Conflict, Hunger, and Famine in Sudan

In April 2023, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces spread into a deadly civil war across Sudan. Now, 16 months since the onset of the conflict, extreme violence and restrictions to the flow of humanitarian aid have led to widespread acute food insecurity and the worst internal displacement crisis in the world. In July 2024, a judgment by the Famine Review Committee (FRC) confirmed the plausible presence of famine conditions in the Zamzam internally displaced persons (IDP) camp located in the state of North Darfur. As ceasefire negotiations continue to falter and severe flooding events lead to greater suffering, it remains to be seen whether this recent famine determination will catalyze the response that is needed.

Q1: How was famine determined, and why hasn’t it been formally declared?

A1: The confirmation of famine by the FRC is the first since the 2020 designation in South Sudan; however, it is not a formal declaration, which must come from an independent state or international body, like the United Nations. The Sudanese government has thus far denied the existence of famine in the Zamzam IDP camp, and the United Nations has declined to supersede that decision with its own famine declaration.

The FRC—a team of UN-supported international food security and nutrition experts assembled to assess official speculation of famine—confirmed that famine conditions were present in the Zamzam IDP camp based on analyses produced by both the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Sudan Technical Working Group. The process of famine (IPC Phase 5) classification is a technical one, determined at a regional level when the following three thresholds are met or surpassed: (1) at least 20 percent of households experience an extreme lack of food, (2) at least 30 percent of children suffer from acute malnutrition, and (3) there is a malnutrition-related death rate of at least two people or four children per 10,000 people each day.

In this case, however, the FRC was able to affirm the likelihood of famine in the Zamzam IDP camp despite a dearth of recent quantitative food insecurity data. Utilizing information gathered earlier this year, the FRC considered worsening local conditions and historical temporal patterns of limited food availability in the region. Data collected by Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, suggests that the famine threshold for acute malnutrition among young children may have been surpassed as early as January.

Q2: How did famine emerge in Sudan, and what are the conditions now?

A2: Conflict and a near-complete lack of humanitarian access are the primary drivers of famine in North Darfur and acute food insecurity across Sudan. More than half of the Sudanese population, 25.6 million people, are facing acute food insecurity at IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) levels or greater. While the civil war in Sudan began in the capital of Khartoum, violence quickly spread across the country. As of July 2024, nearly 19,000 people have been killed, while around 33,000 people have been injured in the fighting, and the number of people displaced or in need of critical humanitarian assistance is in the tens of millions.

The current status of famine in Sudan applies specifically to the conditions in the Zamzam IDP camp located in the Al Fasher region of North Darfur in western Sudan. While, at present, the FRC’s judgment does not extend beyond the Zamzam IDP camp, the FRC has also determined that famine may be ongoing in two nearby IDP camps, Abu Shouk and Al Salam, as well. Additionally, the FRC and FEWS NET do not preclude the possibility that famine is present across other areas of Sudan, with at least 13 regions likely experiencing similar conditions.

The precise population of the Zamzam IDP camp is difficult to determine, but it is currently estimated to be between 500,000 and 800,000 people, about double its population size in April 2024. The rapid population growth of the Zamzam camp is met with already extremely limited humanitarian access, the confluence of which has generated extreme levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. Global leaders have accused the Sudanese government of intentionally blocking the delivery of aid into Darfur for several months. Before the recent reopening of the Adré border crossing—the primary access point into the Darfur region—just a single delivery of food assistance had reached the Zamzam IDP camp in 2024. It arrived in April with a quantity of aid sufficient for less than five percent of the camp’s population.

Based on observed trends in access to humanitarian aid and assessments of deficits in energy intake, excess mortality in Sudan could reach 2.5 million by the end of this month.

Q3: Will confirmation of famine help?

A3: How the international community will react to the growing humanitarian disaster in Sudan remains to be seen, and the tangible benefits of a formal famine declaration are unclear. At the time of writing, the funding goal to support the 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan in Sudan—outlined by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs—remains only 41 percent fulfilled, leaving a gap of almost $1.6 billion. While many experts suggest that the high thresholds and strict procedures for famine declarations delay vital food aid, there is little evidence supporting a significant relationship between famine declarations and the flow of international funding. Additionally, government resistance often hinders the famine declaration itself, eschewing international cooperation and delaying the delivery of life-saving aid.

Despite the limitations of the famine declaration system, famine warnings and confirmations can serve an important strategic purpose. The threat of increased global scrutiny after a famine declaration can move governments and decisionmakers to action. This is particularly the case when famine results from human-caused conditions of violent conflict. Earlier this year, growing evidence for the risk of imminent famine in Gaza was mirrored by mounting pressure on the Israeli government by U.S. and international officials. While a causal relationship cannot be drawn at this time, the reopening of the Adré border crossing comes just two weeks after the publication of the FRC’s confirmation of famine conditions.

Little will change without sustained attention that continues well after famine has been confirmed, however. Despite unofficial statements that suggested famine conditions exist in Gaza, there has been no significant improvement to the conditions that have left nearly the entire population living with high levels of acute food insecurity and no ceasefire agreement. Although Sudanese officials reopened the Adré border crossing on August 15, UN organizations and aid groups still question what aid restrictions authorities will put in place. Between August 20 and August 30, just 59 aid trucks—carrying enough supplies to reach about 195,000 people—have been able to enter Sudan through the crossing from Chad.

Q4: What more can be done to help those experiencing food insecurity crises?

A4: The suffering of food insecurity does not begin when an area is deemed to be in famine, and neither should the delivery of aid and assistance to households and regions facing acute food insecurity and malnutrition. The IPC Acute Food Insecurity Scale includes five phase categories. Urgent action is required at IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) and above—well before households fall into catastrophic states and regions into famine—as households in this phase are already subject to conditions of increased acute food insecurity and crisis-coping strategies that damage household health and livelihoods. Globally, there are currently more than 168 million people living in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) conditions or worse across the 43 regions covered by the IPC.

It should be remembered that assessments of food insecurity and subsequent famine determinations are, by their nature, retrospective, building upon weeks and months of careful data collection and subsequent analyses. The confirmation of famine in the Zamzam IDP camp, for example, came months after FEWS NET reported initial warnings of credible famine risk in March 2024, with a reiterated warning published two months later in May. While declarations of famine are made in part to stimulate increased international action, they also represent a failure of the global community. The prevention of such conditions is at all times the goal of international food security monitoring systems like the FEWS NET and the IPC. It is therefore the responsibility of governments, international aid agencies, and nongovernmental organizations to prioritize preventative action to stop the escalation of hunger before the next famine emerges.

Zane Swanson is a fellow with the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Anita Kirschenbaum is a program manager for the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS. Caitlin Welsh is the director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS.