Photo: iLab/CSIS
Jon Alterman: Dr. Marsin Alshamary is a research fellow with the Middle East Initiative at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. After earning her PhD from MIT, she was a postdoctoral fellow with the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution until earlier this year. Marsin, thank you for joining us on Babel.
Marsin Alshamary: Thank you so much, Jon.
Jon Alterman: Can you briefly describe the standoff that's going on now outside of Iraq's parliament? Do you think we're at serious risk of violence?
Marsin Alshamary: The situation in Iraq right now involves Muqtada al-Sadr—who everyone remembers from the early 2000s as being the leader of the Shi’a opposition to the U.S. occupation. Since then, he transformed into a political leader. He has grown a large following and actually won the largest number of seats in the last election in 2021. He tried to set up a system where he and his allies were the majority in parliament, and where everyone else was in opposition. He wasn't able to do this because since 2005, Iraq's political system has mainly resulted in a consensus parliament and a consensus government. The number of seats that any single party is able to win has never been a large enough majority that they can actually form a government by themselves without the need to form alliances with everyone else, so he tried to do this by alienating his political rivals—which happened to be from the same religious group, the Shi`a community. He couldn’t do that, however, and so in response to that, he asked his parliamentarians to resign. He said that he was leaving parliament and would be seeking other ways to influence what's happening in Iraq. Then, he left parliament, and I think he expected that everyone would come after him and beg him not to leave and to bring back his parliamentarians. But what ended up happening is that the Iraqi political system moved on with the process. The parliament nominated a prime minister, and they swore in new members to take over the positions that the Sadrists had left vacant. I think he was surprised that they moved on and didn’t ask him to come back, so at the exact moment that the prime minister candidate was announced, he called his supporters to stage protests in the Green Zone—a heavily fortified area in Baghdad. Months of protesting in the past wasn’t able to breach it, but the Sadrists were able to breach it very easily a few weeks ago. They've been occupying the parliament building and the surrounding areas since then. To be honest, I was in Baghdad back when it happened, and everyone was so worried that this would devolve quickly into a Shi`a/Shi`a civil war because Sadrists opponents were clearly the members of the armed paramilitary groups associated with Shi`a political parties. The Shi`a political parties all solidified into this group called the Coordination Framework.
Jon Alterman: This was under the leadership, arguably, of former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki?
Marsin Alshamary: This is how it's always presented—that it's under the leadership of Nouri al-Maliki, because Nouri al-Maliki is Sadr’s nemesis. In reality, though, the element that makes Shi`a politics so unique—and what makes it actually hard to fall into civil war despite our concerns—is that it's a multipolar system. There isn't really one person who can claim that they're the head of the Shi`a—whether the Coordination Framework within it, or just broadly. I think that's really what aggravates Muqtada al-Sadr. Now that Iraq doesn't really have existential external crises like the Islamic State group or Kurdish secessionism, every political leader is looking within their ethno-religious and ethno-sectarian group to try and be become the leader of that group. Sadr really wants to monopolize the Shi`a of Iraq. He thought he would be able to do this by being the top person in government, and when he wasn't, he sought the streets and is trying to destabilize and break down the political system that we have now. According to him, we need to rethink everything, including the constitution and the electoral system. Because it's such a multipolar world, though, it makes it hard for one person to emerge as the leader of the Shi`a. That’s good if you're trying to avoid authoritarianism, but it's also difficult because when you need to engage in dialogue, there are so many actors. What we're seeing now is most of the Shi`a actors are coalescing into the Coordination Framework. Nouri al-Maliki, is a very important character, but there are also equally important figures in the Coordination Framework, like Hadi al-Amiri from Fatah. There are a few other people who are also influential in that group. When I left Baghdad, the fear was that there would be clashes between the followers of the Sadrists on one hand and the followers of the Coordination Framework on the other. At the time, there were calls for counter protests to take place in the Green Zone. Fortunately, those were called off quickly, and they didn't devolve into violence like we were worried about. But since then, there have been counter protests. So far, everything has been okay in the sense that we haven't reached anything very violent and there hasn't been any clashes between the different protesters. The political leaders are still calling for dialogue. But, looking at this as a political scientist, I'm not worried that Muqtada al-Sadr is going to one day just tell his followers to go attack or kill the followers of another group. I’m worried that the tension in a place that is confined in extreme temperatures and in these really difficult circumstances might actually have people fighting for a completely different reason, and that might devolve into violence. Since everyone in Iraq is armed—whether they're in a paramilitary group or they’re just an everyday civilian—this could escalate really quickly.
