The Asia Chessboard
Andrew Schwartz: Welcome to the Asia Chessboard, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia, and takes an inside look at the making of Grand Strategy. I'm Andrew Schwartz at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Hannah Fodale: This week, Mike is joined by General Charles Flynn, Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific, to discuss the role of the Army in the Indo-Pacific. They touch on the history of the Army's engagement in the region, the foundational capabilities of U.S. Army Pacific, coordination with allies and partners, and threats to the regional security environment.
Michael Green: Welcome back to the Asia Chessboard for our 59th episode, and we are really privileged to be joined by the Commander of U.S. Army Pacific, General Charles Flynn, to talk about the strategic chessboard, the threat environment our allies and partners, and especially the role of the U.S. Army, which I'm guessing a lot of our listeners don't think about all the time. They look at the Pacific and they see a lot of blue, so they think maritime services and Air Force. But the reality is the U.S. Army provides the foundational logistics for our presence and operations, and historically has been a significant fighting force. There were more Army divisions finding the Japanese in World War II than Marine Corps divisions, for example. So we're going to explore that with General Flynn, but first, of course, General, welcome.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Thank you, Dr. Green, appreciate you asking me to come on the podcast.
Michael Green: And we always start learning a little bit about our guests and how they got situated working on the Indo-Pacific at high levels as you do. You had career U.S. Army, but how did your pathway end up with you commanding the U.S. Army in the Pacific?
Gen. Charles Flynn: So I spent almost four years in 2nd Ranger Battalion. I went to the Naval War College for my intermediate schooling instead of the Command and General Staff College. So I left the Naval War College in 1997, and I came out to my first tour here in Hawaii, and I was the Chief of Operations in the G3. And then I was a battalion operations officer and a brigade operations officer. So I spent my first tour here from '97 to 2000. And at the time, the commander of the division was a guy by the name of J.T. Hill, who later became the I Corps commander and the SOUTHCOM commander.
Gen. Charles Flynn: James Hill had been at that particular time in Hawaii. I think it was this fifth tour, with two tours out of here to Vietnam. Anyways, that officer, and then his deputy commander was a gentleman by the name of James Campbell, and his other deputy commander was a gentleman by the name of Dave Barnell. Those two officers, those three, I should say, General Hill, General Campbell, James Campbell, retired, and General Dave Barnell, made an impression on me in my intermediate years as a major about the value of the 25th Division in the Pacific, but also the value of the 25th Infantry Division in the Army in Hawaii.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And so I left in 2000. I went to a joint job at Joint Forces Command, what was then Joint Forces Command. And I was an observer trainer doing joint training, actually, on the deployable training team. And then of course, 9/11 happened, and I primarily spent the rest of those years at Fort Bragg as a Battalion Commander, Division G3, a brigade commander with repeated rotations back to Middle East. But then I find myself in 2014 being told to come back to the 25th Division to be the commanding general. And so in 2014, I arrived again for the second time, 14 years later.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And ironically at the time, Dr. Green, that was ... We were in the throes of the pivot to the Pacific. And so I spent '14 to '18 here as the Division Commander of the 25th Division, the Senior Commander of the United States Army Hawaii. And then I was the Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific. I left here and went back to the Pentagon and was the Chief Operations Officer for the Army for plan strategy, training, readiness, et cetera. And then I was honored to be able to come back to the very headquarters I was a deputy commander in 2021 and be the commander. So basically from 2014 to 2022, I've of been out of the area for three of those years, but having spent almost eight of them here and then the previous three years. So almost a decade in my time out here. So I'm honored to be able to do it.
Michael Green: And we're glad you're out there. My brother worked for Stan McChrystal as a Marine major and said he was the hardest charging CO he ever had, and made him do more PT than any Marine Corps general officer he ever worked for. So I'm sure you were in really good shape when you were working for Stan McChrystal. When you went to the Naval War College, did that hook your interest in Asia? Because the Naval War College, Alfred Thayer Mahan, a storied history of studying strategy, did that start to kindle some interest?
