China Courts the Pacific: Key Takeaways from the 2025 China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

On May 28 and 29, senior representatives from 11 Pacific Island countries—including Kiribati President Taneti Maamau, Niue Prime Minister Dalton Tagelagi, and a representative from the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat—traveled to China for the third China–Pacific Island Countries (PICs) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. This conference, chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, provided China with the opportunity to pursue two main objectives: firstly, to further normalize its engagement with the region and promote Chinese priorities such as opposition to Taiwan independence; secondly, to present itself as a positive alternative to the United States—especially on climate and trade, two top priorities for the Pacific. These critical questions will examine the outcomes of this foreign ministerial, its significance, and how this event fits into the broader arc of Chinese engagement in the Pacific.

Q1: What key agreements or statements emerged from the event?

A1: China hosted the third China-PICs Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Xiamen, Fujian Province, China, from May 28–29—last held in Suva, Fiji, in 2022. In addition to celebrating 50 years of diplomatic relations between China and PICs (although several countries recognized China much more recently), this year’s conference centered on China’s proposed six-point plan for “building a community with a shared future between China and the PICs” and the adoption of a joint statement. China also released a list of activities it would undertake to “implement the consensus” of the meeting.

The joint statement reaffirmed the participants’ commitment to deepening ties along a broad range of issues, including upholding democracy, freedom, and respect for international law; bolstering economic development and trade; and working together to combat climate change. On one of China’s top priorities, Taiwan, the statement included much stronger language than the previous two meetings—which did not mention Taiwan explicitly—stating this time that “all parties” recognize that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory” and that “the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”

Also included in the joint statement was the “acknowledgement” (although not “welcoming”) of China’s Global Development Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative, and Global Security Initiative, which are primary vectors of Chinese influence into governance and security sectors. Several mentions of working together to combat climate change and the importance of trade also made it into the statement.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also announced several implementing measures at the meeting, including plans to launch 100 projects focused on climate change in the Pacific over the next three years—coined China’s “small and beautiful projects.” Additional programs were announced on disaster assistance, maritime cooperation, agriculture, fisheries, health, and, most notably, police and law enforcement cooperation. On this last point, China announced plans to hold the fourth China-PICs Ministerial Dialogue on Police Capacity Building and Cooperation within the next year.

Q2: What is so significant about this meeting?

A2: This ministerial was notable both for its location in mainland China and the breadth of the participants—every country in the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) except Australia, New Zealand, and the Taiwan-recognizing nations of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu attended. Although this is the third gathering of its kind, it is the first time China has hosted this event in China. Additionally, more Pacific representatives attended than at the previous summits in Suva in 2022 and the 2021 virtual summit. This was the first Pacific foreign ministerial meeting to include Nauru (which switched diplomatic recognition to China in 2024), as well as the Cook Islands, which is in free association with New Zealand.

The timing and location of this gathering were purposeful. Amid regional uncertainty over the U.S. commitment to the region, hosting in mainland China allowed Beijing to roll out the red carpet for senior-level Pacific diplomats and commit resources to the Pacific’s most pressing climate and economic needs. The timing of this event—just months after the United States withdrew from the Paris Climate agreement, paused foreign assistance across the region, and enacted widespread tariffs on the Pacific Islands—presented an ideal opportunity for China to demonstrate its actions in direct contrast to the United States. On climate change, which the Pacific considers its top national security concern, Yi stated, “We deeply regret that a certain major country has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement. However, regardless of how the situation changes, China’s resolve to support and participate in global climate governance will not waver, nor will our commitment to implementing South-South cooperation on climate change.” The 100 “small but beautiful” projects that Yi announced were also aimed at climate change—including USD 2 million directly committed to combat climate change.

In the aftermath of the April 2 “Liberation Day” tariffs—which included tariffs as high as 32 percent on several Pacific Islands—China lambasted the United States for protectionism, economic bullying, and upending the international trade system. At this ministerial, in addition to positioning itself as a reliable development partner, China committed to further opening its markets to the Pacific, boosting trade and business ties, and stepping up tourism and connectivity with the region—again, all in contrast to perceived U.S. actions on trade.

This ministerial also comes at a time during which China has steadily increased its presence in the region, both through showcases of strength—such as its naval circumnavigation of Australia and live fire exercises in the Tasman Sea this past February—and through securing wide-ranging bilateral agreements, such as the China–Cook Islands Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement signed in mid-February. While few agreements have been purely security focused—a prime exception being the 2022 China–Solomon Island security pact—these China-Pacific arrangements often include some type of law enforcement or security adjacent initiatives, such as maritime cooperation, establishing port and airfield infrastructure, or disaster assistance—all of which were mentioned in the ministerial joint statement or implementation plan.

Q3: How does the meeting fit into the broader context of China’s increasing engagement in the Pacific?

A3: While China’s interest in the Pacific Islands region is not recent, its ability and desire to project power into the Pacific has accelerated over the past decade, driven largely by the significant strategic opportunities the region presents to secure critical resources and complicate U.S. defense planning. Through massive infrastructure development projects—often funded by Belt and Road Initiative–related loans—and a surge of diplomacy, China has made significant inroads into governance and security structures in this critical part of the world. While the trajectory of China-Pacific engagement has been upward, it has not been without its blips. In 2022, Wang Yi’s island-hopping tour of the Pacific failed to achieve the grand multilateral agreement he had envisioned; instead, it resulted in then-President Panuelo of the Federated States of Micronesia sending a stark warning to fellow Pacific leaders about the dangers of entering into such an agreement with China.

Despite some missteps, however, China has chalked up several wins in recent years, and Chinese diplomacy has evolved to better appease the Pacific way of consultation and consensus. China successfully convinced Kiribati and the Solomon Islands in 2019 and Nauru in 2024 to switch diplomatic recognition in its favor. And while Wang Yi failed to achieve a grand agreement in 2022, he did come away with several smaller, bilateral agreements—and only two months prior China signed a sweeping (and still secret) security agreement with the Solomon Islands. Chinese diplomats and diplomatic outposts far outnumber U.S. ones in the region, and on-the-ground diplomacy has largely shifted to effective and locally focused efforts such as building roads, bolstering health systems, or delivering supplies to local schools. In late 2024, China alarmed New Zealand by signing a multifaceted agreement with the Cook Islands, a country in free association with New Zealand.

This PIC foreign ministerial follows a pattern of similar China-hosted meetings over the last few years, including senior-level dialogues on law enforcement and climate change. As with this recent gathering, previous meetings have aimed to both establish multilateral and bilateral agreements and provide an opportunity for Pacific representatives to reinforce, in statements, China’s positive engagement with the region.

All of this aligns with China’s aim of increasing influence and presence in what it views as a strategic and contested region, including through reducing Taiwan’s international recognition. As underscored in this most recent Foreign Ministerial joint statement, China will continue to press for all countries to endorse its “One China” principle. With the Solomon Islands, China’s biggest Pacific supporter, set to host this year’s PIF Leaders Meeting in September, all eyes are watching to see how China leverages its influence over the host to sideline Taiwan, which has been a development partner to the PIF for more than 30 years.

In a constantly evolving international system, China seeks to elevate its global standing while highlighting the shortcomings of others whose actions it claims do not align with the Pacific’s priorities. This ministerial provided yet another opportunity for China to continue pushing that narrative. How positively the region responds to this messaging will depend not only on China’s actions in the region but also on how well other partners, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and, most critically, the United States, are able to demonstrate a meaningful alternative.

Kathryn Paik is deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. John Augé is the program manager for the Australia Chair at CSIS.