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This transcript is from a CSIS event hosted on August 7, 2024. Watch the full video here.
Seth G. Jones: Hi. I’m Seth Jones, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. On behalf of CSIS and the U.S. Naval Institute, it is my real pleasure to welcome you to the next event in our Maritime Security Dialogue Series. This series is made possible through the generous support of our partner, HII.
Today, we are delighted to be joined by Vice Admiral George Wikoff. Vice Admiral Wikoff assumed command of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and U.S. FIFTH Fleet in February 2024. Vice Admiral Wikoff’s previous shore assignments include the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center as TOPGUN training officer, Naval Personnel Command, the Joint Staff, and a wide range of other assignments. Operationally, Vice Admiral Wikoff served aboard the USS America, the USS Kitty Hawk, the USS Enterprise USS Truman, and the USS Reagan. In his current role, Vice Admiral Wikoff has had a busy year following the October 7th attack in Israel and conflict in the region, including in the Red Sea, that has pulled in Israel, Iran, and a wide range of Iranian partner forces including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen.
For those with questions for Vice Admiral Wikoff, there is a link to ask questions on the event page at CSIS.org.
So thank you to Vice Admiral Wikoff for joining us today. And now, to lead the discussion, I will hand it off to Rear Admiral Ray Spicer. He’s the chief executive officer and publisher of the U.S. Naval Institute. Ray, thanks to you, to USNI more broadly, and HII for a great partnership. Over to you, Ray.
Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spicer (RET.): Great. Thank you, Seth. And my thanks as well to HII and to CSIS.
And special thanks to you, Admiral Wikoff, for joining us today. I know that you had originally planned to be here in person, but due to recent events in the AOR quite understandably you had to stay back and mind the fort. But really appreciate you taking some time for us, especially in light of recent developments in the AOR.
I fully realize that you can’t talk about a lot of what’s going on, especially sort of the real-time events in theater. I would ask the audience to respect that during the Q&A portion as well.
But I thought, Admiral, just to kick us off, if you could start by giving us an assessment of where – what you can talk about and the overall state of play in the FIFTH Fleet AOR before we dive into what I know is on everyone’s mind, and that’s the maritime security aspect in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden.
Vice Admiral George M. Wikoff: Thanks, Seth and Ray, CSIS, and USNI for this opportunity. Unfortunately, obviously, I can’t be there right now, and I would have loved to because, frankly, looking at all the luminaries in the audience and people dialed in, I’d be able to learn a heck of a lot from the experts in academia, the journalists, the industry, the folks in the diplomatic community. There’s just a lot of really great folks that are dialed into this, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak to them.
Before I start with specifics of the – of the area that I really want to focus on today, is the – which is the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab al-Mandab, and that kind of area, the maritime security aspects therein – just it might be helpful just to kick back a little bit about the different hats I wear, because the one hat as the commander of the Combined Maritime Force will actually become pretty prominent in our discussions today, so.
And as you know, Ray, my first hat’s the FIFTH Fleet commander, and that’s my Navy hat. That’s the hat where I work for Admiral Franchetti, my boss in that role, the CNO. And what I – what I do there is I man, train, equip, and sustain the forces that are provided by the Navy to the FIFTH Fleet AOR. Another role I have there is to make sure that the CNO is informed of operational events here as a member of the JCS so she can work with the chairman to advise the president in matters of national security that may come up with the maritime – specifically the maritime domain in mind.
The second hat I wear is the NAVCENT commander, as you already noted, and that’s my – really my Echelon II hat. That’s my direct report hat to General Kurilla, the CENTCOM commander. My NAVCENT hat, I take those forces that are assigned or allocated to this region and I put those naval assets against the objectives that General Kurilla has – those operations, activities, investments in training, or partnership opportunities in the region. So that’s really the force employment portion of my job.
The third hat I wear is a bit interesting in that it’s probably the most strategic hat I wear, which is the commander of the Combined Maritime Force. And that’s a group of 45 likeminded nations committed to maritime security signed on by rules-based international orders and norms. And those nations – the structure there is those nations’ maritime leadership are my bosses, and I’m effectively a CEO of that organization. I have a U.K. one-star as my deputy. And that group in particular looks at maritime security through a lens of a global maritime coalition that’s committed to maritime security. Nations that sign up, they provide assets and they provide monetary assistance or personnel to the command, and we array those forces within three task forces committed to maritime security: Task Force 150, 152, and 153. (Task Force) 153 is the maritime security focused group that looks at the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Two other task forces, counterpiracy and the other one is for training.
So while that group is – it’s a unique group. For instance, we just recently turned over Task Force 151, a Brazilian-led group that was turned over to a Turkish-led group. So it’s quite a bit of diversity.
