CSIS-DAPA 2024: The Potential for Expanding Defense Cooperation within the ROK-U.S. Alliance

This transcript is from a CSIS event hosted on June 27, 2024. Watch the full video here.

John J. Hamre: Thank you. Thank you very much. Delighted you’re all here. My name is John Hamre. I’m the president at CSIS. And I just want to say thank you all for being here today. We’re delighted to have this conference. I’d also say, you know, we’re responsible for your safety. So if there is an announcement, please follow now. You know, Cynthia is the senior safety officer. She’s in charge of making sure you’re all well and safe. And so if we hear a voice, take her instructions. These exits behind us will take us down and out in the back. If it’s safe to go out in the front, we’ll go out that way. I’ll order ice cream, and we’ll all be happy. We’ll be fine.

Thank you all. Delighted you’re here. I was in Seoul back in March, and that was when I first met Minister Seok. And he had just been in the job for about two weeks. You know, and we were thinking about this conference. And, you know, I was – we’ve been doing this for a number of years, but I didn’t realize, and certainly hadn’t anticipated, how important it was going to be. President Putin’s trip to North Korea has really changed the landscape. It’s really shifted the landscape in a significant way. And we now have to start thinking about this in a new and deeper way.

Korea has always been on the forefront. It holds the flag of democracy on the Asian continent, you know? And it’s going to become bigger, more important now. And we’re going to explore some of that today. I think we’ve been watching this horrific war in Ukraine, illegal, disgusting, what Russia has been doing. We’re seeing astounding developments that are going to have a real impact for all of us as we think about what does combat mean in the future? And it’s – we’re really going to need to be partners, more now than ever.

Now, I’ve been talking with my friends at DAPA for a number of years, and I’ve said we’re ready for the third generation of our partnership. You know, the first generation was you bought our stuff, OK. Then the second generation was you bought the designs and you manufactured our stuff. But at the same time, you were building your own things. You know, and you’ve become a significant arms manufacturing country.

But your market is limited. Our market is limited. We’re going to have to find ways where we’re working together in a more deeper way, where our industrial bases are more connected to each other in mutually supportive ways. This is that third generation. This is where we’re going to have to head. And I think that Putin’s visit has accelerated the urgency for that. And we’re going to explore all of that today.

So I want to say thank you to all of you for coming. I think this is going to be a very important conference today. Minister Seok, thank you for being here. We’re really delighted to have you here. You lead a very important ministry in DAPA. And it’s a real privilege to have you with us today. And Secretary Bush, thank you. When I saw him this morning I said he looks pretty good for a guy that hasn’t slept for four months, you know? I mean, he’s working every hour God sends down. And it’s not only to help rebuild the arsenal for the Army, but it’s to help get the equipment that Ukraine needs for us, to fight for freedom for us. And he’s doing a fabulous job. Doug, thank you.

Let me turn to Cynthia for getting this started, and we’ll get this conference going for real. Thank you all for being here. (Applause.)

Cynthia R. Cook: Thank you, Dr. Hamre. I am Cynthia Cook, a senior fellow here at the Center for Strategic and International Security and also the director of the Defense Industrial Initiatives Group. And it is my very great pleasure and honor to welcome you here today, and to participate in this conference, and to host DAPA as they come to the United States to talk about the very important topic of defense industrial cooperation.

We’ve seen, as the war in Ukraine changes, how Russia is reaching out to strengthen its own partnerships, following a roadmap that the U.S. has set for decades. Our allies and partners are our most important asset, and the Republic of Korea represents one of our single most partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. We’re very delighted to have the opportunity to talk about this partnership today. I will start off by introducing our two panelists, and then welcome Secretary Bush to the podium, and then Minister Seok will come up. And both will give some opening remarks.

So first, introductions. Both of these gentlemen have had very impressive careers. Mr. Douglas R. Bush was confirmed by the Senate as the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics, and technology in February of 2022. In this position, he serves as the Army’s acquisition executive, the senior procurement executive, the science advisor to the secretary of the Army, and the Army’s senior research and development official. He also has principal responsibility for all Department of the Army matters related to logistics. Mr. Bush spent many years on Capitol Hill as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee, rising to the position of deputy staff director of the HASC before coming to the Army to serve as a civilian in 2020. He had served as an Army officer after graduating from West Point in 1993, and he also has a master’s degree from Georgetown University.

Minister Seok JongGun is the minister of Defense Acquisition Program Administration, or DAPA, of the Republic of Korea. In this capacity, Minister Seok is responsible for overseeing DAPA’s extensive portfolio of force improvement programs, the procurement of military supplies, and the promotion of the defense industry. Minister Seok spent most of his career in the Republic of Korea’s Army and retired at the rank of major general and served in a variety of roles including as the director for capability planning of the ROK JCS Strategy Planning Bureau. Minister Seok graduated from the Korea military academy and earned a master’s degree in military operations research at the Korea National Defense University. Thank you.

Secretary Bush, please, we welcome your opening remarks. (Applause.)

Douglas R. Bush: Good morning, everyone. Special thank you to Minister Seok. Thank you. It means so much to have you here, and for your Defense Acquisition Program Administration team here today. And thank you to Dr. Hamre and the CSIS team, including our esteemed moderator, Dr. Cynthia Cook. These exceptional teams have come together to host this amazing event again this year, and I am pleased to be here as part of it. 

The Republic of Korea remains one of our key foreign military sales partners, with 780 active cases, valued at roughly $40 billion across the Department of Defense. Of this amount, the U.S. Army by itself has cases valued at nearly 7 billion (dollars). We have a vital partnership, that is only going to get deeper and more important. We have important work to do, and these conversations like the one today continue to highlight the importance of expanding defense cooperation between our two great nations.

Through close military and industrial cooperation, we can continue increasing interoperability and driving innovation. Our relationship has transformed from one focused initially on security of the Korean Peninsula to what we now have in the form of a comprehensive partnership in which we jointly advance shared goals in security, trade, technology, and democracy. Now we must realize that the challenges we face together require us to deliver even faster in world of acquisition in which we serve, at a faster speed and at greater scale than we’ve ever been asked to do before. 

As we prepare to mark the 71st anniversary of our alliance, let us also celebrate the work that we have done together to achieve joint success. The U.S.-ROK alliance has evolved, as I mentioned, from a security alliance to a strategic partnership of great depth. Through longstanding initiatives, like the Defense Technological and Industrial Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, first signed in 1988, we’ve ensured continued interoperability of our forces through all aspects of defense acquisition, to include exchanging information on our mutual defense acquisition policies, addressing issues that hinder bilateral cooperation and interoperability, promoting the need for continued maximum interoperability. 

We also continue to increase the complexity of our international armaments cooperation through more engineering and science exchanges, foreign comparative testing activities, and the establishment of the – at the undersecretary level of a science and technology bilateral. We jointly empower this international cooperation in military research, development, test, and evaluation through memorandums of understanding, like the one for RDT&E signed in 2009 to allow for cooperative projects and engineer science and exchange memo signed in 2000 to promote cooperation through personnel exchanges. 

Just last year, we signed a new security of supply arrangement strengthening our bilateral supply chains and industrial bases, as well as addressing supply chain risks. This arrangement enables both the U.S. and the Republic of Korea to acquire industrial resources to quickly meet defense requirements, resolve unanticipated disruptions that challenge these capabilities, and promote supply chain resiliency. Our integration only continues to grow. 

For example, Korea’s – Republic of Korea’s light attack aircraft, the FA-50, is comprised of approximately 60 percent U.S. components. If U.S. allies and partners are buying the FA-50, and have necessary security arrangements, these partners can request U.S. security, communications and munitions, all of that enabled by our partnership. This ensures that the Republic of Korea defense exports are interoperable with our partners and allies. 

With these continued efforts in partnership between our countries, it’s important to highlight the critical role played by the defense industrial base and the collaboration required to realize true technological advancements that enable us to provide the best solutions to our war fighters, again at faster speed and at greater scale. For example, Hanwha, a critical company in Korea, has teamed with multiple companies across the defense industrial base, including on the Army’s Small Multipurpose Equipment Transport Increment II program, through the foreign comparative test efforts. 

DOD leverages the FCT program for testing items from South Korea that have high technological readiness levels that may meet our modernization priorities. Locating world-class products like these in technologies built by allies contributes the defense of the United States and increases our partnership. This testing program is one small example that’s allowed the United States and the Republic of Korea to demonstrate next-generation technology across a broad variety of critical new techs, including artificial intelligence, robotics, and communications infrastructures.

Looking into the Indo-Pacific to enhance the defense industrial base of both the United States and the ROK, respectively, there are ongoing in-depth discussions by the Department of Defense for executing the recently published Regional Sustainment Framework to facilitate logistics in a contested environment, as well as cooperation to distribute maintenance, repair, and overhaul capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Aligned with the National Defense Strategy and the National Defense Industrial Strategy, this regional sustainment framework underpins the Defense Department’s effort to develop distributed MRO capabilities closer to the point of need by collaborating with allies and partners, such as the ROK, as well as U.S. and international defense industry to come up with joint solutions.

This effort requires significant additional resources from both governments and members of each of our respective defense industrial bases, but ROK efforts to collaborate on MRO initiatives affirms that such cooperation is in accordance with the direction of enhancing alliance posture and capabilities. The defense industrial base is a shared interest, and ongoing collaborations truly highlight opportunities for new and additional industrial cooperation beyond what I’ve mentioned. Strong, secure and resilient industrial bases are vital to both our nations. 

We will succeed together. Through close military and industrial cooperation, we can continue increasing interoperability, strengthening our industrial bases, and then, through that, our collective war fighting capabilities to defend our people. Thank you, and I look forward to today’s discussion. (Applause.)

And, Minister Seok, please. (Applause.)

Minister Seok JongGun: Honorable President Hamre, thank you very much for your warm welcoming remarks. My special thanks must go out to the Director Cynthia Cook for introducing me to the distinguished audience. Also let me express my deepest gratitude to Assistant Secretary Douglas Bush for accepting our request for the keynote speech and attending here today out of your busy schedule. I would like to express my appreciation to all the distinguished guests joining us today, and all the staff members for putting together today’s meaningful event. Last but not least, let me confirm my gratitude to all the audience joining us in real time through an online platform.

Since the initiation of CSIS conference with DAPA in 2016, DAPA and CSIS have been holding this annual event to continue our in-depth discussion on defense industry cooperation. In particular, as the recent exchanges such as the presidential summit between the two countries, elevated the relations of the two countries to a higher level. Today’s conference is being held under the theme of the potential for expanding defense cooperation with the ROK-U.S. alliance. Last year was the historical year that marked the 70th anniversary of alliance between the two countries. And our exchange is becoming more vibrant in various areas, such as defense and diplomacy, including the presidential summits between the two countries.

Against this backdrop, I highly anticipate that today’s gathering will be the catalyst for discussing the ways to shore up defense industry cooperation further down the road. When the very existence of Korea was on the brink of collapse due to the – due to the invasion from North Korea, a great number of the U.S. soldiers sacrificed their lives for the country that they had unheard of and they had never been to before. Throughout the journey, I was surmounting the deep scar and ruins of war to eventually achieving prosperity and standing tall. There always has been the U.S. beside us.

Once again, I would like to express my deepest gratitude for your longstanding support. The ROK-U.S. alliance began with the Korean War and marked this whopping record of the 70th anniversary last year. And it has continued to grow in a mutually beneficial manner. In addition, the presidential summits in April 2023 further pushed the two countries to elevate our relations to global comprehensive strategic alliance. This is the optimal level in relations between countries. And for Korea, United States is the only country that shares the relations of global comprehensive strategic alliance.

As a result, the scope of cooperation expanded from defense cooperation to economic, critical technologies, and supply chain. And the two countries are materializing alliance in action towards the future to ramp up the peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region, going beyond the Korean Peninsula and sharing the value of free democracy.

The global geopolitics are continuously changing. The Ukraine-Russia war and Israel-Hamas war continue to pose threats to the global security. And the peace in the Pacific region is also hung by a thread. In particular, the Ukraine-Russia war has renewed the importance of defense and security to the global community. Arms building is accelerating with the European countries at the center. And as the unity between the allies and friend countries is strengthening, the conflict between the regimes are exacerbating at the same time.

In the past days, during COVID-19 crisis, the global pandemic undermined the industrial capabilities of countries around the world. And the recovery effort is still ongoing. Looking at the defense area especially, requirements for capabilities are soaring in Europe and the Middle East. However, the speed of recovery in production capability in defense industry is slow. So many countries around the world are putting their utmost effort to secure the required capabilities in a tiny manner. As the outbreak of Israel-Hamas war is adding to the threats on the global peace and security, it is expected that the trend of arms builder will continue for a while.

In addition, significance of the Indo-Pacific region has been underscored by the power competition between the U.S. and China, arising from the dramatic rise of China and conflicts in Europe and Middle East. Following the U.S.-Indo-Pacific strategy, countries like Korea and Canada have announced their Indo-Pacific strategies to further shore up cooperation between their allies and friends. Furthermore, as the first industrial revolution brought the era of advanced science and technology to full view, its utilization as a military purpose is becoming more common.

Since the effectiveness of drone and satellite communications has been proven in the Ukraine-Russia war countries, with advanced defense industry such as United States are witnessing the increase in R&D and investment in order to apply these advanced technologies, such as drone, unmanned technologies, and AI, into weapon systems and capabilities. Since the Korean War, Korea has put a lot of effort to enhance national defense capability to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. And as a result, we can build the capabilities that we see in our defense industry today.

As such, we wish to further expand cooperation with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific regions, as the global comprehensive strategic alliance, and participate in the supply chain of global defense industry so that we can make a contribution to sustaining the global order and promote the global peace. Honorable President Hamre, do you remember the concept of the generation three partnership? DAPA members have handed down this concept of generation three partnership that you have proposed.

Generation one partnership indicates the one direction cooperation, where Korea has received capability from the U.S. through military aid. Generation two partnership indicates the cooperation that we have received technologies transfer through offset program or supplying the U.S. with Korean parts and equipment. Generation three partnership means the expanded cooperation that ranges from joint development to joint production and joint market.

In the presidential summit in April last year, the two heads of states agreed to further expand cooperation in in the field of security, industry, science, and technology, culture, and information, based on our alliance in values. In particular, when it comes to the – comes to the defense area, defense industry supply chain sharing, joint R&D for defense, science, and technology, and MRO cooperation have been well ongoing between the two countries.

If we integrate the critical source technology from the U.S. and Korea’s advanced production capability, along with the expansion of joint R&D for defense science and technology, a great synergy will be produced for the regional security. In order to respond to the global geopolitics mentioned at the outset, the U.S. Department of Defense has announced the first of its kind National Defense Industrial Strategy in this January. Also, RSF, Regional Sustainment Framework, was announced in May as well. These two policy updates in the U.S. Department of Defense have the respective purpose of achieving stable defense industry and robust operation and sustainment of the U.S. capability.

But its building block is the cooperation with allies and partners. Considering the current global situation, I would like to propose generation 3.5 partnership, which is the concept that includes joint operation and sustainment to generation three partnership that President Hamre proposed. So to speak, generation 3.5 partnership is the cooperation that the two countries jointly conduct, development, production, marketing, operation, and sustainment. In acquiring capability, Korea has proactively introduced the U.S.-origin capability, considering the ROK-U.S. combined training and its required interoperability. As a result, our accumulated know-how has reached a considerable level. And some of the common capabilities between the two countries are sustained and retailed in Korea.

The maintenance capability in Korea defense companies has been developed in accordance with the time spent for capability operation and our military’s requirements that always pursues the optimal condition expedited the modernization of facility and infrastructure. Adding to that, the application of cutting-edge technology, such as automation, AI, unmanned technology, is enhancing efficiency, reliability, and speed of procedures. As the significance of the Indo-Pacific region on the global stage is ever growing, Korea is ready to make a contribution to peace and security of the Indo-Pacific region, going beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Honorable President Hamre, Honorable Assistant Secretary Douglas Bush, all the distinguished guests and audience, this conference, cohosted by DAPA and CSIS, is the meaningful event where we cherish the ROK-U.S. alliance that has lasted for 70 years, based on our mutual trust, and discuss defense industry cooperation between the two countries. I truly wish that this conference will offer the perfect venue for defense industries of both countries to explore and implement ways to continuously sustain and develop the cooperation between the two countries for the sake of global peace and freedom.

Thank you all for being here today and taking the time to patiently listen to my speech. Thank you. (Applause.)

Dr. Cook: Thank you both for those inspiring remarks, which are really terrific in terms of setting the stage for some questions we have today, to really draw out some of these themes of cooperation that you have raised. I’ll start with a question to Secretary Bush, really focused on the current fight. We’ve seen that Russia’s war in Ukraine has dragged out over two years, and the lessons about challenges to the United States’ industrial base are still being learned. The Army has heavily invested in revitalizing its 155 ammunition production capacity. Can you share an update on this? What other investments is the Army making to modernize for future warfare, with the lessons from Ukraine?

Hon. Bush: So really there’s two efforts underway broadly. One is, as you mentioned, Dr. Cook, the effort to mobilize our industrial base to increase production capacity in order to support Ukraine, but also position us to replenish our own stocks quickly and also support our allies. Many of whom we – of course, our production flows to them, including Republic of Korea.

That effort – we are 6 billion and counting into just industrial investments by the U.S. government to allow for continued and expanded production capacity. That 6 billion’s flowing through the system. About 4 billion has been for 155. Two billion has gone to other things though that also are really important – Patriot production, GMLRS production, Javelin missiles, Stinger, and other precision munitions. So that effort is underway, on track, but is taking time but is broadly going well.

The other aspect of what we’re trying to do in the Army that especially contributes to supporting allies like Korea is our overall modernization effort to improve our Indo-Pacific capabilities, relevant to any fight where we will be supporting Korea. You know, we are already on the ground in Korea. We’ve been there for 70 years. And the U.S. Army is right there, shoulder to shoulder, the U.S. Army and our Korean allies.

But we are also improving our air defense capability across the board. We are improving our long-range strike capability across the board, new systems, our ability to fire ground launch Tomahawks, SM-6, our new PrSM missile. And then improving our ability to do air defense, both more flexibly for ourselves but also with our allies. So I think all those efforts meld together to position us to be able to do more fighting right there with our allies, like the Republic of Korea. But now we have to carry through on it. It’s going to be a multiyear effort. And it’s got to be sustained over time.

Dr. Cook: That last point is very important. And I appreciate your description of systems that will play in the Indo-Pacific region, which is not always seen as the Army’s fight, but it’s clear that it is.

Hon. Bush: Well, in the Republic of Korea it is absolutely the Army’s fight. We’re the ones on the ground right there. And if we go to war, our armies are going to be fighting right there together, like we’ve always prepared to.

Dr. Cook: Yes, side by side.

Hon. Bush: That’s a ground fight.

Dr. Cook: Yeah. Thank you.

Minister Seok, I’d like to follow up on that question with some reflections on your part. The Republic of Korea is half a world away from the European theater, from Russia’s war in Ukraine. To what extent are insights from Ukraine’s self-defense relevant to you, with the nuclear-armed threat on your own northern border? How are you translating these lessons into guidance for new capabilities, for ongoing acquisition programs, and for other related defense planning?

Minister Seok: (Through interpreter.) Korea is always trying to respond to the threats of North Korea. In order to do that, we are trying to have stable defense industry in order to secure advanced weapon system. And also, we are upgrading continuously our capabilities to improve our security capabilities. The recent Ukraine-Russian war has once again highlighted the importance of being ready and just in time defense capabilities. As a result, South Korea is promoting establishment of a global supply chain and expansion of strategic security partnerships with allies and friends as a way to build a more stable and comprehensive defense supply chain. And such efforts will be improved going on.

Dr. Cook: I appreciate your comments with regard to the global supply chain, and we’ll follow up on those in a bit. It’s clear that the industrial base is not just about the production of weapons, but the entire supply chains that go into ensuring that we have the capacity to deliver support to the war fighter that they need. So thank you for raising that, and we will get back to that topic.

Secretary Bush, along with Russia’s war in Ukraine there are a number of other global strategic concerns. China has been referred to as the pacing challenge. Along with your work in Korea, or with Korea, how are you preparing the army to deter any fight in the Indo-Pacific region? This is a big question.

Hon. Bush: It is. And it’s a big effort across the whole United States Army, of course, and the Department of Defense. It’s outside of acquisition – just acquisition. But one of the aspects of this production surge we’re trying to accomplish is to increase deterrence. We need bigger stockpiles of weapons. Our potential enemies, like North Korea, they need to know we have them, we are ready to use them, and we can mobilize our industrial base, working with our allies in an integrated way, to rapidly respond if aggression comes to our doorstep.

I think my hope is that in addition to just providing more weapons, this effort we’re working through, including with our allies, will help strengthen deterrence by showing that, you know, our industrial bases, when mobilized by appropriate political will and provided sufficient resources, are unmatched. The combined resources of the United States and its allies should deter anyone from taking us on. But we have to show we can do it. We have to show we’re prepared. And we have to show that we are tightly integrated with our allies so they understand it’s not just the United States being the arsenal of democracy, but working with allies so we have an arsenal of democracies – all of them with their own strong industrial bases that are fully integrated with ours.

Dr. Cook: Yeah. That’s a really great point. And I’m going to follow that up with asking Minister Seok to reflect on that a little bit. If the United States should find itself in an engagement with, or even really very, very focused on deterrence, in the Indo-Pacific region, working with allies in the region is going to be critical to success. There’s so many clear benefits to the war fighter, including the maintenance and repair of platforms in theater rather than sending them back to CONUS, to the United States. Where do you think cooperation is most promising, in light of the Republic of Korea’s foreign policy goals and very many industrial strengths?

