Miscellany

This week, I want to address several issues that do not warrant an entire column. First, as those of you who listen to the Trade Guys podcast know, last week we were hit with the “Great Guacamole Crisis (GGC),” as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced it had suspended avocado inspections in Mexico because one of the inspectors had been threatened. Fears that this would cripple the Super Bowl proved unfounded, but the possibility of upcoming shortages loomed. On Friday, however, USDA announced the resumption of inspections, which means that avocados can continue to flow across the border and into your guacamole or on your avocado toast, depending on your generation. GGC averted, but this was another reminder that globalization has advantages, one of which is year-round access to popular produce.

Second, on a more serious note, the U.S. Senate, which is marginally functional on its best days, has taken yet another step backward, as Republican senators have expanded their efforts to block presidential nominees. The most dramatic example is the refusal of Senate Banking Committee Republicans to show up to vote on nominees to the Federal Reserve Board, thereby preventing a vote. (Rules require a majority present to vote, and with committees equally divided, if one party bails out, nothing can happen.) While two of the nominees, Jerome Powell and Lael Brainard, are already in office and will continue to serve, the other three are filling vacancies. While only one of the nominees appears controversial, the committee chair is not willing to separate them, so all five remain in purgatory.

This problem is also affecting the trade world, as the nominees for ambassador to the World Trade Organization, Maria Pagan, and chief innovation and intellectual property negotiator, Chris Wilson, are also on hold because of a senator’s insistence that the U.S. government reverse its position on the Indian-South African vaccine waiver issue. I think the administration’s position on the waiver is wrong, but this is not the way to change it. It won’t work, and it produces collateral damage, particularly to the lives of these honorable civil servants who did not make the policy but, like everyone in the administration, are charged with implementing it.

Hostage-taking deprives the government of the leadership it needs to administer its programs and implement its policies. Career civil servants are, for the most part, excellent (and far more competent than the average citizen might think), but they rely on their political leadership for direction and inspiration. Without that, programs are delayed, and political promises are left unfulfilled. As politicians in both parties have often said, elections have consequences, and the winners should have the opportunity to do what they said they were going to do—and suffer the consequences in the next election if they turned out to be bad ideas.

I speak from experience, because I was a hostage for six weeks when I was nominated to be undersecretary of commerce. After being approved by the committee without controversy, three of us were held hostage by a Democratic senator—these tactics are bipartisan—unhappy with the government’s failure to deal with durum wheat imports from Canada, an issue outside the purview of all three hostages. Three weeks later, the other two were released when a deal on wheat was cut, but I remained in limbo for another three weeks, until the majority leader called the bluff of whoever had placed a hold on my nomination and brought it to the floor, where it was approved without debate and without objection.

That episode shows that hostage-taking is not a new tactic, but lately it has moved to a new level, enabled by an equally divided Senate and procedural changes that have forced leadership to seek cloture on many nominations, taking up floor time and slowing the process down. These changes make it harder to overcome holds on nominations and, as a result, make it a more attractive tool for senators bent on obstruction.

And that is the core problem—obstruction in order to prevent the majority from accomplishing anything. During my lifetime, until recently, our political institutions were run from the center: both parties would seek acceptable outcomes on contentious issues, which usually meant both of them would throw their extreme members under the bus and work out a compromise. Now we are in an era where extremes rule, compromise is a dirty word, and simply blocking the other side becomes the main objective. In short, the lunatics have taken over the asylum. The recent escalation in hostage-taking is a manifestation of this dynamic. Moving beyond it will take concerted effort from both sides, which means it will take a long time.

Finally, last week also brought the news that the United States had lost a case in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) dispute resolution process—a complaint by Canada that our solar tariffs violated USMCA provisions. This followed an earlier case on Canadian dairy restrictions that the United States won. This is a good thing, because it shows the dispute settlement process is working. Cases are being brought, and decisions are being made. The real test, though, is yet to come: Will the losers comply with the decisions? Canada has said it will, but discussions about what “compliance” means have continued past missed deadlines. The United States has not declared its intentions yet, but I hope it will take the responsible course, comply with the decision, and by doing so affirm that it is still possible to resolve trade disputes amicably in a way that respects the rules.

William Reinsch holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. 

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). 

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