How Does Latin America and the Caribbean View the Ukraine Conflict After Three Years of War?

Three years into the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine, the conflict appears at an inflection point. The new U.S. administration of President Donald Trump has pledged to end the fighting and take the first steps toward negotiations with Russia. U.S. allies in Europe and beyond have, in turn, found themselves taken by surprise and decried what they see as a U.S. posture that is overly favorable to Moscow and potentially disastrous for Kyiv. For countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a region which has, with few exceptions, sought to avoid taking strong positions on the conflict, the prospect of a ceasefire or peace agreement raises new questions, as well as opportunities for the region to assert itself on the global stage if it can take them.

Q1: How has LAC’s relationship with Ukraine evolved throughout this past year?

A1: As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches its third anniversary, LAC nations continue to show divisions over their stance on the conflict. Allies like Chile recently approved a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and endorsing President Zelensky’s peace formula. Alongside Argentina, both countries have supported international efforts to return Ukrainian children abducted by Russia through the “Bring Kids Back UA” project. Others like Colombia have endorsed the region’s traditional neutrality in international conflicts and have called for dialogue between Russia and Ukraine. At the G20 summit in Brazil, Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro advocated for direct talks between both nations “without intermediaries.” In a November meeting in Moscow, Colombian Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo reiterated the country’s willingness “to contribute insofar as they request it” in facilitating diplomatic discussions between Russia and Ukraine.

Brazil’s President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, alongside China, proposed a six-point peace plan as an alternative to Ukraine’s peace formula. This proposal emphasized an international conference involving both Russia and Ukraine but failed to address Ukraine’s territorial integrity or demand the withdrawal of Russian troops. Lula’s plan, which was perceived as alignment with Russia, was strongly rejected by President Zelensky as “destructive.” Nevertheless, Lula promoted the proposal at the 2024 UN General Assembly, where over 20 former LAC foreign ministers signed a letter calling for Russia’s suspension from the body.

Differing perspectives among LAC leaders were evident at the peace summit held in Switzerland last June. Despite a strong LAC presence, the region’s divisions over the conflict weakened its influence. Russian allies Bolivia and Cuba boycotted the summit’s final declaration, while Colombian President Gustavo Petro pulled out at the last minute. Brazil and Mexico also withheld support for the final statement on the grounds that Russia needed to be included in the discussions. “We cannot address a bilateral conflict with a meeting by only one of the parties and expect to resolve the problem,” Brazil’s President Lula said at the time. In contrast, Chile’s President Gabriel Boric strongly condemned Russia’s invasion, emphasizing that “international law and human rights is a fundamental principle for our coexistence.”

Q2: What has been the reaction of LAC to potential peace negotiations between the United States and Russia so far?

A2: The U.S.-Russia talks on a potential peace agreement in Ukraine have prompted a murmur of concern among some LAC leaders. Colombia President Gustavo Petro decried the U.S. “betrayal” of Ukraine and Europe, while Brazilian President Lula da Silva expressed concerns about the potential sidelining of Ukraine in current talks. It is hard, however, not to see these criticisms lacking something in the way of teeth, as both leaders have consistently rebuffed Ukrainian efforts to enlist their support for peace negotiations.

On February 17, Mexico’s newspaper MILENIO hosted an interview with Ukraine’s Ambassador to Mexico, Oksana Dramarétska, who emphasized that Ukraine will not accept a peace agreement in which the country is excluded or treated unfairly. These sentiments have struggled to find an audience in Latin America, where key countries such as Brazil and Mexico have echoed Russian talking points, undermining their credibility as potential interlocutors. Instead, they have opted for an observant and cautionary stance. A few reasons might lie behind Latin America’s reserved approach. First, the velocity and rashness with which events unfolded might have left regional leaders with insufficient time to maneuver or react thoughtfully. Within the span of roughly a week, the frenetic pace of Trump’s first weeks in office has abruptly shifted from tariffs and deportations to a call with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. LAC leaders might be opting for a wait-and-see approach to gauge the seriousness of Trump’s intentions. After all, standing up against Trump’s moves may jeopardize their relationship with the United States and put them in the president’s tariff crosshairs.

Second, President Trump decided to exclude Ukraine itself and European leaders at the first round of talks in Saudi Arabia on February 18. This has made LAC leaders wonder if they have any role at all to play in negotiations. Finally, the measures enacted within the first few weeks of the Trump administration have left the LAC region with their hands full. From handling deportation and the freezing of foreign aid to tariffs on steel and aluminum and most recently, the suspension of immigration applications for LAC nationals. Now that the focal point of Trump’s foreign policy agenda has turned away from LAC, potentially risking the momentary reprieve by speaking up may not be the most desirable line of action. However, as negotiations seem to move quickly, the question of when pro-Ukrainian LAC leaders will speak up and stand loyal to their previous statements becomes increasingly pressing.

Q3: What are the potential gains for LAC from a negotiated ceasefire?

A3: A just, lasting, and negotiated peace is still a long shot between Russia and Ukraine. However, if it can be achieved, LAC could benefit in various ways from such a scenario. Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has witnessed LAC retreat into a position of nonalignment and hesitancy. Many countries have expressed a desire to remain neutral—despite foreign policy traditions privileging the use of international law to remedy power disparities and the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity—and others have feared Russia’s control of strategic economic sectors or the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns. Still, others have cited Western hypocrisy related to Israel’s war against Hamas as their reason for remaining neutral.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has snarled global supply chains, introduced a complex maze of overlapping sanctions, and accelerated the drive for economic resiliency birthed during the Covid-19 pandemic. Since 2022, this has thrust several LAC countries into a difficult spot. For instance, agricultural powerhouses Argentina and Brazil are reliant on Russia for approximately a quarter of their nitrates and other ingredients for fertilizers. The need to import these items, the importance of agroindustry, and the growth driver it represents for the economies of both countries reduced their strategic autonomy with respect to Russia’s war in Ukraine. (Arguably, Brazil under President Lula was closer to Russia’s position anyway.)

Countries in LAC have made geopolitical decisions to benefit from the tragedy in Ukraine as well. Brazil, for instance, became the single largest importer of Russian diesel in 2024, a decision that appeared purely geopolitical given that Brazil is currently the seventh largest producer of oil in the world and is poised to become a top five global oil producer in coming years. In a situation of a just, lasting, and negotiated peace between Russia and Ukraine, LAC countries would have fewer geopolitical openings such as this one.

Diplomatically, countries such as Brazil and Mexico—both of which pushed their own peace plans for Ukraine—could find common ground with the United States in its determination to forge lasting peace in Ukraine. Sundry complaints about the United States contributing to the war in Ukraine and not working hard enough to achieve a ceasefire and eventual peace should stop. Beyond the handful of countries noted here, the vast majority of the region, which seeks to hew closely to nonalignment, could gain from a slightly more parsimonious geopolitical panorama. Few LAC countries have been adroit at seizing opportunities presented by recent geopolitical turbulence, and some might welcome a simpler picture where the main focus of geopolitics returns to the U.S.-China competition and where many countries have more strategic autonomy free of Russia’s strategic control of key economic sectors.

Q4: What role could LAC play in influencing peace efforts?

A4: LAC has so far played a minimal role in peace negotiations, a trend likely to continue given President Trump’s minimalist selection of the negotiating parties, even leaving out U.S. special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg. Nevertheless, pro-Ukraine LAC leaders should not opt for passivity now. Public diplomacy efforts are the first step in reiterating their support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and state sovereignty while rejecting Russia’s illegal use of force. In the event of a brokered peace deal, LAC’s historical experience in interstate wars and peace processes should be welcomed as valuable insight for developing a comprehensive approach tailored to Ukraine’s needs. Over the past 200 years, one of Latin America’s greatest advantages has been its relative peace. Over time, LAC countries have developed different strategies to avoid the escalation of such tensions into broader conflicts, including the advancement of and compliance with confidence-building measures, regional dialogue to prevent uncontrolled frictions, acceptance of third-party mediation, and leveraging international arbitration.

Q5: How will ceasefire negotiations impact Russia’s influence in LAC?

