Isabelle Werenfels: North Africa’s Relationship with Europe

This transcript is from a CSIS podcast published on September 3, 2024. Listen to the podcast here.

Jon Alterman: Isabelle Werenfels, welcome to Babel.

Isabelle Werenfels: Thank you very much for having me, Jon.

Jon Alterman: You recently helped write a paper on what were described as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) “southern neighborhoods.” Why should a transatlantic military alliance that's preoccupied with Russia's invasion of Ukraine focus on the Mediterranean?

Isabelle Werenfels: Well, because what NATO is fighting on its eastern flank is also present in its southern flank. I think that is a very important reason. If we look, for instance, at the Sahel, we have a growing Russian presence. We have Russian narratives that are gaining traction in North Africa. We have Wagner, or now Africa Corps, in Libya. It probably came a bit as a shock to the members of the alliance to see how difficult it was to generate solidarity with Ukraine among North African countries in the UN after February 2022.

All these things came together, and then you have Russia drawing on Iranian drones to fight in Ukraine. So, it's very difficult to separate these arenas. Then, of course, you have the southern European allies that are direct neighbors of North Africa, and as Pedro Sanchez said at the NATO Summit Public Forum, our well-being, meaning the Europeans’ or southern Europeans’ well-being, depends on that of our neighbors. All of that came together, and I imagine there was a strong push from the southern European allies to have a look at the southern neighborhoods. 

Jon Alterman: Much of our audience is American. For an American audience, it is a bit complicated to understand what NATO’s role should be, what the EU’s role should be, what a national role should be, and what a multilateral role should be in different venues. In your opinion, what should be the breakdown in NATO's and the EU's approaches to the Mediterranean Basin?

Isabelle Werenfels: There should be a very clear division of labor, as you insinuate. The EU is the actor who is best at all of the questions of development. Development aid, the economic questions, etc. We can discuss whether they are good at that or not, but this is their turf.

When it comes to security, I think NATO has added value. If we just take one example, most North African armies really noticed how well the Ukrainians did initially in February 2022, thanks to NATO training. These countries are very keen on that. It is a way to build ties and bring them closer to the alliance, which is the ultimate goal.

At the same time, it would be naïve to think that these countries will decide between NATO, the alliance, Western countries—whatever we want to call it—and the strategic competitors. However, there are areas where NATO has things to offer that the EU cannot offer. When it comes to heavy lifting, even in domains such as resilience, disaster control, etc., we shouldn't forget that within NATO, we have the United States and, at the same time, there is Turkey. That is also a very important signal to some of the southern partners.

Jon Alterman: Let me ask about the strategic competitors. Of course, Algeria has a long history of relations with Russia and China. Egypt has been deepening its relationships with both Russia and China. As you've watched the Ukraine war unfold, what kinds of attitudes have you seen in North Africa toward solidarity with NATO about Russian moves? To what extent is there a sense that Russia is a useful player, partly for its role in regional affairs and partly for its role pushing back Western European demands for human rights, democratization, and those kinds of things? You've spent a lot of time thinking about Tunisia, and there certainly is a sense that China is a welcome alternative to Western pressure on democratization. How do North African countries think about the prospect of solidarity with NATO countries and Western countries? 

Isabelle Werenfels: There's a huge ambivalence regarding Russia to different degrees. You mentioned Algeria, which has a very long history cooperating with Russia. Since 2022, Algeria has largely, but not completely, aligned with Russia in UN resolutions. However, Algeria saw that its close relations with Russia do not necessarily pay off in its immediate neighborhood, the Sahel.

Algeria had good ties with Mali and decent ties with Niger. Since the coups in those two countries, it has been quite turbulent. Relations with Mali have gone sour, despite the fact that the new military junta in Mali is very close to Russia. Just as its ambassador said at the UN just a few days ago, Algeria does not like having private militaries in neighboring countries, referring to Wagner and Africa Corps. This is one thing which has made them ambivalent.

At the same time, however, there's this sense that Russia, together with China, offers an alternative global order, and that China—more so than Russia—offers a more just, more equitable global order that takes into account what the countries in the Global South need and want. I think that's where the ambivalence is.

Then, we also have differences between governments and populations, and we have differences between different countries. A country like Morocco has aligned much more closely with the Western countries on Ukraine, it has relations with Israel, and it is fiercely anti-Iran. Whereas in Tunisia, we have an interesting situation. We have a military that is rather pro-Western because most of its equipment and corporations are connected to the United States, and that's going very well. They have good NATO ties. We have that, but we have a president who has a totally different discourse, who has traveled to Iran, who is pro-Russian, who's been to China, and who is more or less courting these states, or they're courting him.

Large parts of the political elite are still in a different mode. That's another dimension. All of these countries, not just Tunisia, are strongly dependent on Europe for trade reasons. That is something that we still see. Even if they have diversified—even if Algeria's being courted because of its gas—Europe is a really important partner, and it has pipelines that go to Europe. We cannot forget these dependencies. At the same time, the cooperation paradigm between Europe and North Africa has changed fundamentally in past years. That's what Europe is trying to come to terms with, and so far, hasn’t managed.