And the reason I bring that up is because Task Force 153 is actually the leader now of OPG. And OPG – Operation Prosperity Guardian – the leader of Task Force 153 is an Italian O6. And OPG is really what my – what I am now supporting as the CMF for operations in those – the maritime security operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden under Task Force 153. So what Task Force – what the OPG mission right now – and that’s where we’re talking about the region – is really a focused operation. It’s over 20 nations that are currently signed on for it. And the mission for OPG is to assure and reassure our partners in the region of our commitment to maritime security as well as the industry of our commitment to regional security.
It’s also information sharing. We’ve started a group called the Joint Maritime Information Center where we provide industry with a(n) authoritative view on the current threat environment, and they use that information to make their own threat assessments on whether or not they will transfer through the area. So I believe that’s value added to the environment.
We coordinate efforts and those likeminded goals with our ASPIDES partners out here, which is a(n) EU mission that’s also committed to maritime security, parallel to our efforts but
complementary in many ways in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. And at the end of the day, that mission – the OPG mission – is really to protect mariners. It’s to protect mariners who are just going to work every day, doing their jobs, moving commerce around the globe, and making sure that they are protected when possible or get the right information so that they don’t have to be put in harm’s way because of a poorly informed decision.
The other hats and the other missions that go on for maritime security in the Red Sea are important to differentiate. Another different hat or different mission we have are Sentinel authorities, Operation Sentinel. You may recall Operation Sentinel started in 2019. That was the ability for the United States to escort certain ships through the Straits of Hormuz during a crisis that erupted in that important piece of water space. Those authorities were extended to cover the areas of the Bab al-Mandab last year when we started to have the crisis break out. That’s under a unilateral hat where the United States can now escort ships that are signed on for OPG to sign – have signed onto the OPG mission. So those escorts are a United States-supported effort.
The third piece of that security construct are the active self-defense strikes that you may be familiar with. I want to say this once and I’ll say it again later: That has nothing to do with OPG. Those offensive or those – sorry, those active self-defense strikes against the – some Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, those strikes in particular are nothing to do with OPG. Those are designed to disrupt the Houthis’ ability to terrorize the maritime, and to degrade and hopefully deny the Houthis opportunity to continue to hold the region at risk, with an end state of hopefully enabling diplomacy at some point.
So several different hats, and those hats all kind of converge in that region right now – the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden. But the OPG specifically with regard to maritime security, that’s a CMF-led organization.
I hope that helps frame out the mission set right now.
RADM. Spicer: Yes, sir. That was great. In fact, you answered my next question for you. But I wanted to try to differentiate the active self-defense strikes with what OPG’s doing, and you answered that pretty clearly.
In March, I think you expressed your views that you thought there could be more partner nations involved in OPG. Are you satisfied with where you are now with the nations that are participating in that effort?
VDAM. Wikoff: When you look at the mission, you know, what we’re trying to do is preserve maritime security in a region. If you’re on the East Coast, start at Boston and go all the way to Miami, and that’s about a little over 1,100 nautical miles straight-line distance. That’s the region we’re talking about when we’re talking about trying to preserve maritime security as a – as a kind of unit of measure or reference point. So we’ll need a lot of ships if we’re trying to enforce some type of – what we really rely on is rational actors in the region who act rationally and don’t terrorize the maritime, and that would be the way for us to try to preserve or try to get to a point of some degree of maritime security.
I will tell you that the efforts – that we would certainly like to have more partners involved in providing ships, but those are national decisions based on national resources and what’s available at the time. It’s clear by the efforts we see alongside of our – the EU efforts and other discussion points – to
include the U.N., who have also very recently with 2739 in June also have really reinforced the point that what’s going on is wrong. So more steel on the water would certainly be helpful, but the area we’re talking about is vast, and really what we need to have is a diplomatic solution that comes to a point where we don’t have to worry about trying to defend ships that are just innocently transiting that area.
RADM. Spicer: Yeah. Right. Thank you.
The Houthi attacks have been ongoing since November kind of off and on, but it seems like the attacks have continued despite the coalition’s efforts to prevent them, and as recently as the last couple days. And the Houthis seem emboldened by their occasional success in inflicting damage. I don’t know the numbers, but I mean, they have launched so much at both commercial shipping and Navy ships and coalition ships with very limited success, but they have had some, and they seem emboldened when they – you know, they’re able to sink a ship. So I would ask how effective the coalition response has been, in your estimation. And how is the situation evolving over time? Are things abating, or are they escalating, or does it really depend on, you know, the day that you’re asked that question
VADM. Wikoff: Yeah. Thanks for a fair question, and it’s a struggle we have every to try to figure out where are we on the – on the meter with regard to stability in the region.
You know, it’s the Houthis’ choice. I mean, they can – they can stop this any day they want, terrorizing the maritime. That’s something that they can – they can stop. And we talk a lot about are they being deterred or not, and it’s a – it’s a fair question. But as you know, it’s not that binary. It’s – we have certainly degraded their capability. There’s no doubt about that. We’ve degraded their ability. However, have we stopped them? No. And as you saw with the Motor Vessel Groton, just a couple nights ago was struck by a weapon. Fortunately, no sailors died in that particular attack. But once again, reinforced these ambition(s) to continue to terrorize the maritime. Just a – just a few nights ago, attacked some of our warships just transiting through the Red Sea as well. And we continue to see the Houthis, when they have opportunities, to try to take opportunities – advantage of opportunities like that.
But our mission remains to disrupt their ability and try to preserve some semblance of maritime order while we give an opportunity for policy to be developed against the Houthis. The challenge of the deterrence is, obviously, you have to have a center of gravity to hold at risk. And one thing we don’t really know that much about – and we find this through Yemen through history – is it’s very difficult to find a centralized – center of gravity that we can hold at risk over time and use that as a – as a potential point of deterrence. So trying to apply classic deterrence policy in this particular scenario is a bit challenging. So what we’ll continue to do with the operations we’re doing, we’ll be a shock absorber. And that’s what the military has provided.
You asked whether or not it goes up or down. What I would say is if you go back to the October timeframe, or early October or September timeframe, you saw a rapid drop off in the October-November-December timeframe with shipping, almost a 50 percent drop. Depends on what numbers you look at that day, but a large drop until the beginning of February. That really reflected the maritime industry’s ability to recalibrate and reinitiate their routes. It’s a – it’s a couple-month process to take transit patterns that go through the Red Sea and reroute them around the Cape of Good Hope, et cetera.
What we’ve seen now since the beginning of February is really a stabilization. And it’s an unacceptable stabilization, so don’t get me wrong; it’s not an acceptable solution. But we have seen some degree of stabilization where now, where we used to see about 2,000 ships go through the BAM a month, now we see roughly a thousand ships going through the BAM a month. So right now the idea is continue to maintain that decision space, try to preserve where we are right now to allow other levers of government and other levers of the international community to pressurize the Houthis to stop what they’re doing in the maritime.
RADM. Spicer: Yeah. Great. Thank you for that.
Quick sidebar, if I may. You came to this job from having been the acting air boss, where you were essentially the supplier of forward-deployed forces to the region. And now you’re at the tip of the spear as the consumer. And I’m wondering if you have any reaction. Is there anything different than what you expected coming into the job?
VADM. Wikoff: Well, what I learned during my brief time in Coronado was that it is a heck of a lot harder to force generate than force deploy. It is a thankless, difficult, challenging work. But I will tell you, and – that the forces that have been provided to us to deploy by the SWOBOSS, the surface community – and the aviation community, but the surface community in particular – have been absolutely outstanding. And I’d love to talk about that if we have time at some point here. But I could brag on United States Navy sailors for the rest of this, and we would go on for days about the terrific work that our sailors have been doing out here, and the – and the incredible work by the surface warfare enterprise to force generate and continue to sustain our ships at sea.
Just going to sea with systems that are degraded, it’s not good enough, and everyone knows that. And everyone are absolutely storming, storming any of the challenges we have with full-throated effort. So I’m just incredibly thankful for the work that the community has done. Everybody gets it. And everybody understands that we’re putting sailors in harm’s way, we’re putting them at risk, and they deserve our very best. And I’m very confident that that’s resonating through the force-generation side back in CONUS.
RADM. Spicer: Well, what I learned during my brief time in Coronado was that it is a heck of a lot harder to force generate than force deploy. It is a thankless, difficult, challenging work. But I will tell you, and – that the forces that have been provided to us to deploy by the SWOBOSS, the surface community – and the aviation community, but the surface community in particular – have been absolutely outstanding. And I’d love to talk about that if we have time at some point here. But I could brag on United States Navy sailors for the rest of this, and we would go on for days about the terrific work that our sailors have been doing out here, and the – and the incredible work by the surface warfare enterprise to force generate and continue to sustain our ships at sea.
Just going to sea with systems that are degraded, it’s not good enough, and everyone knows that. And everyone are absolutely storming, storming any of the challenges we have with full-throated effort. So I’m just incredibly thankful for the work that the community has done. Everybody gets it. And everybody understands that we’re putting sailors in harm’s way, we’re putting them at risk, and they deserve our very best. And I’m very confident that that’s resonating through the force-generation side back in CONUS.
VADM. Wikoff: Yeah. And to go back, I couldn’t be prouder of the work going on. I’m the father of a sailor, and watching this happen right now is just something that should give I think anyone wearing a uniform just tremendous pride.
You know, the CNO talks about warfighters, warfighting, and foundation. You see it all here. You see warfighters. You know, people will question the next generation – you always look at the next generation as not quite as capable as your generation, and that’s just a tradition that we pass on. Well, I’ll tell you that this generation is better than any generation I’ve been involved in.
You know, when is the last time a commander has put a fleet through a position where they know they will be engaged? They absolutely know. I knew the other night that our ships were going to be engaged. And I also knew that they were trained, they had weapons systems, and they knew what to do when that was happening. And they did. And they performed, once again, flawlessly. I am careful with the bravado because I do know you’re only as good as your next engagement, and that’s a sobering reminder that we all have. But the discussions of what we’re doing aside, the bottom line is, is that our sailors have been asked to do an extremely difficult job, and they’re doing it better than we could possibly even imagine before.
They put – they know they’re going to be engaged, they put the conflict on the bow, and they steam right into it. And they do it with full confidence with their training. They’re the best-trained, the best-equipped navy in history, and we’re seeing it right now. As you pointed out, SM-2, SM-3, SM-6s; the whole battery of weapons systems, both defensive and offensive, being used in different scenarios right now. Sustained combat, first since World War II that we have – not to discredit the tremendous work done in this same region during the tanker wars, which was a different kind of threat. But certainly, nevertheless, a stressful environment for our sailors.
Our sailors have been doing this now for eight months and they’ve continue with it. You saw the Ike strike group with – really, without a break just due to a host of reasons going through this. It’s just – it absolutely is – you know, we should be very proud.
You know, they’re upbeat. I visited the Cole and the Laboon when they were here in Bahrain a few weeks ago, both of the ships, and the crews understand it. They understand what they’re doing, they understand why they’re doing it, and they understand that they have to be focused on the mission. And then when you watched them a few weeks later out there executing the mission that you know they’re trained for and you’re confident in their ability, that – it makes you – it should make us feel all very proud of our Navy, and the training, and the things that we’ve done for them.
Aside from all the conflict – and I just – because I like to brag on the sailors out here, if you would – if you’d humor me, Ray, you know, one example of our sailors that I really want to illuminate is the Philippine Sea a few – about a month and a half ago now, or a month ago. Philippine Sea was leaving Bahrain. She was ready to head back to join the Ike for the – Ike strike group for the – for the trip home. On her way, it was the same time frame that the Motor Vessel Verbena was hit by multiple cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles, once again, innocently transiting through the Gulf of Aden.
The Phil Sea did exactly what we expect our sailors to do. They launched their helicopter, despite the fact that they knew they were in the WEZ. They went over and they picked up a mariner who was in desperate need of help and critically injured. They took the mariner to a ASPIDES ship, the Karel Doorman, a ship from the Netherlands that had adequate medical capability onboard; flew back; continued to steam deeper into the threat zone; picked up the French vessel Forbin; and went north into the BAM; and right really in the center of all the most complicated area of threat, went and rescued 24 mariners off the Motor Vessel Tutor at dusk in harm’s way; took all those sailors back on board Phil Sea; steamed north, got them aboard the Ike; cared for those sailors overnight, gave them food, gave them medical treatment; and then flew them home. We have 24 sailors – 21 Philippine, three from Nepal. They all made it home. And within about 12 hours, that ship was sunk by the Houthis, who went on – go in with limpet mines and various weapons and sunk that ship. And they could(n’t) care less whether or not those sailors were on board.
That’s what our sailors do. Even when they’re in stress, even when they’re in a difficult environment, they don’t forget what’s important. And there’s humanity and taking care of people is what’s most important. So that’s just a small – you know, we’re tactically performing magnificently. But while we’re doing that, we haven’t lost our sense of purpose, and nor have the other ships in the region out here. And I think we should all take great pride in that.
RADM. Spicer: Yeah, absolutely. Thank you for that. I couldn’t agree more.
There is – as you noted, there’s lots of industry on this call. Are there other capabilities that would help you in theater? And what sort of demand signals are you sending back to Navy staff and industry for things that might help you do the job even better in theater?
VADM. Wikoff: Well, great question. And I think there’s a couple things to – there’s many things to learn and some things not to learn by this fight.
What gets us to here is our sailor resilience, our demanding on our systems, but we want to be careful about learning too much here that that won’t necessarily translate well to fights in other parts of the globe that may prove more complex. But there are certainly challenges in this – in this region: short times of flight, a rapid ability to respond. Those things are unique to this environment.
Well, the Navy is looking at this. We’ve looked at it for years. And you’re familiar – I mean, things like a laser and the ability to not have to reload when we’re shooting these weapons. And a laser – some of your contested logistics and your concerns with logistics can certainly be at least – maybe not solved, but certainly some of those logistical requirements as we’re launching large salvos of weapons could potentially – although we’re trying really hard at it and I know that; we’ve been trying for quite a bit to get some of that capability.
We’ve seen advances in the non-kinetic. And there’s been a lot of discussions about cost per kill, and how many missiles are you shooting, and is that – you know, well, first off, the sailors need to do what they need to do. So I certainly will never question a captain for expending ordnance prior to having a multi-mach missile coming in from a hundred thousand feet raining in on him. I certainly don’t – would never question that.
But, hopefully, there’s opportunities as we continue to learn. Are there – are there other ways to affect weapons that don’t require a kinetic response? And we’re working at that, and I know our Navy is and our DOD-wide is working hard at some of those solutions. But that’s – as we move on to an agile Navy that has to be able to move – shoot, scoot, move, and then resupply – anything we can do to kind of decrease that requirement would certainly be a good improvement to what we’re currently doing.
