Karim Haggag: Egypt’s Balancing Act

This transcript is from a CSIS podcast published on July 9, 2024. Listen to the podcast here.

Jon Alterman: Karim Haggag, welcome to Babel.

Karim Haggag: Thank you Jon, thank you for having me. It's great to be with you.

Jon Alterman: Egypt has had a security focus on the Israeli border since the creation of Israel in 1948. Help us understand the context. How does the current Egyptian concern over Gaza rank among the various crises that Egypt has felt on its border with Israel over the last 75 years?

Karim Haggag: This is a fundamentally different challenge than the large-scale armed conflicts that Egypt fought with Israel over the years, the last one being the 1973 October War. What we have in Gaza is a different situation. We have a resumption of serious armed conflict between a major Palestinian faction, Hamas, and Israel.

Egypt has had to deal with wars between Hamas and Gaza since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007. We've had about four or five rounds of armed conflict between both parties. This time was different. This time the scale of the conflict posed real challenges for Egypt. From the beginning, we had the prospect of the forced displacement of Palestinians into Egypt. This was a declared Israeli objective from the beginning. Egypt viewed this with tremendous alarm and framed this as a red line for Egyptian security.

In addition, the fact that we have a major Palestinian-Israeli confrontation on Egypt's borders poses political problems for Egypt, as it is seen as the major Arab country that can be supportive of Gaza's population. Added to that, we've had real tensions between Egypt and Israel over the flow of humanitarian assistance into Gaza. The Rafah border crossing was, of course, the main conduit for that. Israel bombed the Rafah border repeatedly throughout this conflict and threatened to bomb humanitarian convoys entering Gaza through Rafah, so there was real tension there.

And then we have an emerging reality in Gaza that will pose serious challenges both for Egypt and for the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. Secretary of State Blinken summarized this well in his remarks a few weeks ago in which he said that what we have in Gaza is the potential of a serious insurgency. We have no exit plan for the IDF from Gaza, so we have a situation in which the Israeli military will be in Gaza for the foreseeable future. We have a compounded humanitarian crisis, and we could potentially have a collapse in governance. 

So, we might have Hamas or remnants of Hamas in Gaza, but no one actually governing Gaza. The spillover effects of that into Egypt are quite serious in terms of the chaos and the militancy that can spill over into the Sinai. I think that reality will pose tremendous complications between Egypt and Israel as to how to manage that reality. This crisis really presents a number of challenges to Egypt, and it shows the complexity of the situation that Egypt has had to grapple with.

Jon Alterman: I'm wondering where the Egyptian public is on this. There has never been a lot of Egyptian warmth toward Israel. Is there now greater hostility to Israel? Is there a mobilization of the public? Is the government trying to use public opinion in any way to advance its interests vis-à-vis the border, the Arab world, or the United States? Where is the Egyptian public, and what does it mean?

Karim Haggag: From the beginning, the Egyptian public has been wholeheartedly sympathetic with the plight of the Palestinians in Gaza. The images emerging from Gaza were deeply disturbing. I think the sheer scale of the violence perpetrated by the Israeli military against civilians in Gaza was truly horrific. It touched a deep cord within the Egyptian national consciousness, which has always been pro-Palestinian.

Coupled with that has been a deep frustration over the inability, not just of Egypt, but of the entire international community, to bring this war to a close. The fact that we've seen the international community fail to alleviate the serious humanitarian disaster in Gaza, fail to reach a ceasefire, and fail to hold Israel accountable for the violations of humanitarian and international law, has really built up what I think has been a tremendous amount of resentment and frustration on the part of Egyptian public opinion. That said, there is a recognition that this crisis is complex, and that it does have serious implications for Egypt. So, frustration and sympathy for Palestinians have been coupled with a wariness or recognition that Egypt must tread carefully in this crisis. 

Jon Alterman: As you and I have both witnessed, there has been a lot of cooperation for decades between the Egyptian military and the Israeli military, especially on Sinai security issues. Are you surprised, as I am, that there hasn't been more of an ability for the two militaries to strike more accommodations between each other throughout this conflict?

