Philippines Votes 2025: A Power Shift in the Senate

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Filipinos went to the polls on May 12 for consequential midterm elections. Voters chose representatives at almost all levels, from neighborhood-level leadership posts to seats in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Also at play were governorships and mayorships throughout the country. Among the most crucial elections were those for the 12 open Senate seats, which hold outsize influence, power, and prestige in the Philippine legislature.

The midterm elections, especially the nationally elected Senate, are seen as a bellwether for the 2028 presidential elections. Bread and butter issues like social safety net programs, job creation, poverty alleviation, and improved healthcare access were top of mind for most voters. Protecting Philippine territorial integrity, especially in the contested South China Sea, was another key rallying point. But overhanging these substantive issues was the ongoing political feud between the Marcos and Duterte camps, whose now-broken “UniTeam” alliance propelled President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and Vice President Sara Duterte to power in 2022.

Q1: Who were the winners on election night?

A1: The battle between the Marcos and Duterte camps was fought primarily in the Philippine Senate. The elections delivered a weaker showing for the administration than predicted by polling. Voters are not completely disenchanted with the Marcos administration and the president’s slate of candidates, including radio personality Erwin Tulfo and veteran politicians like Panfilo “Ping” Lacson, who won 6 of the 12 open Senate seats. But that fell short of expectations after polling suggested that the administration could win up to 8 seats. Instead, Filipinos delivered larger-than-expected margins for both the Duterte and newly revived liberal camps.

On policy, Marcos’s Senate slate promised priority bills aimed at increasing transparency, fighting fake news, and improving the economy for everyday Filipinos. President Marcos’s legislative agenda will still likely have bicameral appeal. In the next three years, the Marcos administration will need to convince the Filipino people that the economic gains it has achieved, including lower inflation and a steady growth rate, can translate to tangible everyday benefits. Interestingly, after the election, the president suggested an openness to yet another political marriage of convenience, this time with the liberals against the Dutertes.

Duterte-backed Senate candidates, including former president Rodrigo Duterte’s right-hand man Senator Christopher “Bong” Go and former Philippine National Police Chief Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, won 4 of the 12 seats. The former president himself was elected mayor of Davao City despite being detained by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, and Duterte-aligned candidates performed better than expected in the House of Representatives. Though still in the minority, Duterte-backed candidates in the House may attempt to sideline Marcos’s agenda in preparation for the 2028 presidential elections.

The midterms delivered significant gains to the Philippines’ liberal faction, bringing veteran politicians back into the fold. Former senators Paolo Benigno “Bam” Aquino and Kiko Pangilinan, who served as campaign manager and running mate, respectively, on Leni Robredo’s failed 2022 presidential campaign, won back their seats. They placed a surprising second and fifth place nationally, far outpacing the support indicated by polling. Meanwhile, Robredo won the Naga City mayorship in a landslide, and prominent liberal politicians, including former Senator Leila De Lima, who spent the Duterte administration as a political prisoner, won seats in the House.

Q2: What was at stake for each faction?

A2: For the Marcos camp, ensuring a functional legislative majority is key to enabling the president’s agenda for his remaining three years in office and securing his legacy. By endorsing a broad group of politically disparate veteran politicians and media personalities, Marcos attempted to paint a picture of continuity, integrity, and competence through his Senate slate. The president also decried his opponents’ policy positions, from the Duterte-era war on drugs to the former president’s warm relationship with China.

The Marcos-aligned supermajority in the House impeached Vice President Sara Duterte earlier this year. She will face trial in the Senate by July 30 and seeing her removed from office and banned from running for president in 2028 would clearly be in the Marcos camp’s interests. The muddled results from the midterms make that less likely.

In the Duterte camp, the midterms were a battle for survival. Former President Rodrigo Duterte is awaiting trial in The Hague after his arrest in March. His daughter, Vice President Sara Duterte, is embroiled in legal issues that threaten her political future. By seeking sympathy for their alleged political persecution by the Marcoses, the Duterte camp hoped to secure a firewall of allies in the Senate who could block Sara’s removal from office and spare the family from political extinction.

