This report is part of Strategic Japan, a CSIS Japan Chair initiative featuring analysis by Japan’s leading foreign policy scholars on key regional and global challenges and the implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance.
For a long time, Japan has been abnormal within the context of realism, which assumes that national interests will drive states to seek military capabilities. Despite enormous economic strength, Japan has not expanded its military capabilities. Likewise, despite being surrounded by nuclear-armed powers such as the United States, Russia (then the Soviet Union), China, and, more recently, North Korea, Japan has not developed nuclear weapons.
Yoshida Shigeru, who became Japan’s prime minister soon after the end of World War II, established the basic directions of Japanese foreign and security policy. These three basic tenets, called the Yoshida Doctrine, included maintaining a tight alliance with the United States, building up only very limited armed forces, and pursuing economic growth through international trade. The Japanese constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were the two foundations of this doctrine. In the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the current prime minister, Kishida Fumio, belongs to the Kochikai faction, one of five main groups in the ruling party, which has roots in Yoshida.
With the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan has enjoyed the liberal international order led by the United States since the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, including as the second-largest economy in the world from 1968 to 2010. Now, however, China is challenging this order through its huge military capabilities and coercive diplomacy, while North Korea threatens the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Furthermore, by invading Ukraine, Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has obviously violated the UN Charter. Even the United States has trended toward an inward-looking, if not isolationist, and occasionally unilateral perspective on international affairs, as seen through its decision not to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In short, the international order and norms that have been in Japan’s favor are now in crisis.
Though Japan has not sought to fully expand its defense capabilities, it has been very good at utilizing economic and technological statecraft to aid developing countries. Unlike many Western countries, Tokyo has placed relatively less emphasis on democracy and human rights in its diplomacy. For example, Japan has maintained a good relationship with the military administrations in Myanmar and Thailand, as well as India’s Hindu-centric leadership. Although the Yoshida Doctrine includes the concepts of peace, security, and free trade, it is also a materialistic and secular doctrine.
Since the third wave of democratization, from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, the number and degree of democracies in the world has begun to decline. Major powers such as China and Russia do not show any hesitation to violate basic human rights in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Furthermore, in the case of contingencies, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, authoritarian regimes have appeared to be more effective than democratic ones, at least on the surface.
Concerned about these situations and its own declining economic power, Tokyo has realized the importance of actively promoting universal values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law through diplomacy. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative, introduced by former prime minister Abe Shinzo, is a good example of this values-based diplomacy.
Might, wealth, and values are basic components of international politics and are closely related to each other. In general, Japanese foreign and security policy is shifting from an economic focus to a focus on values, and to some extent, power.
In December 2022, the Japanese government released its new National Security Strategy, in which it elected to spend about 2 percent of GDP on defense and acquire longer-range missiles, including 500 U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. The new strategy marks a “major transformation in Japan’s security policy,” said Prime Minister Kishida. The new strategic document calls the current moment “the most severe and complex security environment” since the end of World War II, according to the Wall Street Journal.
However, even this “awakening” is based on normative considerations as well as strategic ones. Also, without strategic calculations, the international order and norms in favor of Japan can no longer be maintained. In this sense, so-called values-based diplomacy must be realistic as well as idealistic. Can values-based diplomacy be an alternative to the Yoshida Doctrine under Kishida?
This paper examines current developments in Japan’s values-based diplomacy as well as its normative considerations and domestic implications. Based on this analysis, the paper articulates future tasks for Japanese values-based diplomacy and U.S.-Japan cooperation.
At the end of the Cold War, Japan was declared to be the “winner” of the war because Tokyo enjoyed economic prosperity without needing to support huge military capabilities. Some argued that Japan’s economy was now the most serious challenge to the United States after the Soviet military threat. Faced with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, however, Japan seemed to be the “loser” of the war because its economic prosperity heavily depended on oil supplies from the Middle East. Tokyo failed to participate in the UN-authorized, U.S.-led military operation except for financial contributions. This experience led to deep trauma for Japanese diplomacy in the post–Cold War era.