Jon Alterman: But the original system was created to ensure that the Kurds were not left out of the system and that the Sunnis were not left out of the system. The requirement for super majorities was about keeping all the different confessional groups engaged in Iraqi politics. At the same time, there has also been an emphasis on consensus, and as a consequence, a lot of people have commented that elections don't change anything. They say that the parties have their clients who have jobs. They say that certain parties have controlled some ministries for years and years, and the government doesn’t have to be responsive because it’s under the stranglehold of a political system that doesn't change even after their elections. Could one make an argument that breaking apart Shi`a politics and having contestation for Shi`a politics—or for Sunni politics or Kurdish politics—is a way not only of creating a more democratic system in Iraq, but also a system that in the end is less sectarian in nature and might be the beginning of a positive trend in Iraqi politics?
Marsin Alshamary: I spend a lot of time thinking about this—reflecting back on the system that was more or less imposed on us in 2003 and whether any decisions differently could have changed how sectarian Iraq became in the mid-2000s and how the Iraqi political system is perceived by its people right now. Essentially, what is the best way forward for a community that is so diverse. Ultimately, though, one of the problems is that in the lifetime of an individual, it seems like this has been going on forever and that nothing has changed. When you look at the political development of states, historically, though, it takes a very long time to see anything really happen. To see the outcome of a decision sometimes takes multiple decades, but with Iraq, there are clear mistakes that were made and there are clear ways in which the system has failed the people. At the same time, we have to think about what's the alternative right now, and is that alternative really going to make life for everyone better? You mentioned the Kurds, and I think it's so important that you mentioned them. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the largest and most powerful Kurdish political party in Iraq, were allied with Muqtada al-Sadr in the beginning when he was trying to create this government of majority. When he left government, they were much more willing to talk to everyone else, and I think that's one of the things that really bothered him. The reason that they became less and less enchanted with Muqtada al-Sadr and his calls for revolution and changing the system is because he talked about the Iraqi constitution. And to the Kurds, the constitution actually protects them in a way that no other constitution in the world has protected Kurds or given them political rights before, so if you open this can of worms that is the constitution, it's really something dangerous and terrifying for everyone who is not the majority. If you’re not in the majority, you have to fight for this inclusion in the constitution that was so carefully crafted. You’re going to have to fight this fight again, and they are not willing to do so because the constitution is actually very good for Kurds. It lays out the groundwork for having their own region. It gives them resources. It gives them representation. It recognizes their language as an official language of Iraq. These are really big things for the Kurds, and this is why they've actually stepped aside, and distanced themselves from this confrontation among the Shi`a political parties today. If Muqtada al-Sadr keeps talking about constitutional change, I wouldn’t be surprised if he drives his former allies farther and farther away. This is from a very high level—almost elite level view of politics—because it really impacts how political leaders want to see their people presented in society and represented in Iraq broadly. But when you look at the day-to-day life of Iraqis, and you talk to any Iraqi, they will tell you that they're very sick of the corrupt sectarian system and that they just want a government in which sect and identity doesn't matter. That is really the changing tone of the Iraqi street, but do I think that this was the same tone we had in 2003? Do I think this view of politics is the same one that Iraqis had back when the country was still transforming after war? No, I do not. Back then, the fear of sectarian infighting and violence was very high, and now that it's diminished, it is a very good thing and it heralds a change in politics where people’s priorities have shifted and they’re now looking for something else. I think we were on the right track in the last election in October 2021. That election was done with heavy coordination from the international community and an unprecedented degree of help from the United Nations. The degree to which they got involved surprised me. There was a lot of money poured into these elections, too, and the turnout wasn't very high. It was about 43 percent, but they really did usher in a minimal change. We had a lot of independents win in this election. We hadn't seen that before, although some of them are clearly partisan independents. We also had a few political parties emerge both running and winning in the elections that came from the protest movement of 2019 and which called for reform in the political system. To me, this all signaled a slow change in the political system in Iraq. We were building, essentially, a small opposition that along multiple election cycles could have become something bigger and could have been able to do the kinds of reforms from within that took away the power of sectarianism and identity when it comes to politics in Iraq. Where we are today is that Muqtada al-Sadr wants new elections, but you know what will happen? No one will go vote. Anyone who thought, "oh, wow, we can change things through voting because look, we have protesters in parliament," now will think, “they got rid of them so quickly, what's the point of voting anyway?" What Muqtada al-Sadr has really done is deal a blow to democratization. No one will have any more faith in elections if anyone can come and say, "I don't like the results, let's just redo them.” Essentially, that is what he's saying. In the long-term future of Iraq, if we do have these early elections, they're going to be hugely destabilizing for democratization in the country.
Jon Alterman: What you're feeling is that the constitution is too sensitive to change, and that iterative elections over time, will lead to a decline in sectarian voting, a decline in the power of purely sectarian parties and the rise of more independence—if given time and space to develop. Is that accurate?
