The Minerals Security Partnership Under the South Korean Leadership

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Securing the supply chains for minerals and materials has become a top priority for countries with advanced technology manufacturing. The United States and South Korea are two such countries that have set out to mitigate risks that can arise from potential disruptions to minerals supply chains. While visions and strategies may differ, the two countries also have a potential for strong synergies in their industrial capabilities to address the supply-chain challenge. As South Korea succeeded the United States as the chair of the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP)—a major multilateral initiative to strengthen the global supply chains for critical minerals—it merits understanding how the two countries have been advancing mineral supply security, and what could be strategic priorities for the MSP under South Korea’s leadership.
Stakes and Challenges
The global demand for minerals that are key to clean energy technologies is on a surge as the energy transition continues. In 2023, the global demand for lithium rose by 30 percent, while nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements saw their demand grow by 8–15 percent. The economic footprint of these minerals is substantial, with their current market value around $105 billion. Moreover, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), their market value could quadruple by 2040, reaching $420 billion under the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) whereby announced ambitions and targets towards the midcentury net zero emissions are met.
In light of their rising demand and economic value, let alone their importance for decarbonization and advanced technologies, the state of supply security for these minerals has become a major concern to global leaders in advanced technology manufacturing that are highly import-dependent for their component minerals, such as the United States and South Korea. Policymakers in Washington and Seoul are particularly concerned with the lack of supply chain diversity, which entails a host of known and unknown vulnerabilities to their economic security.
The risks of minerals supply disruptions are geopolitical in nature. As the existing global supply chains are dominated by China (Figure 1), China’s latest export restrictions in early December 2024 illuminate how minerals access is a U.S. vulnerability that can be leveraged by a competitor. Importantly, China is the main import source for 21 of the 50 minerals critical for the United States. Moreover, the United States has had over 90 percent import reliance on minerals like gallium, graphite, indium, and bismuth in 2023.

Hyun Soo Cho
South Korea is in an even more precarious situation than the United States. As the second leading producer of semiconductors since 2013, especially with a 60.5 percent share in the memory semiconductor sector globally, access to minerals for semiconductor manufacturing is vital to South Korea’s economic competitiveness. According to the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources, the nation’s net import reliance for all critical minerals exceeds 99.7 percent, and incidents of supply risks like China’s export restrictions on gallium and germanium in mid-2023 have been of exceptional concern to South Korea for its scale of potential damages to the semiconductor industry.
South Korea’s Critical Minerals Vision, Strategy, and Goals
South Korea’s critical minerals policy is anchored in its vision to secure a stable supply of critical minerals and to position itself as a high-tech industrial powerhouse. To achieve this, the government has prioritized 33 critical minerals for economic security, with an emphasis on 10 of them as “strategic minerals” essential for industries like electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries. Aiming to reduce import dependency on critical minerals to 50 percent by 2030, South Korea is expanding its stockpile capacity and developing an eight-day rapid-response distribution system to prepare for supply shocks. South Korea has also laid out its plans for financial support towards private sector-led overseas mining ventures through public loans, insurance, and tax benefits, and for comprehensive institutional support towards domestic resource recycling efforts.
Similarly to the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is pursuing progress in technological innovation, including developing substitute materials and advancing recycling and reuse. Yet, the dearth of domestic mineral resources renders the country to heavily focus on mineral import conditions—whether the mitigation of trade disruptions or the exploration of new import sources—much more than in the case of the United States, whose strategy encompasses facilitating domestic mining as well as strengthening mineral trade. Nonetheless, both countries view the strategic value of securing minerals access in the broader context of economic security. Some similarities and differences in the scope and benchmarking are seen through comparing the two countries’ approaches to securing their critical minerals supply chains (Table 1).
The MSP and South Korea’s Role
The near-total import dependence and the attendant supply-chain vulnerability are also propelling South Korea to seek more partner countries to collaborate towards a more balanced and resilient global mineral supply network. In July 2024, South Korea became the MSP chair, marking the first leadership transition under the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), which is a key global platform to strengthen and expand the global mineral supply chains. Since June 2022, the United States and South Korea have been collaborating with 13 partner countries, including the European Union, to de-risk the minerals supply chain through the MSP.
The MSP focuses on the full value chains for minerals and metals—from mining to recycling—and supports various projects across the world. By September 2024, the MSP had begun supporting 32 projects, including 13 in Africa, 8 in the Americas, 6 in Asia-Pacific, and 5 in Europe. Among these projects is the Mahenge Project in Tanzania, where POSCO International of South Korea is engaged with a $40 million worth of purchase commitment, to help underpin the development of a graphite mine. Additionally, several of South Korea’s public financial institutions joined the MSP Finance Network, which was launched in September 2024, to “strengthen cooperation and promote information exchange and co-financing” among participating institutions.
The passing of the MSP leadership baton from Washington to Seoul underscores the common commitments by Washington and Seoul in securing critical mineral value chains, while also illuminating South Korea’s growing attention to mineral supply security and its appetite for global leadership. Additionally, South Korea’s MSP leadership turns the initiative into a more global and less transatlantic in nature. The MSP’s institutional agenda and broader mineral access engagements with a third country have generally been led by the United States and the European Union, as exemplified by their April 2024 establishment of the MSP Forum as well as their May 2023 support for the Lobito Corridor.
Opportunities for the MSP and South Korea
South Korea’s MPS chairmanship creates several opportunities that further advance the MSP vision to strengthen the diversity of the global supply chains for critical minerals while enabling Seoul to elevate its global leadership. These opportunities are closely intertwined, generating synergies if executed successfully.