A5: With the United States and Russia moving towards peace talks, much will depend on how the coming weeks develop. Most immediately, President Trump’s statements accusing Zelensky of starting the war with Russia and ruling as a dictator will be a propaganda coup for Russia’s media outlets, which are active in LAC. Moscow’s media presence in LAC has been well documented and sophisticated enough to seize on this news in order to amplify claims they have been making for years, seeking to undermine support for Ukraine since the outbreak of the conflict. One such example that has risen to prominence again is the allegation that U.S. arms sales to Ukraine are being redirected to Mexican cartels. In light of the Trump administration’s strong focus on the U.S. southern border and the designation of a number of Mexican criminal organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, these arguments appear plainly aimed at widening the gulf between Washington and Kyiv. However, if negotiations falter or the United States pursues a more aggressive pressure campaign against Russia, there is a high likelihood the Kremlin may seek to retaliate asymmetrically within the Western Hemisphere. Former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s assertion that LAC represents the United States’ “near abroad,” akin to eastern Europe for Russia, suggests that perceived overreach in one theater justifies escalation in another under the Russian strategic mindset. This was on full display in the summer of 2024, when on two occasions, Russian warships docked in friendly harbors in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as a response to the Biden administration’s moves to relax restrictions on Ukraine’s use of U.S. weapons inside Russian territory.

The long-term consequences of a grand strategic bargain between Russia and the United States could result in major shifts within LAC. A Russia that is reintegrated, at least partially, into the global economy and no longer needs to focus on feeding men and materiel into its war machine could have a stronger hand to play in LAC. Russian arms sales could rebound throughout the Global South, including in LAC countries now looking to modernize their equipment on the cheap (though it will need to balance such exports with a likely need to rearm domestically). However, Russia could also face new constraints under a U.S. administration seeking to reassert its role within the Western Hemisphere. The United States would likely take umbrage with actions by Moscow encroaching on what it considers its sphere of influence, for instance, by propping up anti-U.S. dictatorships in Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba. Thus, peace in Ukraine is no guarantee of a lasting accord between Russia and the United States. Indeed, it may well be the case that the next time the two countries clash, it will be far closer to the U.S. mainland.

Q6: How has NATO’s relationship with LAC evolved?

A6: The war in Ukraine breathed new life and purpose into the NATO alliance. While recent comments from Trump and administration officials have brought on seismic shifts, a renewed focus on the defense compact has also created opportunities for countries looking to develop closer bonds with the West. Perhaps the most notable case in this regard is Javier Milei’s Argentina, which in April 2024 formally requested recognition as a NATO global partner designation as such would open new opportunities for joint trainings and defense cooperation, but most notably, it acts as a powerful signal of Argentina’s alignment in a fragmenting world. For NATO, bringing in another LAC global partner would help the alliance bolster its capabilities and networks against threats that are increasingly global, rather than regional, in scope. This cooperation has been shown to be durable as well. Colombia’s armed forces, which are currently NATO’s only global partner in LAC, have enjoyed sustained partnership with NATO forces even under the administration of President Gustavo Petro, who has criticized Western support for Ukraine and suggested that Colombia would rather junk its legacy Russian military equipment than let it be used by Ukrainian forces.

The timing is also opportune for a stronger NATO focus on South America, especially as regional militaries take the first steps towards modernization of capabilities. Here again, Argentina is critical as while Milei has sought to slash government budgets and pursued fiscal “shock therapy,” he has also pushed to modernize Argentina’s military. This includes finalizing a deal to receive F-16 fighter jets for Argentina’s air force, the first of which has now been delivered, and inking an agreement with France to acquire new submarines and surface vessels to the tune of some $2.3 billion. Most notably, Milei has proposed to raise Argentina’s defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, a bold statement for a country that in 2023 spent just 0.47 percent of GDP on the military, the lowest in South America. This commitment to ramping up military budgets has also raised hackles in the United Kingdom and Chile, two countries that have ongoing territorial disputes with Argentina. While Milei has downplayed the clash over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands during his term, bolstering mechanisms for cooperation between NATO and Argentina can help allay regional tensions around military modernization and rearmament.

Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Natalia Hidalgo is an intern with the Americas Program at CSIS. Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS.