The Libyan Uprising: an Uncertain Trajectory

The conflict in Libya is complex, and it is often hard to find the data that best describe key aspects of the war. Varun Vira of the Burke Chair has developed a background analysis of the war, entitled “The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory,” which is available on the CSIS web site at:
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110620_libya.pdf.

The analysis draws upon official NATO reporting and open-source analysis, tracks the conduct of the fighting, and identifies some trends that will be crucial to plan for in shaping a post-war Libya. It also warns that planning for the post-Qaddafi period has been inadequate, and that any end – however, prolonged – could come very quickly. Whether this will take days or months remains unclear, but some form of change is imminent in Libya, and will require careful accommodation.

A War with Uncertain Purpose and End Game

NATO forces are now engaged in a war of attrition in ways that essentially mean regime change. This is a significant expansion from the letter of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that mandated the implementation of a no-fly zone, as well as “all necessary measures to protect civilians.” President Obama has joined senior European and NATO officials in demanding the exit of Col. Qaddafi stating, “Let me just be very unambiguous about this. Colonel Qaddafi needs to step down from power and leave. That is good for this country. It is good for his people. It’s the right thing to do.”

NATO has denied its goal is to target Qaddafi, and says its strikes are directed towards inflicting enough damage to persuade Qaddafi and his advisors to quit power. In the absence of a negotiated settlement, however, it is unclear that anything short of a whole-scale collapse of the loyalist military machine, or a decapitation of Qaddafi and his inner circle, will suffice. Furthermore, it is uncertain how NATO can hope to destroy the Libyan command and control apparatus without targeting the people at its center.

In the meantime, with nowhere really to go, and an International Criminal Court (ICC) ruling looming should he exit the country, Col. Qaddafi appears to be increasingly credible when he declares, as he did on June 7th that, “We shall stay here till the end, dead, alive, victorious; it doesn't matter."

There is also a growing perception that what begun as an uprising has become what could become a long civil war. As yet, it is not possible to determine the scale of support Qaddafi still retains, or accurately distinguish between those who are tied to him by loyalty, and those by fear. It, however, now appears unlikely that Qaddafi can stay in power over the longer-term but the timing and nature of his exit will have important implications on the success of the Libyan intervention.

A protracted conflict could present serious problems, including a rising humanitarian toll – perhaps lower than the retribution Qaddafi would have imposed had he retaken the east – but nonetheless significant, and growing as fighting continues. The cost to the Libyan economy is already severe and the cost to NATO is rising. The White House reported that the cost to the US reached $715.9 million by June 3rd, and is expected to rise to $1.1 billion by September 30th.  There are also worries that military operations could continue indefinitely, although NATO officials have repeatedly signaled that the end is near.

The focus on the tactical conduct of the war has led many to ignore the need to plan for a post-war Libya. In one form or another, a different Libya will emerge. There remains no clarity on how it will look, but any post-Qaddafi Libya will face deep institutional trauma, significant economic challenges and several obstacles towards a sustainable political structure.

Qaddafi’s mode of governance; diffusing power to ensure that none could threaten his rule has resulted in major ethnic, social, status and tribal divides, and overcoming them will be challenging. This will be particularly true for a government as fragile and untested as the current National Transitional Council (NTC). Extensive post-war international support will undoubtedly be required, but NATO has specifically stated it will not be responsible for post-war challenges, and the burden will fall on the UN and other international agencies.

Continuing Need to “Win the War”

The optimistic expectations allied forces had in entering the conflict are no longer realistic. Realistic military planning has turned from days and weeks to open-ended months, and the tenacity of loyalist forces has already forced scale-ups in military capacity. NATO’s fixed wing fleet has continued an operational tempo that remains at about the same levels as when it assumed command, and it has introduced attack helicopters and covert assets, including Special Forces into theater, in ways that essentially provide limited close air support to aid opposition forces

Loyalist military forces do appear to have been significantly degraded, but they have showed considerable tenacity, and have adapted to the needs of the battlefield. They appear to have dispensed with large formations, blended into the civilian population, and swapped into civilian vehicles. Their superior tactical ability relative to opposition forces has allowed loyalist forces to continue to hold onto important urban centers in the West, including the oil towns of Ras Lanuf and Brega, and regime centers of power in Sirte, Zawiya, and particularly Tripoli.

The tactical weakness of opposition forces has been a major impediment to any rapid conclusion of the war. Despite the NATO multiplier, opposition forces have shown little capacity to operate outside their organic strongholds, to wage open combat against loyalist forces, or to capitalize on air support for organized offensive operations that can assault Qaddafi strongholds. Limited external support in arms and training transfers continues to constrain their operational abilities and prevent them from maneuvering in ways that actually pose a threat to dug in loyalist forces.

