Last week, Russian technicians began moving fresh fuel for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant into the reactor building, where it will be loaded into the core in the coming weeks. The German firm Siemens began the project 35 years ago, and the Russians have been completing it for the last 15 years. Iranian officials have hailed Bushehr as a victory for the Iranian people.
 

Periodically, even updates on Bushehr’s progress have sparked press articles about the feasibility, desirability, and even inevitability of bombing Bushehr. Sometimes it’s suggested that U.S. forces target Bushehr, other times it’s Israeli forces. Last week was no exception. But bombing Bushehr would not slow down the Iranian nuclear program, and it certainly wouldn’t eliminate it.
 

The reactor—though the most visible sign of Iranian nuclear progress—is not the most threatening aspect of Iran’s push to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Iran is also enriching uranium, building a heavy-water reactor, producing heavy water, and dabbling in reprocessing-related technologies. All of these are so-called sensitive technologies that have direct applications for making fissile material for bombs.

 

Conventional wisdom is that nuclear power reactors do not pose a proliferation risk. Civilian nuclear energy couldn’t exist if we believed otherwise. The Bushehr reactor is designed to produce electricity, not bomb-grade plutonium. And compared to production reactors and uranium enrichment facilities, such nuclear power reactors fueled with low-enriched uranium certainly are less attractive for making fissile material for nuclear weapons.
 

But that’s not to say it would be impossible. American scientists proved decades ago that a workable nuclear weapon can be made with plutonium from a civilian nuclear power reactor. So, what exactly is the risk?
 

Bushehr is inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that any material going in or out of the reactor is not diverted. In addition, Iran is obligated by an agreement with Russia to send the spent fuel back to Russia, eliminating the possibility of a buildup of plutonium that could be diverted at some point for weapons. But if Iran were to kick out inspectors—in effect, withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—there is little doubt that the Bushehr reactor would be recruited for producing plutonium for weapons.
 

This risk—the “break-out” scenario—exists for all states that are party to the NPT. The stakes are higher with respect to Iran, since it has already acquired many other sensitive nuclear technologies to help make a stockpile of nuclear bomb materials.
 

Talk of bombing the Bushehr reactor raises all kinds of geopolitical, legal, and military issues. In theory, it should also call into question our assessments of how risky nuclear power reactors are. But it won’t, for at least two reasons. First, nuclear power is riding on a wave of enthusiasm for “clean, green, and secure” energy sources. More than 50 countries, many of them in the developing world, are now interested in acquiring nuclear power. In fact, if all states followed through on their proposals to build nuclear power plants, the number of reactors worldwide would more than double in the next 20 years.
 

Second, proliferation “problems” are often handled on a case-by-case basis, rather than implementing widely held principles. This ad hoc approach doesn’t always work and very often becomes hostage to other foreign policy and national security objectives. Making exceptions to rules can be costlier in the end (witness Pakistan). Even in clear-cut cases where a country breaks a global norm, individual states’ interests are sometimes hard to align to create a consensus for response.
 

The “case-by-case” approach relies on an unspoken assumption that some technologies are okay for some states and not for others. This is unsustainable in the long run, particularly if the number of countries with nuclear energy doubles. Nuclear supplier states face a real, long-term policy choice. Either we beef up international safeguards and/or institutional arrangements (like multinational control of sensitive technologies) to the point where we can afford to be indifferent about who acquires technology, or we should stop promoting nuclear energy as the prize it has so clearly become.