In 1992, Tokyo established a new law for UN peacekeeping operations. Under the new law, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) experienced their first deployment overseas, to Cambodia after the conclusion of the country’s civil war. “International contribution” became a key concept for Japanese foreign policy. Later, Japanese peacekeeping operations played an important role in stabilizing East Timor after its independence in 2002. Likewise, Ogata Sadako personified Japan’s “international contribution” as the UN high commissioner for refugees in the 1990s.
As Tokyo cautiously began pursuing international contributions, Japan’s economic bubble burst and North Korea began developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. In the realm of values, China and South and North Korea utilized the history card against Japan. While Japan was the perpetrator in a historical context, it became the victim due to North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens. These events all combined to make Japan’s position in the post–Cold War world unstable.
After 9/11, the United States took part in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an effort to not repeat the failures of the Gulf War, Tokyo became more active in its cooperation with Washington. When Abe Shinzo came to power in 2006, Japan became even more active in regional and global security than in the 1990s. With Foreign Minister Aso Taro, Prime Minister Abe tried to create an “arc of freedom and prosperity” across Asia by promoting values of liberty, human rights, democracy, and rule of law. Abe also proposed the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India.
In 2012, Abe came to power again and proposed the Security Diamond initiative among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India—four maritime democracies—for maintaining free trade and the rule of law in the Indian Ocean and Pacific. Later, he proposed the FOIP initiative, and the United States adopted the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. It goes without saying that these proposals intended the revival of the Japanese economy through free trade and included keen geopolitical calculations under the umbrella of values. However, these initiatives and the conduct of global governance have been difficult to implement for several reasons:
Other events have contributed to the impression that the international order is in crisis. Another unilateral action, the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, helped cement this picture. Biden’s abrupt decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021 without prior consultation with Western allies such as the United Kingdom similarly contributed and may have influenced Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. The world has seen repeated unilateral action taken among major powers, specifically permanent members of the UN Security Council.
The difficulties in promoting the FOIP and other global governance initiatives increase the need for stronger commitment from Japan to values-based diplomacy. Following Abe, Prime Ministers Suga Yoshihide and Kishida have been clearly aware of this imperative. For example, Suga promoted Japan’s commitment to climate change issues, and Kishida created a new position for a special adviser for international human rights in his cabinet, appointing Nakatani Gen, a former minister of defense. In India, Prime Minister Kishida announced a new plan for promoting the FOIP and for cooperating more with the Global South.
Despite the repeated unilateral actions among major powers, cooperative measures have been taken among mature democracies to maintain the liberal international order. In September 2021, for example, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced AUKUS, a new security arrangement with two pillars designed to “deliver Australia a fleet of conventionally armed submarines and to collaborate on a host of advanced capabilities.” Likewise, summit and foreign ministerial meetings for the Quad have been held frequently since 2019, and the leaders of the four Quad countries have confirmed their intent to pursue the FOIP initiative.
Also, Prime Minister Kishida is now improving Japanese-South Korean relations by overcoming the so-called wartime labor issue. In March 2023, he hosted South Korean president Yun Suk Yeol in Tokyo and made a reciprocal visit to Seoul in May. Without improving bilateral relations with South Korea, it would be extremely difficult for Tokyo to promote its values-based diplomacy and more assertive security policy.
Furthermore, in April 2023, the Japanese government announced a plan to create a new framework for Official Security Assistance (OSA) for like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. This assistance will be provided initially to the Philippines, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Fiji.
In the future, Japan might join AUKUS, and South Korea expressed its willingness to cooperate with the Quad in its Indo-Pacific Strategy announced in December 2022. Embedded in the Quad framework, Japanese–South Korean bilateral relations would have far greater stability. Also, U.S. allies in the Pacific, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, could promote security cooperation with U.S. allies in the Atlantic. For example, U.S. allies in the Pacific now realize growing Russian threats, and U.S. allies in the Atlantic now take Chinese threats more seriously than before. Pacific-Atlantic cooperation can function as a safeguard for U.S. isolationism and unilateralism and would also help strengthen the FOIP.
Beyond the above-mentioned changes in the strategic environment, Japanese values-based diplomacy is influenced by many normative considerations.
First, Japan’s constitution is based on the UN Charter. The preamble of the Japanese constitution states that: “We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” This passage seems very opportunistic as well as idealistic. When the constitution was drafted in 1946, Japan was still occupied by the United States, so Japan strongly wished for the end of occupation, the recovery of sovereignty, and participation in the United Nations. Article 4 of the UN Charter notes that “membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter” (emphasis added). Therefore, it is crystal clear that the “peace-loving peoples of the world” in the Japanese constitution is a reference to the United Nations.