Min. Seok: (Through interpreter.) In December 2022, South Korea announced the Indo-Pacific strategy on its own as a comprehensive diplomatic strategy to defend and promote universal values. This is in line with the U.S. strategy. The ROK Indo-Pacific strategy has nine major goals, of which the goal of expanding comprehensive security cooperation is to expand security partnership through defense cooperation. Like you said, specific areas for expanding defense cooperation are there. That include shipbuilding and MRO.

South Korea, as you know, is a powerhouse in the shipbuilding technology. It is excellent technology in vessel building and also maintenance. So based on this, we are going to continue to expand cooperation with our allies and friends in this field. This can also be applied to cooperation with the United States, which is promoting RSF policy, which is expected to open a new chapter in bilateral defense cooperation in this regard. And like you mentioned before, fighter jet and others, we can leverage – or, we leverage the technology from the United States already.

So the, for example, middle-grade fighters, such as trainers, on them we can continue interoperability. So I think we need more consideration in this regard. And also in a lot of field ground equipment we think that there’s a lot of room for cooperation. So vessel area is the top priority, and then aircraft, and also ground equipment. These are the diverse areas that I can mention in terms of the potential for future cooperation. And we’re also going to make efforts in this regard.

Dr. Cook: Support your statement that Korea has very strong shipbuilding industry, and is able to produce at scale, and has capabilities and capacities across a wide range of other weapons systems as well.

Secretary Bush, the U.S. Army plays a critical role in cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea, as mentioned – as you mentioned, on the ground, right there, right now. This partnership was forged in blood in the Korean War, which ended 71 years ago today. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the ongoing relevance of ground forces and artillery. It’s not just about space and aircraft and ships. It’s also about traditional ground warfare. What are Army acquisition priorities relating to the peninsula? And do you see any particular promising areas for co-development or co-production to support this generation three partnership?

Hon. Bush: Yes, absolutely. So and if you think of first in kind of traditional areas, that would be for the Army, you know, our helicopter fleet, our ground vehicles, our tanks, our, you know, artillery systems, infantry systems. In all those areas, Korea has a – Republic of Korea has an advanced, very technologically capable defense industrial base that can clearly support us logistically, including through maintenance of aircraft, for example, where we share fleets already. We already operate similar aircraft. That would make a lot of sense. But also in working overtime on production, cooperation, and sharing of resources.

However, thinking of future tech – it’s not just old tech, its future – this is where there are many areas for potential cooperation. Unmanned aircraft. We are trying to go as fast as we can to take advantage of drones and new unmanned aircraft technologies. We could obviously work together there. Also ground robotics, an increasing area of interest for the United States because of what we’re seeing in Ukraine. We want to make a major effort to have more ground robotics in our formations. And those two technological areas, undergirded by things like AI and advanced communications networks, those two together could both be critical areas of cooperation with Korea.

Ms. Cook: OK. I want to pull the thread on artificial intelligence and uncrewed systems. Oh. (Background noise.) OK. Tech break.

Min. Seok: (Laughs.) Go ahead.

Dr. Cook: So I’d like to follow up with just a little bit of a detailed question there, Minister Seok. If you could talk a little bit about how Korea is thinking about uncrewed systems, and any investments you care to share in those, or areas of potential fruitful work together?

Min. Seok: (Through interpreter.) Because of the equipment failure, I couldn’t hear the question. Can you repeat that, please?

Dr. Cook: I was following on Secretary Bush’s questions about uncrewed systems on artificial intelligence. Really, I wanted to ask you if you had any thoughts on how Korea viewed the future of these technologies. You are both responsible for production but also for identifying investments in new technology for DAPA. So how are you looking at uncrewed systems as sources of opportunities?

Min. Seok: (Through interpreter.) So for Korea, we’re faced with many different situations. We’re facing North Korean threats and we have very low birth rate. So it’s hard to have enough force, human resources. And with the fourth industrial revolution, we have to apply that to the weapon system and use that as a gamechanger in our battlefield environment. So that will help us deter wars, and that’ll guarantee our victory if there is a war.

So as of now, many – a portion of our budget goes to the unmanned weapon systems. And we also need a great deal of R&D in this sector. And we are making great deal of efforts in this sector. However, in the military science and technology, U.S. is very much advanced. And applying this science technology to produce weapon system, we need to be able to share it and use it together with the U.S. That’s why we need co-R&D, co-production, and co-sustainment, and cooperation. So we need to be able to cooperate in various sectors.

So all these manned and unmanned systems will replace our traditional systems. And in this sector, we don’t still have a lot of specific areas. But we need to still explore areas that we can cooperate, and we need to have great plans for this. Then, we will have very stable supply chains in that sector.

Dr. Cook: Thank you. Before – I do have another question for you, but I want to give Secretary Bush a chance, if you want to add on to any discussion of uncrewed systems.

Hon. Bush: Yes, of course. I think – working together, I think there’s a lot we could do there also, since we’re on the ground there together already. That would allow for our two armies to, you know, conduct experiments, try new technologies, and do other work that would let us get there further. I think, to the minister’s point about, you know, generation 3.5 and moving to a new level of interoperability and working together, if our defense industries can cooperate, and they are, even if they’re just teamed together closely, for example, on a new robot or a new UAV, that would be another way to, on the commercial side, advance sharing among our two defense industries on these critical areas.

The two together. You need the government and the commercial. Both have to proceed at the same time to have true interoperability. But I think there’s great potential for that. Chief of Staff of the Army General George has made networks, advanced communication networks, and unmanned systems his two lead areas of change for the U.S. Army right now. So that’s where we would be very interested in working more.

Dr. Cook: OK. Thank you. Minister Seok, we’d welcome your comments on that. I also have a question on the global value chain 30, which is the Republic of Korea’s new industrial base policy. A policy reflective of Korea’s role as a – really, a global defense industrial powerhouse. Can you talk a little bit about the goals behind this policy? Has your thinking about the global defense industrial base and defense industrial cooperation changed more recently, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

And in terms of areas for cooperation, one clear lesson from Ukraine is the importance of fires, including self-propelled howitzers and towed artilleries. Do you have thoughts regarding the direction for the development of artillery capability in the two countries, and whether this could be a good opportunity for cooperation? I recognize that’s a very large question, so please take it in the direction that you think would educate the audience the most.

Min. Seok: (Through interpreter.) So GVC 30 and its main goal is to uncover technological edge and advantageous SME countries in Korea, and nurture them into global supply component supply. And Korea’s SMEs can participate in the global supply chains and grow. And the global systems company can expand their own component supply chains and have a stable production capacity as a result.

And the Ukraine-Russian war has reminded us of the uncertainty of the international security environment. And if we don’t have enough combat readiness, it’ll be hard for us to have a stable operations, in that sense. That’s why many of the allies are supplying with multiple support, including munitions. So we have to take lesson from that situation. And we need to have a very stable supply chain amongst multiple allies and partners. And we need to be able to share or produce necessary supplies if there is a need. In that sense, Korea and U.S. need to cooperate in multiple sectors.

And in particular, the ground fire power area has great potential. Korea already has K9 artillery and Chunmoo. And these weapons are – thinking of purchasing these weapon systems, and some already purchased them. And U.S. is interested in this self and towed artillery. And they’re already modernizing this weapons system. But regarding K9 artillery, we already started upgrading our process so we can share our know-hows and experience with the United States. And if that happens, U.S. can save costs and can achieve the level of modernization in this weapon system.

So some of the projects that Korea is already doing in U.S.’ interest, we have many of these items outside of K9 and Chunmoo, so we can sort of have mutual awareness as to what we have and what we need, and we can think of how to cooperate in these areas, then it’ll help reinforce our defense posture and we’ll be able to contribute to stable supply chain establishment.

Dr. Cook: Secretary Bush, you have any follow-up comments there?

Hon. Bush: So I, first of all, yes, acknowledge actually the K9 system is a 52-caliber, 155-millimeter system, which is very advanced. In some ways more advanced than our systems, because, for example, it has an automatic loading capability. The U.S. Army is going through an evaluation of partner nations with systems that we may be interested in procuring ourselves to advance our goals. We still need longer range. The U.S. army needs range. We want to get that through weapon systems and potentially munitions.

And speaking of munitions, the Republic of Korea is one of our few allies that has the ability to do end-to-end production of artillery ammunition – the whole thing. Which is extremely important. They have it for their own defense needs, but we need to work together more to make sure we remain compatible and cooperate as we ramp our production up, that we are working together, for example, on, you know, making sure that as we ramp up we don’t interfere with Korea’s production for their own needs. These kind of lower level down cooperation things can make a big difference. And I think those efforts are underway, we just have to do it the right way.

Dr. Cook: That’s an interesting point. We think about cooperation as this big picture topic between senior leaders, but it also has to happen on the ground between, you know, majors and more junior civilians.

Hon. Bush: Absolutely. Often those conversations between the majors and lieutenant colonels and their civilian equivalents are actually more productive than the ones we have way up high.

Dr. Cook: (Laughs.) Minister Seok, you spent a number of years in the army yourself, or Major General Seok in this case. Do you have any thoughts on – from your career in terms of these conversations on a working level, and how those contribute to cooperation?

Min. Seok: (Through interpreter.) It’s not easy to answer your question that was just posed, but to be honest we have strategies and policies. And for strategy and the policies, we need to be able to agree on the big direction, then working levels can talk about it. For K9, for instance, that needs to be discussed at the working level. But at the higher level, or senior level, when we talk about that at the senior level, maybe co-R&D of the weapon system and how we can cooperate in that sector, that can be discussed at the senior level – the big picture sort of co-R&D.

So basically, from the perspective of Indo-Pacific strategy, we share values between the two countries. And these shared values need to be materialized and specified. And we need to have a task that can materialize these values. And we need to be able to agree on these specific tasks. Then we can have a specific roadmap that can be discussed at the working level. And we can discuss that and we can explore that more. Military experience is important, but U.S. and ROK militaries and defense industrial bases, we have so much potential for cooperation.

So we can further specify these areas and hopefully draw some road map for future cooperation amongst the two parties. Then that’ll help reinforce the defense posture of the two countries. And in a crisis, we’ll be able to have a stable fighting power, and we’ll have a great environment for our victory. So through these conferences, I hope that we can resonate and come together on these agreement, and that’ll be reflected on the policies. And then those tasks from the policy will be shared and supported at the senior level. If we can have that chain, then bilateral relation between the two countries will further advance.

Dr. Cook: I appreciate your remarks about this conference and other senior leader engagements as important to strengthen the alliance and set the stage for every member of our communities to work closer together and follow this guidance to enhance cooperation. One of our – one of the United States’s new policies that highlights cooperation is, of course, the National Defense Industrial Strategy.

Secretary Bush, we know the NDIS highlights the importance of working with allies and partners as an important line of effort in one of its four lines of efforts. And the goal is to ensure that the industrial base is robust enough to meet the nation’s and the warfighter’s needs, and to allow us to fight together with our allies. How is the Army taking this advice, this guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the service, to the Army, which is more directly related in industrial base and acquisition planning? How are you working to make sure that the goals of the NDIS come to fruition in your Army acquisition program?

Hon. Bush: Sure. So I’ll give you two kind of lines of effort. One is thinking about the security of our supply chains. And security comes in many forms. One of them is, you know, we have global supply chains for our defense industry. And we need that. And it needs to be, though, shifted in some cases to ensure that it’s from our allies.

So we need not just the best, perhaps lowest cost source of a material or an item, but it needs to be from an ally we can trust, like the Republic of Korea, and that takes appropriate measures to secure that, and is also taking measures to protect their companies, to make sure their key defense industries are healthy and supported. So there’s a security aspect of what we’re tasked from the NDIS to do, which the Army is moving out very quickly on, particularly in the areas of munition production, but also electronics – two sensitive areas and important areas where we want to make sure that we are only buying components and supplies from locations and allies we can trust.

The second part of it is the business-to-business, I would call it, aspect of working together. And this is where us acquiring Korean systems would pay a huge benefit. You know, us buying their systems and incorporating them into our weapon systems, or buying entire weapon systems, is enormously – helps, because it strengthens those supply chain bonds. And also being a good partner when Korea decides to procure our systems, such as helicopters or CH-47 helicopters, for example, that we deliver on time, on cost, you know, on schedule. We work with our defense industry to make sure the business aspects of our relationship are fruitful. We can’t just source that out to a defense industry. We have to actively manage that to make sure we’re being good partners.

So the two together – security and just deepening our ties – are probably our two main efforts right now. And our work with Republic of Korea, we are already deeply integrated. So we’re starting from a strong place. I think we can just only get better as we adopt more systems they have, or source key things from them, to help us be a more productive industrial partner.

Dr. Cook: Thanks. I’m going to ask Minister Seok about the same question. And then I think we should touch on the regional sustainment framework and sustainment as well. So I’ll give you that hint so you can think about that.

Minister Seok, the National Defense Industrial Strategy, as Secretary Bush was discussing, it supports a global production web concept that strengthens relationship between the United States and its allies and partners. The ROK is also exploring cooperation, including with Japan, and building on relationships with other southeast island – Southeast Asian and Pacific island nations. So can you talk about the role for partnership and sustainment in these relationships? You know, both with the United States but also with other allies and partners in the region? How are you working to build on the fact that Korea is such a strong defense industrial producer and such a strong democracy in the region, to bring these capabilities across the across your borders to the region?

Min. Seok: (Through interpreter.) Republic of Korea, as you know, since the Korean War from United States we got a lot of military aid. So we do have the self-defense will. Based on that, we have established our capabilities. Korea is surrounded by not only North Korea, but also other powerful countries. So we always need to have this readiness to respond to any risk. So in order to do that, we on our own need to have the defense ecosystem related to military procurement. That was important for our survival. And as a result, recently, as you saw from the Ukraine war when there was a lot of crisis surrounding that, Korea – such country that has this defense ecosystem. Now they all recognize that Korea has such ecosystem, because of such crisis.

So what we see is that when a certain country – it is very difficult for a country alone to deal with everything that’s required. When you have this weapon system used in the battlefield sometimes it can be broken, sometimes it can be destroyed, sometimes it requires maintenance. And to support that you also need ammunition and so on. So especially during the battle time, it is difficult to support all of that. So in case of U.S., not only in Atlantic area but also in Indo-Pacific area, this country is doing a lot of growth. So the U.S. has established a lot of military capabilities for that.

So under such circumstances, in order to have such capabilities to be exercised, you also need some MRO capabilities, and so on, to support that. So under such context – well, as Soviet Union collapsed, well, there was some peace era. And much of the defense ecosystem has evolved in a different way or weakened. But now we have this new kind of threat. And the role of the United States is expanding. And also other powerful countries are also trying to improve their defense capabilities. And they’re also taking on defense industry very importantly now.

So, you know, for the United States to play such diverse roles in this area, having such weapon system and to support the United States to do that, I think such a stable supply chain and component supply are very important, mostly coming from many allies and friend countries. That’s very important. But in this regard, I think we are now just beginning our discussion on this. And so, like, the vessels, or aircraft, or ground equipment in many diverse areas, I think, we need to explore options for cooperation.

And we need to move quickly on that, I think, because recently, as you see, Russia, North Korea, they had a summit talk. They met in Pyongyang. And also – that also has a lot of implication to Indo-Pacific area. Meaning that Russia is paying more attention to the region. So I think – and Korea is also feeling a lot of threat. And we need to prepare a lot for that, to respond to this. So in this regard, Indo-Pacific – in the Indo-Pacific region I think our two countries need to cooperate further. And among such cooperation that, I think, will include defense industry cooperation, like because we share a lot of ecosystem based on such interoperability.

I think on key components and others, we can do more mutual support going forward, and we can have a sharing system. And also on diverse weapon system, Korea has a lot of advantages and benefits. And also U.S. has its own benefits and advantages. We can combine these benefits so that we can go for a success in this area. So more than ever, such a stable cooperation in defense industry and also stable supply chain establishment are important. And cooperation of the two countries in this regard is very important. And we need to find out areas for potential cooperation going forward. And I think this conference will be the beginning point for that.

Hon. Bush: So, Dr. Cook, if I could, and Minister Seok, that last point about working together more on maintenance and repair. So that’s not the part of acquisition that often gets as much attention. It’s not as flashy as buying and developing new weapon systems. But it’s actually where the big money is. For the United States, 70 percent of the cost of most weapons systems is in sustainment, repair, and maintenance over time. Anything we can do in theater with the Republic of Korea to reduce those costs for the United States is, of course, beneficial from that regard for the U.S. Army and our other services, but it has that terrific side benefit, though, of increasing our depth of commonality in terms of repair parts, being able to work together, battle damage and repair, as the minister was stating.

So I think that’s an area that probably needs more attention. And it’s an area where it’s in some ways easier to cooperate, because you’re doing maintenance on new weapon systems – or, maintenance on existing weapon systems, often when we’re operating the same ones. So there is great benefit potentially there, both to save money but also to achieve all the goals that the minister was outlining.

Dr. Cook: Can you offer any sort of broader reflections on that key point, with regard to the regional sustainment framework and that new policy?

Hon. Bush: Absolutely. So where we’ve done it successfully around the world the benefits are manifest. First of all, local defense industries and our partner nations benefit from having work experience fixing U.S. equipment. All that sets the stage, for example, for being ready for war. We have a lot of those arrangements in Europe. For example, with Poland, one of our big allies there, and with Germany. But we want – we should be able to clearly be able to do more of that with our allies in the Indo-Pacific, in particular with Republic of Korea.

So that’s why I wanted to emphasize that that point is probably really ripe for more work. Because you get kind of best of both worlds and you’re really preparing for combat. If we are fighting there, we are going to have to repair equipment in a sustained conflict. Being able to do that and having practice doing it – from ship repair to aircraft, for example – is really kind of a combat rehearsal. That increases deterrence and increases readiness. So there are – there are many benefits, not – including saving money.

Dr. Cook: So I am tracking 100 percent. I have appreciated that, you know, as unfortunate as Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine is, it has illuminated and resulted in investments in some industrial base challenges. Are you seeing any insights – similar insights with regard to logistics, with regard to maintenance, repair, overhaul, et cetera?

Hon. Bush: Well, the importance in a – I really am not a fan of the term “contested logistics.” I would just call that war. (Laughter.) The importance of having things forward with our allies on the ground in place, rather than having to rely on very long supply chains back to the United States – especially in a conflict. Building up those stocks, repair parts, repair capability, ammunition stores is both deterrence but also would help overcome fighting a sophisticated enemy who attacked our supply chains and our – and our supply routes.

So, again, it’s really a win-win. And it helps ensure that we have things right there where we need it on the ground, not kind of just in time arrival, you know, kind of – you know, a concept that we should just wait to do it till the conflict starts. You can’t wait. You have to do it now. You have to practice it. And that logistics cooperation is as essential a part of preparing for war as training together on how to fight.

Ms. Cook: Minister Seok, I’d like to open the floor to you to follow on with any thoughts on sustainment, on logistics. You have your threat, your clearest threat, right at your northern border. So, you know, the supply chains are not quite as long. But there may also be some insights and lessons that you have from that, along with thoughts on the RSF.

Min. Seok: Well, thank you. Well, actually, Republic of Korea and United States are strong alliance partners. And so far, it was mostly about, like, combined forces, like, training. And so it was, like, a limited time for joint training. So we didn’t really pay attention to maintenance. We didn’t have time, and, you know, space to do that, because it’s a very short period of time. We are starting with this prepared weapon, prepared resources, prepared military forces. We do this joint training. So we didn’t – we’re not really prepared for this long-term war, like Ukraine war. And we couldn’t really foresee that there can be this kind – we knew theoretically, but we couldn’t really feel that there can be such difficulties in maintenance and repair and operation.

But through the experience of Ukraine war, we now know that we do really have these local problems. So when we do have this combined operation, what are the things that we need to prepare? We’ve got a very important lesson on that. And also, each country, while they are all, like, are being ready with resources and other things in response to potential war, but when you actually have a battle the companies that are local cannot be fully prepared. They can be destroyed. They don’t have the full capability. So maybe it may not go as expected.

So as a result, what we see is that we have limited combat power in the end. So we have such challenges in the field. So this is not something that one country can handle alone. So maybe friend countries, allies, if they can share that together I think that way we will be able to complement our vulnerabilities. And also, I think we need to be quick on preparing such system. Like you said, well, United States armies and other forces, they come to Korean Peninsula doing the training when there is no, like. equipment or resources. Then if we can locally manage that MRO locally, then we can do it right immediately, begin that again.

However, if we need to – if you need to put that back to the United States and repair that and come back to the Korea, that would take a lot of time. So well, like, in terms of this protracted war and everything, I think we understand the importance of such, like, local MRO and other things. However, in this – like so far, however, I think it was kind of dwarfed by joint training and other important issues so far. So I think now on Indo-Pacific area and then also the Korean Peninsula, to make it more stable and safe, I think other than the joint training we also need to focus on, like, securing stable supply chain and cooperation system.

And for the security in the Indo-Pacific area and Atlantic region, it cannot be separated, according to our president. So Korea’s capability can contribute to the security in the Atlantic region, and exporting our weapons to Poland and et cetera is to prepare against a possible crisis in terms of a crisis there. And those materials can flow back into Korea later on. So the entire area in the world is networked. And if we can send intensive supply and support to the region that has a need for it, then the area will be further advanced through the cooperation of the ROK and U.S. And both country need to feel the sense of urgency in this area and need to make more effort. Thank you.

Dr. Cook: Direct response, Secretary Bush.

Hon. Bush: I would say I couldn’t agree more. I think the more American allies and the more of democracies that have advanced production capabilities and advanced systems they can share with our other allies – the minister mentioned Poland – that’s only a good thing. We need, again, an arsenal of democracies where everyone has advanced capabilities and we all can share in the burden of collectively defending our values. It has to be now shared. It’s not just the United States, nor should it be. It needs to be all of us working together, all of us with advanced capabilities. That’s success. That is – that is an opportunity. That is not a problem for the United States. That is only a benefit.

Dr. Cook: So that production web is key here, where it’s not just the U.S. at the lead, but it’s our allies and partners working together.