Gen. Charles Flynn: It did. The curriculum there, of course, is interesting in that they ... At the time there was trimesters. One was joint military operations, one was strategy and policy, and then the other was structure and organizational design. But I think that the depth of the reading and the exposure to the faculty, the academic faculty there at the Naval War College at the time did take me from a great deal of tactical exposure or experience. And it did put me in a different intellectual place by way of study and research. It was a place also where we were basically writing a paper a week. All of our exams were papers. So there was a lot of reading and a lot of writing. And to your point, there was a fair amount of the academics that was based on Asia and the Indo-Pacific, or the Pacific at the time.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And then I took a fair amount of electives, I think, that helped me understand this part of the region, as well. I did know when I got there that I was coming to Hawaii, so my head may have been that way. And I did get exposed a little bit to it when I was in 2nd Ranger Battalion because it was at what is now Joint Base Lewis McChord, or Fort Lewis then, in Washington. So there was a degree of that, that I was paying attention to even there.
Michael Green: Getting to the role of the Army in the Indo-Pacific theater, so you've done ... it sounds like 10 plus years in that theater, right?
Gen. Charles Flynn: Close to 10, close.
Michael Green: How has the Army's role changed? Now that you’re at the top. But how have you seen it evolve and change in those 10 years?
Gen. Charles Flynn: Yeah, so I think my first tour here ... Obviously this is before the Global War on Terror and the commitments that we had across the Middle East, I think the 25th Division has always had a ... been recognized as the Pacific Division. And I think the important recognition of that is actually from the region. And because of its history in the region, in the various campaigns, the 63 campaigns, actually, more than the rest of the campaigns combined across the globe, largely the 25th Division has played a central role in that. But I would say then, that what the 25th Division was primarily doing was staying very focused on the Korea plans, and then doing the exercises in the region. By the way, a number of those exercises still exist today.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Quick story, Dr. Green. In my recent visit to Thailand, the Chief of Army is a guy by the name of General Narongphan. General Narongphan was a battalion S3 for a battalion that participated in Cobra Gold, and he did the airborne operation into Thailand. Well, I was the battalion S3 of battalion 127, and we were matched together during that exercise, not knowing one another, and not knowing certainly that he would end up being the Chief of the Thai Army, and I would to being the Commander of U.S. Army Pacific. And we just got that connection in the last nine, 10 months while I've been in command. So I think that that is part of our relationships with them.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And so the region recognizes that this division, the 25th Division, is part of a bigger organization called the Theater Army. And I think when I was in the 25th Division, I'm not sure that I fully recognized that. But when I came back to be the commander of the 25th Division and the pivot began in the Theater Army, this ... In fact, my command went from a three star command to a four star command, and the recognition of that was pretty substantial in the region and across the Army.
Michael Green: Well, let's go right to that, partnership, engagement, alliances. When Vince Brook ... I guess Vince Brook would've been the first commander of USARPAC when it was a four star billet.
Gen. Charles Flynn: That's right. And Vince was here when I was ... So when I became the 25th commander, he was the 1st commander here, and had gotten here about nine, ten months before I showed up.
Michael Green: We had him speak at CSIS when he took on that role. He was outstanding in Korea, as well. But he used to make the argument which got people's attention in Washington, that most of the CHODs, most of the chiefs of defense in this theater, are Army. So that relationship, that engagement is an important part of your job, right? How do you assess the key allies and security partners we work with? Where have you seen some real growth, and where do you see opportunity we haven't taken advantage of? You mentioned the Thai, a historic ally with some political challenges. But how have you worked those partnerships and alliance relationships?
Gen. Charles Flynn: So again, I think the region, what is on the Asian continent and what exists between the Southeast Asian archipelagic land bridge, which connects the other continent of Australia. I think the influence of armies in the region is substantial, as you pointed out. The armies in this region, and as you're noting, I think at the present moment we have 22 chiefs of defense that are also army generals. So then you also have 30 army generals that are in charge of the armies. So land power and armies in this part of the world play a central and very important role in stabilizing the region.