The key NATO countries have already significantly expanded their objectives in ways that essentially mean regime change, but the legitimacy of its mandate has weakened as conditions have begun to be perceived as a tactical stalemate. Under the terms of the mandate provided by UNSCR 1970 and 1973, NATO forces are mandated to implement a no-fly zone and implement “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. Since, NATO forces have justified their demands that Qaddafi step down and exit the country as preconditions to an end of operational activity, under the aegis that loyalist forces under Qaddafi command are actively engaging civilian targets. The June 2011 White House report echoed this, noting that “Qaddafi’s departure is a critical component” of coalition demands. NATO forces now heavily target loyalist ground forces as well as their logistical and munitions supply chain. NATO has also moved from targeting marginal forces posing an imminent threat to civilians, to now targeting presumed regime centers of gravity such as the Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli. There have also been military scale-ups, in the introduction of attack helicopters and the presumed expansion of covert activity. 

The mission remains hampered by a lack of cohesive action within the alliance as well as significant operational shortfalls. The burden of the Libya operations is increasingly borne by a small number of countries. Others have erected strong political obstacles to participation, or caveats on their military contributions. The Arab contribution, while much hyped in initial phases, is now marginal at best and growing international criticism, particularly from China and Russia, but also driven by public opinion in the United States and Europe, has rendered the probability of a surge in US military support unlikely. There are also reports of inefficient resource utilization, including the inability to share refueling tankers, and large shortfalls in specific equipment, personnel and munitions that continue to impede an optimal operational tempo.

Even if it ends tomorrow, the Libya mission raises new questions about the merit and conduct of humanitarian interventions, and has again exposed the danger that what started as a rapid and limited intervention could soon become a protracted war. Nonetheless, NATO objectives continue to appear achievable should operations be sustained, and despite growing impatience and some signs of war fatigue, core coalition forces appear set to continue their involvement indefinitely.

Sustaining Victory

Planning for a post-war Libya is difficult. There are too many ‘ifs’ with no clarity and even opposition forces themselves cannot say with certitude whether large, and powerful western centers in the country are bound to Qaddafi by fear, or by some form of loyalty.

If the best-case NATO scenario does play out, and an opposition government is handed control of all of Libya, the country’s problems are far from over. In fact, sustaining victory will be far more important and difficult than merely “winning” the war, and there will remain significant risks of post-war instability, including the possibility for fragmentation along ethnic, tribal, regional and religious lines, and the potential for militant sanctuaries in areas outside state control.

Significant economic challenges will also persist. The Libyan economy’s singular dependence on the oil sector –-95% of Libyan export earnings, 25% of GDP and 80% of government revenue –- has meant that the economy has all but stopped as a result of the war.  Rebuilding infrastructure and resuming production will be of immediate importance, but over the longer-term Libya will require navigation towards a more diversified and modern economy. Reforms to immediately provide productive employment opportunities that can leverage its educated but chronically unemployed youth base will also be important, as will a visibly improved stewardship of oil revenues in ways that create immediate and visible benefit to average Libyans, and provide accountability and transparency that provide a measurable change from the Qaddafi era.

Despite these immense challenges, the NTC is untested. It maintains nominal command over disparate groups that are currently united in a shared goal to topple Qaddafi, but this does not mean a shared vision for a post-war Libya. NTC officials will have to prove their ability to navigate and accommodate these many divisions in ways that truly represents the wants and needs of Libyans, instead of once more favoring narrow interests. It must prove able to guide Libya towards a representative government in ways that will overcome tribalism, and regional divides as well as accommodate the interests of minority ethnic groups.

In many ways, Libya will have to be rebuilt from scratch. The true institutional trauma that thirty years of Qaddafi’s rule has wreaked is still to be truly felt, but virtually no semblance of civil-society or viable state institutions exist. Separating the regime from the state will be difficult, and reconciliation will play an important role. Any attempts at “de-Qaddafiication” will likely have traumatic effects on both disintegrating any available state capacity as well as alienating large segments of the population, who might otherwise have only been tied to Qaddafi by material inducements rather than ideology.

A successful transition will necessarily require international assistance, but for true sustainable success, post-war planning must be Libyan-led and heavily involve the participation of regional countries. Many challenges will persist, but it is important to remember that war, and particularly revolutions, transform society in ways that are not easily foreseen, and the dynamics of the Libyan uprising offer good reasons to be optimistic for Libya’s future.