On Friday, March 28, Myanmar suffered a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake, centered near its second-largest city of Mandalay. An estimated 10,000 buildings collapsed, roads buckled, and the airport sustained damage. Reports of tremors and damage were reported from Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, and Thailand. The extent of the damage and death toll is still unknown, as the Myanmar junta, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), has blocked or censored reporting, and widespread damage and lack of internet connectivity has limited access to information. Lack of equipment, power outages, and temperatures rising to above 100 degrees Fahrenheit have impeded rescue and relief efforts.
Just hours after the earthquake, the military conducted air strikes against ethnic areas in northern Shan State, killing at least seven people. A total of 4,157 air strikes have killed an estimated 2,224 civilians and wounded 3,466 since the coup; Myanmar’s air capabilities have been mainly supplied by China, India, and Russia.
The earthquake adds yet another layer of misery for the people of Myanmar, who have been living under a military regime that took power on February 1, 2021. Since then, the country’s economy has deteriorated, education and healthcare expenditures have plummeted, and the country has been embroiled in active conflict, led by anti-government militias and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
Q1: What was the state of Myanmar prior to the earthquake?
A1: Since the SAC leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, seized power in a coup on February 1, 2021, the emerging economy has spiraled. Grim statistics show that 18.6 million or approximately one-third of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance, including 6 million children. Typhoons and flooding have affected crops and food security is precarious, leading to about one-fourth of the population being food insecure.
The United Nations estimates that 1.5 million people have been displaced since October 2023, increasing the total number to 3.5 million. More than half of the country’s 330 townships are in active conflict.
Myanmar’s economy has been impacted by internal conflict, macroeconomic instability, and natural disasters. GDP growth is expected to be less than 1 percent and inflation as high as 26 percent. The local currency, the kyat, has somewhat stabilized after a volatile few years, but it lost 40 percent of its value against the dollar last year. Electrification is worsening due to infrastructure damaged by conflicts, lack of investments in the sector, declining revenues and increased prices, currency volatility, and poor governance and mismanagement. Blackouts are often unplanned and increase the need for businesses and households to rely on generators. Internet outages due to restrictions and controls further undermine business and education, though some organizations (including anti-government militias) used Starlink satellite systems.
Q2: What steps has the SAC taken regarding receiving aid and assistance? How has this differed from previous natural disasters?
A2: The SAC has requested international humanitarian aid and declared a state of emergency across six regions. The regime spokesman has also called for blood donations. Myanmar’s military regime previously blocked and refused international aid for weeks, most notably during Cyclone Nargis in 2008, which killed more than 138,000 people. The United States had offered naval ships in the region for Cobra Gold exercises off the coast of Thailand to provide assistance, search-and-rescue missions, and aid. UN agencies flew in cargo planes filled with supplies; however, several were turned away. It would take several heads of state, global leaders, and regional governments to push the junta to receive aid. Fears that invasions by countries hostile to Myanmar could be disguised as international aid, or that the provision of international aid reflected efforts to provide covert aid and weapons to anti-government militias, fueled the military’s reasoning to block aid. Additionally, the callous attitude of the SAC toward its citizens—such as encouraging victims to survive on frogs and rainwater rather than aid agency handouts—reflected SAC leaders’ views on supporting those impacted by the cyclone,
The SAC reportedly blocked aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha in 2023, which hit Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, as well as northern Rakhine State and Chin State in Myanmar. The SAC hampered the provision of international humanitarian assistance in Chin and Rakhine States; this was perceived in part as an effort to weaken ethnic armed groups operating in the area, including the Arakan Army, the Chin National Front, and the Chinland Defense Forces, which had taken control of portions of the two states.
Though those fears may still hold, the regime likely wants to improve its image ahead of the election and get ahead of any domestic or international criticism it received during Nargis. Additionally, Mandalay is the center of Buddhism for the country, and its military leaders are devout. Efforts to help those affected in Mandalay—early reports suggest that 200 monks were killed in building collapses—are likely linked to their faith as well.
Q3: What impact does this have on the SAC’s political plans?
A3: The earthquake is unlikely to derail the SAC’s plans to hold an election, which could take place in December 2025 or January 2026. In the midst of the Cyclone Nargis recovery efforts, the ruling regime held a constitutional referendum, its first countrywide vote in 18 years. It delayed the election in areas impacted by the cyclone but still expected people to vote. This reflects the likely mindset of the SAC as it prepares for the general election: If the election is a national priority, the earthquake is but a small obstacle to overcome.
That said, the election date has already been postponed several times. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, head of the SAC, reaffirmed plans to hold a general election by the end of the year at the annual Armed Forces Day on March 27, just two days before the quake. A general election was expected to be held in August 2023, 2024, and early 2025. Security concerns from resistance and armed ethnic organizations were the stated reasons behind the initial postponements. Despite the multiple postponements, the SAC sees the general election as an important demonstration of the country’s return to democracy that could receive tacit recognition from regional powerhouses such as China, and possibly Myanmar’s regional neighbors, which would prefer not to have to deal with the political and diplomatic hot potato that Myanmar has become. The election, whenever it will be held, will not be free, fair, or credible.
Q4: What countries have pledged assistance?
A4: There has been an outpouring of assistance from global organizations and governments. China, India, Russia, and the United Nations were quick to provide rescue workers, search dogs, drones, generators, medical supplies, and personnel for temporary and permanent hospitals, with promises to provide more assistance. Malaysia also sent personnel to help provide aid.
