The outcome of this fall’s elections in the United States could in many ways represent an inflection point in the arc of U.S.-South Africa bilateral relations. The Biden administration has invested mightily in deepening ties and understanding with South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) government during a period of unprecedented global tensions that have seemingly put Washington and Pretoria on a multimodal collision course. Whether both sides can walk back from the brink of a long-term souring of relations depends as much on the new South African national unity government’s ability to take a less confrontational diplomatic approach to Washington as on the outcome of the U.S. presidential and congressional elections.
Under ANC leadership, South Africa has always relished its nonaligned status and in many respects has taken pride in not toeing Washington’s line around major geopolitical debates. From defending regimes in Palestine, Cuba, and Iran to aggressively highlighting Washington’s foreign policy hypocrisy, South Africa has long been a thorn in Washington’s side but one that U.S. officials have had to bear given Pretoria’s unique leadership role among countries in Africa and the Global South. But as Pretoria’s prestige has waned globally and on the continent after the ANC lost much of its moral luster due to internal corruption and mismanagement of public institutions, Washington’s tolerance and even silence in the face of Pretoria’s increasingly anti-Western statements and actions have prompted many U.S. allies and critics to call for a comprehensive review of relations with South Africa.
These calls have accelerated in recent years as Pretoria has adopted a series of positions that suggest that not only is it no longer, as it claims, nonaligned in its foreign policy but also its actions may directly threaten U.S. national security interests. South Africa remained noticeably silent in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, choosing to abstain from UN General Assembly votes condemning the action and encouraging others on the continent to do the same. While Pretoria’s defense of Russia may not threaten U.S. interests on the surface, its decisions to engage in military operations with both Russia and China the following year on the anniversary of the Ukraine invasion, and then allegedly sell weapons to Russia, have pushed both parties in Congress to advance legislation that could ultimately downgrade U.S.-South Africa relations. The bill, among other punitive measures, threatens Pretoria’s eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act—Washington’s premier trade promotion tool with Africa, under which South Africa remains the largest beneficiary. Such action would deeply damage South Africa’s ailing economy and send a threatening and confusing message to Pretoria other African states, who Secretary Blinken and other senior U.S. officials have repeatedly argued are free to choose who their partners are. This hypocrisy could well counteract broader U.S. government efforts to strengthen ties with African states in the face of aggressive Chinese and Russian courtship on the continent.
Losses for the ruling ANC in the June parliamentary elections and President Cyril Ramaphosa’s decision to form a governing coalition with the Western-leaning Democratic Alliance present a hopeful signal that course correction is possible. While Pretoria’s new ANC-affiliated foreign minister Ronald Lamola has remarked that his government’s approach to traditional foreign policy priorities is unlikely to fundamentally change under the new coalition, a less pugilistic delivery may be sufficient to avoid a further rupture in relations but only if Pretoria refrains from pursuing an overtly anti-Western agenda. Efforts to bring Israel in front of the International Court of Justice on genocide charges stemming from its operations in Gaza or to expand the BRICS alliance to include Iran have done little to encourage Washington to mend relations and will likely be seen as punishable acts by a Trump administration.
Going forward, Pretoria’s chairmanship of the G20 in 2025 presents an important opportunity early in the tenure of a new administration in Washington to mend fences and work on an agenda of issues of shared concern. Pretoria would be wise to use its chairmanship to focus on technical issues around global financial reform, intellectual property, and trade—issues that will benefit the Global South—while avoiding the kind of hot-button and overly divisive political topics that have recently distracted from the G20’s traditional economic and development-focused agenda.
Similarly, both parties in Washington would do well to hit the reset button in relations and pause before accelerating efforts to impose legislative or financial penalties on Pretoria for its past real and perceived misdeeds. To that end, a defining feature of any administration’s engagement with Pretoria should be avoiding public spats through an enhanced strategic dialogue mechanism, confining points of conflict to quieter official channels and eschewing bellicose public statements and social media. Contentious issues and vehement disagreements will likely continue to emerge, as they always have. The question is whether Washington will manage those disagreements coolly or combatively. Whichever approach it takes, any new administration should recall that where goes South Africa goes much of the Global South and that picking public fights with Pretoria may open the door for Washington’s strategic competitors in South Africa and across the Global South.
Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