Karim Haggag: Yes, I think it has been surprising. These are highly professional individuals from the security services on both sides. There has been a buildup of deep cooperation over the years, and they manage this complex relationship in a very pragmatic and reasonable manner. This is why it was quite a rude awakening from the very beginning of the conflict, and both Egyptians and Egyptian security officials were quite taken aback by calls for the forced displacement of Palestinians into Egypt—solving Israel's Gaza problem in Egypt. That’s been a longstanding approach of Israeli national security thinkers—finding the solution for Gaza in Egypt. 

So, all of a sudden, we were faced with the reality that, as opposed to the decades of constructive cooperation between both militaries, we had an Israeli side that was completely cavalier about Egyptian national security interests. That was certainly disturbing. This is what prompted Egypt to frame this specific issue as a red line for Egypt's national security and really drive the message home, not just to the Israeli side, but also in Washington, where we found the Biden administration actually echoing the same red line.

Jon Alterman: One of the issues on which cooperation seems to have both ebbed and flowed is the issue of tunnels under the border. For a time, Israelis felt that Egyptians were not doing all that they could to stop these tunnels. Then cooperation seemed significantly better and Israeli concerns went away. Israel now says that it has found more than 50 tunnels going under the border, and it has talked about needing to permanently occupy the Philadelphi Corridor to prevent smuggling. That would not be consistent with the agreements that Israel has signed in the past. As a practiced diplomat who has thought a lot about Egyptian national security and Arab-Israeli peace issues, is this something you're confident can be worked? What are the kinds of ways that a compromise can be found on the issue of ensuring that there is no smuggling through tunnels across the border?

Karim Haggag: The tunnel issue has historically been a very challenging one. It's been challenging for both Egypt and Israel. For decades, when Israel was the occupying power in Gaza, and it was in control of the other side of the border, Israel itself found it very difficult to clamp down on smuggling and cross-border tunnels between Egypt and Gaza. 

It's important to mention that since 2014, Egypt has taken a very proactive approach on the tunnel issue. There was a recognition that cross-border smuggling through these tunnels was a major security concern for Egypt.

This was not only a conduit of illicit trafficking in goods and people, but also in weapons, drugs, and for militancy that spilled over into the Sinai. So, Egypt took a very, shall we say, hardline approach in clamping down on the tunnels. Now, we have a situation in which the extent of the tunnel network is both wider and deeper than many have acknowledged. 

I think the problematic issue is the accusatory tone coming from Israel and the pointing of a finger of blame at Egypt for not doing enough to clamp down on the tunnels. That is not helpful. That just raises suspicion on the Egyptian side and will make it harder to find an arrangement.

One thing I can say is, with the IDF on the other side of the border, in effect reoccupying Palestinian territory, it will be very difficult to find an acceptable arrangement between Egypt and Israel that deals with the whole range of border issues: border security—including the tunnels, humanitarian assistance from Egypt into Gaza, and the movement of people and goods between both sides. We must find an arrangement, but it can't be through accepting the reoccupation on the part of Israel of Palestinian territory.

Jon Alterman: You mentioned the Israeli political leadership many times, and it may be that Israel is evolving in a political direction that poses a new set of challenges for Egypt. There are Israeli politicians calling for expulsion, and there are Israeli politicians calling for an Israeli re-occupation of Gaza. How does Egypt respond to an Israeli partner whose parameters are changing in ways that many Egyptians feel are contrary to the years of partnership that Egypt and Israel have built?

Karim Haggag: With great difficulty. The relationship between Egypt and Israel is a very complex one. Throughout the years, Egypt has, I think to its credit, learned to adopt what I would argue is a sophisticated approach in managing this relationship. Sophisticated in the sense that we’ve learned to compartmentalize aspects of this relationship. 

On one level, there is a very pragmatic, as you mentioned, security cooperation between both sides that's grown and matured over the years. On another level, there are serious political differences, specifically on the Palestinian issue. Israel has very controversial positions on issues relating to not only Gaza, but also the West Bank, its relationship with the Palestinian Authority, and a clear reluctance to move on the political pathway towards a two-state solution. All these things really undermine the prospects of a peaceful settlement to the conflict. That has been extremely difficult for Egypt. 

Now, we have the added dimension of very hardline voices seeking to make decisions that can really compromise Egyptian security, and I think that adds a very troubling aspect to the relationship. It's one thing to have political differences over the Palestinian issue, but it's another completely different matter when we have an Israeli government that can take positions or adopt approaches that compromise Egypt's national security. 

