Press Briefing: Previewing ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol’s State Visit

Paige Montfort: Hello, everyone. Thank you so much for joining us this morning. As our operator introduced, my name is Paige Montfort. I’m the media relations manager here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Thanks so much for joining us bright and early today to preview the upcoming state visit of Korea’s president to the United States.

I’m joined by some really terrific expert colleagues today whom I’ll introduce in just a moment. They’re going to provide their insights and analysis, and weigh in on the expected agenda and the context around this visit as well, and U.S.-ROK relations more broadly.

So, as always, we will have time for Q&A following my colleagues’ remarks. And then we’ll, of course, have a transcript available and out to all of you within just a few hours of this call. It’ll be available on CSIS.org and emailed directly to those who have RSVPed.

And now, without further ado, I’ll introduce my colleagues in the order in which they’ll be speaking today.

So Dr. Victor Cha will start us out. Dr. Cha is our senior vice president for Asia. He also holds the Korea Chair at CSIS.

And he will be followed by Dr. Ellen Kim, who is deputy director of the CSIS Korea Chair as well as senior fellow.

And next up we will hear from Nicholas Szechenyi. He’s a senior fellow with our Japan Chair and deputy director for Asia here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

And last but not least, we are also joined by Gregory C. Allen, the director of CSIS’s new Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies and a senior fellow in our Strategic Technologies Program.

And so we have a lot of ground to cover today. I want to turn it directly over to Dr. Victor Cha to start us off.

Victor Cha: Well, thank you, Paige. And thank you all for joining in this morning. And of course, thanks to Ellen, Nick, and Greg for also being willing to participate in this morning’s press briefing.

So we’re here to talk about President Yoon’s state visit to Washington, D.C., next week. This is – I believe it’s the fourth in-person meeting of the two leaders. That comes just shy of the one-year anniversary of President Yoon’s time in office. The first meeting took place very soon, less than two weeks after President Yoon took office last year, when President Biden went to South Korea. Their second meeting, I believe, was on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Spain. Their third meeting was on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York this past – in September. And then their fourth meeting was in the – in the context of the multilateral meetings in Phnom Penh, where we had a trilateral statement amongst the U.S., Japan and South Korea. So – oh, so, actually, this makes it the fifth – sorry – the fifth meeting. My math is not good this morning. That makes this the fifth meeting.

As you all know, this is a state visit. So he will get the full – the full nine yards, beginning with the South Lawn ceremony at the beginning of the White House day, obviously lots of meetings with the president and with Cabinet officials, a state dinner that evening. CSIS is actually also hosting a private roundtable at Blair House on the 26th in the afternoon. He’ll have lunch with the vice president, hosted by the vice president and secretary of state. Joint session speech at Congress. U.S. Chamber of Commerce. So a very, very full packed schedule.

You know, they’ll discuss all the issues, which I’ll talk about in a minute, but I think sort of the bigger themes that they are trying to put forward for the conference are around three things. One of them is the focus on freedom and democracy, because both presidents pursue a values-based foreign policy. And President Yoon in particular, unlike previous presidents, really has emphasized freedom and democracy as a core theme of his foreign policy. The second is a focus on new frontiers in alliance – in the alliance, particularly in the areas of science and technology, as areas where the U.S. and South Korea can cooperate together, not just for their benefit – for the two allies’ benefits, but more generally for the benefit of the world. And I think there are elements of the visit that will feature that.

And then the third, I think, area will be also about the future. And it will focus on culture and the next generation. As many of you know, Korean pop culture is quite popular here in the United States among younger generations, as well as around the world. And so I think this cultural element, which fits very nicely with the theme of common values, is something that we’ll see – we’ll see expressed during the visit. And it will be in some of these other side pieces. So President Yoon will also go to NASA to do a site visit.

He will have a meeting with the head – a meeting arranged by the Motion Pictures Association of America with CEOs of Disney, Netflix, Sony Pictures Entertainment, again, focusing on the sort of culture side of the – of the relationship. NBC, Discovery, Warner Brothers, like, a meeting with all them. He will also go up to – after his stay in D.C., he will go up to Boston. He’ll be able to go to MIT for science and tech stuff, and then he will give a speech at Harvard University, which I imagine will focus on freedom and democracy. So quite a full schedule of events.

The two presidents have a good rapport and chemistry, is my understanding, based on the meetings they’ve had on the issues they’ve worked together. This summit comes at a time of great turmoil in the international environment, as we’re all aware. The war in Europe impacts not just those in Europe, but it impacts countries like Korea and Japan in Asia. And so I’m sure that this will be a big topic of discussion. The situation in the Taiwan Strait and China’s assertiveness in the East China, South China, and Yellow Seas will also be the context for this visit. And of course, North Korea’s missile rampage that they’ve been on for over – for the past year, going on – coming up on a year and a half, presents a context for this summit in which there will be a lot of focus on the role that the United States and its allies can play in addressing all of these problems.

In terms of what I expect to see, I expect the two will emphasize, again, as I mentioned, values-based foreign policy focused on freedom and democracy and protecting the liberal international order. This, of course – 2023, of course, is the 70th anniversary of the alliance. I think that’s one of the reasons why the president is getting a state visit, and I’m sure the two will speak highly of this being it’s about the 70th anniversary of the armistice ending hostilities in the Korean War in July and the 70th anniversary of the alliance in October.

I believe that President Biden will congratulate Yoon on his Indo-Pacific strategy, which overlaps a lot with the U.S.-Indo-Pacific strategy, unlike the case of the previous South Korean administration, so that the change in foreign policy that the White House will acknowledge by congratulating Yoon on his Indo-Pacific strategy.

I think – and Nick can, certainly, speak to this – Biden will congratulate Yoon on the major turnaround that he has engineered in relations with Japan and place a strong emphasis on trilateral alliance relations among Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo on everything from Taiwan to supply chains.

I expect that there will be some announcements of some new things on extended deterrence. The details, obviously, are not being released publicly yet. But this has been a major issue between the two allies given North Korea’s continued provocations and the United States is working every day – the DOD is working every day on trying to do new things to enhance extended deterrence.

I also expect that there will be some discussion and some announcements on economic security and supply chains. Again, this is a big change from the previous administration in South Korea where there was a little bit of ambivalence about joining the Biden administration’s efforts on securing supply chains through things like the CHIPS and Science Act and export controls as well as the Mineral Security Partnership. All of these things are things in which South Korea under President Yoon is now participating in.

On North Korea, again, Ellen can speak to this more. I expect unity on North Korea, calls for denuclearization. But I don’t expect any new initiatives in terms of diplomacy. North Korea doesn’t seem to be interested in diplomacy right now but I think we will certainly see a unity of purpose and mission from the two presidents on that.

And as I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, I expect a big piece of the summit deliverables to focus on next-generation work of the alliance. In particular, there are many South Korean students that come to the United States. I mean, South Korea is the third largest source of foreign students coming to the United States for education behind China and India, which is actually astounding if you think about the relative size of Korea compared to China and India.

But there’s not as many Americans that are going to South Korea and so I expect that there will be some initiative or something of that sort announced with regard to encouraging more Americans to go to South Korea. Of course, there’s the Fulbright program. There’s things like that. But I expect there to be some sort of initiative.

And, finally, I think the two will have – you know, there are elements of every summit where there’s what’s talked about publicly – talked about privately and then released publicly and then there’s what’s talked about privately and not released publicly and so I think on China there will be a very deep discussion on China but I don’t think any of it will be very public.

South Korea has now adopted language on defense of Taiwan in joint statements with the Biden administration that are similar to those that are in the U.S.-Japan joint statements and that’s significant because Japan takes publicly a much more committed position in terms of defense of Taiwan than South Korea has traditionally.

So I expect to see that same sort of language reproduced in any sort of statement here. Again, I think deep discussion about China but aside from that I don’t think they’ll – I don’t expect them to announce anything new publicly with regard to that.

So that’s sort of it for the overview and the alliance. Let me now turn to my colleague, Dr. Ellen Kim, to talk about North Korea.

Ellen Kim: Thank you, Dr. Cha, and thank you all for joining today.

So on the state visit, I will just add that Washington is rolling out the red carpet for South Korean president to celebrate the 70th anniversary of U.S.-ROK alliance, but also because of the strategic importance of the alliance for the United States in addressing new rising challenges and growing uncertainties in the world today. And as Dr. Cha mentioned, for President Biden, President Yoon’s desire for South Korea to play a more active global role and its value-oriented diplomacy makes South Korea a very important strategic ally and ideal partner in tackling a number of issues and to preserve and uphold the liberal international order. So President Yoon’s state visit to Washington will be a very important opportunity for both countries to elevate and move forward the alliance into a global partnership and turn their strong alignment on a range of issues into more concrete actions into the future.

On the security front, North Korea will be the key agenda issue for both leaders, and I expect continuity and strong alignment in the North Korea policy. Both leaders will discuss the importance of diplomacy, but at the same time they will discuss ways to further enhance their deterrence capabilities against North Korea’s threats and provocations. This will include measures to strengthen and upgrade U.S. extended deterrence to South Korea, and also expand their security partnership in new areas like space and cybersecurity. We may expect to see a major announcement on cybersecurity cooperation between the two countries, which will involve joint cyber exercises and also enhanced information and intelligence sharing between the two countries.

The two leaders will also highlight the importance of the deepening trilateral security cooperation with Japan and through more regularized trilateral military exercises, closer policy cooperation and information sharing on – of North Korean missile data in real time, which has been already agreed at the trilateral summit last November. Recently, the U.S.-ROK-Japan had trilateral discussions on how to implement their intel sharing on the missile data. So I think that this may come up during the summit or potentially in the leadup to the G-7 summit in Hiroshima in May.

On the regional security issues, I expect that both leaders will also show alignment and solidarity. As Dr. Cha mentioned, I don’t think that the leaders will talk publicly on China, but just reiterate their opposition to any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force and emphasize peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and also in Ukraine.

President Biden and President Yoon will likely discuss the Ukraine situation, although President Yoon hinted yesterday that South Korea could send non-humanitarian aid to Ukraine under the certain circumstances like when there is a large-scale attack on civilians, massacres, or serious violations of the laws of war. I think it is too early to tell whether there is a shift in South Korea’s policy and that South Korea will send lethal weapons to Ukraine. But again, I think this shows that Russia’s war in Ukraine situation has direct implication for the Korean Peninsula, with North Korea and South Korea directly and indirectly supporting each side. And given increased cooperation between Russia and North Korea, South Korea finds itself increasingly difficult to avoid entrapment in Ukraine.

So with that, let me turn it over to my colleague, Nick Szechenyi.

Nicholas Szechenyi: Thanks, Ellen. And thank you all for joining us this morning.

I just want to talk briefly about Japan-Korea relations, which, as Dr. Cha noted, will probably be referenced by President Biden during the summit next week. And that’s to be expected, because the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is not only to strengthen bilateral alliances in the region but to network those alliance relationships among likeminded countries.

And when you consider the increasingly complex security environment in Northeast Asia, strengthening Japan-Korea relations, and by extension trilateral cooperation with the United States, is critical.

And the administration has also been consistent in encouraging Japan to do the same. Secretary of State Blinken also congratulated Japan for this step forward in the relationship with Korea when he met with Japan’s foreign minister this past weekend on the margins of the G-7 foreign ministers’ meeting.

President Yoon took a big step forward in March by announcing a solution to a dispute over wartime labor issues. That led to a meeting between Yoon and Kishida in Japan in mid-March, which really generated a lot of momentum for a new stage in the relationship. We’ve seen a resumption of security dialogue between the two governments. Japan has announced its intention to relax export controls which had been in place since 2019 due to tensions in the relationship with South Korea. The two governments are talking about a dialogue on economic security. And we’ve also seen robust exercises in coordination with the United States. And so ostensibly, the summit next week is going to be about U.S.-ROK relations. But I think it’s very much about connecting Korea to the community of like-minded countries, which are trying to shape dynamics in the region to underwrite security and prosperity.

As Dr. Cha mentioned, President Yoon unveiled an Indo-Pacific strategy, which dovetails nicely with what Japan and the U.S. and other partners in the region have articulated as priority. And so the summit next week is also really a springboard for connecting Korea to this broader web of alliance relationships in the region, whether we’re talking about security cooperation, economic security issues, as Dr. Cha mentioned, and interacting with other stakeholders in the region, including Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific Islands. So, this is really a chapter, I think, in Japan-ROK relations which could really lead to some dynamic coordination trilaterally but also with other countries. And Kishida is hosting the G-7 Summit in the middle of May in Hiroshima. President Yoon is expected to attend. There could be a trilateral meeting with President Biden on the margins of that summit. And that’s all very appropriate, because, as Dr. Cha mentioned, the summit next week is about shared values and interests, freedom, democracy, security, economic prosperity. And it’s natural to have Korea join a conversation with the G-7 about ways in which like-minded countries can maintain the international order. So very much a bilateral summit, but with huge strategic implications in terms of connecting Korea to Japan and other like-minded partners in the Indo Pacific.

