Material Advantage: FOIP and U.S. Alliances in Asia

Andrew Schwartz: Welcome to The Asia Chessboard, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia and takes an inside look at the making of grand strategy. I'm Andrew Schwartz at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Hannah Fodale: This week, Mike is back in the studio with Heino Klinck, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia to unpack the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and how it relates to US allies and partners. Heino and Mike explore Chinese strategy towards the US alliance network in Asia and discuss how US allies and partners should think about their roles, missions, and capabilities in response to Chinese aggressive behavior in the region.

Mike Green: Welcome back to the Asia Chessboard. I'm joined by Colonel Heino Klinck, US Army retired, who served with great distinction in a variety of posts. But most recently is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for some of our key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region at the time of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. We're going to talk about roles, missions, capabilities, alliance management, how our adversaries look at alliances, how you manage burden-sharing with allies, and what vision we need for alliances going forward. Heino, terrific to have you and thanks for your service.

Heino Klinck: Thank you, Mike. My pleasure to be here with you today.

Mike Green: Let's start with you. We know you were in the Army, we know you were a colonel, we know you worked in the Pentagon, but what got you aiming towards an army career and a career on Asia within the Army?

Heino Klinck: Well, I will tell you, it was not necessarily a natural progression. As you can probably tell by my name, I've got some roots in Europe. I grew up in Germany and I studied as a university student in Italy. Really, as an undergrad studying international relations, I was focused squarely on Europe. But the day that I got on active duty in the Army was somewhat foreboding because that was June 4th, 1989, which was the day of the Tiananmen Massacre. I remember very distinctly watching the news coverage of it. You could say that sparked my interest in the role China would have in the world and how the US would intersect with a growing China. But for the first decade or so of my military career I did all the stereotypical things you expect an Army officer to do, jump out of airplanes, shoot things, blow things up. But at a certain point I volunteered for the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program.

Mike Green: That's when you were about a captain, roughly?

Heino Klinck: That's when I was a Senior Captain after company command. Fortunately the army didn't look at my record because they would have seen that I spent a lot of time in Europe already, and had some language qualifications there. But I asked for China because I wanted to do something different, and I also saw that that's where the future of the United States interests and values would lie also, our relationship with China. So I volunteered for that and I was selected and spent a couple years in training, and then spent the last almost 20 years of my military career focused on the military relationship between the United States and China. I did a couple tours in Beijing and Hong Kong, several tours in the Pentagon, and a tour in US Army Pacific as well.

Mike Green: When you're an army FAO or a Navy Air Force Marine in Tokyo or in Canberra, you go out at night and have beers and a good time with your partners and your allies, and talk about the next exercise around the corner and how you're going to rely on each other. What does a FAO do for fun in Beijing? Because I'm guessing that your average PLA O-6 was not... well, let me put it this way. If he wanted to take you out drinking, I'm sure it immediately made you suspicious. What do you do for fun when you're a FAO in China? How do you do that job? It must be tough.

Heino Klinck: Certainly different. I'll give you one anecdote. My very first Thanksgiving in Beijing as an attache I invited some PLA officers to my house for a quintessential American Thanksgiving. On Thanksgiving night at the appointed time two different PLA officers showed up at my house, who I had never met before, who I did not invite. The relationship is certainly different. Less social, if you will. Any opportunity to engage with the PLA is something that, frankly, we capitalized upon. But it certainly, there was not an amicable relationship even when I was there in the early 2000s. I would say it's probably even harder now. There were many restrictions placed upon us with respect to traveling. Again, I would say it's probably even more difficult now. But any interaction that we could have with the PLA we sought out because it was so minimal, frankly.

Mike Green: When you went to the Pentagon in the Trump administration you were at that point retired from the Army and a civilian, right?

Heino Klinck: I was, yes. I retired in 2015, 2016 time period, went into the private sector for a number of years. Then I was asked to come back as a civilian for the DASD for East Asia.

Mike Green: You had the DASD job that covers actually the parts of the chessboard we can control to some extent or at least where we can make moves, which is Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan. How did your China experience shape your thinking about how to do allies? I'm sure it lent some urgency to the mission.

Heino Klinck: It did. I think it also provided me some necessary bonafides to talk to our allies and partners about the growing Chinese threat. Because again, I had focused the vast majority of my most military career on tracking the PLA and knowing how they were developing. I think it certainly, I would say the vast majority of my job dealing with allies, partners, and friends in the region was through the context of competition with China.

Mike Green: So, Secretary of State, Tillerson, early on in the administration at CSIS, used the words free and open Indo-Pacific in a speech about India before his first trip. That was the first iteration. As you know, Japan developed this strategic concept of reinforcing the region against Chinese coercion, FOIP as the acronym goes. Then the Pentagon, basically the entire administration, took on this frame. There was no debate about whether our future was with our allies or with China. It was with our allies and partners for the time you were in government, which, frankly, is where the Biden administration is. It is now the mainstream of American strategic thinking. But from Tillerson's speech, then you had the Pentagon's, Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. At what point did you step into the job and shape the allies and partners part of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific?

Heino Klinck: I didn't join the administration until the summer of 2019. This was already underway if you will. Like you mentioned, the term FOIP really originated with Prime Minister Abe who had a very good and close relationship with President Trump for a variety of reasons, frankly. President Trump, this is something that he embraced, FOIP concept. It's something that we started to see in the very strategic documents that had already been published when I got into office that I was then charged with implementing. It was good in that it gave us a unifying narrative to share with our allies that, again, originated with our key ally in Northeast Asia. That everyone was able to attach their wagon to one way or another.

Heino Klinck: As you know, a lot of the countries in the region have their own visions associated with FOIP. ASEAN has its Outlook on the Pacific. India's got its Act East policy. There's the Australian Indo-Pacific concept, the ROK’s New Southern policy, and so on and so forth. It's something that resonated and we were able, again, to use as our North Star.

Mike Green: It has to be one of the biggest coups in Japanese diplomatic history that the Prime Minister's, not just his concept, but the exact words he used, "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," are now embraced by maritime democracies pretty much everywhere in the world. Although I remind the Prime Minister and his staff that originally this concept is Alfred Thayer Mahan's, and before that Commodore Perry, the idea that maritime democracy should safeguard security against a continental hegemon has a long history in our thinking, so it's a natural one for us. How do you think, as a China expert, Beijing looks at this? Obviously we're no longer in the 2013-14 frame of considering a new model of great power relations or bipolar condominium with China. We are organizing ourselves around our allies and partnerships. China's trying to drive wedges, but what do you think their strategy is? And is it working?

Heino Klinck: I would say I agree, they're trying to drive wedges, and this has always been the case prior to FOIP as well. The Chinese have been saying, for many, many years, that we, the United States, as well as those that align with us, are continuing to have this 'cold war mentality'. I mean, that's been a standard talking point of theirs for decades, quite frankly.

Mike Green: Yeah. I did a consulting gig for the State Department in the late '90s, going to China and gauging their perceptions of our policies. Late Clinton administration. They wanted to understand if China understood our intentions. To keep myself awake with jet lag, I would write down how many times I heard, cold war mentality. It was dozens of times a day, Yeah.

Heino Klinck: They're very good about staying on message. But again, using that historic example of the US leadership in the post-World War II era against Soviet expansionism. That paradigm just, I don't think it holds any water in comparing our relationship with China now, or even in the last 10, 15, 20 years. Then sometimes I wonder if it's meant more for the Chinese domestic consumption than anything else. But the Chinese, of course, are looking for seams and it's obvious that the Cold War really bears little resemblance to how we've been approaching China. Because I don't think or I don't subscribe to the thought that we're trying to contain China, because I think everybody realizes that that's not possible containing China. Again, stating the obvious, the economic element to the relationship will never allow for something like that to occur even if we wanted it to occur, and I don't think we do want it to occur, frankly. Again, it's a common mantra that the Chinese use.

Heino Klinck: Another thing that I consistently heard was that the United States is encircling China via its military bases. Originally it was just talk of the United States and Korea. But even after our intervention in Afghanistan almost 20 years ago, there were also conspiracy theorists within the PRC that said that's all part of the Americans' grand master plan, encircling China with bases. Again, the Chinese are looking to be able to drive those wedges, those seams, between us and our allies and partners in the region because this has always been our competitive strength. Whether it was in Asia or in Europe or elsewhere, it's a system of alliances, whether they be multilateral as the cases in Europe or bilateral as has been the case with our treaty partners in Asia.