Hon. Bush: Absolutely.

Dr. Cook: Yeah. Minister Seok, I just want to applaud you for recognizing the new challenges that we see based on Russia’s war in Ukraine, including the unexpected length of the war and the fact that Russia is targeting Ukrainian weapons manufacturing locations. So this is a bit of a sobering thing to reflect on for a future fight. And it does remind us of the importance of this production web.

I’d like to follow on something that was raised in opening remarks about the Security of Supply Arrangement, which the U.S. and the Republic of Korea recently concluded. Are you starting to see benefits of that agreement for enabling cooperation and for the balancing of both countries’ immediate needs, that both of you highlighted? How are you seeing that in your – in your work? Has it realized itself yet, or is it a work in progress?

Min. Seok: (Through interpreter.) Yes. Earlier, Russia is attacking Ukraine’s manufacturer facility to weaken Ukraine’s operational capability. So it is natural for Russia to go for that. And that was very expected behavior by Russia. So these production base, when these are destroyed we need to have a sustained production base to replace that. And we need allies and partners. We need to talk to them in advance, to share their supply chains before this crisis happens. And we can complement our vulnerabilities that way.

Regarding SOSA, so far we don’t have any specific or tangible results. And we need to work on it more going forward. In order to implement the arrangement, Korea is explaining more to our defense industrial bases, so that they can take advantage of it more going forward. At this stage, though, we don’t know what tangible benefits we are seeing. And it’s hard to answer that clearly. But we agree on the overall benefit and direction of the SOSA. And we just need to have a more implementation sort of strategy on that. Thank you.

Hon. Bush: So I think what that agreement – it’s the kind of framework agreement that highlights the deeper cooperation. One thing that comes to mind, though, and why you have to have such agreements, is fundamentally being able to do more between our defense industries requires sharing more information about our systems with each other. So the United States needs to be more open, frankly, with our key allies. That agreement is a part, an example of trying to do that, to where we are more comfortable sharing detailed information about our systems so we actually understand them fully and can cooperate more.

We are trying to – Department of Defense is trying to move from a, you know, approach where it’s kind of withhold information first, as our first instinct with our allies, to share information first. That needs to be where we start, and then we adjust from there, because this detailed information about our weapon systems is really the only way to actually get to the work on the ground, people turning wrenches, people repairing aircraft, building ships, working together. You can’t do that without a level of trust and an ability to exchange information. So I think that agreement is a part of a larger department effort to position us to share more information with our allies so we can do more things like this.

Dr. Cook: OK. Thank you. Minister Seok, I hope you are seeing an increase in these signs of trust from the United States when you work with us. So we just have a couple of minutes left. And in order to leave time for a round of applause, I would like to ask both of you if you have any final reflections, additional thoughts, comments on where you see the future of the partnership, and how you are working to help nurture it and make it grow.

Secretary Bush.

Hon. Bush: Sure, I can start. I think – so, you know, I am here just representing the U.S. Army. But we are already, again, deeply integrated already on the ground. Our industries need to be more integrated. Kind of like our militaries are very integrated, we need our defense industries to be integrated in the same way. I believe there is going to be more of that, simply kind of based on the power of the market. There are advanced companies in the Republic of Korea that have technology that we want to incorporate into our systems to make them better.

There is also, for example, manufacturing technology. You know, one of – you know, the Republic of Korea remains one of the world’s powerhouses of manufacturing. We need in the United States to learn from that. And as we try to rebuild a lot of our manufacturing capacity, we need to learn from and share technology from our allies who already are really good at that. So I think it’s not just buying each other’s things. As Dr. Hamre said, we got to move to the next level. I think the government role there is to facilitate cooperation. But at the end of the day, often our defense companies have to cooperate.

So that’s where us pushing from the government, creating forums for cooperation, letting our respective companies and defense industries just do what they do best, which is develop new technology, manufacture things at scale, and then do it in closer cooperation with each other. I think that will bear even more fruit than the existing strong government relationship. So I think – I think that is really the unexplored, or less explored, area that Dr. Hamre’s referring to, and Minister Seok was referring to, where we need to push more. But we need – we have a role in government in facilitating those things. We have to help our defense companies work together to do more, from production to maintenance and repair, as the minister stated.

Dr. Cook: Thank you.

Minister, you have the last word.

Min. Seok: (Through interpreter.) Based on a very strong alliance between the two nations, we share many values and we agree that we share those values between the two nations. So for us, we need to think about what we need to specifically do to materialize those values. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, either with combined exercises or supporting for our companies, we need to have stable supply chains. And that is important. And we need to push for that direction. However, in doing so we still have subtle policy and cultural differences between the two nations. And we need to make compromises in those sectors for bigger cooperation. If we can do that, we can easily push for what we’ve envisioned.

As I said during my keynote, we always had the U.S. by our side, and we were able to achieve the free democracy thanks to the U.S. And as a member of global community, we would like to do our responsibility. And we would like to contribute our capabilities to U.S. strategies and materializing those strategies of the United States. So in that sense, all the discussions we had will be able to materialize what we think. But time is not on our side. So we need to really move fast.

And I’ve been talking about the U.S. systemic issues and our differing opinions, and how to eliminate these obstacles between the two nations. And if we can discuss more and compromise more, and we can think of each other more, then we will be able to achieve what we want to achieve. And if we can do that, we’ll be able to materialize our Indo-Pacific strategies, and both nations will be able to play a proper role in the region. And I really hope that we can cooperate together in that aspect. Thank you.

Dr. Cook: Thank you very much for that inspiring statement.

1. We are now at time. And I would – we have a short break coming up. First, I would like to ask for a round of applause for our panelists. (Applause.) Thank you.

(Break.)

Gordon Lubold: Good morning, everybody. Hi. My name is Gordon Lubold. I’m a reporter with The Wall Street Journal. I cover national security and foreign policy here in Washington. And I’m delighted to moderate today this great panel. I think what we’re going to do is have some brief opening remarks from the two good folks on my left, and then presentations kind of a little bit more from the other three. We’re here really to talk about, broadly, U.S.-ROK relations, but particularly in terms of aligning industrial bases and kind of maximizing the alliance to help both sides in this age of competition. We can get into more stuff later. And I think we’ll have some opportunity for questions from the audience later, and I have some questions. But I think we’ll start here.

Jed, yeah.

Jedidiah P. Royal: Gordon, thank you so much. Hopefully the mic is working OK, you can hear me all right. Thank you, first, to CSIS and to DAPA for continuing this relationship, continuing to bring us together to talk about these really important issues. We really appreciate that in the Pentagon. We get a lot of insights out of these engagements. And so I’m sure we’ll have much to take back after hearing from my panelists – my fellow panelists today. Great to be here with all of you.

Earlier this month at the Shangri-La Dialogue Secretary Austin talked about a new convergence in the Indo-Pacific that’s leading to a more resilient and more capable network of partnerships. This developing network of partnerships is emerging in a deliberate and purposeful manner that is all about solving key problems.

In some cases, we may face an interoperability problem, so we’re designing exercises to improve the connectedness of our militaries. Or it might be a problem of awareness, so we are fielding equipment and software to our partners so they can better see what is moving in and out of the exclusive economic zones or their own territorial waters. Or it might be a problem of capacity, so we’re looking to improve co-production with partners, and we’re designing our security assistance programs to close key military gaps. So what you are seeing with this new convergence is a very practical, tactile implementation in the form of force posture agreements, multilateral exercises, improved interoperability, and beyond.

At the very core of this is a foundation and a commitment to collaboration. We know that collaboration is the answer, and the defense industrial base is no different. Strengthening resilience in our supply chains collectively will undoubtedly further invigorate the potency and durability of our defense relationships. So one thing you may have heard in Secretary Austin’s speech at Shangri-La is the U.S. endorsement of a multilateral statement of principles for Indo-Pacific defense industrial base collaboration. The principles that he sketched out have some really defining characteristics.

One, we need to put resilience at the top of the list. That maybe has not been the frame that we have used in recent years past, or even recent decades past. That needs to be at the top of the list going forward. Two, we need to understand and empower the comparative advantages of those who desire to partner together for this goal of defense industrial resilience. Our partners have a lot to offer, and it will be important to tap into those natural advantages they have. So we need to explore those, understand them, and then employ them. And three, we need to capture the incredible opportunities associated with developments in academia, commercial enterprises, and scientific advances. This approach will guide future bilateral and multilateral defense projects, including through greater research and development collaboration and by finding new sources of materials, processing, refining, assembly, and even maintenance.

Twelve nations have now endorsed those very same principles, and they’ve also agreed to establish a contact group for defense industrial base resilience focused on the Indo-Pacific. My team and our partners in the acquisition and sustainment group at the Pentagon have been working closely together on this project. We’re calling it the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience, or PIPIR for short. Always need a good acronym. And we’ll be sharing lessons learned and best practices with one another on this multilateral level. But most importantly, we will talk about emerging opportunities to improve the strengths of our industrial bases.

Our goal with these efforts is to unlock these new sources of supply, as well as manufacturing and engineering talent of this pivotal region in ways that will support the United States, our allies, and our partners. This will increase purchasing power of the U.S. defense budget, provide greater assurance in critical supply chains, and drive improved readiness. And just as importantly, it will further embed the new convergence already happening in the Indo-Pacific in increasingly practical ways.

That’s a bit of a long wind-up to make one key point: The U.S. and the South Korean partnership is absolutely foundational to the success of the entire region. And that’s true both on a bilateral and on the multilateral level. Both are critical to meet our own military requirements and to improve the conditions for security in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. And the U.S.-ROK alliance has made recent strides in this effect, particularly with the security of supply arrangement that we signed last year. The SOSA, as we call it, will help mutually reinforce our supply chains to get defense resources that our forces need very quickly and very efficiently.

Streamlining close industrial cooperation and enhancing the alliance’s standing as a high-end security partnership also allows us to support the ROK’s vision to increase its contributions in the Indo-Pacific and as a global pivotal state. Sustained partnership with a technological and manufacturing powerhouse like the ROK allows us to sustain our domestic defense production here in the United States.

And the work we’re doing with the ROK exemplifies how we are working hand in hand with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific and beyond to build a dynamic, innovative, resilient, and productive defense industrial base. For decades, the United States has been the world’s most dependable partner of choice for defense development. Work like this is about keeping it that way and improving the Indo-Pacific for future generations across the board.

Gordon, I’ll leave it there. Thank you very much. Look forward to our fellow panelists.

Mr. Lubold Thanks, Jed. Thanks so much.

Stacie.

Stacie Pettyjohn: OK. Thank you so much to CSIS for inviting me here, and Dr. Cook. It is a pleasure to be on this panel.

I’m going to step back and sort of broaden the aperture a little bit in terms of explaining how we got in this situation where we are today, where industrial base cooperation is so important and so critical, and why we’re unprepared for the threats that we face in the modern world. And part of this is we ended up being lulled into complacency in the United States, I think, after the Cold War ended. And we ended up not producing as many weapons as we needed, and we underestimated the intensity of modern warfare.