Marsin Alshamary: Yes, it is. I realize that to other people who know Iraq very well, I might seem overly optimistic, but Iraq's constitution isn't a bad constitution. It enshrines a lot of important rights, and it really does lay out the basis for a functioning democracy. The main issue with the constitution is that it doesn’t really have consequences for violations of the constitution—particularly when it comes to elections. If you don't elect the prime minister by a certain date after elections, it doesn't say what should happen, so it allows people to transgress on it very easily. That would be my main criticism. I know that my formula for change in Iraq, is one that is heavily premised on an optimism in the non-intervention of armed actors and in the development of a political neighborhood where surrounding countries aren't constantly infringing on Iraqi sovereignty. It’s definitely not a perfect world, but I do think that the alternate route is likely to be revolution—whether orchestrated by the masses or more of a coup. In either way, that really raises the risk for civil war, and I just don't want to see that happen. Between a system that is languishing, but possibly getting somewhere good in the next 50 years, and between a civil war that might take at least a decade to wind down with no certainty about what will happen after, I would pick the former.
Jon Alterman: The United States and Iran have played major roles in Iraqi politics in the past. In your judgment, are they still playing major roles?
Marsin Alshamary: What's really interesting is that both the United States and Iran have been less hands-on in this government formation than in previous ones. Some people might say, "Oh, is that why it's taking so long to do anything?"
Jon Alterman: Do you think that’s a good thing?
Marsin Alshamary: I think it's a good thing. One of the policy recommendations I always make to diplomas in the international community working on Iraq is that 2003 created a belief in Iraq that the United States and the rest of the world will jump in at any crisis in Iraq and fix it. This is unrealistic. Neither the United States nor the international community jumps in to fix problems in other countries, so this distancing is a good thing because it allows Iraq to get on its feet and address its own problems by itself. From the Iranian side, it's a little bit more complicated because Iran shares a long border and a very extensive history with Iraq, and it has ties with almost every political party in the country. Everyone focuses on the Shi`a political parties because of the shared religion, but they also have really good ties with Kurdish parties as well.
Jon Alterman: Especially the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Marsin Alshamary: Yes, especially that the PUK. These kinds of ties are always going to create Iranian influence of the country, particularly because Iraq is very weak. The weaker it is, the more susceptible it is to influence and intervention. From the U.S. side, interventions in Iraq have really lessened over time. I do think both Iran and the United States are distracted more than usual during this particular government formation cycle—more than in previous government formation cycles. I think that is a good thing, ultimately, because it's going to let Iraqis hash out their problems by themselves. And what we're seeing right now is the Shi`a hash out their problems by themselves. Hopefully, it won’t be in a violent way, but I could see Iran intervening down the line to push them to resolve things.
Jon Alterman: When this does get resolved, would you guess that external actors will have catalyzed a resolution, or do you think this is going to be worked out on Iraqi terms by Iraqis working together to the exclusion of external actors?
Marsin Alshamary: I think external actors are all interested in seeing Iraqis hash this out, so as long as this process is ongoing, it will be Iraqi. But I think if there are any significant stalls or any critical junctures in this process that might raise alarms—particularly when it comes to violence—then external actors will get involved.
Jon Alterman: And as you look forward to the resolution of the current crisis, do you expect that it's going to provoke a more permanent change to Iraqi politics—or are we just biding time until the next crisis? Do you think this crisis will actually create a platform for different kinds of Iraqi politics?
Marsin Alshamary: If I actually thought that Muqtada al-Sadr truly had the intention to change the system, I would be less critical of him despite his past, but he seems to be headed towards creating another government that is even less representative of the Iraqi population than the previous ones. He wants to frame that as some kind of success. He has received little support from everyday Iraqis, who are frustrated with him—but also scared of him because they’ve seen his history—so he wasn't able to really amass this huge protest that he thought he could and get everyone to concede to him. Now, he has to save face, and the only way to do so is by saying, "Look, I brought new elections, and that's a major change.” But new elections when most people don't want to vote anymore, means more seats for Sadrists and more seats for all the other entrenched political parties—which means the very little representation we had is going to be lost. This is the kind of change that feels to me like the death of any hope for democratization in the country. What is truly sad about this is that this is the outcome that will give us no violence, but it's also the outcome that's really bad for the country in the long term.
Jon Alterman: What's the optimistic resolution to this? What should we be hoping for?
Marsin Alshamary: Sadly, this is the most we can hope for; the other thing we could hope for is that Muqtada decides to put his parliamentarians back in parliament and we move on. The most hopeful thing we can get is as little change from where we were in October as possible. That would be moving on and just forming a government with the MPs elected in October. That’s unlikely, but that is the best-case scenario from my point of view. I'm someone who is very averse to anything revolutionary in the country because—maybe just as a jaded political scientist—I don't see many revolutions succeed. I think if people's lives are bad now with the revolution, they're likely to be 10 times worse. Iraq has been through wars, uprisings, and sanctions—all of these things. Everyone understands the toll on everyday life that this kind of upheaval creates, but the status quo is so deeply depressing as well.
Jon Alterman: It sounds like the best case scenario is, we go back to October, and we just move forward.
Marsin Alshamary: From my perspective, yes.
Jon Alterman: We will watch and wait. Marsin Alshamary, thanks very much for joining us on Babel.
Marsin Alshamary: Thank you so much for having me.