Mike Green: Polls in the US show incredibly strong support for alliances. Interestingly, if you see in the Center for American Progress polling, and I'm guessing Trump administration veterans don't rush to the Center for American Progress website every day in the morning-

Heino Klinck: I think my subscription's canceled.

Mike Green: But it's interesting because they... Progressive Perspective surveyed use of alliances and among millennials alliances are, I forget the number, but it's something like 80% support on alliances. So it's a thing, it's cool. The Chinese wedge strategy you described as a diplomatic... it's a narrative. It's an information campaign against alliances. The other aspect of it is operational and how do they manipulate and drive wedges where there are seams in gray zone coercion or even in a high-end warfighting fighting scenario. I heard Admiral Davidson when he was INDOPACOM commander say, on more than one occasion, "We are in an era of no longer just interoperability but interdependence.” Our own plans and our own strategies actually depend on alliances probably more than in the past. Do you worry about not just... you don't seem too worried about the Chinese rhetoric. But on the operational side, do you think the PLA is looking for those seams between us and our alliances in an operational context?

Heino Klinck: I think so. I think if we take the last couple years as an example, and if we take a very close look at PLA operations, particularly in the maritime and in the air domains, and how they have progressively expanded both in scale and scope their exercises and deployments, particularly along geographic seams, if you will. For instance, South Korean and Japanese waters and airspace, obviously Taiwan and Japanese airspace and maritime space. You see that they're becoming more assertive, more aggressive. You can track how the PLA Air Force and the PLA Navy have become much more adept at 'out of area operations'. But also again, taking advantage of those geographic seams if you will. Because that will require coordination on our part, on the part of the regional actors, which frankly isn't necessarily as robust as it should be.

Heino Klinck: For instance, Japan and Taiwan obviously don't have diplomatic relations. Despite the fact that they're geographically very close and their militaries operate in close geographic proximity to each other, their coordination is not particularly robust. South Korea and Japan, obviously, historic animosities that often come to the fore that has also caused some problems specifically in coordination between the South Korean Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. I think these are things that the PLA understands and wants to exploit, and they're doing this in training and day-to-day operations as well.

Mike Green: There's the old line which we used in a book we did here on alliances that Churchill used that the only thing worse than fighting with allies by your side is fighting without them. Then Napoleon's famous line, he prefers fighting against alliances because he would manipulate those seams-

Heino Klinck: That's right.

Mike Green: To divide them. Which of course he almost did at Waterloo famously. We have some good stories, I think, from your time in office. Actually going back to Obama with Japan, with the change in the interpretation of the Constitution to allow the Japanese prime minister to exercise the right of collective self defense, which basically means allow planning for a variety of contingencies. My sense is we're doing much better with Australia. You probably have seen these polls in Japan where three quarters of Japanese say Japan should have a role in helping secure Taiwan, and you have very prominent Japanese politicians saying that. China is creating some of these antibodies that pull allies closer together. But as you point out, Japan, Korea, big gap, big problem.

Mike Green: Let's do a quick run around the region. Let me get your take on what roles, missions, capabilities, readiness issues, seams we need to fix with each of these partnerships given what we've just been discussing, starting with Japan. Look, I'll caveat this by saying, I'm sure as Deputy Secretary of Defense and certainly myself I've had ideas on what Japan needs to do, but of course in the US system we can hardly really make the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, and the Navy, and the Army do exactly what is necessarily the national command priority. Every country's got pork barrel projects and politics and all that, and they're sovereign countries. But with all that caveat aside, if you were king, what would the Japan Self Defense Forces look like in the next few years?

Heino Klinck: Let me just take one step back if I might. Obviously I'm not 100% objective, but I do believe that we left our system of alliances and partnerships and relationships in the region in a better condition than we found them in, particularly when it comes to Japan, Australia, and Taiwan as well. I think if you take the last seven, eight months of the Biden administration, you actually see a lot of progress continuing to be made that was based on the foundation that was left behind in the previous administration. I think, begrudgingly, even members of the current team would admit that. Maybe not in public, but in private they would admit that.

Mike Green: They publicly thank the Bush administration. That's what they tend to do, and I’ll take it.

