowledged when discussing Zimbabwe, when there is a change in leadership by force, it is not difficult to determine when something “seems like a coup.”
Second, when a coup is acknowledged, the African Union should utilize all the tools at its disposal to ensure coup leaders will not stand for eventual elections, including making public statements reiterating that it is not merely a normative decision but a legal requirement that such leaders stand aside. The bloc should also engage in quiet diplomacy, working to convince juntas of the value of respecting this norm. Finally, in the event that diplomacy fails to alleviate the issue, the African Union should maintain suspensions for states where coup leaders assume the presidency.
Enforcement of AU treaty obligations not only strengthens the body and works to reverse its reputation as a club of elite protection, it also reclaims its primacy in internal international affairs. International powers often look to the actions of the African Union when determining how to respond to happenings in the region. Where there is no response, actors like the United States must make their own policy determinations without regard to the wishes of the bloc. Where the African Union is forceful in standing up for human rights and democracy, other powers will be incentivized to align their own policies. Where the bloc’s policy is vague, internally unaligned, or incomprehensible, there is no such incentive.
Regional Bodies Should Enforce the Norm
In addition to the AU, regional bodies should be similarly creative in its approaches to enforce this obligation. the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) response to coups has been mixed historically: The organization staged a military intervention in Gambia when former dictator Yahya Jammeh refused to leave power after losing an election, and threatened to do the same in Niger after President Mohamed Bazoum was ousted, but then backed down and quietly resumed normal ties.
One of the main lessons to be learned from ECOWAS’ approach is that the whims of military juntas are unpredictable. Even after borders were reopened and sanctions were lifted, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger opted to leave ECOWAS and form their own regional organization that would not pester them to democratize. Other regional organizations should take note that timidity will not satisfy coup regimes.
The United States Should Sanction Individuals Who Disrupt Democratic Transitions
The traditional toolkit of the United States for promoting respect for human rights and democracy has been narrowed with the recent foreign assistance review. For example, there is no U.S.-funded Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) for the upcoming election, alongside a canceled European Union EOM. However, the United States still has important mechanisms it should use to foster adherence to democratic norms, in particular individual sanctions. In addition to exercising both quiet and public diplomacy, the United States should not hesitate to pursue both individual economic and travel sanctions against actors seen as standing in the way of democracy and violating human rights.
Such sanctions are far more valuable as part of a larger campaign to influence malignant actors to relinquish power, and therefore should be done in coordination with the African Union and regional bodies. The African Union working publicly to enforce its norms will go a long way in creating consensus around approaches and targets.
Andrew Friedman is a senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