- Opportunity 1: Position Economic Security as a Core Objective of the MSP
Gallium and germanium are essential minerals for semiconductor manufacturing, where China accounts for approximately 98 percent and 60 percent of its global production, respectively. With the global semiconductor industry projected to grow more than three-fold by 2032 compared to 2023, the volume of global demand and international trade for gallium and germanium is set to increase accordingly. However, the Chinese export restriction imposed on these minerals for semiconductors has recently come under geopolitical scrutiny, reflecting the vulnerable status quo of a minerals supply chain for a cornerstone industry of modern economies. It has also highlighted the embedded economic security risks that follow from a heavy reliance on a single producer for resources.
The MSP “focuses on the minerals and metals supply chains most relevant for clean energy technologies.” Critical minerals for non-energy end uses—such as those essential for semiconductors and advanced technologies—are not explicitly excluded from the MSP’s scope. However, they have not been a key focus. For instance, out of the 32 MSP projects, 2 projects are for gallium, and 2 projects are for germanium. Leading at the forefront of advanced technologies, South Korea should work to expand MSP project activities to place more focus on minerals that are vital to advanced technologies as well as energy transition. This step would better align the MSP focus with not only the growing global emphasis on advanced technologies but also the heightening attention to supply-chain risks in the economic security strategies of many governments.
Specifically, South Korea should propose to elevate the notion of economic security as a broader core objective within the MSP and position the MSP to more effectively maneuver supply chain disruptions as well as augment the MSP’s long-term strategic relevance against the dynamic geopolitical landscape.
- Opportunity 2: Grow Partnerships with Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia holds substantial mineral resources that are increasingly recognized for their potential to help diversify the global mineral supply chains. Notably, Indonesia possesses approximately 22 percent of the world’s nickel reserves, around 16 percent of global tin reserves, and about 4 percent of global bauxite reserves. As a runner-up of nickel reserves in the region, the Philippines accounts for 5 percent of nickel reserves. Vietnam and Myanmar each hold about 18 percent of the world’s rare earth element reserves, while Vietnam also has approximately 18 percent of global bauxite reserves. However, no Southeast Asian country is an MSP partner or an MSP forum member. (Under the MSP, countries and the European Union that constitute the MSP are referred to as “MSP partners” while resource-rich countries that the MSP partners engage with through project development and policy dialogue are referred to as “MSP forum members.”)
While abundant in mineral resources, Southeast Asia is limited in midstream capacity and capital. Even for some regional economies that are emerging as important global mineral suppliers, the lack of diversification in foreign capital for critical minerals projects could be a concern. For example, Indonesia has developed domestic nickel refining capacity, but the sector’s success has come with a significant expansion of Chinese influence. Participating in MSP activities and pursuing concrete projects would help Southeast Asia mitigate geopolitical and economic risks that are associated with over-reliance on a single economic partner. The MSP should be positioned not merely as a mechanism for securing resources but as a platform for building stronger economic resilience in participating regions.
South Korea should therefore leverage its growing ties with Southeast Asia to actively pursue and welcome the region’s engagement in the MSP. South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are to identify action plans for greater cooperation for the next five years starting in 2025, following the elevation of bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in October 2024. This development provides an opportunity for South Korea to include critical minerals engagement in the bilateral Plan of Action and pave the way for Southeast Asia’s participation in MSP activities. As such, Seoul has an opportunity to leverage its growing ties with the ASEAN and its MSP chairmanship to reinforce regional economic priorities while rectifying the absence of an MSP project in Southeast Asia, which is one of the main gaps in the MSP activities (Table 2).
- Opportunity 3: Expand Projects on Recycling and Recovery
The recycling of critical minerals is emerging as a crucial secondary source of supply. According to the IEA, scaling up recycling could reduce the need for primary minerals production by 25–40 percent by 2050 and could save $600–$800 billion in mining investments, under their APS scenario. Importantly, the battery recycling industry is expected to grow significantly. Annual revenues are forecast to surpass $95 billion globally by 2040, where end-of-life EV batteries are projected to supply over 90 percent of recycling feedstock by 2050. However, the current rate of growth in materials recycling is insufficient to meet the surging demand for critical minerals for clean energy transition. This broader pattern of neglect is also seen in the fact that only 3 of 32 MSP projects relate to recycling and reuse.
Addressing this gap could be a major contribution by South Korea. Per the IEA, South Korea is one of the three—along with China and the European Union—out of 22 countries and regions with a comprehensive roadmap with long-term strategies for critical mineral recycling. In its roadmap, South Korea aims to increase the share of critical minerals sourced from recycled materials from 2 percent to over 20 percent by 2030. Also, South Korea has pledged to provide financial support for recycling firms and tax incentives for research and development and to establish demonstration centers and industrial clusters to promote minerals recycling. As such, South Korea should work to encourage recycling capacity-building initiatives under the MSP.
Conclusion
As the first member country to succeed the United States in chairing the MSP, South Korea’s tenure could yield significant value to South Korea and the MSP. With a focus on filling in the gaps within the current MSP framework and projects, South Korea can aim to use this leadership role as an opportunity to better institutionalize the MSP. South Korea should also aim to attract more partners and member states to participate in the framework, and to encourage a better system of minerals recycling for a stronger supply chain. Most importantly for the MSP, South Korea’s leadership could help bolster the linkage between mineral access and economic security.
An important caveat is that the Korean priorities for the MSP agenda should not be constrained by short-term political dynamics. Instead, they merit bipartisan support that is underpinned by the clear recognition that mineral access is key to its economic security. The sustained support for the agenda could maximize the synergy between South Korea’s strategic objectives and the values of global supply-chain security. In the end, the MSP leadership transition is a testament to the sustained and universal nature of its mission, and the potential for further achievements.
Hyun Soo Cho is a visiting junior scholar with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Jane Nakano is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS.