Open Letter on Afghanistan to the House Committee on Armed Services

January 16, 2008

Afghanistan is not a forgotten war, but is a war that is being fought without the proper troop levels and aid resources, and with unrealistic deadlines. The attached open letter to the House Armed Service Committee outlines the basic changes needed in the way the US and its allies support the war, provide forces and aid, set deadlines and goals, and seek support from the public and their legislatures.

It suggests that the US and NATO/ISAF are able to defeat the Taliban and other Islamist extremist movements at the tactical level, and have won important victories in 2007. However, the Taliban still seem to be winning the battle for political and economic space. US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan forces are not strong enough to "hold" large areas after they "win." There are only limited aid resources and personnel to "build" even in the more secure areas, and the Afghan central government cannot provide effective governance, services, and anything approaching the rule of law in most of the country, and particularly in high threat areas.

The rate of increase in Taliban control and influence in Afghanistan seems to have slowed sharply in 2007. It is clear, however, that the Taliban continues to score gains in controlling or threatening parts of Afghanistan. Moreover, the problems in Afghanistan are greatly compounded by Taliban and Al Qa'ida influence in Pakistan, and the area of direct day-to-day Taliban influence in that country continues to increase. It is all too clear that this war is not simply an Afghan struggle, but rather an Afghan-Pakistan struggle that is centered on Pashtun areas, is spreading into other ethnic areas, and is linked to growing Sunni-Shi'ite tensions. This war cannot be understood or won unless it is seen as a struggle for the future of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At the same time, it suggests that the war in Afghanistan remains eminently winnable. The Taliban is not strong. Its core forces probably number between 10,000 and 15,000, and its gains occur largely because of problems in resources and US and NATO/ISAF strategy for aiding the Afghan government. Some of these problems have already been eased by the increases in NATO/ISAF forces and US aid in 2007. The others can be solved by time, patience, and added resources – if the Afghan and Pakistani governments also move forward.

There also are convincing reasons why the US and its allies should provide the forces and resources necessary to win. The risk in losing this war must be addressed as honestly as the risk of continuing the fight. The choice is not one between staying or leaving. If the US and its NATO/ISAF allies lose in Afghanistan, even to the extent of losing effective control of the Pashtun areas, they will create a new sanctuary for both the Taliban and Al Qa'ida and make it extremely difficult for a divided and troubled Pakistan to ever secure its own Western tribal areas.

Failure in Afghanistan will force virtually every country on Afghanistan's borders into some form of at least covert intervention, and Al Qa'ida's reputation and influence will be vastly strengthened throughout the Islamic world and wherever Islamist radicals are present. Afghanistan and Pakistan are a far more serious center of terrorism than Iraq, and the risk of having to fight the same ideological and terrorist threat at home and in friendly and allied countries is at least as great, if not greater.

If the US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan governments are to win, however, the US and its allies must provide a substantial increase in aid, and take account of the fact that senior commanders have stated in background briefings that they need three key elements: at least four more battalions – some 3,000-7,200 troops; an end to national caveats that divide and limit the operations of many NATO/ISAF forces and relegate French, German, Italian, and Spanish forces to "stand aside" roles; and a far more active and effective Pakistani military effort on the Pakistani side of the border. They have also repeatedly stated that they need more helicopters, and some have made it clear they need additional armor.

The US and its allies must also create a mix of strategy, plans, programs, and budgets that go well beyond 2008 and the February  2009 deadline in the Afghan compact. Success in Afghanistan will almost certainly require a substantial  effort through the end of the next Administration, and  plans  must provide continuity and realistic goals and resources through a timer frame like  2012-2014. Moreover, the sustained political support the US and allied governments need  from their publics and legislatures requires a fundamentally different level of reporting on progress in the  war and what is actually needed to win.