Countries have also pledged millions of dollars of assistance, including Australia, China, Hong Kong, Ireland, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission, both directly to Myanmar and through international organizations such as the International Federation of the Red Cross, Myanmar Red Cross Society, Myanmar Humanitarian Fund, and UN Refugee Agency Joint Response Plan. China sent the first tranche of $13.9 million in emergency aid to Myanmar on March 31, suggesting there will be millions more the country sends for relief efforts.
Q5: What has the United States promised to provide?
A5: The U.S. Embassy in Myanmar stated that the United States would provide up to $2 million in aid through Myanmar-based humanitarian assistance organizations and that a USAID emergency response team was “deploying to Myanmar to identify the people’s most pressing needs, including emergency shelter, food, medical needs, and access to water.” The day after the earthquake and two days before the post, the U.S. Department of State issued a press statement on the fate of USAID, saying “Today, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have notified Congress on their intent to undertake a reorganization that would involve realigning certain USAID functions to the Department by July 1, 2025, and discontinuing the remaining USAID functions that do not align with Administration priorities.”
There was a USAID mission in the Yangon Embassy, but cuts and “realigning” the agency and assistance overall have effectively eliminated the staff, connections with local organizations adept at mobilizing assistance, and resources from regional embassies and U.S. military outposts that are needed to address the crisis. There is no timetable for the team to arrive, and news outlets have not reported any U.S. presence. The 72-hour window after a quake, when rescuers are most likely to find survivors in the rubble, has already passed.
As reported in several news outlets and based on the response efforts in previous disasters, USAID would have sent a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) within 24 to 48 hours of the earthquake. These teams are made up of highly trained staff who specialize in mobilizing to lead the U.S. government’s humanitarian response on the ground. DARTs deployed to provide relief after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti that killed 300,000 people, the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan that triggered meltdowns at the Fukushima nuclear plant, wars in Iraq and Syria, and more recently, in Ukraine. With the shutdown of USAID and the pause on foreign assistance, some of the DART disaster response staff were ordered to return to Washington, while others lost access to their email and other electronic systems.
Q6: What is U.S. policy on Myanmar?
A6: The State Department notes on its Myanmar policy web page, last updated on January 25, that it supports efforts since the coup to restore democracy, hold the military accountable for human rights abuses, and provide humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations. In February, the United States cut 39 of 40 development projects in Myanmar, many of which would have pivoted to supporting relief and recovery efforts after the quake. Given the Trump administration’s focus on America First and its impact on aid, assistance, and immigration, U.S. support from the executive branch for these efforts will wane significantly.
The United States has imposed several diplomatic and economic sanctions targeting Myanmar, including visa bans and financial sanctions against several businesses, state-owned enterprises, and military and SAC officials.
Congress has historically played a crucial role in shaping U.S. policy toward Myanmar, and it has continued to do so since the February 2021 coup through making floor statements, creating a first-ever Congressional caucus on the country, and introducing and passing legislation. For example, Congress passed the BURMA Act, which was folded into the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 and was signed into law by President Biden on December 23, 2022. The BURMA Act contains several provisions, including authorizing the funding and implementation of activities that support anti-junta actors, which would include nonlethal support to EAOs, protecting vulnerable populations, and promoting economic sanctions coordination. Representative Bill Huizenga (R-MI-04) introduced an amendment to push back the sunset date on imposing sanctions. Congress is considering bills targeting the military, including H.Res.106, that calls on the UN Security Council to immediately impose an arms embargo and hold it accountable for its ongoing violations of human rights. It was introduced by Representative Claudia Tenney (R-NY-24) in February.
Congress also appropriated $121 million in funding for Myanmar-related programs for fiscal year 2024, but with changes in USAID and foreign assistance, it is unclear how or if these funds will be dispersed.
Q7: Does this open any opportunities for diplomatic engagement with the SAC or democratic openings similar to 2010?
A7: This is unlikely. The Trump administration has not yet released an Indo-Pacific Strategy and likely does not view Myanmar as a critical area of focus. Though it’s still early days, it does not seem that Myanmar, with few exceptions, would add value to an America First foreign or economic policy, as it does not have the resources to contribute to U.S. activities in AI, digitalization, or improving manufacturing in tech, semiconductors, and other industries at home.
One area that could spark interest from the Trump administration is in competing with China and having access to the country’s vast mineral and natural resources wealth. Myanmar is estimated to have 3.2 billion barrels of oil reserves and 18 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, mostly offshore, though the full scale of oil and gas reserves has not been confirmed. Myanmar is also home to tin, antimony, manganese, cement, coal, copper, ferroalloys, fluorspar, jade, lead, natural gas, nickel, nitrogen, petroleum (crude and refined), steel, sulfur, tungsten, zinc, and rare earths, which China has been interested in mining. In 2020, Myanmar was the third-highest producer of rare earths in the world, accounting for 13 percent of world production. Many of these natural resources are located in active conflict areas and on land controlled by large EAOs.
The SAC is likely not interested in improving its relationship with the United States; the United States has traditionally supported opposing groups, pushed for democracy and human rights, and has actively sanctioned it and its patrons for decades. The SAC would likely request sanctions to be dropped to allow access to its mineral resources, something Congress and vocal human rights activists would oppose.
Erin L. Murphy is the deputy director for the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics and senior fellow, Emerging Asia Economics, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