So, the Egyptian response has been forceful but at the same time controlled. Egypt is clearly, communicating to the Israeli side that there are things that Egypt will not accept. Egypt stated, very clearly, that if there is this prospect of the expulsion of Palestinians into Gaza, then that would be a real breach in the relationship. 

That's how we will approach this government. We will deal with it in a pragmatic way when the conditions warrant so, but we will clearly communicate to the Israeli side when we have serious concerns about their actions which affect Egypt's security.

Jon Alterman: I'm interested in your views on the red lines of Hamas' future role in the governance of Gaza. Egypt cracked down sharply on the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, of which Hamas is the Palestinian branch. There are Egyptians who are active with the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups who are in exile because of the government's policy. What are the boundaries that the Egyptian government thinks are appropriate for Hamas' role in Gaza, given the rather strong approach that the government has taken regarding the Brotherhood's role in Egypt?

Karim Haggag: Like our relationship with Israel, our relationship with Hamas is also complex. Hamas does belong to a rival ideological movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, so there has been an adversarial relationship on the ideological level and, at times, on the security level, vis-à-vis Hamas. On the other hand, Hamas is the governing body in an adjacent neighboring territory, so there's a pragmatic incentive to deal with Hamas as the entity in charge of Gaza. 

On the third level, Hamas is an important element of the broader Palestinian national movement. In the context of Egypt's overall approach to the Palestinian issue, Hamas is an important partner that Egypt has had to deal with, whether with respect to the objective of achieving Palestinian reconciliation, reunifying Gaza with the West Bank, or mediating ceasefires during the various rounds of armed conflict between Hamas and Israel. 

So here again, Egypt has had to compartmentalize its approach to Hamas. With respect to Hamas' future role in Gaza, from the very beginning, there was deep skepticism that the declared Israeli objective of completely uprooting Hamas from Gaza was achievable. We've been through this so many times. We understand, I think probably more than most, the extent to which Hamas represents a very deep-seated movement in Gaza, and that the only approach you can adopt to deal with Hamas is political. Hence, Egypt has historically placed such a high importance on achieving intra-Palestinian reconciliation by integrating Hamas formally into the Palestinian national movement and the institutions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). That is the approach that Egypt has adopted during this conflict.

If you recall, the very first ceasefire proposal that Egypt put forth included this element of intra-Palestinian reconciliation. So, from the beginning, there was a recognition that we must find an approach that addresses what will ultimately be remnants of Hamas in Gaza, in whatever shape or form. That increasingly seems to be a reality which many people are acknowledging, even on the Israeli side, albeit reluctantly. So, Hamas will remain a reality in Gaza which we have to address one way or the other.

Jon Alterman: How would you address Israelis who say there's no living with Hamas, and what they’ve seen from Egypt's own experience is the government's determination that you can't live with political Islam. There are Israelis who say, “They are asking us to do what they refuse to do themselves. There was no reconciliation in Egypt. There was suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Is this different?

Karim Haggag: You correctly point to Egypt's unique experience with the Muslim Brotherhood, and that has been a very difficult and recently a very painful chapter in Egypt's history. Egypt has not taken the approach of exporting that model in its dealings with other countries that have parties affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt does not make a claim of universalizing its approach vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood, whether it's in Tunis, Morocco, Jordan, or Syria. The reality remains that there is no military solution to Hamas in Gaza, which is exactly why we, as Egypt, had to adopt this very pragmatic and compartmentalized approach. 

We have no illusions about Hamas. We have learned to deal with it in a very pragmatic way. The fact that the Israeli side has no military solution to Hamas forces us to find another approach. Otherwise, what we will be left with is a situation in which there is no “day after.” If we have a continuation of the armed conflict, we will not be able to get to a point where we can begin reconstruction or begin to have humanitarian assistance in a sustained way to alleviate the situation in Gaza. So, we will have this very troubling outcome in which there will be no end to this war.

Jon Alterman: Can you foresee an ongoing future Egyptian role in Gaza, not just on the border allowing humanitarian supplies to come in, but in terms of governance, government support, or potentially security? Is there any formula either with the United States, with international Arab partners, or with the Palestinian Authority, in which Egypt would play an ongoing role inside of Gaza?