RADM. Spicer: Thank you, sir.
There are some who suggest that as things are currently playing out over time that the odds favor the Houthis and the reason they say this is because we’re out there having to successfully defend against 100 percent of the Houthi attacks on both commercial and Navy and coalition shipping and, meanwhile, the Houthis are there and all they need is for one of their weapons to get through and hit a Navy ship or a coalition ship and it’s a big win for them, and they go on social media and talk about how great they are.
Many are arguing that we’re not doing enough, and I know that there’s a lot in play in that regard but they suggest that, you know, we’re playing mostly a defense game and a good game of whack-a-mole at Houthi targets that are about to launch but not doing enough to go after the infrastructure and things like that.
Meanwhile, Houthis continue to be effective at disrupting the free flow of commerce through the Red Sea and, as you noted, still a lot of the commercial ships are choosing and the companies are choosing to reroute their ships, you know, around the Cape of Good Hope instead of going through the Suez and the BAM.
But I was hoping you could talk a little bit about that but specifically do you see any path that would help instill more confidence in these shipping companies to route their ships again through the Suez and the – and the BAM?
VADM. Wikoff: Yeah, that’s the question that we’re kind of all struggling with: What’s the approach? And I will tell you from the military dimension what we’re currently doing is trying to continue to preserve some decision space for our leadership.
And as you point out, the Houthis have to get lucky once. Now, they got lucky many times, according to them anyway, against the Ike and against many of the other ships. I saw lots of reports, but I never got a call from my battle log. But somehow, the next day I saw on the news that the Houthis continue to hit our ships, which is just part of their strategic narrative.
But what – but they do have that opportunity. Every time we put a ship in harm’s way, that opportunity exists that that could be the opportunity that – and more so – more important than their narrative is the fact that we could have a sailor get injured or killed, and that’s a sobering thought. So aside from all the other pieces of it, putting sailors in harm’s way, we have to – certainly have a reason.
I believe – and, granted, a lot of folks out in the audience here, they’re involved in policy and different aspects, so I don’t really want to dive deep into that discussion. But what I will say is a cautious approach is warranted. You know, Yemen, as I think you know, is a maritime crossroads. And for a millennium it’s been a tribally kind of oriented piece of geography on strategic – very strategic terrain, that we see through history a lot of difficult decisions and difficult challenges being – you know, being had by folks that are trying to control that piece of terrain. Even just in the last hundred years, I mean, Ottomans, Egyptians. The U.K. had some influence there. The Saudis have tried for several years now. A lot of countries are trying hard to come up with different solutions over the last – even just the most recent century, and solutions.
So I think it’s – we have to certainly be careful about going in without – you know, leading with the helmet – (laughs) – and going in with a – with a really specific policy that will then allow us to achieve ends that are beyond the military sphere. And I know that people are working that real hard right now. I know the international community is working that. We don’t see it every day on the news, but I know that that is part of the solution. But the solution is not going to come at the end of a weapons system. I think we all know that. It’s going to be the international community.
This is a global problem. The entire globe is impacted by this problem. And we can certainly try with some warships and some sailors and some folks trying their best to preserve maritime security, but this is going to require a global solution. And the more players on the field that can get involved in the diplomatic and that piece of this, the better off, I think, we’ll be in terms of the odds of success.
The part with the maritime industry – and I very frequently – every month I have a meeting with 85 percent of the global maritime industry. They will tell me over and over: We need stability. We will not come back until there’s stability. And the Houthis are a weapon looking for a reason to use it.
There’s reasons why they’re now claiming they’re doing it, but that didn’t help the motor vessel Swift back in 2016 when I was here as MOC director. That didn’t help the Mason back in October of 2016 when I was on the watch floor here, when she was being shot at. That didn’t – that didn’t help the Royal Saudi frigate, the [Al Madinah], who was struck by the Houthis in 2017; or the 25 vessels shot at between 2016 and before October of 2023 by Houthis in the maritime.
So this is a – we need a solution that extends beyond just kind of taking care of triaging the current situation, because what the industry will say is we can stop the current situation but we need assurance that we have stability – long-term stability reestablished because, frankly, right now they’re not under tremendous pressure to come through. I’ve heard terms like “strait of convenience” used for the Bab al-Mandab because we could go around. The global economy, the assurance is not – we haven’t seen a large spike that we were concerned with inflation.
You know, the global commerce industry has self-healed. They had capacity available when this started due to post-COVID and a lot of different reasons. But there is – it’s a very complicated industry, as you know. But the bottom line is there is capacity available to absorb this, and the maritime industry has done a wonderful job of rerouting and moving things around. So as a general rule, the global economy hasn’t felt it. So the maritime industry doesn’t feel right now that the time is right – nor do they feel the time is right, frankly, anytime real soon, until we can have a stable environment that Houthis are part of potentially or not part of. But it doesn’t matter; it has to be stable along that strategic terrain for maritime industry to want to come back.
