The outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election will likely have a significant impact on the continuity and direction of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—and therefore the domestic and foreign policies of both Moscow and Kyiv.
So far, the Kremlin’s efforts have made Russia resilient despite the U.S.-led sanctions regime, largely shielding its economy and war effort from any immediate disastrous consequences. Facing foreign divestment, Russia has abandoned austerity, turning to its extensive financial reserves to run a budget deficit of 2 percent of GDP. Moscow has also managed to redirect Russian crude oil shipments from the European Union to countries such as India, China, and Turkey. These actions, among others, have allowed the Kremlin to sustain soaring defense spending and have made the defense sector the economy’s main driver. By importing dual-use technology and military weapons from its partner countries, such as China, Iran, and North Korea, Russia has kept its armed forces in Ukraine relatively well supplied.
At the same time, a significant increase in government spending has caused the Russian economy to overheat, leading to rising costs of living, labor shortages, and diminishing financial reserves. When these issues are coupled with high Russian casualty rates in Ukraine, estimated to have exceeded a total of 500,000 since the start of the invasion, Russia’s ability to maintain steady recruitment levels comes into question.
But Ukraine is in no better position. Kyiv surprised Moscow with its Kursk offensive, putting pressure on the Kremlin and illuminating existing deficiencies within the Russian military. However, a recent Russian counterattack might be winning back some parts of the Ukrainian captured territories. Russian gains in Ukraine, albeit with heavy losses, also keep adding up. This trend has become especially evident in the Donetsk region, where Russian troops are now threatening Ukraine’s key regional strongholds.
Against this backdrop are the U.S. elections in November, which could change both sides’ calculus, actions, and fortunes. At first glance, Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris and her vice presidential pick Tim Walz seem like good news for Ukraine. People close to President Zelensky view Harris as a reassuring candidate who is highly likely to continue President Biden’s policy of supporting Kyiv for “as long as it takes.” Indeed, during the September 10 presidential debates between Harris and Trump, Harris praised U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine and said that it would continue under her presidency. Similarly, Walz is considered a strong advocate for Ukraine. As governor of Minnesota, he signed legislation restricting state agencies from doing business with Russian or Belarusian companies. His state is also home to arms manufacturers supplying weapons to Ukraine.
Even though Kyiv remains hopeful about the Harris-Walz duo, the Zelensky administration would prefer if Harris broke from the strategic caution characteristic of the Biden administration. While Biden has secured unprecedented Western support for Ukraine, he has also been cautious about supplying certain offensive weapons to Kyiv and has put limitations on their use to avoid escalation with a fellow nuclear power. Ukrainian leaders believe this concern over escalation, especially following the Kursk incursion, has been exaggerated and has prevented Ukraine from launching an effective counteroffensive against Russia. Ukraine, therefore, would like to see a new Harris administration take more decisive steps in terms of arms delivery and their geographic use, which, in turn, could strengthen Kyiv’s negotiating position and ultimately secure a “just peace” with Moscow.
This policy shift now seems more likely due to U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken’s recent visit to Kyiv, which has led some Western analysts to assume that Washington might soon be lifting existing geographic restrictions on the use of U.S. weapons by the Ukrainians. If this happens, Harris will likely follow her predecessor’s suit, but she might also expect more active European involvement. Two individuals believed to play an important role in the new Harris administration—Harris’s current national security adviser, Philip Gordon, and deputy national security adviser, Rebecca Lissner—appear to share a vision of the world in which the United States acknowledges its past examples of overreach and limits its grand ambitions in the international arena. This may also indicate a renewed U.S. effort to urge European capitals to increase their own support for Kyiv if Harris wins.
In public, Russia officially embraced the Harris-Walz duo. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has said that Moscow was “not very surprised” with Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race and could not assess what a Harris presidency would mean for U.S.-Russia relations, noting that aside from some instances of unfriendly rhetoric, “her contribution to our bilateral relations has not been noticed.” Putin, on several occasions, has jokingly mentioned that he supports Harris’ candidacy. However, experts on Russia argue that in private the Kremlin is highly concerned about Harris’s campaign. Russia likely sees Harris as representing “liberal terrorists [and] liberal dictators,” making it difficult to end the war favorably for Russia under her presidency. Of course, much depends on Harris’s rhetoric and actions if she is elected president. Should she double down on Western arms delivery efforts to Ukraine and further weaken restrictions on the use of different weapons systems, Russia will likely announce a new wave of mobilization in the first few months of her presidency.
In the case of Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump, there appears to be even less certainty for Ukraine. Trump has previously claimed he would end the war within a day after taking office by forcing Zelensky and Russian president Vladimir Putin to negotiate. During the presidential debate with Harris, he reiterated his clear desire for the war to end, but refused to provide a direct answer as to whether or not he wanted Ukraine to win. Recently, retired U.S. lieutenant general Keith Kellogg and former CIA analyst Fred Fleitz, both serving as chiefs of staff in Trump’s National Security Council from 2017 to 2021, have presented him with a concrete plan to end the war, to which he allegedly responded favorably. The plan envisages Washington halting further weapons deliveries to Kyiv if it does not enter peace talks with Moscow. The White House would simultaneously warn Russia that, should it refuse to negotiate, U.S. support for Ukraine would increase. Trump’s vice presidential pick, Ohio senator JD Vance, has repeatedly criticized Ukraine, arguing that he does not “really care” what happens to Kyiv, as the Russia-Ukraine war has been exhausting the U.S. resources necessary to counter Washington’s real security threat—China. Elbridge Colby, a possible Trump administration senior official, holds a position on Russia and Ukraine that in many ways overlaps with Vance’s.
Other analysts argue that Trump’s Ukraine policy might be more unpredictable than expected. For instance, this spring, Trump gave House Speaker Mike Johnson tacit approval for a $60 billion aid package to Ukraine. In July, Trump had a “very good call” with Zelensky, during which he reportedly pledged to “achieve a just peace in Ukraine” if reelected. A July 25 op-ed, “A Trump Peace Plan for Ukraine,” coauthored by Trump’s former secretary of state Mike Pompeo, offered strong backing for Ukraine, proposing policies like driving down oil prices, reinforcing sanctions on Russia, bulking up the U.S. defense industry, creating a $500 billion lend-lease program for Ukraine, and integrating Ukraine into NATO. However, it is unclear whether Trump and Vance would embrace these suggestions fully, partially, or not at all.
Therefore, should Trump win the 2024 presidential race, he might (1) seek a hasty peace deal, which would ultimately benefit Moscow, leaving Crimea and other annexed territories in eastern Ukraine to Russia and Kyiv without a clear path to NATO or EU membership; (2) let the war continue, ultimately exhausting Russian resources but also testing Ukrainian and Western resolve; or (3) escalate the conflict, especially if Moscow proves difficult to negotiate with, by furnishing Ukraine with arms the Biden administration was reluctant to send. According to CSIS senior associate Michael Kimmage, Trump, like Putin, might even “refuse to declare tactical nuclear weapons off limits in Ukraine . . . to strengthen his hand at the negotiating table, as a bluff or just to separate himself from his predecessors.” All in all, Trump’s reelection would not automatically mean that Kyiv will lose or that Moscow will emerge victorious. As Politico’s Matthew Kaminski has said, “The outcome is up for grabs and the people around Trump are fighting over it.”
Policy Recommendations for the Next U.S. Administration
- Define the limits of U.S. engagement in the Russia-Ukraine war vis-à-vis other priorities. Russia continues to strengthen its defense-military partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea and has boosted economic and trade relations with the middle powers (e.g., India, Brazil) and other Global South countries. Whatever the next steps vis-à-vis Ukraine (strengthening it militarily or seeking an end to the conflict), the White House should provide a plan explaining how each policy decision ensures the United States retains a competitive edge against China in terms of the wide-ranging strategic competition between Washington and Beijing.
- Agree on the long-term goals for Ukraine. In the last two years, the Western coalition’s perceived inability to dramatically weaken Russia’s military potential or proactively provide Ukraine with much-needed weapons has led to internal tensions and undermined its credibility in the eyes of other countries. The next U.S. administration should provide a clear vision of the goals for the war and the road map toward achieving them.
- Undermine Russia’s oil revenues. Peace talks notwithstanding, Putin’s Russia will remain a long-term U.S. challenge, attempting to undermine Washington’s global influence. To weaken Russia’s long-term war-fighting potential, it is critical to deprive the Russian state of the revenues needed to sustain its war effort. Russia remains deeply dependent on revenues from fossil fuel exports. Yet the West has been reluctant to aggressively target Russian oil exports for fear of the political and economic fallout and has failed to enforce existing measures like the G7’s oil price cap. The task is to identify what actions the West can take to deprive Russia of energy revenues without causing significant global economic or energy disruption. The next U.S. administration should identify effective measures to reduce Russian energy revenues going forward.
Maria Snegovaya is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Tina Dolbaia is a research associate with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. Nick Fenton is a program manager and research associate with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.