So, with that, let me turn it over to Greg Allen, who will talk about semiconductors and cooperation on export controls.

Gregory C. Allen: Thanks, Nick.

The U.S.-Korea relationship, one of the challenges that it has to deal with is the wake of the October 7th, 2022 export controls that the United States Bureau of Industry and Security issued on advanced semiconductor technology exports to China. And specifically within the realm of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, China is decades behind the global state of the art. So, this was a major blow to China’s ambitions for semiconductor manufacturing. At the time of the October announcement, the controls were unilateral. However, U.S. allies, including Japan and the Netherlands, are also key producers of this equipment. And so the long-term success of the policy depended upon the United States securing Dutch and Japanese cooperation to control the types of semiconductor equipment that U.S. companies do not produce, and also to prevent Dutch and Japanese companies from backfilling the technology that the United States is no longer willing to sell to China.

So, in January 2023, the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan all had meetings at the White House, literally back to back. And then two months later, the Dutch and Japanese governments announced their intention to proceed with new export controls that broadly align to what the United States put out in October. And so Korea, along with Taiwan, are the sort of other two major players in this situation. Taiwan’s exports of semiconductors are covered by U.S. application of the Foreign Direct Product Rule, which essentially allows the United States to enact export control regulations that affect the behavior of key Taiwanese players.

So one of the issues that the Biden administration is going to want to talk about during this South Korean state visit is South Korea and the implications of this October 7th policy. That comes up in two critical dimensions, the first of which is South Korea is not as significant a player in the global semiconductor manufacturing equipment market as the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan. But it is still a significant player. About 5 percent of the global market of semiconductor manufacturing equipment is produced by South Korean companies. And they’re present in sort of key subsegments of this, including testing tools, deposition tools, etching tools, and resist processing tools.

And the most important aspect of all of this is just that even though South Korean companies are not as large, and generally not as technologically advanced as those in the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands, they are vastly superior to the companies in China. Which, as I stated, generally are decades behind the state of the art. So now that China is cut off from access – from accessing U.S., Japanese, and Dutch technology, they are making overtures to South Korean companies and essentially, you know, trying to access South Korea’s technological capabilities. And, unsurprisingly, being willing to offer an extraordinary amount of money in order to do it.

The second aspect of the October 7th policy that is significant is that in cutting off access to these sort of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, that affects semiconductor production facilities located in China, including ones that are owned by South Korean companies. So the October 7th policy has a presumption of denial policy for exports of advanced equipment to Chinese-owned companies who are producing above a certain technological performance threshold. But for non-Chinese-owned facilities that are operating in China, those are being managed on a case-by-case basis.

And so Samsung and SK Hynix, which are two of the global leaders in the supply of memory chips, have major production facilities in China, some of which are operating above the technological performance threshold where the export controls kick in. And so shortly after the October 7th policy, these South Korean companies were granted one-year waivers, where they can continue to import the equipment, they can continue to import the spare parts that they need to maintain the equipment.

But the sort of long-term outcome for those facilities remains in doubt. In February 2023, Undersecretary of Commerce Alan Estevez stated actually at an event here at CSIS that BIS is working, you know, with those companies on a way forward and that there would likely be a cap on the level that they can grow to in China, either in size, or technological sophistication, or both. But those negotiations are ongoing, and those facilities represent tens of billions of dollars of investment. And so South Korea is looking for sort of a long-term answer on what’s going to happen to those facilities.

I should mention that the export controls that are hurting these South Korean companies with facilities operating in China, there are also Chinese export controls. So once you install semiconductor or manufacturing equipment, that does not mean that you can never move it. There is a vibrant resale market for used semiconductor manufacturing equipment. However, in the case of China, there are export controls that prevent you, once you have imported this equipment, from taking it out of China. So China doesn’t want those South Korean companies to move these very advanced production facilities, full of very advanced production equipment, out of China.

And so South Korea is caught between China, on the one hand, which is using export controls to prevent them from, you know, recouping that investment and relocating that investment, and the United States, which, potentially, is going to restrict their ability to get spare parts or to operate at certain levels of technological advancement. So this is sort of a major issue in the U.S.-China relationship and, obviously, it’s now having major reverberations in the U.S.-South Korea relationship.

And I’ll stop there. Thank you.

Ms. Montfort: Great. Well, thank you so much, Greg and Nick, Ellen, Dr. Cha, for your insights/analysis.

At this time, we will open it up to questions from those of you who have called in. So I’ll turn it back over to our operator to let you all know how to queue up if you would like to ask a question.

Operator: (Gives queuing instructions.)

And our first question comes from Patsy. Please pronounce your last name followed by your company. One moment. You’re open, Patsy.

Q: Sure. Yeah. Hi. Thanks. I’m Patsy Widakuswara with VOA.

I think somebody mentioned it – I think, perhaps, Ellen did mention this briefly – but if you can speak more on this latest reporting that South Korea might be willing to provide support for Ukraine beyond humanitarian and economic aid if it comes under large-scale civilian attack. If you can speak more about whether you see this as a shift, how likely is it to happen and whether or not it could be a reaction to the leaked Pentagon documents suggesting that they’re in a bind over U.S. request to arm Ukraine that’d be really helpful for me. Thank you.

Dr. Kim: Thank you, Patsy.

So on the spying issue, let me just say that in South Korea there are people who have some feelings of unease on this issue. But yesterday President Yoon stated that, quote, “South Korea and the United States are a resilient value-based alliance that can fully readjust even when there’s interests that are in conflict or when there’s trouble.”

So, based on that statement, I do not expect that this issue will be raised publicly when the two leaders meet. Even though, you know, there have been a number of ups and downs and difficult times in the U.S.-ROK alliances, the alliance has endured in the past 70 years. So I expect that this issue will not be highlighted, even though the two leaders could discuss privately.

On the Ukraine question, as I mentioned, that this statement by President Yoon actually came during his interview with Reuters and came out yesterday, suggesting that he might think about the – you know, South Korea giving more than what it is doing beyond just the humanitarian and financial control – and especially under the certain conditions, which is that when there is a – you know, a massacre or a large attack on civilians, or there’s, like, a violation of the law of the war.

But this came just now and we haven’t really seen the reaction within domestic South Korean politics. Obviously, the opposition party really opposes South Korea providing lethal weapons to Ukraine. So I don’t think that this is – I think this is just too early for us to examine and tell whether there is a shift. But I think that the Ukraine situation will be discussed between leader – two leaders, given the importance of this issue and the implication for Korea.

Q: And if I could just follow up, Ellen, do you think that the leaked documents could be one of the factors that, perhaps, is pushing the South Korean president to be more open to the idea at least publicly in his interview and just to gauge the reaction domestically, possibly?

Dr. Kim: Could you elaborate why the linkage – the document and the Ukraine situation?

Q: Yeah. I mean, I guess I’m just struggling – I’m trying to understand whether this leaked documents that is showing that South Korea is in a bind because the U.S. is expecting more from them in terms of assistance from Ukraine and then, you know, obviously a week later we have this interview with Reuters where the president is signaling that he is open. So I wonder if the two might be related, in your view.

Dr. Kim: I think it’s not really related. I think that South Korea takes the leaked document as a separate – I mean, the leaked document shows that South Korea has its concern, its dilemma, about what to do, given, you know, the request, not just from the United States and NATO, about South Korea providing more direct support to Ukraine. But I don’t think that this actually has to do with President Yoon saying that there could be more or that reflects that President Yoon also shares a dilemma about this.

Q: Thank you.

Dr. Cha: This is Victor, Patsy. Let me just say that I think the intelligence leak is linked to this in the sense that it’s causing people to draw President Yoon out more on this issue. And as the Reuters interview said, when you draw out President Yoon more on this issue, he clearly has a view on it, right, which is he’s open to the idea of going beyond non-humanitarian assistance under certain conditions.

That’s not something that any foreign minister or any other bureaucrat in the South Korean government system can say. But what these leaks have done is caused the press to push him more on this. And we’re hearing more and more about how he feels about the issue.

Now, of course, there is domestic law currently, legislation in Korea currently, that makes it impossible for them to send weapons directly to Ukraine, you know, as a country that’s in a conflict. That’s what their law says. But, of course, there are many other ways that Korea could do this through, you know, backfilling NATO countries that are providing weapons to Ukraine.

Korea has one of the largest, if not the largest, stockpile of munitions of any country in the world. And they also have tremendous production capacity in terms of munitions. And if there’s one thing that Ukraine needs in this war and that NATO allies who are supporting Ukraine need in this war, it’s munitions.

So I would say to watch this space. Like Ellen said, I don’t think they’ll announce anything at the summit, in part because it’s so proximate to this leak. So I think it makes it very awkward to announce anything during the summit. But I would watch this space because Yoon, he often emphasizes that his primary compass for foreign policy is the support of freedom and democracy and the liberal international order. And so you – (inaudible) – a sort of exhibit number (one ?) for the liberal international order, freedom, and democracy.

Operator: And next we have Aamer Madhani with AP. You’re open.

Q: Thank you.

Do you expect Yoon will press Biden on the Inflation Reduction Act and making some sort of exceptions for Korean automakers’ manufactured EVs, or is that whole area closed? And I just sort of ask in the – you know, the administration offered or Biden said he was open to tweaks when Macron visited in December, and they did follow up with opening critical-mineral talks following the von der Leyen visit or during the von der Leyen visit.

Is there some room to accommodate the Koreans here? Thank you.

Dr. Cha: This is Victor. I mean, I think that certainly this was a big issue last year. It was the only thing that every South Korean government official, from the working level to the president of the country, would talk about, their first talking point when they met with any American.

I think the two sides have since tried to – in bilateral talks, tried to find ways to address Korean concerns, in particular with regard to one company and the one-tax subsidy issue. Overall, I think there’s – the Korean public became more aware of the element for the Inflation Reduction Act; there is a realization of how this is actually quite beneficial to Korea and Korean industries, particularly in the EV battery market, very beneficial to Korea as a supplier in the United States, as well as a global supplier, compared even with competition with China in this market globally.

And in addition to that, you know, I think there have been adjustments at the state level in terms of the effort to speed up the production of the Hyundai plant that will go online producing electric vehicles. And then there was also concessions given in terms of allowing for the – for leasing arrangements. Tax subsidies applied with regarding to leasing arrangements.

So the bottom line is that I don’t think this is as front-burner issue as it was over the – at the time that – at this time last year, in no small part because the two governments have been working quietly bilaterally to try to address Korean concerns about this one issue with regard to this one company.

Operator: And next we have Min-Seok Lee with Chosun Ilbo. You’re open.

Q: Hi. This is Min Lee of Chosun Ilbo. Thank you for doing this today.

Victor, you said that you don’t expect that U.S. and ROK will announce anything about China issues. Do you feel that at the Biden administration officials of the U.S. government want South Korea to be more aligned in countering China, and would push President Yoon privately this time? And would the U.S. require ROK more participation in the Ukraine situation, not just in weapon side, but also in condemning Russia with the rest of the world? Thank you.

Dr. Cha: So the way I would answer the question is I would say I think the context of both of these issues has changed overall. What I mean by that is that, you know, traditionally Koreans have been very shy to talk about Taiwan and very shy to get involved in any sort of contentions between the United States and China. Sort of classic entrapment fears, not wanting to get caught in between their main security patron and their main economic patron. But the situation is changing. Or, the situation has changed.

The war in Europe has created insecurities for everybody, not just in Europe but also in Asia, including Korea. In addition to that, you know, China has clearly been much more assertive in – as I said – in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Yellow Sea. It has incurred into South Korean airspace over Dokdo. I mean, it has – it has done all sorts of things. And so I think the environment has changed in such a way that Korea’s much more open to talking about Taiwan with the United States and in conjunction with Japan.

And the reason is the scenario that everybody’s worried about is some sort of contingency in the Taiwan Straits, and then North Korea seeing that as an opportunity for opportunistic behavior on the Korean Peninsula, when U.S. capacities are stretched. So this is a scenario that probably was a very far and distant contingency that Koreans preferred not to think about because it was uncomfortable. But the war in Europe and China’s assertiveness has made it – has made it such that they’re much more focused on it now.

So I don’t think it’s a question of the U.S. pushing Koreans harder. I think there’s an interest on the Korean side to understand more about these contingencies, what the U.S. plan is, and how to think about it trilaterally among the three allies. How do you apportion resources, preplan in the event that there’s a contingency where you – in Taiwan, where you also want to deter North Korea from doing anything – doing anything stupid.

And, again, with regard to Ukraine too, I mean, I would imagine that one of the questions – not in which Biden will push Yoon – but one of the questions that Yoon will most certainly ask Biden is, you know, what is the status of Ukraine? What is the future of this? You’ve seen this war going into – you know, through the rest of 2024. There’ll be a lot of interest from the Korean side, again, because it has major implications for Korean security.

So I guess my bottom line is I think it’s a different conversation today on both Taiwan and Ukraine than we would normally expect, where Koreans would prefer to sort of stay away from those sorts of things. I think there’s active interest in knowing what the situation is, what the implications are for Korea, and then how Korea should prepare with regard to both contingencies.

Operator: And –

Mr. Szechenyi: This is Nick.

Operator: Oh, I’m sorry.

Mr. Szechenyi: Sorry, could I jump in briefly? This is Nick. I just wanted to add –

Ms. Montfort: Hey, Nick, yes, absolutely. Go ahead.

Mr. Szechenyi:

 I just wanted to add – sorry, we’re all talking over each other. I just want to add briefly to what Victor said. I don’t think it’s so much about what South Korea or Japan says about China. It’s about what they do to strengthen deterrence and prevent China from thinking that it could drive a wedge between the United States and its two treaty allies. I think there’s wide recognition in the U.S. that, as countries on the frontlines of the China challenge, Korea and Japan are going to use more nuanced language, and their strategy is going to be more subtle. Still balancing deterrence and interaction with China, given shared interest in maintaining economic ties.

But you can do both, and you can do it in a nuanced way. So I think it’s much more important to encourage South Korea and Japan to start thinking about and discussing the issues that Victor raised with respect to regional security. I don’t think there’s an expectation that the South Korean should be more vocal or change the way it talks about China. It’s really about what we do together, and that speaks to the importance of alliance networking in that context.

Ms. Montfort: Great. Thank you so much, Nick.

Operator: (Gives queuing instructions.)

Our next question comes from Dong Hyun Kim with Yonhap News. You’re open.

Q: Hi. Yes. This is Dong Hyun Kim from Yonhap.

I have a question on Ukraine and then one on export control. If South Korea provides lethal support to Ukraine, what impact will it have on inter-Korean relations? With each Korea indirectly participating in the conflict, do you think it will make it more unlikely that North will talk with South? And then on the export control, Greg mentioned Undersecretary Estevez’s comments on the cap and level. Going forward, will the U.S. government be open to providing some leeway for Korean companies operating in China? Or will the Korean companies just have to accept the fact that this is an environment that will not change, and have to somewhat reduce their presence in China? Thank you.

Dr. Cha: Thanks for the question. Why don’t I let Greg go first? Greg, do you want to go first?

Mr. Allen: Yes. So, you know, the statement that Undersecretary Estevez made at CSIS I think indicated two things. You know, one is that this is an area of ongoing discussion. And so if – and I do expect it to be an area of discussion, you know, at this state visit. So I’m not sure that there has been, you know, a final resolution. But the solutions that have been talked about, the potential answers that have been talked about, you know, do not discuss something like, you know, forcing South Korea to shut down these facilities.

I think the – you know, you used the language, scaling back. I think the more likely scenario is a reduction of future growth. And that would be growth both in terms of technological sophistication – so these facilities, you know, might continue to produce sort of at the current state of the art, but might not, you know, be upgraded technologically over time. And then the second, you know, is the production, output, and geographic footprint of these facilities being unlikely to increase over time.

I do want to, you know, point out that in the Chinese semiconductor sector, among the most technologically sophisticated Chinese-owned companies was YMTC, which was hurt extremely badly by these October 7th export controls. They were a major competitive threat to both Samsung and SK Hynix. And just in commercial terms, the – you know, the damage done to YMTC was probably worth more to these South Korean semiconductor companies than the challenges associated with their own, you know, Chinese production facilities. I’ll stop there. Thanks.

Dr. Cha: This is Victor. I’ll just add to that by saying that if that scenario proves to be the case, sort of reductions – not so much a closing, but reduction of future growth and footprint and technological sophistication. I mean, that, in effect, over time will I think eventually cause these plants in China eventually to move out because the Chinese will make the environment as difficult – after they are able to gain as much as they can from those companies, they will make it as difficult as possible for the Korean companies if they Korean companies are not cooperative, so.