And what we’ve seen with Ukraine and in other places in the world is that high-intensity conflicts consume an enormous amount of material, especially munitions. As the international community has tried to support Ukraine, it’s become clear that our existing stockpiles are too low and that our defense industry cannot surge to meet the demand, even collectively. Therefore, one of the areas that I’m going to argue that we need to really focus on is precision-guided munitions, and munitions more generally. The other is drones, which is another topic near and dear to my heart. I just released a report last week, “Swarms Over the Strait,” and had one previously on Ukraine. And I think these are two areas where our industrial bases could collectively work together to help to improve both countries on the commercial technology side, as well as the military-specific technology side.

So how did we get here? You know, the Cold War ended. We had the brief, brilliant war in the Middle East with Operation Desert Storm against Iraq when it invaded Kuwait. And this convinced everyone that we had technological superiority, and that you could use better capabilities, these precise weapons, to have outsized effects. And that we’d be able to win very quickly. And that you could win without actually having to defeat another country’s army. And that’s proven not to be true. If countries decide to fight, they can dig in for a long time, especially if they’re great powers. And that is what the United States is focused on preventing from happening by preparing for it today.

So as the U.S., with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, really highlighted the threat from China and then the acute threat posed by Russia, while recognizing persistent challenges like North Korea, Iran, terrorism. And is centered on finding a way to deepen integration, not just across domains and within our own forces, but with allies and partners. And a key part of this is industrial base cooperation. And I think it needs to go beyond where we have been in the past in terms of simply having co-production agreements where we assemble weapons in each other’s countries. We need to think about how we can leverage each other’s strengths, compensate for each other’s weaknesses, and also strengthen our supply chains instead of stretching them.

And this will deepen our interdependence, but we’ve seen that we need to do this. You look at the world today – my boss and a colleague, Richard Fontaine and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, had an article in Foreign Affairs recently about the “Axis of Upheaval.” You’re seeing that aggressive states like Russia, North Korea, and China are cooperating. And that they are supporting each other in ways. So we need to actually – those who are opposed to aggression – support each other in very concrete ways.

We need to revise our planning assumptions in terms of what our requirements are for weapons going forward, whether they be PGMs, whether they be drones. And we need to really begin investing in them, because one of the things that we found that we need to be able to do, and where weapons technology has moved, is that precision – let’s see if I can talk – precision is now widely available. That’s what you’re seeing in Ukraine with drones. Cheap commercial drones are allowing the Russians and the Ukrainians to have very precise effects with unguided artillery. This is true across the world. We face problems with the Houthis in the Middle East and the Red Sea and the Iranian attacks. And these allies are trying to sap our inventories of air defenses, which are another type of key missile that we need to be investing in.

So going forward, I really like this PIPIR, this resiliency idea that Jed mentioned. I think there’s a dramatic need for deepening co-development of new technologies, co-production of existing weapons, so that we can meet the demand for countries in the world right now, spanning different regions for weapons that are being used in Ukraine, but also the types that might be needed in the Indo-Pacific, and then shared sustainment. This is an area that’s getting increasing attention but is incredibly important when you think about increasing the availability of different weapon systems. And also really strong signal of combined resolve that will strengthen deterrence and give any of the states that might aggress pause to think about it, hopefully so they never go down that route.

So I’ll end there.

Mr. Lubold: Great. Thanks for those framing remarks. It really does help us to kind of get our heads around why we’re here today, and what we want to talk about.

Scott, I believe you have your – our first presentation. You could get the clicker and I guess – yeah, so we can look at it over – OK, hopefully.

Scott A. Sendmeyer: First, thank you for the opportunity to come today and speak about our department’s first National Defense Industrial Strategy. I think my colleagues did a great job setting the stage for why we needed this document and the need for, as we’re saying, just establishing a guiding vision for our national defense industrial base. I worked in the office that was responsible for publishing and drafting and then – drafting and publishing this document. It was a pretty ambitious endeavor that we set out on last summer and we were able to publish this January. And we currently are working on the implementation, which I’ll talk about a little bit later on.

So as I mentioned, you know, really all about taking the things that we were already doing, guiding those things that we’re going to be doing into the future when it comes to the industrial base, and then setting out what we thought were the most important aspects that we needed – the most urgent need of attention in our – in our defense industrial base. Intended to be very comprehensive in nature, in that it’s not just the department. It is the entire enterprise.

We’re looking at this to be a three-to-five-year timespan for this document, roughly. Of course, aligned well with our budgeting and resourcing processes. I will say also nested very well underneath the National Defense Strategy, especially in the building enduring advantage portion. Really put lots of thought into how we enable those enduring advantages that are identified there, and then build on the idea that we can’t do this alone. It’s going to take cross government, cross international partners, our allies and partners, Congress, to accomplish the goals that we set out here.

And part of it was also really trying to change the dynamic of the relationship between the department and industry from a very transactional. Say, this is about a partnership amongst us in industry. It’s a partnership between our partners and allies’ industries. And that’s the way we can receive the – we can reach the point of resiliency, capacity, and responsiveness that’s needed in our defense industrial base. As I mentioned, I’ll briefly talk to implementation at the end of the brief.

Quickly, just to take you through. You know, Stacie did a great job highlighting some of the growing challenges that we’ve identified and the atrophy that occurred to our defense industrial base over the past several decades. And that was really the focus of where we ended up on the four priorities that we did – namely resilient supply chains, the workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence. From there, I’m going to take you through each of the priorities, but the idea was then to identify what actions are needed in the near future to counter those challenges and reduce that risk, and then also how we would then go forward in identifying what are the most pressing matters to inform resourcing decisions for the department as we move forward.

So, quickly, just an overview of the four priorities. I’ll give you a moment to read that. But while you’re doing that, what I’ll say is these are in no specific order. We kind of see these as equally and – equal in importance. However, we’re very cognizant of the fact that achieving effects in each of these priorities is probably not operating on the same timeframe. You know, probably can make relatively quick progress in resilient supply chains. A lot of work to be done there, but action being taken already is making progress there.

Whereas workforce readiness is probably more of a generational problem. It’s going to be needing to be solved both domestically for us but also, as you heard our Republic of Korea counterparts say this morning, they have their own workforce challenges. And transitioning that workforce of the past, of those dirty, dark and dangerous jobs to the high-tech, high-end needs, the STEM needs that we have in our defense industrial base today.

So as I mentioned in each of the priorities we broke it down into discrete actions that were identified as needed in our – needed to achieve effects in these priorities. I will say, as – especially when it comes to resilient supply chains, as you heard Honorable Bush say this morning, you know, the Republic of Korea already is a substantial – is very substantial in its own right when it comes to its defense industrial base. And the contributions that we can make collectively between each other in this priority are probably the most applicable between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea.

One, just an extra capacity in that we can identify gaps in our – each of our supply chains, that we potentially could fill for one another. Two, Korea is unique in that it’s one of the other nations that has a national stockpile of strategic materials. So joint or combined planning, at least considerations for that stockpile planning. When it comes to diversifying the supplier base, especially on new production methods. You know, we need to take advantage of each other’s advantages in advanced manufacturing and apply those advantages across both of our defense industrial bases.

On the leveraging data analytics, I can tell you the department is extending substantial resources and time and doing a deeper dive into our supply chains. And there’s probably an element of collaboration and cooperation that could be gained there by shared understanding of each of our supply chains and the global supply chain writ large. You heard a lot of talk this morning between Minister Seok and Honorable Bush about the importance of our partnership, the expansion of production, and the increased resiliency across our defense industrial base and our military weapon systems.

I would argue you can almost – it would be rough to – it would be tough to find a more compatible, more interchangeable, more interoperability between your services and our services. And I think the opportunities to expand that even further are easily there, which goes into the foreign military sales process. You know, great, great opportunity for expansion of that, both from foreign military sales perspective, but also in direct commercial sales.

On the workforce readiness, won’t spend a whole lot of time here, but what I will offer is, you know, although this is very much domestically focused in our strategy, there’s nothing to be said that we could not take lessons learned, best practices across both of our industries, and apply those into each other’s defense industrial bases. Just to highlight a few of the items that we’re looking to do internally, you know, really a promotion of those industrial careers, making people understand that, you know, to be successful you don’t necessarily need a college degree.

And there’s great opportunities in our defense industrial base. And that’s at the manufacturing level, but also all the way up to the advanced engineering and innovation levels. And that’s where that requirement for those STEM requirements comes out. So great efforts being done in terms of increasing our apprenticeships, both from the department perspective but also working with industry to support and expand their apprenticeships programs. And then really focusing on nontraditional communities and recruiting into the defense industrial base to meet the workforce needs of the future.

Moving over to flexible acquisition, I think there’s opportunities for collaboration and cooperation here, especially when you look at the strength and requirements and process curb at the top. So discussions on our part, in terms of as we develop our requirements for future weapon systems, or even modifications to existing ones, making sure that we’re bringing our partners and allies in early and that we’re building those requirements into that at the start rather than after the fact, where it’s much more difficult at times – and much more costly, for that matter.

It also then, on the back end, as you heard Honorable Bush say, when it comes to sustainment, building that in early also enables future sustainment of that. You heard me briefly talk about data – data analytics and expansion of data. So a lot of that is reliant on or dependent on the increased access to that data. It also goes to the point that they made earlier on intellectual property. And our ability to share and license that property is the only way we can really reach the production goals that are needed. (Coughs.) Excuse me.

And the last one I’ll speak to just briefly is on broadening the platform standards. This is really focused on the innovation side of the house, and very early on opening up the sharing of information and incorporating the best technologies into our systems as they’re being developed. And that can only be done through more collaborative intellectual property sharing and open architecture frameworks. Lastly, another area of relative opportunity when it comes to Republic of South Korea and the United States, and that’s on our economic deterrence front. What I also say on this priority is this is one that the department really sees as we are probably more reliant on our other partners than internal to the department ourselves.

Yes, we can do things internally, and are already doing things internally, but we’re really reliant on the interagency and then those collaborative efforts across our allies and partners to ensure that we’re, you know, establishing enforcement standards when it comes to adversarial capital, potentially adopting shared prohibited sourcing policy. As you heard them speak this morning, none of us want to have adversaries on our supply chains. And we need to reinforce that mutually between us. Really trying to press for greater involvement of the U.S. in standard setting bodies, especially when it comes to AI, space, and communication. And then lastly, you know, expanding on our agreements when it comes to economic security agreements. You know, the SOSA that we discussed earlier is just the start of those opportunities.

So as you heard me mention earlier, this is really all focused on the idea that we’re trying to buy down risk in our industrial base. We’ve identified 25 actions against the four priorities. And if you’ve read the strategy, there are a multitude of risks that we’ve identified that are threats to our industrial base. And as we develop our assessment framework for the strategy, that’s what this is really focused on, is how do we mitigate those risks and what are the measurements of both performance and effectiveness that we need to look towards to make sure that we’re making progress towards these priorities?

And as I mentioned before, on implementation. So we have been working since publication on developing implementation for the strategy. In the very near future, you’re going to see a release that basically looks from time now backwards of the things the department has been doing already and is continuing to do that support the strategy. Following that, later this summer you’ll see a version – an unclassified version of the implementation plan for the strategy that takes all the efforts that are ongoing across the department, the services, the interagency, and industry, and demonstrates how they are complementary to one another while also identifying how we’re going to assess that progress moving forward.