Gen. Charles Flynn: I've said publicly and I've written that the armies here in this region, and land powers, in this region. They really are the security architecture that bind the region together because they play a central role in protecting national sovereignty, the borders, the people, the resources that main a stable, free, and open, and international rules-based circumstances for each one of the countries.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And so to your question, yes, army leaders play an influential role, both in the ... as chiefs of defense and as army generals. Four of the last five countries that I visited, their chiefs of defense are army generals, and their army chiefs are, of course, army generals. And they're likely to be replaced by those army generals. So those relationships really matter. And the region is widely influenced by that role that the armies play here.
Michael Green: I imagine when you're engaging the Chief of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Forces in Japan, for example, versus the Chief of Staff of the Army in Brunei, that it's a different kind of dialogue. But what constitutes success for you when you're engaging with your counterparts? Is it about trust? Is it about access, capacity, building resilience? What are you looking for when you come? You just had a big tour in Southeast Asia. What do you look for as success when you have these engagements?
Gen. Charles Flynn: Simply stated Dr. Green, it's just creating a relationship. And from a deeper, honest, open relationship, then opportunities will emerge. So I think that being able to sit down, look each other in the eye, share our concerns about security through one another's perspectives, and then talk about our experiences in the region, allow a better, a deeper, a more candid and frank exchange of ideas. And so to your question of success, I think success at my level with them is to create a relationship where there is increasing trust that then translates right down into the very force of, at least in my case, the army.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And, and then if that army general, like General Yamazaki in Japan, who obviously was the previous Chief of Army, if that then translates into a broader degree of trust with the Joint Force and the military because the influence that an army general plays, then that's beneficial. And I think that's helpful not just to the Army and land power, I think that's helpful for the Joint Force. So I think it's really just a relationship, and I think that relationship continues to build opportunities and create opportunities between our forces and our countries.
Michael Green: Yeah, this came home to me in a very tangible way in 2004 and 2005 when the tsunami hit. And the first QUAD was a joint quadrilateral task force, U.S., Japan, Australia, and India. And the reason it happened was not those of us in the White House or back in Washington, in the Pentagon. The reason it happened was because Admiral Duran, the Seventh Fleet Commander, had gone to Command and Staff College with an Indian counterpart, was homeporting in Yokosuka and knew his Japanese counterpart, exercised with an Australian counterpart, and they trusted each other. And national policy followed from that. So the payoff's big, beyond the army, for these kind of relationships.
Michael Green: But it has to be tricky, too, I would think, because a lot of these Chiefs of Defense and Chiefs of Army play a different role from our Chiefs of Defense, Chiefs of Army in domestic politics, like in Thailand or in Bangladesh. So you're also representing not just the Army, but you inevitably have to be representing the whole U.S. government when you're dealing with someone who's also a political player in a way that our uniformed military wouldn't be. Do you have an approach to handle that? Do you try to stick to military things? Do you talk about civil military relations in the U.S. context? How do you handle that? You've got a political aid, I guess, from the State Department, but it's got to be a tricky thing.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Well maybe I'm just going to simplify. I don't know if I find it to be tricky. I think that if I am a good example and I am trustworthy, and honest, and forthright, and that the relationship becomes deeper because we're having frank conversations about what our formations, what our armies need from one another ... because they have skills, they have attributes, they have characteristics, they have advantages that we do not have, and we need to learn from them. And I think that's a helpful way, or at least my experience here has been helpful, that it's not all about what the U.S. Army wants. It's also about what they can provide and can help us with, because there are certain things that their army does in those countries that are really, really helpful.
Gen. Charles Flynn: If you don't mind, I'm going to tell a story here to highlight this fact. When I was a division commander, I went and brought a corps commander from an army in Southeast Asia, and I brought him into a brigade command post. And the brigade command post had UAVs flying, it had full motion video. It had all this ... I'll say high end technology that was monitoring, tracking, reporting, and conducting, and command and controlling a fairly large operation.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And I was feeling pretty proud, and I walked out of the command post, and I looked at the Indonesian corps commander. I'm a division commander. And I said, "What do you think? That was really good, huh?" And he turned to me and he said ... And he pointed over his shoulder, and he said, "You know we'll never be like that." And I stopped and took ... There was some air out of my balloon there. And then he pointed over at the jungle and he said, "But that's what you need us for."