Sorry, on Ukraine – your question was what on Ukraine?

Operator: I’m sorry, Dong Hyun Kim. Please re-queue by pressing one-zero. Dong Hyun Kim, you’re open.

Dr. Cha: Or, like, we remember, yeah.

Q: Again, my question –

1. My question was: If South Korea provides lethal support to Ukraine –

Dr. Cha: Oh, right. Right, yes, yes, yes, yes.

Q: Impact on inter-Korean –

Dr. Cha: Right, and impacts on inter-Korean relations.

So I – my answer to that question is I don’t think it will have much impact on inter-Korean relations because I have very low expectations of anything happening in inter-Korean relations. As you know well, you know, North Korea has already made their decision about providing lethal equipment to Russia in the weapons that they are providing to Russia that the – that the White House released imagery of from November of last year. So they’ve already made their decision. They were one of only four countries that recognized Russia’s gains in the – in eastern Ukraine and that referred to Russia’s aggression as legitimate. So they are clearly using this as an opportunity to draw closer to Russia.

For South Korea, again, if we think about the costs and the benefits of providing lethal assistance, I don’t think it will have an impact on inter-Korean relations because I don’t think there is any interest by the North Koreans in engaging with South Korea at the moment. Second, Russia is already – already sees South Korea as a combatant in the war because of South Korean participation in sanctions, the global sanctions regime on Russia. And they – and through South Korean sales of munitions to the U.S. Army and their sales to Poland, the Russians already accuse South Korea of backfilling supporters of Ukraine in this war. So Korea’s already bearing the brunt of Russian anger and animosity when it comes to their support for the – for the war in Ukraine.

Ms. Montfort: Thank you, Dr. Cha.

I think we have time for one more question.

Operator: And that comes from Duk Byun with Yonhap News. You’re open.

Q: Oh, hello. Can you hear? Hello?

Ms. Montfort: Yes. Yes, we can.

Q: Hi. Well, thanks for taking my question. And this is Duk Byun from Yonhap News Agency.

I have a question for Victor. I think you spoke a little bit about extended deterrence, but I was hoping you could talk a little bit more about some of other deliverables that you think we can expect from the summit. Thanks.

Dr. Cha: Do you – do you mean on extended deterrence or deliverables in general?

Q: Oh, just any others.

Dr. Cha: So I mean, I – again, you know, as you would with any summit, in preparing any summit the administration is pretty tight-lipped about what they’re going to unveil. But I do think that – and so I can’t speak to the specifics, but I do think where we will see sort of plus-ups, if you will – like, movement forward – will be in terms of the types of exercising around the peninsula with regard to extended deterrence and more ways of demonstrating the presence, the reliability, and the strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, since that, you know, is a topic of a lot of discussion in South Korea. So I expect that we’ll see something on that.

And then on economic security, the other area where the Yoon government has expressed a strong interest in being much more participatory with the U.S. and with IPEF and with the Quad, on these sorts of things, I would expect to see more discussions of those issues. As Greg said, you know, there are some very specific issues on export controls that I think will be a topic of discussion.

You know, as you know, Kim Tae-hyo, the deputy national security adviser, was here last week, I think, to talk about these issues, as well as cyber and other issues. And, you know, the South Koreans have also put forward this idea of a 2+2+2, meaning a trilateral economic security dialogue among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. So I don’t know if that’s something that will come up or be discussed at the meeting.

And then, as Ellen said, I think there’s a lot of focus now on cyber and space, two areas that the Yoon government has expressed a lot of interest in working on. And so I expect to see plus-ups in terms of what the United States and South Korea can do in terms of cybersecurity information sharing, cybersecurity defensive deterrence, and cybersecurity exercising; and then the – in the area of space, exploration in space cooperation. I think this is another area that will be highlighted by Yoon’s visit to NASA.

Ms. Montfort: Great. Well, thank you so much to everyone for calling in today. This is Paige again. We are coming up on 10:00, so – and we don’t have any other questions in the queue, so I think we will wrap up here.

For those of you who dialed in today, thank you so much for taking the time. We will have the transcript out within just a few hours again. And if you have any follow-up questions, were not able to get your question asked and answered today, please feel free to reach out to me. My email is pmontfort@CSIS.org. And we are more than happy to set you up with our experts.

So thanks again. And have a good day, everyone.

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