So, again, thank you for the opportunity to talk about our strategy. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. Lubold: Tremendous. JinA, please.

JinA Park: Good morning, everyone. I’m JinA Park, director of Defense Industry Advancement Support Division at DAPA of ROK. I didn’t expect to visit Washington D.C. again after my family trip about two years ago, but I’m thrilled to be back in this gorgeous city, even though this is for a different purpose this time.

It’s truly an honor to be here today and give a presentation. I will discuss the measures for Korea-U.S. cooperation to stabilize the supply chain of weapon system parts. The presentation will cover the following topics: Trends related to supply chain stabilization, and mutual efforts between Korea and the U.S. to stabilize weapon system supply chains, and, lastly, enhancing support for the entry of Korean SMEs into the global weapon system supply chain.

The first part is trends related to supply chain stabilization. OK. In recent years, the stabilization of global supply chains has become a critical issue, due to various factors such as COVID-19, the Russia-Ukraine war, and Israel-Palestine conflict. In high-tech fields like semiconductors and core materials, we are experiencing competition in technology and production capabilities, so we often face supply demand instability or imbalance in this advanced technology sector. Additionally, there is an emerging need to build environmentally sustainable supply chains as a measure against climate change. For these reasons, supply chain issues are increasingly becoming a matter of national security, beyond just the economic necessity.

The United States, under the Biden administration, immediately implemented measures to inspect the supply chain of core manufacturing industries. The report concluded that resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains are necessary for national security across several major U.S. industries. Based on these findings, the U.S. is promoting various supply chain policies to expand the supply bases domestically and with allied countries for advanced technology industries.

Since Japan’s export restriction on semiconductor materials to Korea in 2019, Korea has been continuously strengthening the competitiveness of materials, parts, and equipment industries. We have enacted laws such as Basic Supply Chain Act and are managing items essential to economic security. In addition, the government has selected 12 national strategic technologies for intensive investment. These are semiconductors and displays, secondary batteries, advanced mobility, next-generation nuclear power, and so forth. The government plans to invest a substantial budget in these fields over the next five years. On the defense side, we are also fostering companies in these high-tech, strategic industries as well. I will provide more details about this later.

The next part is mutual efforts between Korea and the U.S. to stabilize those weapon systems supply chain. In November last year, Korea and the U.S. signed SOSA. We have agreed to mutually prioritize and support industrial resources for the stabilization of supply. chains between the two countries. If one country requests a priority for a specific contract, the other country will directly grant priority or ensure that the contracting company fulfills the priority request. Korea is also taking necessary measures to implement the SOSA agreement with the United States.

Moreover, following the joint statement of the RDP-A MOU in May 2022, Korea and the U.S. are discussing the signing of RDP agreement. This agreement is expected to lead to rationalization, standardization, and improvement in interoperability through mutual opening of Korea-U.S. defense procurement market. Despite concerns in Korea about opening our defense procurement market to the U.S., which is superior defense technology, cooperation is needed in a way that can expect fair mutual benefits, not only through mutual trade but also by promoting joint development and production to form a reliable supply chain.

1. Furthermore, we are continuously working toward the third-generation defense cooperation, which include joint development, production, and marketing between Korea and the U.S. An example of this cooperation can be seen in the development of a hypersonic missile defense system in the United States, while Korea simultaneously develops related materials and component level products. Together, we can produce an integrated system and even conduct marketing efforts to third countries. As I know, we will propose another project of this type of cooperation in the next session, to be held in this afternoon.

Korean companies are also participating in the U.S. foreign comparative testing, FCT program, with recent selections, including LIG Nex1 guided rocket for a manned surface vehicle in 2022. We hope to see more Korean companies in high-tech strategic industries, including in the FCT program through ongoing collaboration. This picture shown here is from the 2022 FCT team to Korea. DAPA is strengthening the investigation and management of the weapon system supply chain, so we implement annual investigation of weapons system supply chain and build an alarming system based on the information of parts supply chain.

Also, we are promoting the cutting-edge industrialization of the defense industry to prepare for the future battle environments. We have selected AI, drones, robotics, semiconductors, and space technology, as the five major fields of high-tech strategic industries for intensive cultivation. We provide systematic support from entry into the defense field to product development, certification, testing, and marketing, aiming to develop world-class defense SMEs. This picture describes five major defense high-tech strategic industries to prepare for the future battlefield. And the next picture shows the support measures by the Korean government for each stage of business growth of defense SMEs.

Lastly, this diagram illustrates various support programs by the Korean government to assist the defense SMEs in entering domestic or international weapon system supply chains. The last part is enhancing support for the entry of the SMEs into the global weapon system supply chain. The Korean government is supporting the enhancement of technical capabilities and product competitiveness of SMEs, so that technologically advanced Korean parts or component can participate in the supply chains of global system companies. Then SMEs can export their own products worldwide. Meanwhile, the government provides SMEs with information about global system companies and utilizes the offset obligation of foreign system companies contracted with the Korean government. This would also help our SMEs enter global supply chain.

The GVC 30 project is a new initiative being undertaken by DAPA and carried. We analyzed the competitiveness of Korean SMEs weapon system parts, components, or equipment in 15 technological field, while also examining the supply chains of global defense companies to support the matching of mutual cooperative companies. By utilizing the Global Biz Matching System developed by KRIT, we will analyze and match companies and then create opportunities for Korean companies and global system companies to meet and conduct detailed discussions through events like Global Matching Day.

Based on this, we aim to support the development of parts or components by Korean companies and facilitate their participation in the global supply chain by utilizing the offset trade system. The Korean government plans to assign a higher value multiplier to the offset trade in this case, compared to others. A considerable number of U.S. companies would be included in these global system companies. Through this project, we expect to nurture globally competitive parts companies and contribute to stabilization of supply chains in both countries. We request your interest and support for mutual cooperation with the GVC 30 companies supported by the Korean government.

We seek your assistance in reviewing the technologies or products of GVC 30 companies and arranging opportunities for discussions on their participation in the supply chains of U.S. defense companies. Additionally, we request that Korean companies be considered for participation in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base Consortium, the IBC, to undertake joint project. We hope that the partnership between companies from both countries will enhance mutual defense capabilities and contribute to strengthening supply chains. Furthermore, if you could set up a Korean pavilion and provide promotional opportunities, such as participation in the local programs at AUSA, for introducing the GVC 30 project and enhancing defense cooperation between our two countries.

This is a diagram of showing the booth layout at Sea Air Space Exhibition, to show the Australian booth as an example. And these two pictures show many programs run at AUSA. We hope to see many Korean and U.S. companies meet and communicate in this wonderful setting, fostering close cooperation for a stable and resilient weapon System supply chain. It’s all I prepared for my presentation. Thank you for listening.

Mr. Lubold: That’s tremendous. Thank you so much, JinA. Han, if you would then go. And just please, and I think just so we have enough time to get a few questions in, if you could try to keep it a little bit short, and so we can get through it and make our 12:30 deadline. Thank you.

Han Seung Jae: (Through interpreter.) Thank you. I am Sung Jae Han. As many people have emphasized, cooperation and resilience is very important. Because of the Ukrainian war, that requires a lot of consumption of weapons, and fast delivery was more difficult than expected. Well, historically, when there’s a collision among powerful nations, usually the war was very protracted. The First World War was more than 50 months, and Second World War also was 60 months and over. So if we predict such warfare, I think the bottleneck will only intensify. On the other hand, China and Russia, these rival nations of the United States, they are also going through similar pain points. So if – in this liberal bloc – if we do have enough stockpile, and if we are ready to use them, I think we can have deterrence effect. So in a nutshell, I would say that capacity equals deterrence.

If I talk about Russia-Ukrainian war, advanced weapons, including drones. are actively leveraged. But you can also see that not just advanced technologies from new technologies, actually the production capability is becoming more important. In the beginning, Ukraine seems to be on the superior side because of the technological advantage. However, as time goes by, Russia also fastly adopted drone technology. As a result, now the two sides are having drone production capability competition. So the production capability, having advantage on that, is still very important under this era – in this era of advanced technology.

At the same time, for the security of the United States going forward, we think production capability will stay important. Republic of Korea, we are aligned with such strategic interests of the United States. In all areas, we are one of the partners that have the interoperability. So I think it is time for us to improve our cooperation between bilateral industries, going further so that we can close the gaps in security. For this goal, the two countries, I think, have some potential ideas.

First idea is having institutional cooperation. In 2023, we signed SOSA. So we need to designate the companies that will implement that. And also, secondly, I think we need to have more customized G2B cooperation. So RDP-A or SOSA, through such we can have more fast and effective implementation of that. Recently, the two country FCT program, we have cooperation projects to intensify the depth of our cooperation.

However, I think we have room for further intensification. Recently United States, DIBC OT system and also the DIO and Singapore Defense Ministry arrangements are good cases in point. And also Korea, DIBC OT is – wants to be one of the DIBC countries. And also we are willing to cooperate – intensify our cooperation in this regard. Such system will exempt Korean companies from some barriers in participating in this market.

And also, lastly, we can have more cooperation fields. I think ally is about friends indeed and in need. So if you know what your friends are in need of, then your cooperation can intensify further. I think Republic of Korea, like I mentioned, there are five new areas that the Korean government is focusing on. Especially we have the Defense Company 100 Project, where we are nurturing more defense companies. NDIS by U.S., or NDSTS, if you look at those documents you can see that it overlaps a lot with the five major areas that Korean government is focusing on, which includes robotics, drone, and semiconductors.

The two countries, in order to have better cooperation, we need to expand our spectrum of cooperation. Recently, DOD NDS or NDIS, through such documents in defense cooperation, it emphasized the importance of partner and allied countries. I think that will be the foundation of national competitiveness. And also, it will be a good way to have deterrence against risk from enemies. Like President Roosevelt said, every machine, every arsenal, every factory. He said that. So all the defense companies need to exercise its full potential, so that the United States can play the role of arsenal of democracy.

I think we need to add every alliance as well to his saying. Alliance is, I think, similar to football games. You need to play your role sincerely. Only then you can have success. I think the ROK-U.S. alliance, through such close cooperation, like in football, like Jerry Rice and – (inaudible) – you know, we need to have such co-working. If we can do that, I think we can have stronger alliance even. Our institute will do our best so that the bilateral industries can be flourished, based on our support. And also we’ll make sure to have the supply chain that is reliable and trustworthy, based on which we hope that our alliance will go – become more robust. Thank you.

Mr. Lubold: How about we – I would like to just kind of ask a broader question that touches on everything that I think everybody’s talked about a little bit, but Stacie and I were talking a little bit earlier. Is, how do you – how do you deepen the defense and industrial base relationship between the two countries, but also allow competition to flourish? As some of you alluded to, you know, obviously South Korea has a robust competition and sells a lot of exports, a lot of weaponry and the like. The U.S. needs some of that, as we saw with the purchase of the ammunition for Ukraine recently. But basically, how do you deepen and also navigate competition?

Dr. Pettyjohn: Oh, I didn’t realize I set myself up for that.

Mr. Lubold: You did. You totally did.

Dr. Pettyjohn: But it’s not an easy question that I have a clear answer to. But I think, you know, we both have, and fully support, having the private sector being strong. And competition is a key part of that. I do think there needs to be some discussion at higher levels of government about whether there are different roles and responsibilities, like we were talking about in certain areas, and maybe aligning certain markets and certain capabilities, and saying that’s going to squarely be the focus of what you’re doing, and we’re going to focus over here, so we don’t duplicate too much.

Though resilience is important and does require redundancy, right now, it just seems like the need is so great that everyone can actually do well because there are so many countries out there who are trying to bolster their defenses because they realize that they hadn’t prepared adequately, given the magnitude and scale of the threats that we face globally.

Mr. Lubold: JinA, do you want to try to answer the same question? How do you navigate – how do you deepen the relationship, while also navigating natural competition between the two countries?

Ms. Park: (Through interpreter.) First of all, in order to do cooperation, I think it’s important to know each other. While in Korea, with GVC 30 project, we are leveraging Global matching – Biz Matching system developed by the Institute. Through that, we are trying to see the competitiveness of our companies and evaluate that. And we’re also trying to see what the global weapon systems are in need of. So we’re analyzing the needs as well. So we’re looking at two pillars together to match the supply and demand. So our government is trying to do that. So the two sides need to be able to know what are each other’s competitiveness and what are the needs of each other. Only then I think we can have more proper direction in our cooperation.

Mr. Lubold: Jed, can you just kind of give us a couple, like, practical examples of what you see as more of this deepening relationship? I’m really kind of struck by the opportunity potentially for American ships to get more maintenance there. The tyranny of distance is very clear in that region, as you well know. But that’s just one example. But what should people think this looks like, as it deepens?

Mr. Royal: Yeah, thanks. Maybe I’ll just touch on the previous question briefly as well, which is that I don’t think we want at all to minimize the – all the benefits we get through competition, fair market competition. That will continue to be the case. I think the question for us is, has that fully provided for all of the requirements that we have, given the recent history of international insecurity that we’re facing? And there, the question is, can governments apply the same level of organization, and orchestration, and commitment that we that we have in the strategic space, in the political space, and the policy space, to the defense industrial space?

And I don’t think it’s actually much. I think a little bit of organization and orchestration actually has a – goes a very long way to simply accelerate what will naturally happen in the market anyway. And so if we get after these comparative advantages, understanding where one nation has a real opportunity to provide and where others have real needs, we can actually accelerate the way that that that marketplace naturally works over time. That’s really, I think, what we’re talking about here.

On the practical examples, thanks for bringing up sustainment. This is going to be a really important area going forward, in my opinion. Kudos and hats off to our acquisition and sustainment colleagues who have built a new regional sustainment framework. We know from working with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command that in this region we have a real operational requirement for forward sustainment. That’s on a variety of platforms and systems. And as we think about the character of competition as it unfolds, and also as we think about planning for crisis and conflict, where do we want hubs for sustainment of critical systems that will, in the very first case, impact deterrence – that’s what we’re after – but in the event of crisis or conflict, how are we able to rapidly sustain U.S. allied and partner systems that might require that?

So think ports of entry, embarkation and debarkation. We need to make sure that they have the kind of capabilities necessary for rapid sustainment. Air hubs, missile hubs, for sustainment. All of those things require a collective thinking and a mapping process of where physically, geographically, do you want those areas? And we know that Korea has some tremendous capability in this regard, that I don’t think the United States has fully taken advantage of. We need to be better at doing that and thinking our way through what Korea provides, again, not just for us and for Korean systems, but for others in the region as well. And vice versa. There will be other areas where we need to sort of think our way through this. So I think that’s a great area to think practically about this issue set.

Mr. Lubold: Han, do you have any view of, from your standpoint, about what this looks like? Kind of basically the same question I just asked Jed.

Mr. Han: (Through interpreter.) I also want to take one example. One of the thing I saw in the presentation is that the Korean companies, they have this unmanned rocket system developed. So we participated in the FCT program. I think LIG is participating in that. If you look at that background, you can see that in order for the United States to counter Chinese, you also need this unmanned version, so that they can respond to the firearms of Chinese, so then we can also counter the main vessels of China later on.

Usually, they call it, like, distributed maritime operation. I don’t know exactly in English. So you see, I think you need a lot of unmanned watercraft. It’s not only just to consume that. It also needs to have some power to combat LIG 2.75, this ground rocket is now – can be embedded in this unmanned watercraft and supplied to United States. I think that kind of cooperation is possible bilaterally.

Mr. Lubold: In a few minutes, I want to grab one or two questions from the audience. But, Scott, just I wondered if I could ask you to expand a little bit more on the resiliency issues. Nobody knew anything about this until COVID hit some years ago, and now we’ve got supply chain issues because of all these different conflicts, or whatever. But could you give us one example of a challenge in this regard? Like, I guess, kind of a specific example? And then how you briefly see kind of the road ahead to kind of deepen or strengthen that supply chain?

Mr. Sendmeyer: Yeah, I’ll try. So and I’ll try and incorporate a couple of the different priorities in, because I think it’s a decent example and it gets at the adversarial sourcing – the fact that we have global supply chains. We saw the challenges that came out of COVID-19, whether it be because of distribution or production. And frankly, as you just alluded to a few minutes ago, the demand is such that lead times are just growing longer and longer.

So a good example that we’re working through right now is, you know, we look to try and remove – a good example is rare earth element magnets – as we try to remove them out of our supply chains. An area that China has a dominance in the market on, low cost, relatively low risk to our systems in terms of integrity or confidentiality. But when it comes to availability, you know, at time of crisis – and you’re already seeing it now with some of the tariffs that they’re putting in place, or export restrictions – we’re being faced with greater supply chain restraint. And leveraging all those capabilities globally amongst our partners, who have some of the processing capabilities, potentially have existing mines that they’re already drawn out of that maybe those materials are being sold to China for processing.

You know, these are – these are long solutions that have to be put in place. But it gets to the solutions that we’re getting after, as Han mentioned, in terms of DIBC OTA, and that investment vehicle, to be able to target those investments towards the capabilities that are required to fill those gaps in the supply chain. Whether it be way down – way upstream in the supply chain, at the raw material, or even, as we were discussing earlier, at the component or part level and coproduction. It doesn’t have to be, you know, end-material, end-item coproduction. It could be component, where we have, Stacie mentioned a great example earlier, solid rocket motors. Where we have a clear need and a greater demand than we can meet. It’s a great opportunity for our partners and allies to fill those gaps. And, you know, the Republic of South Korea is well-postured to do so.

Mr. Lubold: Great. Can I open it up to the audience in our last few minutes here, or whatever? Who’s got a good question? Sir.

Q: I am – (off mic). I am the director of the North America cooperation division for the DAPA.

So, actually, the NDIS – I have a question for Scott Sendmeyer. Actually, NDIS is focused on the global resilient supply chain stability between the allies and friendly countries. So, as you mentioned in your presentation in advance, the U.S. will announce the NDIS implementation plan in summer. So I’m just wondering that you can find some detail, the specific area, the cooperation – industrial cooperation area between the U.S. and South Korea, or another country, in in the implementation plan.

Mr. Sendmeyer: I could try and point out few areas without, you know, letting the cat out of the bag. You know, of course it’s going to be organized under the framework of the strategy. So really working towards showing the complementary effects across these multiple programs that are ongoing in the department, and the demands that we’re putting on both industry and our partners and allies. The other aspect, I will say, is – and not giving it all away – but there are six implementation initiatives that the secretary and the deputy secretary have identified as the items that they see most pressing, urgent, must be addressed, and they expect our components to come back and tell them how we’re addressing them and how do we address them in the future.

To not go into strict detail, but you can, you know, understand that one of them would be focused on the INDOPACOM region, and what are the aspects and this the operational requirements that are needed – adjustment in the defense industrial base to meet those pressing needs? Areas that you see in the strategy but are echoed in the implementation in terms of greater cybersecurity of the defense industrial base. And not only our defense industrial base, but our partners and allies because if we expect to share greater intellectual property, we got to make sure that it’s assured protection of it. So those are just two examples that you’ll see. But honestly, within days you will probably see the – as I mentioned – the backward-looking report. No promises, but it’s already in staffing. And then towards the end of the summer, you’ll see the unclassified version published.

Q: Thank you.

Mr. Lubold: Anybody else have something burning they’d like to ask?

We’ll wrap up here in a minute. But I’d just – it’s kind of an obvious question – but I am interested in maybe brief responses from anybody who wants to jump in, but just, you know, the subtext of all this, as I say most recently, are of these conflicts, particularly Ukraine but also in Gaza. (Coughs.) Excuse me. What has – what has South Korea learned from those conflicts, in terms of the need to strengthen all the stuff that we’re talking about today? But what is – what have you learned in Seoul, in the context of those conflicts? JinA, go ahead.

Ms. Park: (Through interpreter.) Based on the recent conflicts, like, through relationship among allies and partners, we understand now that securing supply chain is very important. And also, at the same time, like, technological control among countries are also on the rise. We also realize that, and we now learn that we also need to be prepared for that. So among the allies, in cooperation of course they’ll put their interests as top priority. However, at the same time, we also need to share their own strength with each other, so that they can contribute to each other’s growth and development.

And under such circumstances, we think that we can have more synergy. And also we can have more broader perspective in this cooperation, to have more effective and faster progress. For example, in case of United States, in advanced areas United States have strength and South Korea not only technology, but also we do have strength in our production capacity. And also we do have some areas with technological strength. So if we can share that together, and for our cooperation, I think that will be great for our success. And I think that will be the right direction for cooperation. And we also need to be prepared for that. That’s one of the lessons we got.

Mr. Lubold: That’s actually a great way to conclude, but, I mean, anybody else want to jump in along those lines? Yeah, please.

Mr. Sendmeyer: Maybe I’ll just endorse – fully endorse this comment. (Laughs.) Which is that the greatest lesson coming out of the conflicts we have is that friends matter, alliances and partnerships matter. Aggregation of political commitment all the way down to materiel issues, operational understanding, matters. And that has to be shared fluidly, quickly, responsively to any of the emergent crises that we face. And there’s a ton of lessons. Maybe just one more lesson, which I think came up earlier, maybe, Stacie, in your comments, was that mass still matters as well. So in the age of precision, in the age of innovation, mass still matters.

And so, how do we couple those that the – the precision and the mass – in a manner that really complicates the adversary’s defense calculations? And I think that’s really where we’re on the cusp of right now. When you combine the alliance and the partnership aspect with mass and innovation together, I think the opportunities are just really terrific – particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. And so we’re going to do everything we can to try and generate this in Washington’s instruments of power, the ability to go and prosecute those opportunities and get after them as quickly as possible.

Mr. Lubold: Sounds great. Please join me in thanking our panel. And everybody have a great day. (Applause.)

(END.)