Jon Alterman: Let's talk about that. When you and I first met more than 20 years ago, everybody was talking about the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. What happened to those ideas that were in the air in the early 2000s? What went right and wrong, and what needs to be done differently going forward?

Isabelle Werenfels: That's a huge question. The framework at the time had different baskets: there was the political track, there was the economic track, and then there was a civil society track. There was already a contradiction between strengthening civil societies and closely cooperating with authoritarian regimes. However, I don’t think that was the essential problem. The problem was that somehow, reforms in those countries didn't really work, or they did not work enough.

The idea was that there should be a ring of prosperity around the Mediterranean. However, the reforms didn't develop in the way that Europeans had hoped, and the relationships just didn't deepen the way Europeans had hoped.

One reason for this was that Europeans were very much in a donor-recipient mode, and they were not ready to make concessions on issues that were very important to those countries. In trade, if you look at tomatoes from Morocco or olive oil from Tunisia, Europeans were not ready to really open their markets. As far as visas were concerned, southern partners were frustrated because Europeans couldn't grant visa freedom or freedom of movement for obvious domestic reasons. The southern partners were disappointed and lacked the will to really engage in the reforms the Europeans wanted, especially democratic reforms. They saw no reason to engage in those prior to 2011 and the so-called Arab Spring.

What has changed in recent years is that the North African countries now want to call the terms of trade. Europe is still struggling to deal with their stronger sovereignty reflexes, growing leverage, and negotiating power. There are lots of reasons for North Africa’s growing leverage, but one of the main reasons is the issue of migration, and the second reason is the export of oil and gas. Phosphate and other minerals also matter, but to a lesser extent.

That has given these countries a lot more negotiating power. There are other factors that have put them in a stronger position: instability in the Sahel, which has made stability in North Africa even more important, and the growing presence of strategic competitors. A country like Morocco has become very aware of the fact that it has important trade corridors between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. That connectivity has become a huge issue. Highways, pipelines, ports, etc. It's being courted by many actors. We see a lot of leverage, and, at the same time, the Europeans are not united on how to deal with these countries. These countries are excellent. They have learned how to play European countries against each other.

Jon Alterman: Let me pick up on two points that you just raised. You said that these North African states have a lot more leverage, and they're using the leverage more effectively. To what extent has the 2011 Arab Spring changed European perceptions and zeal to promote democratization? Is there a sense at all on the European side that maybe it wasn't worth it to invest so much in democratization because it didn't yield much? Or was there some other impact of the 2011 Arab uprisings that reframed the way Europe thinks about what is happening in North Africa?

Isabelle Werenfels: There were a number of things that reframed that. After 2011, there was general euphoria. There was a conviction that democracy was really coming and that we would see linear processes. Disappointment began in 2013 with Egypt. At the same time, European countries were very wary of the growing strength or impact of Islamist parties to different degrees. After the 2013 Sisi coup, the atmosphere had already changed a little bit.

For many European countries, 2015 was another important point because of the so-called migration crisis. After that, democratization was off the agenda. The one and only concern was, "How can we keep migrants out for domestic reasons? If we don't keep them out, we will have right-wing parties getting stronger and right-wing discourse and narratives dominating our domestic politics.”

We had a change and a disillusionment. If you look at a country like Tunisia, enormous funds were invested from the European perspective. Then, there was stagnation and a sense that many important reforms didn't take place—not just politically, but also economically. Then from 2021, we had a new president becoming increasingly authoritarian. So, there is almost total disillusionment.

Additionally, the terrorist attacks that happened after 2011 and the jihadism coming from North Africa and the Islamic State in the Middle East played a role in Europe, albeit to a lesser extent than migration. There was an amalgamation of the entire region, and it came across to many Europeans as a threat. Right-wing politicians played on that, and that changed the whole cooperation paradigm from the European side. While on the other side, there was growing self-confidence, leverage, and negotiating power.

Jon Alterman: As you mentioned, Europe is not a single body. There are different countries with a whole set of different perspectives. Are there different blocs in Europe? Are there groups of countries that think about things in different ways? How would you disaggregate them to understand where Europe is coming from?

Isabelle Werenfels: Regarding democratization, you have always had a Northern European bloc and a Southern European bloc. In Northern Europe, democracy, human rights, etc., were very dominant in the discourse and maybe a little less dominant in the policies.

Countries such as Spain, France, and Italy were always very pragmatic when it came to democracy. These states were their direct neighbors. They wanted to cooperate with them. They have close trade relations. In those countries, human rights, democracy, governance discourses played a smaller role. So, we have these blocs regarding democracy.

Then, interestingly, you had Eastern Europe with increasingly authoritarian tendencies or currents. If you look at the Hungarian president or at a certain time in Poland, there were sympathies for authoritarian leaders.

