Photo: ALFREDO ZUNIGA/AFP via Getty Images
The 2024 general election in Mozambique on October 9 will take place in a Cabo Delgado province that has undergone significant changes since the 2019 general election. In the past five years, voters in this province have witnessed the evolution of a local insurgency, the Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (ASWJ), into an Islamic State affiliate often referred to as Islamic State-Mozambique. Cabo Delgado’s voters have watched this group grow in size, capability, and geographic presence, but have also witnessed the ASWJ’s subsequent decline and resurgence. Throughout this conflict, Cabo Delgado’s residents have experienced severe economic disruption, infrastructure destruction, and the displacement of over a million people, but since 2021, they have also seen nearly half of those displaced return to their areas of origin, accompanied by some efforts to rebuild areas that have been under insurgent control.
Over the past five years, this conflict has evolved significantly, including the dramatic 2021 attack on the town of Palma, which resulted in a halt in the continent’s largest liquified natural gas exploration project and the introduction of foreign troops to the province. This has made the conflict a key talking point in the leading candidates’ platforms, such as FRELIMO candidate Daniel Chapo, independent candidate Venancio Mondlane, and Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) candidate Lutero Simango, each pledging to see the conflict end during their presidency.
However, changes in elite calculus toward the costs of the conflict, along with the allocation of political and financial resources needed for long-term stabilization, are likely to remain obstacles to even the most well-intentioned plans. As the new president prioritizes the demands of his elite and popular base during this transitional period, stakeholders may have an opportunity to weigh in on how the new administration can approach these challenges and develop a comprehensive way forward to put Mozambique on the road to resolving this conflict.
In many ways, the ASWJ’s impact on the 2024 election began shortly after the 2019 election concluded. What government officials initially dismissed as “bandits” and “evildoers” evolved in less than two years into a group that could execute sophisticated, multipronged attacks and exert a measure of control over key territories, like the port city Mocimboa da Praia. This period of ascendence for the group was characterized in part by a concerted effort to eliminate the tools and symbols of state governance, such as destroying infrastructure, impeding travel, and driving away civilians, including administrative officials and community leaders. The insurgents accompanied these actions with messages to the public condemning the government of the ruling party, FRELIMO, for profiting at the expense of the poor, particularly the Muslim population, while offering their vision of a sharia-based government as an alternative. The deployment of Rwandan and Southern African Development Community (SADC) forces in 2021 helped bolster security in certain areas of the province, encouraging displaced residents to begin their return. However, they were met with limited state services and, more recently, renewed insurgent threats, further casting the FRELIMO government in a negative light to these potential voters.
Indeed, the developments over the past five years have elevated security in northern Mozambique into a key electoral issue, with each candidate presenting a plan to resolve the conflict. FRELIMO candidate Daniel Chapo, for instance, visited Tanzania, which has roughly 300 soldiers stationed in Cabo Delgado, to reaffirm the two countries’ historical and political ties. Chapo reportedly visited Rwanda as well, suggesting a prioritization of these two partnerships and an intent to sustain their support on the ground. In August, Chapo also advocated for “robust investment” in Mozambique’s security services to advance the conflict’s resolution and called for greater investment in the province’s tourism industry.
Opposition party presidential candidates have also weighed in on the conflict, offering their own perspectives on a potential solution that in part focuses on addressing the underlying drivers of the insurgency, such as poor economic opportunities and political alienation. Venancio Mondlane has argued that eliminating corruption and restoring integrity in government are essential to defeating the insurgency. Meanwhile, the MDM candidate Lutero Simango has emphasized negotiations as a path forward, saying he would be willing to talk “with the devil, if necessary” to end the conflict. Both of these candidates have also emphasized the importance of generating employment for Mozambican youth and ensuring that wealth generated in the province remains in the province. In particular, Simango has focused on increasing the processing of raw materials in the province rather than exporting them abroad during his campaign.
The conduct and outcome of the election will likely serve as key factors in the conflict’s trajectory in the post-election period. Allegations of electoral fraud that result in a FRELIMO victory—while not uncommon in Mozambican elections—would reinforce the ASWJ’s narrative of a government indifferent to the will and needs of the people. If electoral irregularities further alienate the public and deepen distrust in the state, civilian indifference toward supporting the government’s security efforts could grow even if the allegations of electoral fraud are insufficient to prompt legitimate support for the insurgency.
The new government’s execution of its campaign promises to alleviate insecurity and foster greater economic opportunities in northern Mozambique may also influence both public confidence in the state and the trajectory of the conflict. The general agreement among candidates is that stability has not been fully restored to the province and that attention to issues like economic opportunity is vital. This message will likely resonate among voters in the province who are seeking to reestablish their lives. However, even the most earnest candidate will need to overcome the same political and resource constraints that have helped shape the current government’s approach, obstacles that even the FRELIMO candidate, Chapo, would likely struggle to manage.
The consensus among political analysts following Mozambican politics is that Chapo will win the election, creating a unique opportunity for stakeholders to potentially help shape his approach to Cabo Delgado. Mozambican presidents have a long tradition of shifting course on key issues upon taking office, and Chapo himself has indicated an intent to promote greater investment and economic growth in northern Mozambique. Furthermore, his own background as someone who experienced displacement as a child, combined with his reputation for seeking to improve the lives of the general public during his tenure as governor, may suggest a predisposition to address more seriously some of the underlying issues fueling the insurgency. Stakeholders could potentially contribute to a rethinking of Cabo Delgado through several avenues:
Mozambique’s slate of presidential candidates has shown a greater awareness of some of the key issues at play in the conflict, issues that transcend historical geographic, ethnic, and religious divides. Greater employment opportunities for youth will be important to voters from Maputo to Palma. Improving training to the security services to better serve the people’s security needs, such as combating kidnappings and organized crime, would likely improve the quality of life across the country. Translating that line of thought into concrete action, however, will be the greatest challenge, but one that would signal the beginning of a long, but potentially fruitful, process toward improving stability in Cabo Delgado.
Emilia Columbo is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