Gen. Charles Flynn: And I think the point is that this is sometimes more about them and less about us. And I try to use that when I go into my meetings with my counterparts because I think that helps create opportunities for the U.S., and the U.S. Army, and the U.S. Military, and I think that's part of the forming that security relationship that matters over time.
Michael Green: That's actually a great story. And it captures in your job what I think the State Department, the Treasury Department, the whole U.S. government, and our allies and partners, should be doing because in the contest we're in, in Asia right now, and historically for us in that region, if we're helping countries be more resilient, more secure, and achieve their goals, we win. When we're trying to harness them to our goals, it's not going to work if that's all we're bringing. So that's a great example. Could you tell us a bit ... The USARPAC provides what are called foundational capabilities for all the U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. Could you tell people a bit about what that means? What are these foundational capabilities?
Gen. Charles Flynn: Before I do that-
Michael Green: Yeah?
Gen. Charles Flynn: Could I just come back to that point you just were highlighting? At the end of the day, the relationships of senior military officials, or really senior officials ... So I believe, and I guess my experience bears witness to, that the great counterweight against any adversarial, destabilizing, or activities that try to undermine national sovereignty, the great counterweight is the network of allies and partners that we work with here. I mean, full stop. That is the great counterweight because if the neighborhood is friendly to one another, and we're working to achieve one another's aims, objectives, and goals, and trying to help, then that will be the greater good and the best counterweight that we have to destabilizing activities, namely from China. But there's also from North Korea, and there's also from Russia, and there's also from extremist organizations. If I can, I'll jump over to the question, Mike, unless you want to respond to that.
Michael Green: No, no, you're absolutely right.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Yeah. So-
Michael Green: So foundational capabilities. Yeah.
Gen. Charles Flynn: So often misunderstood and not well-represented is that the Theater Army ... And by the way, the largest Theater Army by more than two times is the Theater Army that I command, honored to command. And in this Theater Army, we have commands that we refer to as enabling commands. Those enabling commands are things like integrated air missile defense, sustainment, contracting command, civil affairs, engineer, Corps of Engineer, vertical and horizontal engineers, port opening capabilities, police. There's 13 flag officer commands that represent enabling capabilities that I refer to as foundational to the Joint Force. My secretary talks about them being the backbone of the Joint Force.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And I think that those capabilities give us scale and capacities in the theater that allow for freedom of maneuver, freedom of action for the Joint Force Commander because they bring scale, and they bring command and control, and they bring the ability for headquarters to become coalition, joint, inter-agency, and multinational literally overnight. The one thing that the Army does bring is command and control and scale, because our headquarters can build up very, very quickly because we have flag officers in charge of it, a full and robust staff, and we can take on, as I said, joint multinational and inter agency, or even international plugs, to be able to respond from typhoons and earthquakes, to other crises, or to conflict. And so, I think that's the value of these foundational capabilities that are found at the theater army level.
Michael Green: And your command was just re-certified as a combined joint task force capable command, and that's what that means, right? That ability to integrate in a crisis is there in your command.
Gen. Charles Flynn: That's right. Shortly after I took command in June, there was an exercise called Pacific Century, and Pacific Century was the JTF certification for U.S. Army Pacific. And so we do that once every two years. I'll do it again in June of '23 under, obviously, the command and control of USINDOPACOM, who was a huge player in that, as well as the other components, PAC Fleet, and PACAF, and MARFORPAC, and SOCPAC.
Michael Green: So the INDOPACOM commander, Admiral Aquilino, has stated that one of the big challenges we face is an erosion of traditional deterrence, vis-a-vis, peer competitors, obviously China. And part of that, of course, is the extended A2/AD, anti access/area denial envelope. The PLA increasingly enjoys access. We’ll see what happens this week in the Solomon Islands with a joint military agreement with China. So as that envelope moves out into the maritime domain and into the area where the Army provides these foundational capabilities, how does that change your job? How are you transforming land power and thinking about the Army's role when ... This is a very different environment than when you first served out there, I'm sure.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Yeah. I think I'll address how maybe the region has changed, certainly since 2014, and also since just as recently as 2018 when I left, and I reenter back into it in 2021. So I'll jump up to south Asia first. When I departed, probably the damming effort along the Mekong was one of the more profound problems that was there. And of course, as you mentioned earlier, or touched on it, there was a coup there in '14 in Thailand. But I actually think military to military we've come a long way, and that was represented the other day, or last ... two weeks ago when I was in Thailand with General Narongphan and the leadership of Thailand.