Article 9 of the Japanese constitution famously states that “aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of forces as means of settling international disputes.” Due to this article, the Japanese constitution is often called the “Peace Constitution.” Many Japanese believe that their constitution is a harbinger of abandoning warfare for international peace. Prior to the constitution, however, Article 1 of the UN Charter aimed
"to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."
Namely, prior to the Japanese constitution, acts of aggression were prohibited across the world under the UN Charter. In this sense, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution just reconfirmed Article 1 of the UN Charter. In short, the foundation of the Japanese constitution is the idea that international peace shall be attained through the United Nations. This foundation is now challenged by Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Though the UN Charter admits that any sovereign nation possesses the right to individual and collective self-defense, the Japanese government still takes the politically compromising interpretation that Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defense only against clear and existential threats. Before Japan established the new Legislation for Peace and Security under the Abe administration in 2015, it could not exercise the right of collective self-defense under any circumstances. However, even Prime Minister Abe could not amend the constitution.
Japan would certainly respond if China attacked U.S. bases such as Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, but what about an attack on Taiwan? Abe often said that the security of Japan is connected to Taiwan. However, according to China expert Oriana Skylar Mastro in a Washington Post opinion piece:
"Crudely, Japan seems to be prepared to push back against only Chinese assets that are clearly poised to attack its sovereign territory. . . . While a degree of strategic ambiguity makes sense, too much could backfire. If Japan is clearly unwilling to defend Taiwan, then, improvements in Japanese military capabilities will do little to deter conflict across the strait."
On the one hand, the UN Charter authorizes the U.S.-Japan alliance as a regional arrangement; on the other hand, the current interpretation of the Japanese constitution still restricts the functions of the alliance. Today, normative concerns about the UN Charter being in crisis have grown, and constitutional restrictions on Japanese foreign and security policy have also loosened. Nonetheless, in the normative triangle among the UN Charter, the Japanese constitution, and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the Yoshida Doctrine still survives.
Beyond this normative triangle, Japanese foreign and security policy will have three options. First, if Japan were to loosen constitutional restrictions, it would become a more values-based and power-based country. This would lead to a cooperative and strong Japan. Second, if it ignored the UN Charter, Japan would become a less values-based and more power-based country, ultimately making it cynical and opportunistic. Finally, if it were to depart from the U.S.-Japan alliance, it would be a less values-based and less power-based country, making it a small and selfish Japan.
Another normative consideration is that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and North Korea’s provocations are destabilizing the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It should be noted that Ukraine possessed massive nuclear weapons after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, surpassed only by Russia and the United States in terms of the number of nuclear warheads it possessed. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, Ukraine decided to abandon such weapons in exchange of security assurances. Today the very country that abandoned nuclear weapons is now under attack by the largest nuclear-armed power in the world. Moscow has further suggested the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine and has decided to depart from the New START Treaty with the United States, reducing the prospects for nuclear disarmament in the future.
Japan, which suffered from two atomic bombings in World War II, will never accept such a consequence. For Japan, it is a moral principle that goes beyond security calculations. Japan is serving as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council from 2023 to 2025 and chaired the G7 Hiroshima summit in May 2023. Using these opportunities, Japan should mobilize international forces in favor of nuclear disarmament.
The final normative consideration is that Japan has enjoyed peace and prosperity under the liberal international order. The Yoshida Doctrine fit in this order. For example, the order was led by the United States, Japan’s only ally, and allowed Japan to pursue economic growth through international free trade without huge military capabilities. As Japan has decreased in relative national power, this order has become destabilized. For many Japanese people, Japan’s decline is almost identical to the liberal international order falling into crisis.
Japan must now move from the Yoshida Doctrine in a new direction toward a cooperative and strong Japan. Economy-based diplomacy alone is no longer effective and should be complemented by both values-based diplomacy and power-based diplomacy. Mobilizing a three-dimensional diplomacy, Japan can help save the liberal international order, under which it can continue to enjoy peace and prosperity. In other words, by moving beyond the Yoshida Doctrine today, the aims of the doctrine will be well achieved.
