Key Takeaways from the TTC Ministerial in Sweden

The pace of transatlantic cooperation has significantly accelerated, as demonstrated during the allies’ swift response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and, more recently, at the fourth ministerial meeting of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) on May 30 and 31 in Lulea, Sweden. U.S. secretary of commerce Gina Raimondo, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken, U.S. trade representative Katherine Tai, and European Commission executive vice presidents Margrethe Vestager and Valdis Dombrovskis, the five cochairs of the council, gathered in Sweden, which currently holds the Council of the EU presidency.

Launched in 2021 as a mechanism to reaffirm the health and importance of the transatlantic relationship, it was further spurred by the need for cooperation on sanctions and export controls after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, concrete progress from the TTC has long been hindered by persistent frictions about climate and trade policy, including the Inflation Reduction Act’s (IRA) electric vehicle tax credit and the European Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). These frictions seem to have subsided, paving the way for what was a fruitful and technology-centered TTC.

Similar to the recent G7 Summit in Hiroshima, some of the more geopolitical nuances of economic statecraft—such as inbound and outbound screening mechanisms, export controls, economic coercion, and “de-risking”—colored the TTC ministerial. Convergence around key technologies like 6G, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) also featured prominently. Given the productivity of the last summit was derailed after the strong European displeasure with the IRA decelerated progress, resulting in lackluster outcomes on critical topics such as supply chain resiliency, clean tech, and standard-setting, May 2023 was crucial to proving the ability of both parties to cooperate in joint actions, particularly on critical emerging technology issues.

Q1: What did the parties agree to in the fourth TTC ministerial?

A1: The joint statement put out by both parties revealed that a wide array of policy initiatives, cooperative projects, research efforts, and agreements discussed in previous meetings have begun to produce results. Extensive attention was given to the question of regulation of emerging technologies, such as quantum and AI, which lawmakers have prioritized given their major potential as tools of societal advancement, but also as major risks to humanity. Cooperation on these issues seems to have superseded the importance of collaboration on building a "green marketplace." That is not necessarily surprising, given the same trend is occurring in broader media coverage of treating AI as the preeminent existential threat, casting climate issues to the side.

Arguably the three most salient outcomes of this meeting on technology surrounded AI, quantum technology, and 6G. These include updates to existing initiatives and the creation of new bodies:

  • Joint Roadmap for Trustworthy AI and Risk Management: Agreed to under the last TTC summit in December of 2022, the Joint Roadmap was designed for both sides to share definitions, standards, and approaches to risk management of AI based in the OECD AI Principles, and supporting the work done by the G7. In this ministerial, they announced they reached their previously stated goals of creating three new expert working groups on AI Terminology and Taxonomy, Cooperation on AI standards and tools for trustworthy AI and risk management, and Monitoring and measuring existing and emerging AI risks. They have already begun to produce tangible results, with the release of 65 key shared terms relevant to a risk-based approach to AI, along with a mapping of U.S. and EU standardization activities to find areas of common ground.
  • Task Force on Quantum Technologies: The newly founded Joint Task Force on Quantum Technologies is expected to feed into the U.S.-EU Cyber Dialogue, with a focus on issues including property rights, defining standards for quantum computers, export controls, post-quantum cryptography, and how to ensure cooperation between each bloc’s research and development programs.
  • 6G Outlook: Arising from discussions in previous TTC meetings, a 6G workshop convened by both governments on April 20 of this year generated valuable data and recommendations, included in the newly created 6G Outlook. It established key shared principles for its future development including sustainability, security, and accessibility.

Outside of emerging technology, other policy goals saw significant progress including an agreement on two trusted connectivity projects in Costa Rica and the Philippines, the publishing of an annex with guidelines on the identification of foreign information manipulation and interference, new principles for platforms regarding the safety of minors online, and an agreement to further cooperation on export controls and investment screening.

Q2: Did AI feature prominently at the TTC?