Heino Klinck: That's fine. That's fine. With respect to Japan, I would tell you first and foremost, my focus was less on hardware for the Japanese Self-Defense Force and more on how they employ the hardware. By that I mean, there are significant restrictions for training and operations in the Japanese islands. This obviously affects US forces forward deployed as well, but it has an even bigger impact on the Japanese Self-Defense Force. I understand the geographic limitations. I understand the political sensitivities. But I think first and foremost, what I would like to see is Japan start training and exercising the way that the fifth generation equipment that they've been investing in is designed to be used. Because that's not happening as much as it should.

Heino Klinck: I think part of that is, again, that political sensitivity domestically, which frankly every country has. No one likes helicopters flying at night in their neighborhood or artillery ranges in their backyard and the like. It's just that, again, the threat that Japan faces based on not just its Chinese neighbor, its North Korean neighbor as well, I think necessitates a look at ensuring that training and exercises are commensurate with the operational tempo that they may face in a contingency.

Mike Green: That's what, a combination of unit sizes being too small exercises. They don't do large scale combined arm exercises as much-

Heino Klinck: They don't do large scale-

Mike Green: What else does that mean?

Heino Klinck: Night flying, training with live ammunition. Again, particularly from fixed wing and rotary aircraft. Those are the big ones, quite frankly.

Mike Green: So Singapore has an even bigger real estate problem than Japan and Singapore sends its Chinooks to Texas, it's Army to various places in East Asia. Is that an answer for Japan? Could they be using Northern Australia, California?

Heino Klinck: I think that's a partial answer. I think that's part of a solution. Again, I understand and acknowledge the limitations that the Japanese islands present, but you can't do all of your training overseas.

Mike Green: I also wonder how much in, the Japan case... I agree with what you say by the way, that assessment, You'd be closer to it. But part of the problem may stem from command and control relationships. You look at US Korea, which we'll get to in a second, but the definition of requirements, the exercises are stressed, the force test the plans, because we have plans because we have a joint and combined command relationship and we don't have that with Japan. I've wondered how much of this problem you're describing could be fixed if we had more closely aligned command and control relationships. That's a whole debate. Who is it? Is it INDOPACOM? Is it PACFLT? Is it the Marines? But because the command and control relationships between Japan and the US are a little, frankly, ad hoc, they're not institutionalized like Korea or NATO. The plans don't dictate the training and stress the force to validate the plans. Is that a fix, do you think, or is that a little too hard?

Heino Klinck: Again, I don't think that there's a silver bullet that can be used. I think that that could also be a component of a solution. But fundamentally, I think it's a political decision that the Japanese leadership needs to make that says that, "We're going to ask our population to accept some inconvenience, if you will, based on the historically new threat that the country and the society as a whole is facing." I think part of the dialogue should include, obviously, a candid conversation on what the Chinese are doing. I mean, again, that's out there. It's just that, I think the government can probably utilize that to magnify the concern even further, but also underscore, frankly, why the Japanese government is making huge investments in capabilities. Because they are, there has been, as you know, a significant uptick in Japanese investments. If you're going to invest in the hardware, but not actually utilize it to the maximum of its capability, I just don't think that that's wise. I think also it undercuts the value of that initial investment.

Mike Green: Japan's roles, missions, capabilities are shifting, expanding. I gather when you were in government you were supportive and encouraged this. But to include now at least notionally, standoff strike and things like that. That's a logical move for Japan from our perspective?

Heino Klinck: I believe that there's a strong argument to be made for the Japanese to have their own counterstrike capability.

Mike Green: Would you embed that in more of a joint concept of operations joint, well, command and control even?

Heino Klinck: I think much of this needs to be predicated on a joint war fighting concept that frankly here in the United States, I don't think it's seen the light of day yet. My understanding is it's completed but it hasn't been published yet. I think once we finalize our joint war fighting concept and incorporate the roles of our allies and partners into it, I think we should be able to find the justification and rationale for Japan to be able to have its own counterstrike capability and not be dependent on the US for that.

Mike Green: Yeah. The consensus is there politically that they should have that in Japan capability. The technical questions are still up in the air and I suspect there's still time to shape those and have that discussion. We have a few more months to get our act together because I don't think Tokyo knows what exact systems they would procure or how they'd integrate them.