For any country, foreign policy can easily be inconsistent with domestic politics. In the fields of human rights, according to Stanford sociologist Kiyotada Tsutsui, many countries have suffered from the “paradox of empty promises.” Namely, by expressing idealistic policies related to human rights internationally, governments sometimes struggle to adopt consistent domestic policies in accordance with those diplomatic goals.
Prime Minister Abe was a leading conservative politician in Japan. His nationalistic supporters tended to hate China, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea. To a large extent, Abe promoted values-based diplomacy as a countermeasure for China and North Korea, who are clearly against democracy, freedom, rule of law, and basic human rights. However, Prime Minister Abe did not enact strong economic sanctions against Moscow after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 because he was eager to promote bilateral talks with Putin over the Northern Territories. In this sense, Abe’s values-based diplomacy could be called a double-standard as well as realistic.
Prime Minister Kishida belongs to the Kochikai faction of the LDP and is regarded as less conservative than Abe was. His Kochikai faction is small within the party, and his rate of support from his cabinet is unstable. In the wake of Abe’s demise, Kishida needs to play the role of Abe’s legitimate successor in order to keep Abe’s supporters. Kishida’s values-based diplomacy, as well as his assertive security policy, is also deeply rooted in domestic political considerations.
This makes Japanese values-based diplomacy complicated. For example, many Japanese conservatives do not want to accept more immigrants, refugees, sexual diversity, or same-sex marriage. The LDP is still cautious to submit legislation promoting LGBTQ+ human rights in the National Diet. Article 24 of the Japanese constitution states that “Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis” (emphasis added). Legally speaking, it may be difficult for Japan to accept same-sex marriage without amending this article. As a result, in order to accept ethnic, sexual, religious, and cultural diversity, as other mature democracies do, Japanese society must change itself significantly, which conservative forces dislike and resist. While Article 9 was not open to interpretation through the drafting of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security, many Japanese constitutional specialists advocate for greater ability to interpret Article 24. This is nothing other than legal hypocrisy. Both conservatives and liberals suffer from the “paradox of empty promises.”
In the field of international law, Japan has not yet signed the Genocide Convention, despite the treaty being ratified by 152 countries, including the United States, Russia, and China. Similarly, Japan has not ratified the treaty prohibiting employment discrimination under the International Labor Organization. Also, Japan does not have an equivalent law to the Global Magnitsky Act, which can identify and punish individuals and organizations for human rights violations. In light of the “paradox of empty promises,” Japan’s domestic legal frameworks need to be further reviewed.
As mentioned above, values-based diplomacy should be supported by power-based diplomacy. Today, a majority of Japanese citizens are in favor of the country’s new defense strategy. At the same time, however, more than 60 percent are not in favor of increasing taxes for the new strategy. This is the paradox of democracy. Without implementing plans in detail, any strategy is just a piece of paper. Prime Minister Kishida’s government must persuade Japanese constituents to depart from the Yoshida Doctrine.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Japan suffered from economic decay. Then, by emphasizing liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Japan gradually developed values-based diplomacy as a supplement to economy-based diplomacy. Aware of the severe strategic environment, Prime Minister Abe provided the new concepts of the FOIP and the Quad. In addition to being a realistic response to the economic and strategic environment, however, Japan’s values-based diplomacy is founded on various normative considerations, such as the UN Charter, the Japanese constitution, and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, among others, as well as domestic political calculations, which easily brings any country to the “paradox of empty promises.”
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Since the end of the Cold War, Japanese foreign and security policy has gradually shifted from being economy-based to being values-based and, to some extent, power-based. This shift is a reflection of the relative decline of Japan’s economic competitiveness, the liberal international order in crisis, and the new severe strategic environment.
In the era of the Cold War, the Yoshida Doctrine fit the liberal international order. In order to save this order, however, Japan should move from this doctrine in a new direction for a cooperative and strong Japan. Following the demise of former prime minister Abe, Prime Minister Kishida must persuade and educate Japanese conservatives to support values-based diplomacy and the liberal public to support power-based diplomacy.
Murata Koji is a professor of political science at Doshsiha University in Kyoto, Japan.
The Strategic Japan initiative is made possible by a grant from the government of Japan.