Karim Haggag: This is, I think, an issue that security planners are wrestling with in Egypt. Clearly, there has been a reluctance throughout the years to assume that type of role in Gaza, and I think justifiably so. The wariness stems from the prospect that if Egypt assumes a role in Gaza, especially when it comes to providing security and governance, then we have the prospect of Egypt assuming responsibility for Gaza. This is an outcome that has been openly called for by Israeli officials throughout the years: that Egypt should just assume responsibility for Gaza and basically take over the burden of providing security and governance in the Gaza Strip.

That said, there is a recognition and a sense of responsibility in addressing the very problematic outcome in Gaza which I just described. The worst of all worlds in Gaza. To alleviate that eventuality, there is thinking about what Egypt can contribute to a potential plan to deal with the aftermath in Gaza. Whatever that contribution is, it must be in the context of a clear multilateral framework. So yes, if there is an international force that is mandated by the United Nations Security Council to provide security and governance in Gaza, then Egypt can think of having a role within that context. 

The other condition that will be very important for Egypt is that whatever arrangement we have for Gaza is tied to a clear pathway towards a two-state solution. Egypt cannot be seen as being a party to an arrangement in which it is a subcontractor for Israel's continued occupation of Gaza. We need to connect any arrangement for Gaza back to a pathway for two states. 

Jon Alterman: You spend a lot of time thinking about U.S.-Egyptian relations. You've watched and participated in those relations. What do you make of the U.S. role? Is the United States playing an effective role? Is it not doing enough to persuade Israel? Is the United States not doing enough to help Egypt? How would you grade the administration's approach—not necessarily the outcomes, but the actions?

Karim Haggag: I will give you a personal assessment. From the beginning, the way the Biden administration has framed this conflict has been extremely problematic. By bringing back the language associated with the war on terror—that Hamas is ISIS, and that Hamas is pure evil—they signed off on a very expansive, unbounded view of this conflict. That set the stage for Prime Minister Netanyahu's approach of total victory against Hamas and an unconditional or unbounded objective that can be realized by military means.

And we've seen, as a result, what some have referred to as the bear hug approach by the administration for this Israeli government, and that has resulted in some very problematic optics. We had the President of the United States sitting in on meetings of the Israeli war cabinet, followed, of course, by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. The optics of this reflected that the administration was actually a part of this conflict. And so, people associate—in a very close way—the administration with all of the atrocities that have taken place by the Israeli military in Gaza. And they don't hear the voices of concern that emanated from the administration about Palestinian lives or the need for Israel to adopt a more measured approach towards this conflict. That, I think, took a real toll on the administration's standing. 

Finally, you've seen an approach by which the administration sets red lines on a number of issues, then completely ignores when the Israeli side runs through those red lines. This leads to great skepticism as to what the administration can constructively do to bring this conflict to an end and then move to a “day after” approach which brings hope to Gaza and proactively moves towards a two-state outcome—which the administration claims is its ultimate objective. There's now real skepticism about the credibility of the United States with respect to this conflict and the moral standing of this administration when it comes to everything we've seen coming out of Gaza.

Jon Alterman: We have an election in November with an unclear outcome. The polling suggests that the likelihood of a return of a Trump presidency is increasing. How does that shape the approaches of the participants in these negotiations over the coming five months? Does it create a sense of urgency? Does it create a sense of passivity? How does this affect the prospects for near-term and longer-term solutions?

Karim Haggag: It's quite hard to say how this factors into decision-making. On the one hand, as an Israeli prime minister who finds it tremendously difficult to make the political decisions and compromises to end the war, it probably would make sense for Netanyahu to wait for a new administration. That is, buying time, looking to the November elections, and hoping that the outcome will alleviate him of having to make these difficult decisions. I doubt the elections factor into the calculus of Hamas. Also, because of the immediacy and the urgency of the issues facing Egypt, there's certainly no sense that we can wait for the November elections to start addressing this very difficult reality emanating from Gaza. 

Now, with respect to the broader U.S.-Egyptian relationship, I don't get the sense that Egypt has any partisan preference as to who controls the White House. We will deal with Democratic and Republican administrations alike. Unlike, interestingly enough, the Israeli-U.S. relationship, which seems to be becoming more and more partisan, I don't think Egypt is in a position to adopt that approach. The Egyptian-U.S. relationship is too important to make it a partisan issue.

Jon Alterman: Karim Haggag, thank you very much for joining us on Babel.

Karim Haggag: Thank you, Jon, for having me.

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