Changing of the Guard: It’s Time for Washington to Strengthen SOUTHCOM
Photo: CHANDAN KHANNA/AFP/Getty Images
United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) will soon experience a changing of the guard. On November 7, U.S. Navy vice admiral Alvin Holsey will assume command of SOUTHCOM from Army general Laura Richardson. During her time at the helm of SOUTHCOM, General Richardson carried out several initiatives to strengthen relations with U.S. allies and partners throughout the Western Hemisphere.
With a new commander in Miami and a new administration coming in Washington, it is time for U.S. policymakers to (finally) provide SOUTHCOM with the assets it needs to fully perform its mission. With an area of responsibility encompassing 31 countries and 12 dependencies, the Caribbean Sea, and waters in the Eastern Pacific and South Atlantic down to Antarctica, SOUTHCOM has much to do with limited resources. The change of leadership and the elevation to Service Component Command in mid-September of the U.S. Air Force Southern (AFSOUTH), the air component of SOUTHCOM, should encourage the next administration to engage more actively with SOUTHCOM.
Compared to other geographic combatant commands, SOUTHCOM is in a relatively ideal situation. There is no SOUTHCOM equivalent to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a volatile geopolitical situation comparable to the Middle East, or a China with direct territorial ambitions. Latin America and the Caribbean had not experienced an interstate war since 1995 when Peru and Ecuador shared brief hostilities. There are no nuclear powers in the Western Hemisphere besides the United States, and the probability of interstate warfare remains minimal. Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro regularly threatens Washington and has an ongoing border dispute with neighboring Guyana, but even then, the likelihood of Caracas starting a war of aggression is unlikely in the current circumstances.
Both Russian and Iranian warships visited the region in the past two years, intended to be a reminder that Moscow and Tehran have regional friends and allies. However, neither government has a comprehensive military strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean other than “reciprocity” against the United States for its presence in other theaters. Principally, China’s presence is aimed at trade and access to precious resources, something SOUTHCOM is not directly tasked with addressing, though Beijing’s attempts to sell military technology to the region are concerning. The next frontier of Beijing’s overtures to the region may well be in the defense cooperation space, as the increasing number of exchanges attests.
In other words, defense and security threats in the Western Hemisphere are mostly nontraditional: terrorism, transnational crime, gang violence, and environmental crimes, particularly illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing. Militaries are also heavily involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HA/DR), including ongoing firefighting missions. Latin American—and, to a lesser extent, Caribbean—armed forces procure military technology, increasingly from domestic suppliers, but they are for deterrent strategies and to replace old equipment, not because of the presence of any regional arms race. Thus, it is easy to see why SOUTHCOM has struggled to become a more relevant combatant command in a milieu of limited resources, exacerbated by the lack of traditional security threats and direct challenges to U.S. national security.
From its headquarters in Miami, the command has managed not only to stay afloat but also to emerge as a helpful (and mostly preferred) partner to U.S. allies in its area of responsibility (AOR). Currently, SOUTHCOM is providing logistical and transportation support for the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti; U.S. Navy ships assigned to the U.S. Fourth Fleet (SOUTHCOM’s naval component) plus Coast Guard cutters routinely intercept the infamous narco-boats and narco-subs in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Moreover, Latin American and Caribbean militaries take pride in training with the U.S. military; hosting U.S.-sponsored multinational exercises like UNITAS, Resolute Sentinel, Solidarex, or Tradewinds is a significant honor for regional partners. Finally, the National Guard’s State Partnership Program has successfully elevated the expertise and capabilities of regional armed forces.
During her time in command of SOUTHCOM, General Richardson has traveled often to the region. She also routinely visits Washington to speak at think tanks and testify before Congress to explain SOUTHCOM’s vital importance for U.S. national security, deterring threats to the homeland, and Washington’s global military strategy. Moreover, General Richardson has been great at thinking “outside the box” to increase SOUTHCOM’s relevance to the U.S. military. Uncrewed surface vessels were tested in Caribbean waters via Operation Windward Stack; as uncrewed technology becomes more popular and integrated into the U.S. military and the integrated deterrence strategy, SOUTHCOM’s AOR, as a low-threat region, is an ideal testing area for new technologies.
SOUTHCOM has also been innovative at circumventing some of its historical limitations in a region sensitive to issues of sovereignty. Given that the U.S. military will not be opening a base anywhere across Latin America or the Caribbean anytime soon, General Richardson has been inventive in strengthening military-to-military relations. For instance, SOUTHCOM is helping select partners open “centers of excellence,” part of the Theater Maintenance Partnership Initiative, to maintain and repair their fleet of vehicles and other systems.
SOUTHCOM also provides much-needed equipment to Western Hemisphere militaries. The Louisiana-based shipyard Metal Shark is building a fleet of 13 Near Coastal Patrol Vessels (NCPVs) for countries across the Greater Caribbean; the NCPVs will be very helpful in cracking down on maritime crimes and patrol of exclusive economic zones close to coastlines. Recently, SOUTHCOM transferred mobile clinics to the government of Trinidad and Tobago, which will be invaluable during HA/DR operations. While these transfers are dwarfed by U.S. military assistance to Ukraine—the Department of State recently announced a new military assistance package worth $425 million—they are highly useful in the AOR and appropriate for the missions regional militaries face. Realistically, SOUTHCOM will not be assigned a carrier strike group or a squadron of F-35 warplanes, but Washington can help SOUTHCOM’s mission by assigning assets without negatively affecting resourcing to other combatant commands.
History will be made in November, as Admiral Holsey will become “the first African American to lead SOUTHCOM since the organization assumed its mission more than six decades ago.” Moreover, Holsey is the third Navy officer to command SOUTHCOM in less than a decade—Admiral Kurt Tidd (2016–2018) and Admiral Craig Faller (2018–2021) commanded SOUTHCOM before the U.S. Army took over again). Given the proliferation of commanders from the U.S. Navy and the various maritime operations the combatant command carries out across its AOR, there are several practical, low-cost recommendations that would strengthen SOUTHCOM.
First, SOUTHCOM deserves a permanently assigned hospital ship to replace the aging USNS Comfort. The U.S. Navy is building a fleet of Spearhead-class expeditionary transport vessels, including Expeditionary Medical Ship class ships, beginning with the USNS Bethesda. SOUTHCOM would benefit from having a modern, permanently assigned ship for its AOR during the annual Operation Continuing Promise or when a natural disaster occurs. Having a permanent hospital ship assigned to HA/DR duties would help SOUTHCOM maintain its lead against China’s efforts to encroach on this space.
Second, the Fourth Fleet would benefit from one or two permanently assigned Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) to constantly patrol the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. The Navy is not interested in the LCSs for more contested environments, but they would be very helpful in SOUTHCOM’s AOR, where the threats are not as complex.
As for AFSOUTH, its new designation as Service Component Command will ideally signify additional resources so that U.S. Air Force assets can fly across Latin American and Caribbean skies to assist regional partners in combating threats, especially those related to the trafficking of illicit goods. A U.S. reconnaissance aircraft would provide invaluable intel information to locate potential illegal activities in progress, including narco-insurgents in Colombia and Peru or vessels carrying out illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing activities in the Eastern Pacific or South Atlantic.
Most governments across the Western Hemisphere want to have close security partnerships with Washington, and regional militaries like to train and work with the U.S. armed forces. The next administration should assist SOUTHCOM; if the command can do a lot with limited resources, imagine what it can do with just a little more.
Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Ryan C. Berg is the director of the Americas Program at CSIS.