New Zealand’s Wake-Up Call: Beijing’s Reach Reorienting Wellington’s Regional Role

Throughout the nineteenth century, geography was a persistent challenge for New Zealand, as the country had to work hard to stay connected and relevant to the wider world. In the second half of the twentieth century, many Kiwis came to view that challenge as a strategic boon, as this remoteness allowed the country to play a less active role in major geopolitical events. In the twenty-first century, however, geographical distance might well be completely strategically irrelevant. That’s an unpleasant fact that a series of recent encounters with China have underscored to New Zealand, and which are feeding into a new, and more proactive, set of policies in Wellington.

In late February, a Chinese navy task force transited the Tasman Sea and conducted live-fire exercises with no prenotification, causing some 50 commercial airlines to alter their flight routes to avoid becoming inadvertent targets. The week prior, the Cook Islands, a Pacific Island in free association with New Zealand, signed several agreements with China, including a wide-ranging Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In the Cook Islands, Winston Peters, New Zealand’s foreign minister, worried that New Zealand was “in the dark over all but one of the agreements signed by China and the Cooks last week”. In the aftermath of the People’s Liberation Army’s unprecedented transit of the Tasman Sea, Judith Collins, the country’s minister of defense, warned New Zealanders that the incident was a “wake up call” for New Zealand and that “it is very important to understand that our distance means little to nothing and people need to realize we cannot do anything just by ourselves.” These events illuminated the slow-moving discussion as to what more is required from New Zealand, its political leadership, and the public to better safeguard the country’s national security interests.

This debate has been fueled by a steadily declining security environment for New Zealand, due to both natural factors such as climate change and growing threats from state-based actors. The result has been a New Zealand that is slowly transitioning into an active regional player engaged in thinking about what it can do, on its own and with others, to shape its region in subtle, but significant, ways. This evolution has been visible first in political intent, then in bureaucratic alignment, and, lastly, in resourcing. These are all necessary steps, but to have a strategic effect, Wellington needs to push this conversation into the public sphere in new ways to ensure that policy efforts are supported and resourced in politically sustainable and financially enduring ways.

Political Intent

Recent years have seen a steady evolution in Wellington’s thinking about the continued degradation of the security environment and what the country needs to do to better prepare itself for a more complex and interconnected world. This has manifested itself in a steady shift in New Zealand’s discourse on strategic challenges, pushing beyond closed-door discussions of intelligence threats, and evolving into consideration of New Zealand’s place—and responsibility—in the broader region.

When New Zealand’s conservative government swept into power late in 2023, it accelerated the measured but clear shift in New Zealand’s strategic outlook that had begun under the previous Labor government. This shift saw New Zealand align itself much more closely with the United States and other like-minded partners, and early statements by the Luxon government seemed to demonstrate continued movement in this direction. Prime Minister Luxon encompassed this shift in posture in an August 2024 speech when he asserted that New Zealand could no longer “perceive themselves as buffered by splendid isolation” amid aggressive military expansion and threats to regional stability and security. Luxon stated that as New Zealand looks outward at the broader region, “New Zealand too must be a participant and a contributor—not an interested bystander.”

This is also true of the other key policymakers in the government who hold national security portfolios. In one of his first speeches as deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Winston Peters emphasized the need to draw New Zealand closer to traditional intelligence partners in order to “enable [New Zealand] to act in a more challenging geo-strategic environment.” As New Zealand Defense Minister Judith Collins stated simply earlier this year, “We need to clearly step up our game.” Throughout his time as prime minister, Luxon has maintained a steady drumbeat of foreign travel—including chairing the grouping of Indo-Pacific Four at the NATO summit in July 2024. A distinct and consistent feature of Luxon’s travel—and that of his senior cabinet members—has been reinforcement of the collective effort to contribute to existing rules and norms on which the global community is founded.

All these actions and statements demonstrated clear political signaling about the willingness to take a more proactive approach that leans into traditional allies and partners in a significant and—for New Zealand—unprecedented way.

Bureaucratic Realignment

But governmental intent can only go so far. After all, effecting sustained change requires more than just a ministerial speech or a statement. To make sure intent translates into action, bureaucracy has to be aligned. And, over the past year, Wellington has steadily been adjusting its bureaucratic gears to enable a more synchronized, coordinated, and forward-leaning set of policies.

This change can be seen in the bureaucracy, with new leadership at all the major departments that hold a national security portfolio. Several months into the new government’s tenure, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Defence all had well-known and experienced senior civil servants tapped to run them. What’s significant here is not just that this triumvirate is experienced or respected, but rather that they are largely aligned in their views, capable in their management, and forward-leaning in their orientation.

The shift can also be felt in increasing official recognition of a changing geopolitical landscape and, consequently, a heightened impetus to more assertively protect New Zealand’s national interests against growing threats. For the first time, these threats are explicitly laid out in New Zealand’s 2024 Security Threat Environment report, which calls out Chinese efforts to influence New Zealand politics and actions through various public, private, educational, business, and media sectors. This unprecedented public document demonstrated not only a growing awareness of the threat that China posed, but also a willingness to acknowledge and address this issue more broadly in the public space.