Lastly, the liberals sought a return to the national stage as the “true” opposition. The noise of the Marcos-Duterte squabble provided an excellent backdrop for their campaign, which pledged to focus on substantive issues affecting the lives of everyday Filipinos rather than expending energy on political infighting. Without the power of incumbency or the same political machinery, this group spread its message primarily through volunteerism and grassroots politics.

Q3: How were the campaigns run?

A3: The Philippine midterms focused on splash, virality, and branding over substance. National candidates focused their efforts on capturing in from vote-rich areas such as the Manila National Capital Region and surrounding provinces, as well as the Central Visayas region around Cebu City. While the usual campaign stories and events played out in person, capturing hearts and minds through social media remained a key priority for national candidates. Though mostly peaceful, there were scattered reports of electoral violence throughout the country. Glitches in automatic counting machines led to some Filipinos casting votes for candidates they did not vote for based on accidental smudges on the ballot. But these glitches were not significant enough to alter the results, and the elections were generally free and fair.

Data from the Commission on Elections revealed that millennials and Gen Z made up over 60 percent of registered voters in the 2025 midterms. This led to a noticeable uptick in political discussions on social media platforms; analyses indicate that millennial and Gen Z voters accounted for 71 percent of those online discussions. Like in previous national elections, disinformation campaigns played a big role in swaying the public. Astroturfing, a tactic used to create a false sense of grassroots support for a cause, was a common occurrence in this election, with the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism discovering over a hundred political advertisement Facebook pages disguised as media outlets. Creating false momentum helped local and national candidates boost their bids. From January to March 2025, these pages spent over $860,000 on political advertisements as they promoted or attacked candidates.

The Duterte camp’s disinformation machinery, building upon years of success, roared back to life in the wake of Rodrigo Duterte’s ICC arrest to buoy the family’s Senate fortunes. Posts defending the former president, decrying his arrest as a “kidnapping,” and portraying him as a martyr inundated Philippine cyberspace. Fake profiles made up over 30 percent of pro-Duterte social media profiles on X, for example, with many more instances on other social media outlets aimed at parroting and boosting content for greater awareness. The Marcos camp, meanwhile, is attempting to use its political power to investigate disinformation and curb fake news for its benefit.

Q4: What’s next for the Philippines?

A4: The 2025 midterm elections are the starting line for an even bigger, more high-stakes 2028 national election. The future of the warring families has major implications for the Philippines’ future, including its place on the international stage. President Marcos is term-limited, meaning the race is on to determine his successor. A more traditional Marcos-allied or liberal president would likely maintain the trajectory of the current administration in deepening the alliance with the United States, shoring up international economic ties, boosting foreign direct investment, and strengthening the Philippines’ role in regional defense networks. Such an administration would lean on the United States for military modernization, training, and mutual defense.

Sara Duterte, or a Duterte-aligned candidate, however, would likely return the Philippines to an unpredictable foreign policy more sympathetic to China. While domestic policy would largely echo the Marcos administration’s focus on bread-and-butter issues, international economic relations would be far more uncertain. The previous Duterte administration did not demonstrate a strong interest in deepening economic ties with the United States and its partners, instead focusing on a largely unsuccessful effort to attract Chinese investment in national infrastructure. The Philippines under such a leader may sour on military collaboration with the United States, putting Marcos-era advancements on the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and Armed Forces of the Philippines modernization in jeopardy.

The Marcos camp’s weaker performance in the national elections will not likely translate to significant discord in the House or Senate, and the president may lean into new alliances to pass his legislation. The Marcos administration will likely continue to push forward poverty alleviation and programming for the working-class Filipinos that shape its voter base. Its first major test after the elections will be its handling of Vice President Sara Duterte’s upcoming Senate trial.

Rallying the Marcos camp and convincing enough senators to remove Sara Duterte from office may be a high-risk, high-reward gamble. In one scenario, the Marcos campaign could decisively remove a strong competitor from running in 2028 and dominate the competition with newfound alliances with liberal factions. Alternatively, Sara Duterte’s conviction and ban from political office may add fuel to the fire started by the elder Duterte’s detention and Sara Duterte’s impeachment, propelling another Duterte substitute to the presidency and endangering Marcos’s legacy.

Japhet Quitzon is an associate fellow with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.