So that’s kind of where my discussions with industry have been. And, obviously, it’s – we want to preserve and want to reestablish as soon as possible. But I think industry will have a say in that, and we just have to set the conditions over time with a policy that allows that to happen.
RADM. Spicer: Yeah. Understand. Thank you.
Admiral, not surprisingly there is a ton of questions pouring in for you. So I will – I’ll just ask one more from my list and then I’ll start going through some of the audience questions for you.
But this is just a quick one. The last three strike groups – and I guess they were also the first three strike groups – they all got extended. So Gerald R. Ford was the first, and then Bataan ARG, and then Eisenhower was the las
And as you well know, we’re sort of tuned to six-month deployments for lots of reasons, and not the least of which is crew morale and time away from family but also the fact that our ships, aircraft, and weapons systems have maintenance requirements, you know, at certain periodics.
Can you talk a little bit about the challenges associated with extending these strike groups? And is there a different level of support that’s required when we operate forward for extended periods? Are you seeing any of that?
VADM. Wikoff: It’s the age-old challenge. And it’s – we should feel extraordinarily proud that our Navy remains in high regard and high demand around the globe to respond to crisis, and that flexibility and that ability to force generate and respond to crisis at the same time can be what continues to pressurize this problem.
So this is absolutely – I mean, the Ike – the Ike extension will impact decisions two years from now, three years from now. It’s just – it’s just a continued challenge, as you know, in our already stressed ability to – for the shipyards and maintenance and all the things that are required to bring a ship back and get it back to sea, so – not to mention the cost on morale and on crews.
While I say that, though, I’ll tell you the crews that are in this mission right now get it. They get it, and they are – and I think you probably got a chance to, hopefully, see some of them go back to Norfolk or Mayport. And just watching those sailors and some of the things I’ve seen, you know, the sailors are very engaged, and understand what they’re doing, and are very proud of it.
But materially, you know, the – I don’t know. I can’t speak to whether the extensions will be permanent. Certainly, that’s not what the hope is. A redistribution of the assets right now is – we’re responding to crisis. You know, this region has transitioned from a just-in-case, really, to a just-in-time region. And we are able to flow forces; we’ve demonstrated that. So we’re not going to have carriers sitting here permanently over time like we’ve had for quite some time and we had to in – years ago. But we certainly have the ability to respond to a crisis, and we’re showing that agility right now.
So we’ll see how these decisions play out over time, but certainly that healthy appreciation for force generation comes back in. And in my very short time in wearing that hat, I understand what these implications are long term and what the – what the future risk we may be presenting employing forces now. But, at the end of the day, we’re here, we’re now in a crisis, and that’s what our Navy’s doing.
RADM. Spicer: Great. Thank you.
For the audience – I don’t think this audience actually needs this reminder, but in case you don’t know how to submit a question you can do it from the events page on CSIS.org.
So, Admiral, a question from Lieutenant Commander Cate Gillen, U.S. Coast Guard. She asks: What lessons are we learning related to unmanned systems and missile defense in the Red Sea that you think will translate to a potential conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait?
I would add to that that I think we’re learning lessons both in the Red Sea about unmanned – use of unmanned surface, air, and even in some cases underwater vehicles. But we’re also learning some lessons, I think, from the war in Ukraine, at least from the maritime aspect of the war in Ukraine, and we’ve seen Ukraine be very successful with unmanned surface vessels in disrupting the Russian combatant fleet there.
So, but back to Cate’s question: Are we learning lessons that could translate to potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait?
VADM. Wikoff: I think there’s a lot of observations there. I’m not sure we’ve fully captured all the lessons. Clearly, the calculus has changed, and the way that we can – and the signature and the things required to employ some of these unmanned systems, relatively small unmanned systems. They’re not taking off from long, large runways. They’re able to be pretty austere and launch from cover, and in areas that are not required for typical launches or typical launches of aircraft, but still have some effect at a relatively low cost.
I think that that is a – that is a threat that we’ll have to continue to explore and learn about. Relatively easily modifiable, it seems like they continue to get better, and our adversary is learning as well. Kind of juxtaposed with the – with what we’re seeing in the Black Sea, where we’re seeing capabilities that the – that the Ukrainians are developing that are more offensive-minded and more lethality of unmanned weapons systems as well. I do know that there’s – and I think most of us know there’s tremendous efforts going on in 7th Fleet right now and some in the INDOPACOM AOR on integration of unmanned assets into a higher-end fight.
So I think there’s some lessons to learn here, but I think that there’s lots of different scenarios out in the Western Pacific for a future fight that probably would not necessarily be learned here. I think this might be – that the fight we’re seeing here is a different kind of fight than we’d see potentially in the – in the 7th Fleet AOR.
RADM. Spicer: Right. Understand.
While we’re on that topic, I know you’ve had Task Force 59 out there in your AOR doing lots of work over a number of years with unmanned vessels and integrating them into the rest of the fleet. Are you satisfied with how that effort is going? And do you see it being viable for future use in the AOR?
VADM. Wikoff: Yeah. Task Force 59, we just had their change of command two weeks ago, so we just transitioned to the third, now, commander of that unit. What we’re seeing is a – is a maturity of the approach of the – and so, basically, it kind of went from a startup model to something that’s now more in a – moving to a warehouse and becoming somewhat more of a part established of our fiber here, and we’re learning along the way.
We are continuing to use Task Force 59 and inviting industry to come in using the maritime assets where I don’t have naval ships. They can – there is tremendous opportunity not only in maritime on the water, but under the water and over the water for eyes – to provide me eyes at low cost at high stare times to operate in areas that I don’t have to put a DDG, or I don’t have to put a cruiser or a LCS or any other ship. And they can provide me that longer look, that longer reach, longer dwell times, and then perhaps if I need to, then, queue a ship or something to a surface contact.
But what we’re finding is, is that we are continuing to expand that, and now the next part is operationalizing these units. So now, how do we put them in an operationally relevant environment? So we kind of come out of the kind of giving it an opportunity in a – in a certain environment, move it to an environment that’s now more operationally relevant. And a task force commander now – Task Force 59 turns it over to a task force, and now that task force actually uses it for several months, and then comes back and provides feedback on here’s how this system does or does not fill an operational requirement.
So that’s the natural evolution of Task Force 59. They go out. They’ll do a tech scan of industry. They’ll see what’s available out there – that’s at the request of a task force commander – and then bring that back, quickly validate it, and then get it out to the – to our different fleet units to use in an operationally relevant environment. So it’s a fantastic – even despite everything that’s going on out in the region right now, we still continue to remain focused on developing technology through Task Force 59, and it shows continued great promise to give us eyes longer.
Notably, our other components out here – Task Force 99 from the Air Force and Task Force 39 from the Army – all have unmanned pieces now, all of our components who have integrated in the – in the area, the AO out here, to see what we can do together.
So I’m really pleased with the tech innovation. General Kurilla is driving us towards tech integration and we’re getting there. So Task Force 59 is alive and well, and certainly a big part of our team out here.
RADM. Spicer: Thank you.
A question from Dr. Eric Rubenstein, Image Insight Incorporated and Navy Reserve. He says: Vice Admiral Wikoff, you mentioned that it is difficult to identify a Yemeni center of gravity for Houthi forces. It seems to many that the Houthi center of gravity is Iranian IRGC logistics support. Without addressing that capability, are we looking at endless Houthi aggression?
VADM. Wikoff: Well, we’re not ignoring that. There’s a line of effort right now that continues to look at all supply coming in to the Houthis, and which it is, we don’t believe, necessarily limited to the Iranians. The Iranians certainly back the Houthis, but the Houthis are diversifying. There’s discussion that they could be becoming exporters of technology, and they are – they are continuing to develop their capabilities. So what used to be I would consider maybe when I failed here 10 years ago as the MOC director to stop the Houthis from getting supply back then, they have developed far beyond that and far beyond the ways that we used to look at Houthis being supplied. We find them to be diversifying.
So there’s absolutely – we do believe there’s a(n) Iranian relationship here that’s well-known and well-documented. But our assessment right now is – and we’re certainly trying to deny that capability to make it in. We do believe that the overall supply of the Houthis is far more complex than limiting it to that.
RADM. Spicer: Understand.
The next one is from Heather Mongilio, USNI News. And it was about AI and how you are employing AI, especially in the unmanned space, in response to operations in theater.
VADM. Wikoff: I know theaterwide that General Kurilla has driven the integration of AI quite aggressively for us to develop our ability, especially in the targeting process, to integrate AI tools with some of the suites we have now in theater that are available to us CENTCOM-wide. General Kurilla has really become – he’s driving us to integrate AI into our targeting.
And we have work to do in the maritime specifically, and we’ve talked through this, on maritime patterns and predicting – not telling me what happened yesterday, but tell me what’s going to happen in the future. And we are still working on that, and those are some areas that – of interest that we’re working. And that’s an area of the Task Force 59 has also integrated. So it’s ripe for continued development, and we will continue to work along that line. General Kurilla requires us to do it, and we absolutely see the value in integrating AI as we move forward.
RADM. Spicer: Great. Thank you.
Next one is from Lieutenant Commander Jim Halsell, U.S. Navy. He says: The U.S. and its allies are expending valuable resources in protecting freedom of the seas and global commerce. China has a presence in the region. Have you seen China expending any resources in attempting to protect the global commons as well?
VADM. Wikoff: No.
RADM. Spicer: (Laughs.) Great. Thank you. (Laughs.)
