Decisionmaking at the Speed of the Digital Era
Photo: Royal Malaysian Navy/U.S. Navy
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The Issue
The United States has stated it is in a strategic competition with China. Analysts and actors identify the need to rapidly iterate through concepts and capabilities to develop new, more effective means of engaging in that competition. At present, however, the Department of Defense underutilizes publicly available data and the software development community to build tools that enable faster modeling, hypothesis testing, and variability analysis than traditional wargaming or modeling alone. This brief describes the speed and utility of developing a simple software tool to stress test a hypothetical People’s Republic of China (PRC) surprise attack against U.S. facilities in the Indo-Pacific.
Introduction
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is reminding the world that missiles can help militaries achieve objectives even when ground and air forces are kept far away. The degree to which Russia’s strikes are steadily destroying Ukrainian targets highlights the importance of considering how such weapons may shape the conduct of future conflicts in Europe and in other regions.
The Biden administration’s national defense strategy, still classified and with only a brief summary available to the public, identifies China as the United States’ primary security concern. Even as the Department of Defense (DOD) talks the talk of preparing for future conflict, it is far too resistant to adapting the systems or picking up the pace that served it well for the 30 years since the end of the Cold War.
The past 10 years have seen a steady cadence of reporting on highly classified and time-consuming wargames showing that the United States consistently “loses” to China. The results, easily summarized as “bad!,” lack sufficient publicly available detail to enable informed debate on how best to resolve the potential shortcomings.
Wargames that are classified or complex can offer benefits to policymakers, though frequently to a small number of highly technical individuals; however, open-source analysis and DOD’s own publications create a wealth of information which can—and should—be closely analyzed to encourage DOD leaders, lawmakers, and the public to consider how best to prioritize limited resources, including money, time, and personnel. Combined with simple and affordable modern software capabilities, this information should be leveraged to improve and focus more time-intensive wargaming efforts.
Photo: Greg Baker/AFP/GettyImages
That is why, over a six-week period, the authors developed a relatively simple and low-cost tool to assess what might happen in the first hours of a potential future conflict in the Western Pacific. The model assumes China conducts a surprise missile attack using only its land-based People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF). Drawing on DOD’s annual China Military Power Reports and available data on PLARF operating locations, organization, and capabilities, the study team created an algorithm to compute the most likely U.S. and allied targets along with a rough assessment of the operational consequence of such strikes.
Despite an initial hypothesis that, “it won’t be that bad,” this analysis suggests that early phases of a conflict could be very bad for U.S. forces and facilities in the Western Pacific.
Methodology
Leveraging publicly available data on PLARF ranges, operating locations, and inventories, the study team created a model for PLARF capabilities able to engage in a first strike against U.S. and allied facilities in the Western Pacific and as far away as the continental United States. Those facilities were drawn from previous work and imagery analysis and included locations, runways, headquarters facilities, missile defenses, and estimates for other forward-deployed forces. First, the algorithm calculated which U.S. and allied bases were in range of a given launch site (the model does not currently account for the mobility of PLARF assets). Then, the team assessed a value for each site based on the total U.S. capability and capacity there as well as the likelihood of the strike disabling or destroying its target (mission kill). Finally, the algorithm iterated through launch sites and potential targets to determine the optimal combination of missiles and targets to maximize the PLARF’s ability to neutralize U.S. forces.
The program offers users four scenario choices for a PLARF first strike on U.S. and allied bases in the Pacific. From most to least expansive, scenarios would allow the PLARF to
- Strike at any base within range of PLARF missles, including Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and the lower 48 states;
- Strike bases in the Pacific, excluding the lower 48 states but including Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam;
- Strike bases including Guam but excluding Alaska and Hawaii; and
- Strike bases not in U.S. states or territories.
Limits
This program and the resulting analysis are a proof of concept for digital decision modeling and are not intended to be a definitive answer to exactly how PLARF assets might operate. Several assumptions were necessary to develop this initial prototype, but they may limit the utility of the current program to assess risk. These assumptions include the following:
- PLARF missiles are assumed to be 100 percent accurate.
- The missiles target fixed U.S. facilities rather than U.S. assets.
- PLARF assets are all assumed to be static.
- U.S. missile defenses are accounted for in a very rudimentary way.
- The model assumes no prior warning for U.S. or allied forces.
- The United States receives no benefits from space or cyber capabilities.
In addition to addressing some or all of the above limitations, additional refinement—or built-in flexibility—could offer both greater confidence in assessments and means for conducting sensitivity analysis across a range of variables. For example, within the program’s constraints, the importance of a submarine base in the Second Island Chain is roughly 10 times higher than that of a command and control node in the same area. Such a value was analytically useful to ensure the code ran correctly. Refining those values or allowing the user to define those values, however, would enhance the exercise’s utility and increase decisionmaker confidence in the outputs. Similar assumptions are present at several points in the program.
It is important to note that the program excludes PLARF locations believed to be nuclear sites (green stars) from the analysis. This was based on a judgment that a nuclear first strike—whether plausible or not—would lead to a different scale of U.S. response and so was not helpful to analyze. There is some uncertainty in the open-source literature about which PLARF missile locations are purely conventional or purely nuclear. Because of the ambiguity, there is a chance that the program assigns a nuclear site to strike a U.S. base. Dual-capable bases and assets are assumed in this model to fire conventional warheads as a “worst case of the best case.”
Results
Employing the scenarios described above, and subject to its limitations, the software provides results that can be reviewed and analyzed. The first (including the lower 48 states) and second (including Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam but excluding the lower 48 states) scenarios returned the same results, as the PLARF did not target bases in the continental United States. The third scenario (including Guam but excluding Alaska and Hawaii) resulted in a shift by the PLARF to attack U.S. facilities in Busan in lieu of attacking U.S. bases in Hawaii. The fourth scenario (excluding any U.S. states or territories) reallocated PLARF missile locations from striking Guam to striking U.S. facilities in Misawa and Yokota.