Heino Klinck: Right, and I think part of it is... I mean, again, as allies, we should be having a very mature conversation about what would be the appropriate type of capability for Japan, whether it's based on a China threat or a North Korea threat. Again, the integration piece is always when that becomes costly in financial terms.

Mike Green: Jumping across the sea which shall remain unnamed to Korea, we have long history there of debating roles, missions, capabilities, because of issues like Wartime OPCON transfer conditions-based. Basically we want Korea to have certain capabilities so it can take over command in war time, we're not there yet. There's a history of this, but most of it's about the North Korean threat. When you look at the same question for Korea that they have the right mix or do you think they need a little bit more of a 360... well, not 360 degrees, because that would include Japan, which we don't want to encourage. Should they be looking more to their maritime flank and the China problem in their definition of capabilities and requirements? Or do you think they're right to focus militarily on North Korea? How would you unpack that one?

Heino Klinck: Understanding of course that this is a very sensitive topic in South Korea. I don't think that the South Korean military nor, to be frank, the US forces that are stationed in South Korea can be only focused on the DPRK. I think that that's a luxury that certainly the United States can no longer afford. When we think about the size of our military where we are forward deployed, I think it's a luxury to have 28,500 troops on the Korean peninsula focused only on the DPRK. Yes, that's absolutely their primary mission. But if you recall, we've pulled troops off the peninsula before to fight, for instance, in the Middle East. I think we need to have an honest adult conversation with South Korea that, again, is nested in an overall concept of, how are we deterring Chinese aggression in the region? I don't think we can afford just to not include the forces we have in the peninsula and potential contingency plans.

Heino Klinck: With respect to South Korea itself, I mean, we see that they're investing robustly in their defense. As a matter of fact, the Moon administration has increased defense spending pretty well. Now, a lot of that is going to indigenous systems that, again, countries obviously want to be able to build up economic capacity at home also. But some of the systems, for instance, I would question the utility of an aircraft carrier as an example. But there are other things that, given the fact that under the South Korean Defense Reform 2.0 program by which they're cutting a large percentage of their ground forces, there are certain things that they need.

Heino Klinck: Then also in line with OPCON transition, for instance, command and control, there are things that are going to be going away that frankly with the Korean army downsizing pretty significantly only increases the necessity to ensure you've got solid command and control, solid communications. Given the daily threat that the DPRK poses, coupled with, I think, the longer term threat of an aggressive China. We have to remember the Chinese have also entered South Korean airspace, South Korean maritime domain in conjunction with Russian aircraft as well. I'm confident that my former counterparts in the ROK MND are looking at those things as well.

Mike Green: This comes up a lot of the last two decades at least. When we ask for what we euphemistically call strategic flexibility, to use our forces in the Korean Peninsula as we want, when we ask for it explicitly, we risk Seoul saying, "No," because they're not ready to... they need an alibi. They don't want to be on the line in this strategic competition with China. But what I hear you saying, and I agree, is, and I like the way you framed it, it's time for a mature discussion about this. Because I think Seoul risks isolating itself increasingly from other allies in the region and having, frankly, less influence over American strategy. That's the cost of strategic ambiguity, of having an alibi. I think you put it very well. For the US-Korea Alliance, it's not enough to just do really, really well on the North Korea problem, which is a huge problem. If the Alliance can't figure out how it would function in the context of strategic competition, and if we can't talk honestly about our forces, it's going to hurt, it's going to hurt. It's going to hurt the influence and weight of the alliance in Washington and the region.

Heino Klinck: I will tell you, I've actually, in the last couple months, seen some positive indicators that the Moon administration is starting to shift on that. As an example, in the spring, I think it was late winter or early spring when the two plus two occurred first in Tokyo when Secretaries Austin and Blinken met their counterparts. There was a very strong joint statement that was issued, which you would expect from the US and Japan, that called out the Chinese. Two days later they go to Seoul and it was a very vanilla statement that came out. Unfortunately, that didn't come as a surprise to me either. However, if you fast-forwarded to when President Moon met with President Biden and the joint statement that came out of that.