There’s an information campaign that we see from the Houthis. And you touched on it a little bit with their, you know, dealings with Ike, saying that they had sunk the Eisenhower, and of course they didn’t. But they’re kind of using information warfare to cast themselves as champions of the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile, they are indiscriminately attacking ships, whereas they, you know, first announced that they were only going to go after ships that are U.S.-flagged or Israeli-flagged or going from U.S. ports or Israeli ports.
So, meanwhile, they’re indiscriminate. And I think we’ve seen reports that lots of ships are actually moving food/fuel/supplies to – from Russia. And when they do this, there are occasions when massive amounts of fuel are spilled. And what happens, essentially, is they impact their own economy – severe economic consequences on – for the Yemenis employed in the fishing industry – and it’s a major source of employment, the fishing industry – and food security for the Yemenis.
So they’re using an information campaign – an information-warfare campaign. The question is, are we also employing an information warfare campaign to counter what they’re doing, and is it helping our cause?
VADM. Wikoff: You know, fair. And they have been very aggressive, honestly, in kind of bending the conversation in a way that seems to match their ends.
As we already noted, they’ve been doing this for better part of a decade now for different reasons. So they kind of have a – their target seems to move depending on what they are aggrieved about that particular day, and we can see this now with the current narrative.
Our narrative, it’s not a difficult narrative. The bottom line is the Houthis are isolating themselves from the international community. You know, we employ the truth. We say – we tell what has happened. And the plain – the facts are straight and the facts are pretty clear. Two-thirds of the people in Yemen – in the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and Yemen writ large are right now in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Thirty million people are starving in the region.
One of the – one of the escort ships we did had to be delayed because we had to get an escort for it. It was – it was a USAID ship going to Port Sudan, another country in great economic poverty. You have one of the poorest regions in the world, and you hear nothing about governance from the Houthis. All’s you hear are these narratives of what they’re – what they’re trying to do and then terrorizing random mariners. Almost a hundred and twenty nations’ mariners have been inflicted or somehow either shot at, mariners on ships, of ownership, of flags, around the globe. So the Houthis have a narrative of why they’re doing what they’re doing, but at the end of the day they’re only hurting a lot of people who have absolutely nothing to do with what – you know, what they’re proclaiming they’re doing.
The Suez, revenue’s down 64 percent. That’s creating unrest, tremendous unrest. I was in Egypt a few months ago. I talked to the Suez Canal Authority.
Jordan, Port of Aqaba – I visited Jordan a month ago. Typically, three cruise ships line up at a pier at any time. You know, the head of the Navy brought me to the pier, showed it to me; not a single ship there. He said there hasn’t been a ship there for many, many months now. Aqaba, a beautiful port and a beautiful area of the world, hotels were empty. Petra, empty.
I mean, so the impact of this is really widespread. Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia being slowed because you rely on tourism, and if the tourism is being threatened by unrest those plans are going to start to slow down.
So I guess at the end of the day the Houthis have a narrative, but the reality in front of the globe is pretty clear. They’re seeding tremendous unrest. They don’t care for the people that they’re claiming to represent with widespread dire humanitarian assistance requirements – the worst famine in 40 years in the region, 30 million people at risk of starvation. And they just seem to continue to threaten shipping, and those very ships that will bring aid to them and bring aid to people.
So you’re absolutely right, I – the narrative that the Houthis have been allowed or are able to manipulate is unfortunate because it’s really the people of the region. While I talked earlier about the global shipping, not – the global inflation rate not being high, that doesn’t speak to the acute challenges around the Red Sea in those nations that are suffering from this. And the Houthis are continuing to – seem to be not concerned with the basics of being a country that’s interested – or, sorry, a group, not a country – a group of people interested in any kind of diplomatic or international stature. They’ve completely separated themselves, if anything, from any kind of international effort to bring them in or negotiate with them. So it’s unfortunate, but that’s the reality of what the scenario is in the region right now.
RADM. Spicer: I understand, sir. Thank you so much.
We’re out of time. I’ve been through all the questions that popped in. I want to use this remaining time to, one, thank our partner, CSIS, and especially thank HII for sponsoring this.
I think having people like you, Admiral, that can come on and talk to this audience is really beneficial for all of us, and we are so grateful for you or to you for doing this for us. And I think I speak for everyone when I say thank you for all you’re doing, all the hats you’re wearing. Thank you for your service to our nation. And just appreciate everything you’re doing out there in the FIFTH Fleet AOR.
VADM. Wikoff: Thanks, Ray. I appreciate the opportunity.
Once again, it’s a privilege of a lifetime to watch our Navy standing the watch right now out here in a very, very difficult, very challenging situation, and they’re serving with valor and honor. And I could not be – 34 years later, as a – as a(n) egocentric aviator, to watch our surface warfare officers, surface warfare community in its finest moment in 80 years performing the way they’re performing, my hat’s off to the sailors on the ships and to the – to the Navy for their support And we’ll continue to get after the mission and do as we’re – do as we’re directed.
But I appreciate the opportunity for – to join you here today, and thanks for everything.
RADM. Spicer: Thank you, sir.
(END.)