A2: Generative AI programs such as ChatGPT have catapulted AI and ethics issues to the forefront of policymaking in recent months, which the joint statement further underscored. Discussions at this ministerial took on a new weight with the one sentence statement released at the start of the summit, signed by AI experts and industry leaders, stating that: “Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.” In the TTC statement, the parties emphasize the importance of establishing guardrails and rules of the road for generative AI. They state: “The United States and the European Union decided to add special emphasis on generative AI, including its opportunities and risks, to the work on the [the Joint Roadmap on Evaluation and Measurement Tools for Trustworthy AI]. This work will complement the G7 Hiroshima AI process.” The need to expand these standards beyond the bilateral context will be crucial, particularly given that AI poses serious dangers, given its ability to invade our privacy, steal intellectual property, stoke polarization, and weaken democratic norms through the spread of disinformation.

In the U.S.-EU joint statement, the parties agreed that: “Recent developments in generative AI highlight the scale of the opportunities and the need to address the associated risks.” As of this meeting, the Joint Roadmap for Trustworthy AI and Risk Management is officially tasked with exploring the dangers of generative AI, and to give it “special emphasis.” Furthermore, on the second day of the summit, officials met to start drafting a voluntary code of conduct for monitoring AI, which, according to Vestager, aims to establish an expanded joint transatlantic initiative, which could be presented to the G7. Overall, if the Russian invasion of Ukraine spurred historic transatlantic progress on sanctions and export controls, the rapid deployment of increasingly advanced AI along with warnings from industry experts has re-contextualized some of the fundamental philosophical problems facing the transatlantic alliance.

Q3: How has the reshaping of transatlantic China strategies affected TTC talks?

A3: If the tech-focused agenda the last meeting was disrupted by the European uproar over the IRA, the outside geopolitical trend influencing officials during this round of talks has centered around evolving U.S.-China tensions and a slower bid by the Europeans to put forth a cohesive China strategy. While some EU member states and officials have taken a harder line against China, some, like France, have remained neutral, distancing themselves from U.S. efforts on export controls and other economic statecraft measures. While European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has emphasized the need for the EU to de-risk, and not decouple, from China, French president Emmanuel Macron made headlines earlier this year in his state visit to China when he mentioned pursuing an independent strategy from the United States, in order to not become “followers.”

The way that officials have chosen to bridge this divide is to simply remove almost all mention of China from the joint statement. China was only mentioned by name twice throughout the statement. However, the number of times it was subtly referenced was much higher, highlighting the problems with a “Control+F diplomacy” approach. The phrase “non-market policies” was used throughout the document, and often in a way that could be seen as a not-so-subtle reference to China.

Q4: What can be expected in the future for the TTC?

A4: While the date for the next ministerial has not been scheduled, it is will likely take place towards the end of this calendar year in the United States. Given the current global attention on the dangers of AI, and questions as to how to regulate its growth become more widespread, the release of a formal code of conduct would be a valuable and productive outcome.

Beyond AI and technology issues, it is imperative that the parties work to develop an affirmative action on climate and sustainability. Another consideration is that the next ministerial is likely to come on the heels of official Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and 2023 UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) meetings. Policymakers will thus have to contend with competing geopolitical dynamics and priority areas but have a tremendous opportunity to reaffirm the importance of transatlantic leadership and to secure additional third country buy-in to the broader agenda, particularly on AI and climate change mitigation policies.

The TTC represents an opportunity for the parties to reassert their unity and global influence, further building on the agenda recently outlined by European Commission president von der Leyen and key Biden administration officials. The post-Cold War economic order is coming to an end, ushering in a new chapter of history. New challenges invite new opportunities to cooperate, whether on emerging technologies, green supply chains, or a fundamental de-risking of commercial ties. The strength of this TTC ministerial demonstrates that Brussels and Washington recognize this reality and shows they intend to capitalize on it. However, onlookers should not take the existence of the TTC for granted. Both the European Union and United States will enter major election cycles that will occur in 2024, potentially shifting respective gazes inward. It will thus fall on leaders to accelerate the TTC agenda, knowing that domestic political factors may soon intercede.

Emily Benson is director of the Project on Trade and Technology and senior fellow with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Catharine Mouradian is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Project on Trade and Technology at CSIS.

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Katya Mouradian
Program Manager and Research Associate, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business
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Emily Benson

Emily Benson

Former Director, Project on Trade and Technology and Former Senior Fellow, Scholl Chair in International Business