Palestine's UN Gamble

In the coming weeks, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will likely submit a formal request to the United Nations for full membership status. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council must approve the request before it goes to the General Assembly for a final vote. With Israeli-Palestinian negotiations stuck for more than a year, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas portrays the UN vote as the only hope for ever achieving Palestinian statehood. It simultaneously signals Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Obama administration’s efforts to resume negotiations and lack of confidence in the prospect of reaching any agreement with the government of Israel.

President Obama has rejected the Palestinians’ strategy, telling Palestinians in a May speech that “symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United Nations in September won’t create an independent state.” The Obama administration has threatened to veto the proposal in the Security Council and has instead pushed anew to persuade the two sides to resume direct negotiations. An American veto would not be the end of the story. The Palestinians could still persuade the General Assembly to approve an upgraded observer status or to pass a nonbinding recognition of Palestinian statehood.

The Palestinian strategy places the Obama administration in a quandary: it has identified an independent Palestinian state alongside a secure Israel as a U.S. national interest, but it is likely to be on record opposing Palestinian statehood. However it plays out, the Palestinian move creates dilemmas and risks for Israel, the Palestinians, and the United States.

Q1: Why are the Palestinians seeking UN membership, and what do they stand to gain or lose?

A1: Palestinians of all political stripes argue that nearly two decades of negotiations have failed either to end Israel’s settlement construction in the West Bank or create an independent Palestinian state. Palestinians are now turning to the UN and international community, where they enjoy wider sympathy, in the hopes of gaining leverage over Israel.

As a full member of the UN, a Palestinian state would have the right to bring cases against Israel in the International Court of Justice. Under such circumstances, a Palestinian state could argue that Israel is an occupying military force and step up the international boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. Such a move would likely further damage Israel’s international diplomatic standing, especially in Europe.

However, increased isolation is unlikely to provoke Israeli concessions in the near term. Rather, an increase in international pressure on Israel and efforts to delegitimize it further will likely strengthen the nationalist and hard-line tendencies within the Israeli government and population. Instead, the Israelis are likely to seek to be punitive, potentially increasing settlement construction or tightening restrictions on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

Domestically, the UN gambit could become a liability for the Palestinian Authority. It could face growing opposition and resentment if Palestinians feel that the UN strategy has failed to change the lives of ordinary Palestinians.

Q2: Why does the U.S. government oppose the Palestinian strategy, and what is at stake?

A2: For nearly four decades, the U.S. government has argued that only direct Arab-Israeli negotiations can establish an independent Palestinian state. The U.S. policy in Democratic and Republican administrations alike has been to bring the two sides together rather than have them pummel each other in the court of public opinion.

More immediately and practically, a Palestinian-led UN fight over Israel may provoke Congress to call for suspending aid to the Palestinian Authority. According to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. government has provided an average of $600 million in annual support to the Palestinian Authority since 2008. The United States is also the single largest donor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which is charged with aiding Palestinian refugees, including those in Gaza. A dramatic shift in U.S. relations with the Palestinians could marginalize the U.S. role in peacemaking for years and further undermine U.S. standing in the region.

Q3: What challenges does Israel face from the UN vote on Palestinian statehood?


A3: Israel vehemently opposes the Palestinian bid for UN membership and launched a diplomatic counteroffensive in Europe and beyond to oppose the UN vote. It is relying heavily on the United States to persuade the Palestinians to abandon the plan or veto the Security Council vote. The last time the United .States vetoed a Security Council resolution critical of Israel, in February 2011, the Obama administration followed the veto with a harsh statement condemning the Israeli actions that had prompted the resolution. Another U.S. veto could once again strain U.S.-Israeli ties at a time of heightened political sensitivity.

Beyond the political and diplomatic ramifications, Israeli military planners worry that a failed UN vote may trigger a mass uprising by Palestinians at its borders. The greater threat perhaps is that a mass nonviolent protest movement could confront the Israeli army at key locations in the West Bank, leading to civilian casualties. Palestinians previewed this strategy in May during protests marking the creation of the state of Israel or what Palestinians call the Nakba (catastrophe), and in June when protesters in Syria rushed the Israeli-Syrian border. Israel’s army can prepare for these contingencies, but the government will pay a diplomatic cost if such incidents continue and casualties among unarmed civilian protesters increase.

Haim Malka is deputy director and senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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Haim Malka