 At the same time, the New Zealand government, alongside other Five-Eye partners, promulgated advice to tech start-ups, warning companies of cyber threats by “malign actors.” And in December 2024, the New Zealand government created new laws to protect ground-based space infrastructure from foreign spies, noting that “some entities” had attempted to establish seemingly civilian-use projects in New Zealand that could have been used to help foreign militaries. As stated succinctly in the recently released Defence Capabilities Plan (DCP), New Zealand’s “physical and virtual connections to the world are increasingly vulnerable.”

Increasing Resources

All the intent in the world means nothing, of course, without sufficient resources. Until recently, it was unclear if New Zealand’s political will and growing bureaucratic alignment would translate into a much-needed increase in defense spending. In addition to aging ships and equipment, the country’s defense spending of just over 1 percent of GDP did not allow for properly resourcing personnel and basing needs. While the Ministry of Defence statement of intent lays out not only strategic objectives for the country but also specific defense milestones, it is the DCP that officially requests the budget to actualize these objectives. After almost a year of bouncing back and forth in the purgatory between the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Parliament, the DCP was finally released on April 7, and it does not disappoint.

In addition to almost doubling New Zealand’s defense spending—bringing it above 2 percent of GDP for the first time in over 30 years—the DCP outlines 12 billion in investments over the next four years across maritime, air, cyber, and land domains. Key investments include unmanned long-range aircraft, enhanced strike capability, replacing aging helicopters and Boeing 757 fleets, enhancing cyber and intelligence tools, and investing in basing and infrastructure. On its aging frigates, New Zealand has dedicated significant funds to a sustainment package to allow for the continued use of the Anzac-class fleet. Throughout the DCP is an emphasis on the imperative to ensure interoperability with its ally Australia, ensuring that the two nations’ defense enterprises are in lockstep.

The Next Phase . . .

While the intent, alignment, and resourcing are present, what comes next will demonstrate how well New Zealand can effectively articulate its self-interest on the regional stage. The DCP is a noteworthy document and makes clear that the country is posturing itself to be, as Prime Minister Luxon said last August, “a participant and contributor” in protecting the rules-based order upon which New Zealand so deeply relies. With China increasing its footprint and ambitions across the Pacific, however, it is incumbent upon New Zealand—and all like-minded partners—to use increased defense capacity not just to raise readiness at home, but also to integrate further with partners in pursuit of deterrence. In this regard, New Zealand’s recent signing of a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines was a significant step forward, and paves the way for increased cooperation in the South China Sea.

This means, first and foremost, follow through on the roadmap laid out in the DCP, including associated budget alignment and more effectively leveraging the private sector. It also means doubling down on making the case to the New Zealand public, in a compelling, calm, and sustained manner, that the vast Pacific no longer provides a buffer against regional conflict. Abroad, this articulation must be heard through proactive statecraft, especially with its Pacific neighbors. Island nations that profess to be “friends to all” should also understand that agreements and relationships with some “friends” that threaten the security of others cannot be tolerated.

New Zealand should also consider borrowing a page from Australia’s recent attempts to use diplomacy more creatively—and more strategically. New Zealand and Australia might be the closest of allies, but they are very different countries in size, capacity, and Pacific relationships. Nevertheless, they share a common security outlook—and common security concerns. Throughout 2024, the Australian government rolled out a series of unique and bespoke bilateral agreements with several Pacific nations, all crafted to meet a specific need—in one case emigration mobility, in another banking, and yet in another rugby—and all incorporating a provision requiring consultation before security arrangements with third party nations. Wellington should consider pushing the bounds of its own creative diplomacy, especially in Polynesia.

As New Zealand’s strategic outlook and posturing evolve, so too should its partnership with the United States. Bilateral security discussions should continue to move forward, both in track 1 form—such as the dialogue former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell held in Auckland last fall—and in the Track 1.5 sphere, which fosters candid debate and creative problem-solving. With the Australians, New Zealand should pursue a similar set of Track 1.5 engagements to complement their Anzac strategic and defense dialogue.

Conclusion

As New Zealand’s posturing on security has evolved, so too has its role in the region from that of an “interested bystander” to an active participant in pursuit of its own national interests. At the same time, there remains some tension between its desire to be a good partner and New Zealand’s difficulty in advocating for its own strategic interests in tangible ways.

The shift to more proactive thinking about what New Zealand can do is palpable in the conversation with most senior officials and many of the country’s leading politicians, but this is also novel territory for them. In private, senior government officials will candidly remark, “We’re used to engaging across the region and working to be trusted partners; we’re just not used to advocating aggressively for our interests and to deny hostile states a purchase.”

This shifting security posture is not simple, but it is necessary. New Zealand’s leaders—at the political level and in the bureaucracy—have recognized the significance of the country’s changing security environment and have taken important steps to reorient the country to weather a more challenging geopolitical environment. The next phase, however, will require more than just reorientation. It will demand follow-through, real and sustained resourcing, greater levels of public engagement, and an uptick in official dialogues and creative strategic thinking—all stemming from the belief that New Zealand can and should work to positively influence the trajectory of the region.

Charles Edel is a senior adviser and the inaugural Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Kathryn Paik is deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at CSIS.