Advances in digital technology and the proliferation of social media have turned U.S. elections into a world affair akin to the World Cup or the Olympics. News of U.S. electoral developments, from the primaries to the conventions and nominations, captivates millions of people worldwide, who often pick sides, rooting for one candidate over the other. This is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo), where U.S. politics has weighed heavily since the creation of the Congo Free State by Leopold II of Belgium in 1885.
However, relations between the United States and Congo may be best described as incongruous. U.S. interests in Congo have been driven mainly by either the need for homeland security or access to resources. These interests tend to be urgent in the short term but are not part of a coherent long-term policy around which the Congolese government and people can rally and prioritize their own long-term national objectives. For the first 100 days of a new Harris or Trump administration, Congo will look for signs of a new approach to U.S. engagement.
Because Congo plays a vital role in several areas of great import to world powers, ranging from minerals to energy to climate change, the Congolese people often shoulder the weight of demand-side pressures without commensurate returns. As a result, these policies have not led to a win-win partnership between the United States and Congo.
China, by contrast, has engaged Congo over a long horizon, starting in the 1960s, with clear long-term objectives for both countries. China’s approach allows Congo to either design its own policy that taps into what China offers or chart its own course. U.S. engagement, on the other hand, does not reflect long-term commitment and often confounds Congo as to what the end goals are.
From Congo’s perspective, U.S. engagement lacks staying power. U.S. administrations come out strong on a set of issues and mobilize Congo and its resources, only to walk away once U.S. domestic politics change. The default U.S. stance, on topics from democracy and governance to economic development, is to start strong but rarely to push to the end. Nevertheless, the United States expects Congo to subscribe to the U.S. worldview, even as such an approach provides Congo with little benefit.
Cold War Lessons for Today’s Great Power Competition
History offers important perspectives and lessons for U.S. engagement in Congo under the next administration. During the Cold War, the United States articulated a clear strategy for Congo, betting that a strong, united Congo would be more useful as a bulwark against communism in Africa than a weak, divided Congo that could not resist the advances of U.S. adversaries. The United States upheld this posture for nearly 40 years, starting in 1960.
U.S. politicians supported or tolerated President Mobutu Sese Seko as he ruled Congo (Zaire) because of clearly defined U.S. security interests and objectives. Congo knew how to tap into U.S. policy to implement its national agenda. Mobutu maintained strong but at times rocky relations with the United States through six presidents—a classic case of friction between U.S. security imperatives and the quest for regional stability, economic development, and democratization.
However, U.S. support ended with the 1992 U.S. elections, which ushered in a new crop of leaders under President Bill Clinton who rejected Cold War politics. The Clinton administration signaled to strongmen that they could not count on the United States. The administration reduced or suspended security assistance to these regimes and insisted that these strongmen transition their countries to democracy.
In 1996, Congo began grappling with armed conflict as a coalition of African armies invaded the country to support a rebellion against an ailing Mobutu. The following year, at the height of the war, Bill Richardson, the U.S. envoy to the United Nations, delivered a letter from Clinton ordering Mobutu to step down or have his corpse dragged through the streets of Kinshasa. Mobutu fled the country and died in exile in Morocco in 1997.
Starting with the 1991 Sovereign National Conference, the Congolese laid the foundation for a new constitution and consultations for a democratic post-Mobutu transition. The 1996 war derailed that process. Not only did the United States not fully support the democratic process unfolding in the country to the end, but the Clinton administration also walked away from Congo when the Congolese needed the United States the most. China has capitalized on this void.
Incoherent Post–Cold War Policy
As Congo descended into conflict and divisions, some U.S. and Western governments and think tanks saw—and continue to see—the crisis as an opportunity to break up Congo into more manageable countries. That school of thought encourages and tolerates neighboring countries’ encroachment on Congo’s territory, sovereignty, and resources.
In the short term, a weak Congo may benefit some of its neighbors, mining corporations, and other nonstate actors. In the long term, however, it is easy prey for U.S. adversaries. China, for example, has exploited Congo’s weak governance framework and limited investment options to tighten its grip on the country’s mineral resources. The same applies to multinationals such as Glencore and Israeli tycoon Dan Gertler, who expanded their holdings in Congo when the country grappled with dire financial constraints.
The factors that made Congo important to the United States during the Cold War matter even more today as renewed great power competition plays out. The rise of new middle powers, such as Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf Arab states, adds another dimension to the scramble for Congo’s resources. While the plurality of potential partners provides Congo options and choices, its public institutions are too weak to protect the country’s interests.
For instance, Congo’s dysfunctional and highly politicized judiciary cannot ensure the rule of law and guarantee the sanctity of contract, two elements that would improve the country’s investment risk profile. The defense and security forces have fallen short of the citizens’ expectations for peace and security and would benefit from better training and sustained support from the United States.
Congolese civil society organizations (CSOs), however, play a crucial oversight role, monitoring areas of public governance, with mixed but impressive results. For example, in 2013, the board of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative suspended Congo temporarily for failure to fully report revenue from mining and oil operations. This happened because of the commitment and due diligence of CSOs. These organizations require more funding and training to discharge their oversight duties.
The next U.S. administration needs to articulate a clear strategy for Congo. A strong, united Congo would be more useful to the United States as it seeks to offset its losses in the Sahel. The United States must rethink its current policy and invest in rebuilding and strengthening Congolese institutions.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