Gen. Charles Flynn: But let me go across south Asia and tell you where we are today. As previously, there was fighting. Now there's hardening of positions along the line of actual control between China and India. We have incursions in the Bhutan. We have a coup in Myanmar. We have ground routes being developed down into the port of Karachi. We have ground routes being built into Rangoon. We have high speed rail being built. We have challenges in Laos and Cambodia. So in South Asia alone, since I left in '18, there are some challenges that need to be addressed.
Gen. Charles Flynn: By the way, Dr. Green, that represents nearly two billion people from the Indian border to Vietnam. So that is not something to ... We have to pay attention to that. And then my recent visit just highlighted this, is that while we have a number of opportunities, I believe, in Southeast Asia, with the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste. I believe that there's opportunities there. But what I would express to you is that they are concerned about some of those destabilizing activities in south Asia migrating into Southeast Asia. Okay? And then I'll jump out to Oceania, and you mentioned the Solomon Islands. There are other challenges in Oceania.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And I think as you and I have talked before, many of the countries that I just talked about, they are concerned about three things. They're concerned about fresh water, they're concerned about food security, and they're concerned about minerals, minerals to run factories to keep people working and to help their economy. That includes these small island nations that if they get wiped out by a natural disaster, they need resilience in their infrastructure, because what do they need? They need an airport opened back up. They need a port opened back up. They need their power grid back on so they can treat injuries, and they can stave off loss of life. And I think that's where the Army plays a role in being able to respond on the ground to the people who live on land so that we can protect our allies and partners, build that relationship, increase trust.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And as a result of exercising out there in the region, like we do constantly, we are creating conditions where interoperability and trust are really our value proposition in the region. And that network of allies and partners that grow from that is, again, is the great counterweight to any of these adversary and destabilizing activities that occur here across Asia and Southeast Asia, or for that matter, Northeast Asia, as well.
Michael Green: So, what I think I'm hearing is, as the security environment gets more complicated in South and Southeast Asia, with capabilities of peer competitors, the answer is more engagement, more access, more partnerships, broadening ... strengthening our critical advantage, I guess.
Gen. Charles Flynn: So. Yes I do. But I also think that ... Because I think your question was more about the Chinese arsenal and the A2/AD capabilities that they've developed. Let me put it this way. The A2/AD arsenal that they have created is largely designed to defeat naval and air power. And then secondarily, it is to degrade, disrupt, deny and counter space and cyber. It's not primarily designed, or even secondarily designed, to find, fix and finish land forces. So distributed, lethal, mobile, networked, meshed into the joint web with our allies and partners, land power distributed using all those attributions that I just talked about it, land power, not only increases confidence in our allies and partners, not only increases our joint and multinational interoperability. It can do things on the land that is challenging for our adversaries to have to engage in.
Gen. Charles Flynn: And so I just feel like if we go at this challenge domain on domain, the outcome is not something we see. But if we go at this challenge in a very joint multinational way, and our allies and partners are part of that equation, that will be the great counterweight to what they have designed. And I think that no force in the world can contend with a highly competent joint and multinational effort.
Michael Green: That's interesting. And it's kind of counterintuitive. In the Cold War and NATO, land power was the Soviets' advantage, and we needed to come up with asymmetrical responses. But, what you're saying in this traditional maritime and air theater, our asymmetrical advantage may actually be land power itself, if it's mobile and if it's agile.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Well, I will not dispute the critical nature of naval, of maritime, and air power. I will not. That is absolutely central. But land power, distributed, networked, lethal, mobile, and meshed, networked to the Joint Force on the terrestrial layer, the aerial layer, and the space layer, one that can operate in all domains, one that can have impacts in all directions, and one that is conducting operations in every dimension, the human dimension, the physical dimension and the information dimension, I think that over complicates the problems for adversaries here. And that, to me, along with our allies and partners, that is the great counterweight to their efforts.
Michael Green: Really interesting. When I hear that, what I think is, if you're talking about mobile distributed network, you're talking ... If I'm thinking about this correctly, you're talking about a different kind of army officer than the kind of army officer who worked in this theater maybe 34 years ago. You need captains, lieutenants, majors who know the theater, who know their counterparts, who have some sense of the history and the cultural context, different kind of geography. Are you getting those young officers and NCOs coming up in the force to do this new strategy?
Gen. Charles Flynn: Yes we are. So let me touch on that a little bit. So this is where Multi-domain Operations come in. This is where the Multi-domain Task Force comes in. This is where a redesigned First Corps comes in, our three star operational headquarters out here. This is where the Security Force Assistance Brigade comes in. So this is all about ... When the Secretary of Defense says integrated deterrence, my translation of that to the tactical leaders is the sum total of capability, posture, messaging, and will. And then the intent from my joint commander, Admiral Aquilino, is to think, and act, and operate differently to seize the initiative.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Well, my ... Again, my interpretation of that is, and I translate that into, we're going to take new formations, our signature formation, like the Multi-Domain Task Force, and other new organizations like the Security Force Assistance Brigade, we're building a theater fires element in my headquarters. We're likely to have another Multi-Domain Task Force out here in the Pacific fairly soon. And so this is exactly the approach that I think you're talking about, Dr. Green, is these are going to bring a new kind of soldier. This is going to bring a new type of thinking.
Gen. Charles Flynn: This is going to create opportunities out here that previously we had not been thinking our way through until we took our operational, our new concept from Multi-Domain Battle, which was in the pre-2018 period. And we, in 2018, came out with Multi-Domain Operations. We matched the modernization efforts of the Army. We stood up a four star command to focus on modernization, Army Futures Command. And then we put in place the Multi-Domain Task Force with the brigadier general in 2019, our signature organization. And then out comes, the Security Force Assistance Brigade into the region.
Gen. Charles Flynn: So these are all things, Dr. Green, that you're talking about because we have to organize differently around this problem. And creating new organizations that are matched with modernization priorities in this theater, I think, are going to be, again, a way for land power and the security architecture that binds the region together with our allies and partners to play a profound role here.
Michael Green: So I'm a historian among other things, and it's a great discussion. And it reminds me of one of the characters in the history I wrote of U.S. strategy in Asia. The first real Army officer to go to the Pacific was a Kentucky cavalryman named Humphrey Marshall. And he commanded a regiment of Kentucky Calvary in the Mexican American War, a West Point guy. And he ran for Congress from Kentucky, and was offered a political post, and he chose to be the ambassador of the commissioner in China. And up to that point in the 1850s, everybody who worked on the Pacific was from New England or New York, and was Navy.
Michael Green: And so this Army colonel goes out and becomes a U.S. Commissioner and changes American strategy because he sees the region differently. And he wrote home, and I quote this, it's the title of that chapter in my book, By More Than Providence. He said, "This is the theater for the most keen intellects." He saw this theater differently because he was a land power thinker, and put in place a lot of key pillars of our Asia strategy we still rely on today. So it is a theater are a really keen intellect. And I think for a lot of officers, NCOs, soldiers working for you, it's got to be pretty exciting. So, General Flynn, thanks so much for joining us. Great discussion. Really appreciate it.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Okay. And I appreciate you asking me to be part of this, Dr. Green. And I really look forward to coming back. In fact, if I do come back, what I'd really like to talk, two big efforts that we have underway is the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, our training center that we're creating out here in the Pacific. Like we have one in Europe, and two in the continental United States, that's a pillar of our new approaches and our ability to think, act, and operate differently. And then what Vince Brooks and I were on the front end of with Pacific Pathways, the operational design that we have for the theater is Operations Pathways. And I'd like an opportunity to talk about that. But we could do that at a follow on.
Michael Green: Big initiatives. Congratulations on those.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Thank you.
Michael Green: General Flynn, thank you.
Gen. Charles Flynn: Thank you.
Andrew Schwartz: Thanks for listening. For more on strategy and the Asia Program's work, visit the CSIS website at CSIS.org, and click on the Asia program page.
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