Heino Klinck: I will be very candid, if I would have put money on that I would have lost. Because the fact that they mentioned the Taiwan Strait I thought was, first of all, a positive development, but it came as a surprise to me. That being said, a pleasant surprise. Then in the intervening weeks and months we've seen more and more the South Koreans, without naming China explicitly, but characterizing certain behavior. Everybody can connect the dots that they're talking about China. I think this is positive. Also again, although I'm not necessarily a believer in every poll that I read, polling data recently said that South Koreans dislike the Chinese more than they dislike the Japanese.

Mike Green: That's quite an accomplishment by Xi Jinping.

Heino Klinck: That's right. That's right. Absolutely.

Mike Green: That's not just one data point. Almost all the polls are showing that.

Heino Klinck: That's right. That's right. Again, the fact that that's the case in South Korea where Chinese economic tentacles have really encumbered South Korea. I think that shows you, I mean, to your point, that maybe it's less what we're doing and what we're saying but more what Xi Jingping’s China is doing and saying. They are driving a consensus in the region, and I would argue even in most parts of the world that China's behavior is being viewed more and more as a dangerous phenomenon.

Mike Green: Continuing our journey now to Taiwan, you could make the case that the decisions Taipei makes on its roles, missions, capabilities, its deterrents capabilities may be the most consequential of all for the next few years, because that's the weak link in the armor so to speak. That's where the Central Military Commission will make decisions of war or peace, is gauging all these other allies, but especially Taiwan's capacity and will to fight. You pushed hard on this when you were in government. Taipei listened, most of the time, some of the time. What do you think Taipei has to do to realize it's asymmetrical strategy and basically survive to complicate Chinese planning?

Heino Klinck: Fundamentally, I believe that Taiwan Armed Forces only have one mission, and that mission is to deter the PLA. If deterrence fails, to basically prevail long enough for the international community to dissuade the Chinese from continuing offensive operations. Sometimes I question the decisions the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense and the Taiwan Armed Forces make in terms of prioritization of specific capabilities or in reform that needs to take place. I'll be frank with you on that, and I don't think they're doing enough. I believe that they need to make concerted efforts to ensure that PLA calculus is in fact as complicated as it can be. For instance, whereas the Taiwan Armed Forces do need a balance of both conventional and asymmetric defensive means, the balance has been historically towards the conventional, so F-16s, M1A1s.

Heino Klinck: I think now the balance needs to shift a little bit more towards the asymmetric. So very specifically, coastal defense cruise missiles, sea mines, enhanced hardening, strengthened C4ISR. I think that part of this is also messaging on the part of Taiwan and the Taiwan authorities. In that, if they're demonstrating that they're willing to do what's necessary, I think that will engender more and more international support quite frankly. As you mentioned, the Japanese have become much more vocal about, in essence, stating that they view the defense of Taiwan as the defense of Japan as well. Well, you have to demonstrate that you're willing to do what needs to be done. The fight is also part of it, frankly. A lot of people have questioned whether or not your average Taiwan citizen would in fact pick up arms to defend his or her way of life.

Heino Klinck: You would hope that a place that's really the beacon of democracy, if you will, in terms of, you have a woman president, one of the highest percentages of women in a national assembly, LGBTQ rights enshrined in law. I think the only place in Asia, as a matter of fact. Freedom of the press, freedom of religion, you name it. You would think if you grew up not knowing any different, that you would fight for that, and I think some polls say that. On the other hand, military career is not something that your average Taiwan person seeks out. I think there needs to be a leadership role in basically expressing to the people of Taiwan that, "You play a part." But the government also needs to show that they're willing to make investments and things that your average Taiwan general or admiral doesn't necessarily think is sexy. Airplanes, tanks, big ships are sexy, but that's not what they really need, to be honest with you, in a contingency.

Mike Green: As you point out, those choices in themselves are an indicator of will, and it's really important. By the way, there's no shame in a national military strategy of survival. That's how George Washington won.

Heino Klinck: That's right. That's right. Again, it goes back to my point, they have one mission, they have one mission. I think they should be able to organize themselves and plan accordingly. They have taken some steps, but I think in the last... I'll be honest, since we've left government there's been some backsliding as well. If you look at their last defense review, there was no mention whatsoever in the overall defense concept, which is something that the Taiwan MND and the United States had been discussing in detail with respect to, again, an asymmetric approach to defending Taiwan. The overall defense concept is not mentioned at all in that document. Then if you look at, for instance, the types of things recently reported on the arms acquisitions that Taiwan is pushing. Again, not things that I would prioritize. There are a lot of other things that I would prioritize first and foremost.