Then, you have uniting issues such as migration. Egypt is a country where most European states will have the same policy. All over Europe, you hear that Egypt is too big to fail. Egypt is geopolitically crucial because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Regarding Egypt, there's no disagreement. When we move toward the Maghreb, however, we really have huge disagreements. If we look at Libya during the times of huge violence when General Haftar, the Russian-backed general who commands Eastern Libya, was moving to Western Libya, France supported him while other Europeans were very much aligned with the UN-backed government in the capital in Western Libya. You have these dynamics, and really almost hostilities. Italy had a different position from France. Germany was very much trying to mediate. It's very easy to create divisions among European countries when it comes to North Africa.

Jon Alterman: Let me take you back to Libya. During the Libyan Civil War, the Obama administration talked about “leading from behind.” Has the way that European countries and the United States engaged in Libya changed the way that that they're likely to engage in security issues in North Africa? How does Libya shape how the United States and European countries think about bilateral versus multilateral engagement in regional security issues?

Isabelle Werenfels: It has certainly lowered the appetite for intervention. That is absolutely clear, because the outcome was not what any of the countries engaged in Libya in 2011 were wishing for. Libya has shown how difficult it is to multilaterally engage in the security domain with a country that is so divided, because you will always have different positions of individual actors. Again, you have the direct neighbors such as Italy and to a certain extent France. You have others that are further away and then take on different positions in Europe.

Libya has also shown the Europeans that if you have a power vacuum, you will have strategic competitors moving in there. And this is what has happened with Russia. On the question of whether Europeans are still enthusiastic for democratization, I think anything that could imply destabilization is something Europeans are extremely wary of. Of course, Libya plays a role in this. Countries like Algeria are profiting from this, because they are increasingly considered an anchor of stability. So, regimes in those countries are being supported. Morocco is, in a way, the big winner in the region. Also, Egypt has profited enormously from the instability in the larger neighborhood.

Jon Alterman: There's a long, European history of colonial ties to the Mediterranean Basin. France played a dominant role. The UK also played a role. There was the Italian colonial presence in Libya. How does that legacy shape the way Europe continues to engage with the Mediterranean Basin, and the way the Mediterranean Basin continues to engage with Europe? Do you sense that even the non-colonial powers in Europe think about the Levant, which was largely British, differently than it thinks about the Maghreb, which was largely French?

Isabelle Werenfels: The colonial legacies are interestingly becoming much more of a burden these days than they were 10 years, 20 years, or 30 years ago. France senses this very much. After 2011, when France supported the dictator in Tunisia to the last minute, France became unpopular in Tunisia and among the Tunisian class. In Algeria, it was always very ambivalent. Also, Morocco has begun to move away from France. These colonial legacies play out a lot in hostilities or in very strong post-colonial discourses these days, discourses of neo-colonialism, and what I said before regarding sovereignty reflexes.

From the European side, it has become much more difficult to present advice, even if Europeans do not consider them to be patronizing suggestions, because they will be considered patronizing or neo-colonial from the other side. Everything related to political systems in these countries is rejected as being neo-colonial. It doesn't matter which country it comes from. France is in the most difficult position. Italy is in a difficult position to a certain extent in Libya. At the same time, one cannot deny the extremely close ties in the social fabric and the language. It is where young people from the Maghreb want to go and study. Libyans like to go to Italy. All the Francophone Maghrebis basically want to go to France. It's changing a little bit. It's very complex, very troubled, and I would argue it's getting more difficult. There is also a possibility for actors such as China to come in with new discourses of global order that claim to offer a different order that is based on justice, doesn't have the colonial baggage, etc.

Jon Alterman: What do you think that means for U.S. and European cooperation in the Middle East? Is the United States seen as part of that hegemonic project that's disadvantaged and gets lumped in with Europe? Are there ways the United States can untie the colonial legacy because of the long American history of anti-colonialism? How should it play out from a U.S. and European government perspective?

Isabelle Werenfels: The United States has a big advantage theoretically. At the moment, it doesn't have a big advantage practically because of the war in Gaza. That is changing the way North Africans are looking at the United States. However, if we move back to before 7th October, in a country like Tunisia, the United States was able to criticize more than many of the European countries without causing a public outcry. With Morocco, we know that ties are very good and getting closer all the time. This has to do with normalization with Israel and the so-called Trump deal, which has been upheld by the Biden administration. It's very difficult to say where it's going now with anti-U.S. sentiment.

Then, we have another thing. Maghrebis are quite divided over which administration they wish to see. The Moroccans and Egypt would have the smallest problem with a Trump administration. Others would have more difficulties with it. Morocco has been close and has profited from the Trump administration. Trump made very positive remarks about Sisi. He will remember that. We will see different reactions to different U.S. administrations. If we discount the current situation, the United States can approach these countries in a different way, because it does not have the colonial legacy.

Jon Alterman: Isabelle Werenfels, thank you very much for joining us on Babel.

Isabelle Werenfels: Thank you very much for having me.

 (END.)