Mike Green: Going down south on this road trip to a country where we don't question the will to fight, Australia. Peter Jennings will be the next guest on this podcast, the head of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on the 70th anniversary of ANZUS, of our treaty. But, smaller than the US Marine Corps, their entire defense force. Their choices with long distances to cover really matter. How do you assess the Australian defense strategies as you've seen them unfold?

Heino Klinck: I think the Australians, frankly, are probably more serious than any of our partners and allies. In the sense that, they have faced the brunt of Chinese coercion in the economic arena, yes. But it certainly has underscored Chinese intent in trying to shape, dissuade, push the Australians in a direction that they don't want to go in. Yes, you said accurately that the ADF is smaller than our Marine Corps, but they certainly punch above their weight class, and they've been with us in every fight since World War I.

Mike Green: Thank you, by the way, for not taking a cheap shot at the Marine Corps just now as an Army guy, I appreciate that.

Heino Klinck: No, no, not at all. They win battles, we win wars, but that's fine. That being said, the Australians of course also only have finite resources. They have to make hard decisions as well in what they need to invest in. To-date, for the most part, I've actually found their investments to be strategic, if you will, because they need to maintain also a balance of conventional force projection capabilities, some expeditionary capabilities as well. They also have to build some resiliency, frankly. But there will be some tough decisions there, and I think where... many countries run into this. When you have, for instance, domestic defense production and the role that plays in the local economy start having an outsized influence on decisions made for defense acquisitions. That's where sometimes I become concerned.

Heino Klinck: Now, as an American that's easy for me to say, since we have this mighty military industrial complex, and it's hard to be able to convince local politicians and name the country to only buy American. But I do believe that there are things that, frankly, the opportunity cost of coming up with some sort of bespoke system produced locally. That opportunity cost may be too high. Now, I do believe that we as Americans, the American government and the US industry needs to look more at co-development and co-production so that foreign partners have more skin in the game and more of the benefit is spread across the field. So in essence, I think defense industry needs to be looked at through a new lens so that every country that's making necessary investments gets a good return on those investments.

Heino Klinck: Particularly in the environment in which we find ourselves in, because I'm fairly confident in the next couple years we're going to see that the US defense budget is going to decline. At least in real terms it's not going to grow. But I think the Chinese threat that should be driving our acquisition plans, that's only going to get greater with time.

Mike Green: Your last point's a really good one and probably one I should do more on this podcast to address. Because when you look at alliances, everyone pays attention to the AUSMIN, the two plus two, the flags at the table, the agreements, and the exercises. But in a lot of ways, the lifeblood of an alliance is intelligence sharing and it's defense industrial cooperation. That's what really locks countries together in the competition.

Heino Klinck: The info sharing is absolutely key. We've been good at that, frankly. We've done that for generations now. It's mutually beneficial as well because obviously our partners and allies have sources and methods that we might not have. But I think some place where we haven't looked to try to come up with greater opportunities to harness the benefits of economies of scale and scope, or what have you, are co-development and co-production of systems that all of our allies may need. You've heard me talk about long range strike with respect to Japan. I think Australia wants that as well. We certainly have a need. There should be opportunities for industrial cooperation there.

Mike Green: So, Heino when you were on the job and we'd invite you to closed sessions with our allies to talk about these kind of issues, we all really were impressed with the clarity with which you could explain the logic. I guess a lot of it has to do with being a China FAO and knowing the challenge we face. But really glad you could share it with the podcast audience today, and good luck. You're at Klinck Global LLC now in the private sector for, I guess, the first time in decades at least. Good luck with that, must be kind of fun.

Heino Klinck: It is kind of fun, quite frankly, being able to do what I want to do on my own schedule and the like. I'm also fortunate to be able to, again, bring my military experience to bear. I spent a couple years in defense industry prior to coming back to the government as a civilian. I think the challenges are great and only growing, again with respect to China, and I'm hoping to still be able to contribute.

Mike Green: Excellent. More to follow. Thank you.

Heino Klinck: Thank you.

Andrew Schwartz: Thanks for listening. For more on strategy and the Asia programs work, visit the CSIS website at csis.org and click on the Asia program page.